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<ags:resources xmlns:ags="http://purl.org/agmes/1.1/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:agls="http://www.naa.gov.au/recordkeeping/gov_online/agls/1.2" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/">
<ags:resource>
					<dc:title><![CDATA[The Qur’an, Historical Descent, and Transhistorical Presence]]></dc:title>
					<dc:creator>
					<ags:creatorPersonal><![CDATA[Sa`īdīroshan, Muhammad Baqr]]></ags:creatorPersonal>

			</dc:creator>
			<dc:publisher>
				<ags:publisherName><![CDATA[University of Qom]]></ags:publisherName>
			</dc:publisher>
			<dc:date><dcterms:dateIssued><![CDATA[2006]]></dcterms:dateIssued></dc:date>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[Qur’an]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[Immortality]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[historicity]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[modernism]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[epistemological foundations]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[variants of life]]></dc:subject>
			<dc:description>
				<ags:descriptionNotes><![CDATA[Includes references]]></ags:descriptionNotes>
				<dcterms:abstract><![CDATA[On one hand there is a theory known as the ‘theory of historicity’, whose advocates tend to use it to every phenomena and realities. On the other hand, the Qur’an is the final Divine revelation for human society. Now the question is that, since the Qur’an came down in a certain period of time and its verses refer to certain objective realities and situations, is it necessary for us to classify the Qur’an on the basis of the theory of historicity and to consider its divine enduring identity subject to the passing of time? Or rather are we not to say the theory is not unconditional and all-embracing, but embraces only certain objects? This essay deals first with the exposition of different assumptions and opinions concerning the possibility of reconciliation between the everlastingness of the Qur’an and the realities existed in the period of the descent as well as the variant factors of human life; second, it presents the epistemological foundations of the notion of historicity; and finally it examines the possibility of the application of this theory to the Holy Qur’an.
 ]]></dcterms:abstract>
			</dc:description>
            <dc:identifier scheme="dcterms:URI"><![CDATA[http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_289_064cc74fb1534cfc8f98881b3bfc7b01.pdf]]></dc:identifier>
			<dc:identifier scheme="ags:DOI"><![CDATA[10.22091/pfk.2006.289]]></dc:identifier>
			<dc:type><![CDATA[Journal Article]]></dc:type>
			<dc:format><dcterms:medium><![CDATA[text]]></dcterms:medium></dc:format>
			<dc:language><![CDATA[فارسی]]></dc:language>
			<dc:source><![CDATA[http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/]]></dc:source>
			<dc:source><![CDATA[Journal of Philosophical Theological Research]]></dc:source>
		</ags:resource>
<ags:resource>
					<dc:title><![CDATA[Bewilderment (hayra) in Sufism]]></dc:title>
					<dc:creator>
					<ags:creatorPersonal><![CDATA[Sādeqī, Majīd]]></ags:creatorPersonal>
<ags:creatorPersonal><![CDATA[Oroji, Razeeh]]></ags:creatorPersonal>

			</dc:creator>
			<dc:publisher>
				<ags:publisherName><![CDATA[University of Qom]]></ags:publisherName>
			</dc:publisher>
			<dc:date><dcterms:dateIssued><![CDATA[2006]]></dcterms:dateIssued></dc:date>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[stations of the Sufis]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[bewilderment]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[rational faculty]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[intuition]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[the unseen world]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[gnosis]]></dc:subject>
			<dc:description>
				<ags:descriptionNotes><![CDATA[Includes references]]></ags:descriptionNotes>
				<dcterms:abstract><![CDATA[The present essay deals with bewilderment (hayra), which is in Sufism one of the important objects of desire and one of the high stations of the Sufis. It may, at the beginning, seem synonymous with wandering off the straight path but in Sufism it is a gnosis which enters in a Sufi’s heart without reflection, and which shows the Sufi’s mystical knowledge being limitless. Since God’s nature is an infinite reality, our reasons fail to comprehend it as well as fail to understand realities of the invisible domain. God is the greatest mystery that neither rational faculty (‘aql) nor intuition can grasp its nature and always remain complicated and bewildering. Although the philosophers and Sufis have made a great effort to understand the truth and are in agreement with each other in many cases, they do not sympathize in the case of bewilderment, whereas the philosophers always tend to avoid bewilderment, the Sufis tend to seek it; so bewilderment is blameworthy for the philosophers but praiseworthy for the Sufis.
 ]]></dcterms:abstract>
			</dc:description>
            <dc:identifier scheme="dcterms:URI"><![CDATA[http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_284_889ed91e4e9e224546d0d4cf8df1624f.pdf]]></dc:identifier>
			<dc:identifier scheme="ags:DOI"><![CDATA[10.22091/pfk.2006.284]]></dc:identifier>
			<dc:type><![CDATA[Journal Article]]></dc:type>
			<dc:format><dcterms:medium><![CDATA[text]]></dcterms:medium></dc:format>
			<dc:language><![CDATA[فارسی]]></dc:language>
			<dc:source><![CDATA[http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/]]></dc:source>
			<dc:source><![CDATA[Journal of Philosophical Theological Research]]></dc:source>
		</ags:resource>
<ags:resource>
					<dc:title><![CDATA[Vision of God According to  Fakhr-ad-din ar-Razi and ‘AllāmahTabātabā’ī]]></dc:title>
					<dc:creator>
					<ags:creatorPersonal><![CDATA[Mu&rsquo;addab, Sayyid Reza]]></ags:creatorPersonal>

			</dc:creator>
			<dc:publisher>
				<ags:publisherName><![CDATA[University of Qom]]></ags:publisherName>
			</dc:publisher>
			<dc:date><dcterms:dateIssued><![CDATA[2006]]></dcterms:dateIssued></dc:date>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[vision]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[sights]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[‘Allamah Tabataba’i]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[Fakhr ar-Razi]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[necessity being]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[corporeality]]></dc:subject>
			<dc:description>
				<ags:descriptionNotes><![CDATA[Includes references]]></ags:descriptionNotes>
				<dcterms:abstract><![CDATA[Among theological discussions is vision of God, especially in the next life, upon which Imamites, Asharites, and Mu`tazila have a difference of opinion. Whereas Asharites maintain that vision of God is possible Imamites reject the possibility of seeing God in the hereafter. They both offer arguments to prove their own view; one argument presented by both of them is the Qur’anic verse 6:103 (“the eyes attain Him not, but He attains the eyes”). The author in this article is going to deal with the explanation and examination of two Islamic thinkers’ viewpoints, ‘Allamah Tabataba’i and Fakhr ar-Razi, as well as to criticize the latter’s opinions.  ]]></dcterms:abstract>
			</dc:description>
            <dc:identifier scheme="dcterms:URI"><![CDATA[http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_288_f0ca8894f6bf1e604b774466485269c6.pdf]]></dc:identifier>
			<dc:identifier scheme="ags:DOI"><![CDATA[10.22091/pfk.2006.288]]></dc:identifier>
			<dc:type><![CDATA[Journal Article]]></dc:type>
			<dc:format><dcterms:medium><![CDATA[text]]></dcterms:medium></dc:format>
			<dc:language><![CDATA[فارسی]]></dc:language>
			<dc:source><![CDATA[http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/]]></dc:source>
			<dc:source><![CDATA[Journal of Philosophical Theological Research]]></dc:source>
		</ags:resource>
<ags:resource>
					<dc:title><![CDATA[Immortality of the Soul: A Reflection upon Plato’s Dialogue in Phaedo]]></dc:title>
					<dc:creator>
					<ags:creatorPersonal><![CDATA[Rahmatī, Inshā&rsquo;allah]]></ags:creatorPersonal>

			</dc:creator>
			<dc:publisher>
				<ags:publisherName><![CDATA[University of Qom]]></ags:publisherName>
			</dc:publisher>
			<dc:date><dcterms:dateIssued><![CDATA[2006]]></dcterms:dateIssued></dc:date>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[death-thinking]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[soul]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[body]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[Immortality]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[dualism]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[materialism]]></dc:subject>
			<dc:description>
				<ags:descriptionNotes><![CDATA[Includes references]]></ags:descriptionNotes>
				<dcterms:abstract><![CDATA[The present article – which is a deliberation upon Phaedo, a Plato’s notable writing in dialogue form – first, remarks that according to Plato, death-thinking is among the major concerns of a philosopher and the cause of joy and cheerfulness on the point of death, is the belief in the life after death, which is much more pleasant than worldly life in view of good men. Can one say that the life after death is a mere imagination hold by some philosophers like Socrates? It is here that one is seriously confronted with the question of the immortality of the soul. The paper, next, discusses two Platonic notions of the soul as simple soul and tripartite soul, and while finding an explanation for gathering these notions, it shows that what is discussed in Phaedo is the same simple soul. In the continuation of the paper, Plato’s four demonstrations on the immortality of the soul are examined critically. And finally it reconsiders and discusses Plato’s two objections to the immortality of the soul as well as his own answers to them.
 ]]></dcterms:abstract>
			</dc:description>
            <dc:identifier scheme="dcterms:URI"><![CDATA[http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_290_647567a49777198f513dd8e98c31c724.pdf]]></dc:identifier>
			<dc:identifier scheme="ags:DOI"><![CDATA[10.22091/pfk.2006.290]]></dc:identifier>
			<dc:type><![CDATA[Journal Article]]></dc:type>
			<dc:format><dcterms:medium><![CDATA[text]]></dcterms:medium></dc:format>
			<dc:language><![CDATA[فارسی]]></dc:language>
			<dc:source><![CDATA[http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/]]></dc:source>
			<dc:source><![CDATA[Journal of Philosophical Theological Research]]></dc:source>
		</ags:resource>
<ags:resource>
					<dc:title><![CDATA[Demonstration against dualism from Mutual Hindering: 
An Analytical Examination of its Theo–Philosophical Versions]]></dc:title>
					<dc:creator>
					<ags:creatorPersonal><![CDATA[Dīrbāz, `Askar]]></ags:creatorPersonal>

			</dc:creator>
			<dc:publisher>
				<ags:publisherName><![CDATA[University of Qom]]></ags:publisherName>
			</dc:publisher>
			<dc:date><dcterms:dateIssued><![CDATA[2006]]></dcterms:dateIssued></dc:date>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[Unity]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[lordship]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[coexistence of independent causes]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[unreasonable preference]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[unity of the universe]]></dc:subject>
			<dc:description>
				<ags:descriptionNotes><![CDATA[Includes references]]></ags:descriptionNotes>
				<dcterms:abstract><![CDATA[Obviously for a religious person it is of basic importance to be proved God’s unity. From a long time ago, Islamic thinkers have made a great effort to offer different arguments for it. One of these arguments is based on the ‘Mutual Hindering’, which is inspired from the holy Qur’an. Presenting two theological versions as well as two philosophical versions of the argument, this paper deals with the analysis of their principles and the evaluation of their strengths and weaknesses, and at the end it represents the summing-up of the matters and the complete formulation of this demonstration, which in the author’s view, is still a convincing proof.
 ]]></dcterms:abstract>
			</dc:description>
            <dc:identifier scheme="dcterms:URI"><![CDATA[http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_291_beac6db8389bbcfab04c7eb71888aa1c.pdf]]></dc:identifier>
			<dc:identifier scheme="ags:DOI"><![CDATA[10.22091/pfk.2006.291]]></dc:identifier>
			<dc:type><![CDATA[Journal Article]]></dc:type>
			<dc:format><dcterms:medium><![CDATA[text]]></dcterms:medium></dc:format>
			<dc:language><![CDATA[فارسی]]></dc:language>
			<dc:source><![CDATA[http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/]]></dc:source>
			<dc:source><![CDATA[Journal of Philosophical Theological Research]]></dc:source>
		</ags:resource>
<ags:resource>
					<dc:title><![CDATA[The Prophetic Elements and Writings in the Old Testament]]></dc:title>
					<dc:creator>
					<ags:creatorPersonal><![CDATA[Kalbāsī, Husayn]]></ags:creatorPersonal>

			</dc:creator>
			<dc:publisher>
				<ags:publisherName><![CDATA[University of Qom]]></ags:publisherName>
			</dc:publisher>
			<dc:date><dcterms:dateIssued><![CDATA[2006]]></dcterms:dateIssued></dc:date>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[Apocrypha]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[Daniel]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[Isaiah]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[prophet]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[Messianism]]></dc:subject>
			<dc:description>
				<ags:descriptionNotes><![CDATA[Includes references]]></ags:descriptionNotes>
				<dcterms:abstract><![CDATA[The scientific study of the background and origin of emerging a collection of biblical writings called “prophetic writings” or “apocalyptic writings” and their role in creating historical, ethnical and national identity of the Jewish and Christian traditions, aside from its special scientific importance, contributes to understanding the spirit and essence of western religious and mythological beliefs. These scriptures reflect a set of objective socio-political elements of the age in which the scriptures have been written, and a set of religious, theological and mythological beliefs, which are composed in a special way and considered as a document regarding the spiritual precedent of the two religious traditions. This paper, which devotes to the examination of two major writings of the prophetic scriptures of the Old Testament, is going to describe their principles and structure as well as the characteristics of the messianic and apocalyptic ideas in the Bible.
 ]]></dcterms:abstract>
			</dc:description>
            <dc:identifier scheme="dcterms:URI"><![CDATA[http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_292_f64790c2d4bbf5c50ecc9323aed2a3b1.pdf]]></dc:identifier>
			<dc:identifier scheme="ags:DOI"><![CDATA[10.22091/pfk.2006.292]]></dc:identifier>
			<dc:type><![CDATA[Journal Article]]></dc:type>
			<dc:format><dcterms:medium><![CDATA[text]]></dcterms:medium></dc:format>
			<dc:language><![CDATA[فارسی]]></dc:language>
			<dc:source><![CDATA[http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/]]></dc:source>
			<dc:source><![CDATA[Journal of Philosophical Theological Research]]></dc:source>
		</ags:resource>
<ags:resource>
					<dc:title><![CDATA[Aristotle’s First Mover]]></dc:title>
					<dc:creator>
					<ags:creatorPersonal><![CDATA[Kurd Fīruzjā&rsquo;ī, Yār ali]]></ags:creatorPersonal>

			</dc:creator>
			<dc:publisher>
				<ags:publisherName><![CDATA[University of Qom]]></ags:publisherName>
			</dc:publisher>
			<dc:date><dcterms:dateIssued><![CDATA[2006]]></dcterms:dateIssued></dc:date>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[Aristotle]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[motion]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[First Mover]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[unmoved mover]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[efficient cause]]></dc:subject>
				<dc:subject><![CDATA[final cause]]></dc:subject>
			<dc:description>
				<ags:descriptionNotes><![CDATA[Includes references]]></ags:descriptionNotes>
				<dcterms:abstract><![CDATA[Aristotle, who has composed several treatises on physics, metaphysics, and so on, has accepted the reality of motion and change, and reasoned that, since everything that moves is moved by something else, there must have been a First Mover. But how can such a being move the whole universe? Aristotle employs the analogy of a lover and his beloved. According to the traditional philosophical account, the First Mover moves the world by being the final cause not the efficient cause. There has been some evidence for such an account, which is accepted by most of philosophers in the West and the East. The author in this essay attempts to prove that such a construction is imperfect, and Aristotle’s first mover is not only a final cause but also an agent cause. Because, first, Aristotle’s argument on the existence of the prime mover entails an agent for motion. Second, Aristotle himself specified the first mover being an agent. Third, the evidence of traditional comment for Aristotle words has been misinterpreted and it doesn’t indicate their claim.
 ]]></dcterms:abstract>
			</dc:description>
            <dc:identifier scheme="dcterms:URI"><![CDATA[http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_293_dbeb2515488660489bc457116d3206b3.pdf]]></dc:identifier>
			<dc:identifier scheme="ags:DOI"><![CDATA[10.22091/pfk.2006.293]]></dc:identifier>
			<dc:type><![CDATA[Journal Article]]></dc:type>
			<dc:format><dcterms:medium><![CDATA[text]]></dcterms:medium></dc:format>
			<dc:language><![CDATA[فارسی]]></dc:language>
			<dc:source><![CDATA[http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/]]></dc:source>
			<dc:source><![CDATA[Journal of Philosophical Theological Research]]></dc:source>
		</ags:resource>

</ags:resources>