دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979123120210321Comparative Evaluation of Free Will in Muhammad Taqi Ja’fari and John Searle's Viewارزیابی تطبیقی ارادۀ آزاد در نظرگاه محمد تقی جعفری و جان سرل530186510.22091/jptr.2020.6136.2424FAسید احمدفاضلیاستادیار فلسفه و کلام اسلامی ، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران.0000-0000-0000-0000مرضیهصادقیدانشیار فلسفه و کلام اسلامی ، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران.مرتضیزارع گنجارودیدانشآموخته دکترای فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران00000000000000000Journal Article20201109The question of free will has long been considered one of the most important philosophical questions. It can be said that different and even conflicting opinions have been expressed on this issue. Allamah Jafari and John Searle are two thinkers who, in their intellectual framework, have made a significant contribution to clarifying the “free will” debate. The two thinkers agree on various issues such as the role of the ‘I’ in creating free will, the non-randomness of action, the existence of a gap before activity, and so forth. They also differ on issues such as “the meaning of free will or freedom,” “the scope of freedom or free will,” and the “Divinity of ‘I’ or non-divinity of ‘I’.” Allamah Jafari, besides the rational and reasoning method, pays attention to the scientific context. Searle also has a scientific and reasoning view of the question of free will. Jafari proves free will by introducing the metaphysical self. Moreover, consciousness has a unique role in his theory. Searle, On the other hand, with the concepts of “consciousness” and dependence on the “non-empirical self,” seeks to create a hole for proving free will. Jafari’s view about freedom is that we have free will. Therefore, his approach in this regard is liberal. But Searle plays a role in explaining the issue of “free will” by proposing two hypotheses. <br />Both philosophers believe that the substantial evidence for the existence of free will is that we always think before we act. This thinking causes a gap between the period before the action and the time of the action. According to Jafari, a gap appears in the time “before the action” and “the time of the action.” But in Searle’s view, this gap appears between “reasons for the decision,” “the decision” and “the decision and the action,” and between “the action and the continuation of that action.” A careful examination of the views of these two philosophers can open a new way for the question of “free will” and “freedom.” This is because both thinkers have also dealt with scientific issues and have considered various aspects of the phenomenon of “will” and its freedom or lack of freedom have been considered. This article, in addition to describing and clarifying the opinion of the two philosophers, is responsible for analytical, comparative, and critical points. The comparative and critical analysis of this article reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the views of these two philosophers. The idea of Jafari and John Searle is a new view on the issue of free will. <br />Finally, it can be said that the scientific and philosophical attitude of these two philosophers can be a new way to develop other influential theories in this field. We can summarize the contents in such a way that this article includes the views of two philosophers along with analytical, critical, and comparative evaluation. The purpose of this study is to provide a new solution and further clarify the issue of free will with a descriptive-analytical method. <br /> <br /> <br /> مسئلۀ ارادۀ آزاد، از دیرباز یکی از مهمترین مسائل فلسفی بوده است. علامه محمد تقی جعفری و جان سِرل، در سیاق نظام فکریشان، دستاوردی قابل توجه در ایضاح بحث «ارادۀ آزاد»، عرضه کردهاند. در نظر سِرل، داشتن ارادۀ آزاد به معنای دارا بودن اِختیار است، اما علامه جعفری، صِرف آزاد بودن اِراده را به مثابه اِختیار تلقی نمیکند. «اِختیار»، در نظر او، شامل اِعمال و نظارت «من» نسبت به اِراده و سپس نسبت به تصمیم است. هر دو اندیشمند، یکی از شاخصههای اصلی پیداییِ اختیار را حالت گسست یا وقفهای میدانند که فاعل، پیش از کنشْ تجربه میکند. جعفری و سِرل، «مَنِ غیر تجربی» را به عنوان یکی از شروط اصلی تحقّق «ارادۀ آزاد» یا «اختیار» در نظر گرفتهاند. در نظر سِرل، «مَن» ساحت متافیزیکی ندارد، اما فاقد وجهۀ مادی است، اما در نگاه جعفری، «مَن»، دارای بُعد متافیزیکی و ساحتی متعالی است. ارادۀ آزاد در منظومۀ سِرل، به «آگاهی» فروکاهش مییابد. نیز از منظر جعفری، آگاهی یکی از مقوّمات اصلی کنش انسان و وجهۀ مختارانۀ اوست. رویکرد جعفری در مسئلۀ امکان یا امتناع ارادۀ آزاد، «اختیارگرایانه» است، اما سِرل، با طرح دو فرضیه، بیشتر در مقام تبیینگر مسئله نقش ایفا میکند. آرای جعفری در دستۀ ناسازگارگرای آزادیگرا و آرای سِرل طبق قرائت نخست، در دستۀ ناسازگارگرای تعیّنگرا و مطابق قرائت دوم، در دستۀ ناسازگارگرای آزادیگرا قرار میگیرد. تلاش این پژوهش در جهت شرح و بسط، و ایضاح مسئلۀ ارادۀ آزاد - نزد جعفری و سرل - با روش توصیفی ۔ تحلیلی است.دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979123120210321A Comparative Investigation of the Intrinsic Mobility of the Natural Body in the Mulla Sadra’s Philosophy with the Continuous Evolution of Quantum “Particles”بررسی تطبیقی تحوّل جسم طبیعی در فلسفهٔ ملاصدرا با تحوّل مستمر «ذرات» کوانتومی3154186210.22091/jptr.2020.5394.2296FAفریدحجتیدانشجوی دکتری فلسفه تطبیقی، گروه فلسفه وکلام اسلامی ، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران.مهدیمنفرداستادیار گروه فلسفه وکلام اسلامی ، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران.0009-0006-1375-1788حبیب اللهرزمیاستاد گروه فیزیک، دانشکده علوم پایه، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران.Journal Article20200407In quantum theory, objects (particles) are intrinsically evolving and changing based on the Uncertainty Principle, and the particle state is described by a time-dependent wave packet such that the wave packet corresponding to even a free particle is successively evolvable; a quantum particle has an indefinite and transformative state. In the relativistic Quantum Fields Theory, instead of the concepts of particle and wave packet, a continuous object named “field” with permanent fluctuation in its ground state (the quantum vacuum) is considered as the original concept. In Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, based on the Substantial Motion Theory, the subject of continuous evolution and change in the natural body appears as the intrinsic mobility of the natural body. In this paper, we are going to present a comparative investigation of this topic in the two areas of study mentioned. Initially, we present some necessary topics in physics including the motion of fundamental particles, the motion of quantum objects (quantum non-localizability), Quantum Fields Theory, quantum vacuum, and the creation and annihilation of particles in the Quantum Fields Theory; then, we consider some necessary topics in some fields of study in philosophy about the natural body and the nature and the identity of physical bodies including the ideas and the special opinion of Mulla Sadra. Particularly and with more detail, we pay attention to the Sadrian philosophy about the evolution and intrinsic mobility of the natural body based on his famous Substantial Motion Theory. With a comparative study, and by considering Sadrian philosophy as the fundamental philosophical basis for natural sciences, particularly physics, we try to compare the intrinsic motion of natural bodies in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy with the intrinsic evolution of quantum objects in modern physics. Our research method is based on and uses standard resources including books and research papers about Mulla Sadra’s thoughts and theories and the internationally well-known books and papers on standard quantum physics and quantum fields theory. The conclusive remarks are as follows: <br /> <br />The transformation of quantum particles or the creation and annihilation of particles in the theory of quantum fields agrees with this point that the intrinsic mobility of the natural body in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy doesn’t reason on the philosophical existence and/or loss of existence. <br />That a quantum particle doesn’t have a constant status in two consecutive instants is in agreement with the Sadrian Substantial Motion Theory that explains ‘motion’ in the ‘bed’ of time. <br /> <br />Finally, we should mention that although the intrinsic motion of the natural body in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is based on its completion while the creation and annihilation of particles in Quantum Fields Theory may be better compared with the emergence and extinction well known in peripatetic philosophy, by considering the background quantum vacuum field as the main basis of the so-called “particles” which is continuously in evolution and permanent fluctuation and is the basis for the creation and annihilation of particles, the comparison between the modern Quantum Fields Theory and Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is done well. <br /> <br /> در نظریهٔ کوانتوم، اشیاء (ذرّات) مدام در حال تغیر ناشی از اصل عدم قطعیت بوده و حالت ذرّه با یک بسته موج تابع زمان توصیف میشود؛ به طوری که تابع موج منتسب به حتی یک ذرّه آزاد، دارای تحوّل پیدر پی است و ذره، حالتی نامعین و دگرگونشونده دارد. همچنین در نظریهٔ میدانهای کوانتومی نسبیتی، به جای مفاهیم ذرّه و بستهٔ موج، اصالت به شیْء پیوستهای به نام «میدان» که دارای افت و خیز دائمی در حالت پایه (خلأ کوانتومی) است، داده میشود. از سوی دیگر، موضوع تحوّل جسم، در فلسفۀ ملاصدرا هم در قالب حرکت ذاتی و تکاملی جلوهگر شده است. در این پژوهش، برآنیم تا - با استفاده از منابع شناخته شده و استاندارد در حوزه فلسفۀ صدرایی و همچنین فیزیک مدرن - به روش مطالعه و تحقیق کتابخانهای - در دو حوزهٔ پیشگفته به بررسی تطبیقی بپردازیم. نتیجهٔ کار این است که همانگونه که تحوّل جسم طبیعی در فلسفۀ صدرایی، دال بر وجود یافتن و وجود باختن فلسفی نیست، تحوّل و تغیّر ذرّات کوانتومی و یا خلق و فنای ذرّات بنیادین، بر اساس نظریهٔ میدانهای کوانتومی نیز قابل تطبیق با این معناست؛ همچنین، این که بر اساس اصل عدم قطعیت کوانتومی، یک ذرّه در دو لحظهٔ پیاپی وضعیت یکسانی ندارد، با نظریهٔ حرکت جوهری ملاصدرا که حرکت را در بستر زمانْ تبیین میکند، قابل تطبیق است.دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979123120210321A Study of the Relationship between Deity and Personalityبررسی نسبت امرِ الوهی و شخصوارگی5580173510.22091/jptr.2020.5562.2337FAمریماحمدی کافشانیدانشجوی دکترا، فلسفه دین، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.000-0001-9027-300عبدالرسولکشفیدانشیار، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.0000-0002-5702-2281محمدرضابیاتاستادیار، گروه فلسفه دین، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.0000-0002-2900-860XJournal Article20200525All popular concepts of deity (Theism, Pantheism, and Panentheism) believe in divinity. In Theism, “God” has attributes such as consciousness, will, goodness, and so forth, which can be seen in humans. On the contrary, pantheists argue that: a) the person is equal to the human being; b) embodiment is a prominent feature of the human being; c) having attributes such as consciousness, will, and so forth, requires a body and equates to anthropomorphism. In other words, these attributes are inevitably associated with embodiment and the resulting limitations. Thereby, the pantheistic deity is impersonal. There is a duality of the “personality” and “impersonality” of the deity. The crucial question of this article is, “what is the relationship between divinity and personality?” The relationship of embodiment to personality and the relationship of perfection to the impersonal deity, constitute the sub-questions of it. <br />We show that there is a significant relationship between personality and divinity. In the first section, the term divinity is examined; firstly, it is assumed that, contrary to pantheism, divinity is definable. Otto’s attempting to trace the origins of the “holy” and the historical studying of pantheistic approaches confirms this assumption. Secondly, “Infinity, ” “influence, ” and “transcendence” are three critical terms in defining divinity. Pantheistic argument showed that all critiques of personality are summed up in the fact that personality is a limiting factor. <br />That is, it is inconceivable that the transcendent, infinite, and influential deity can be a person. Therefore, in the second part, the concept of person is examined, and we conclude that: 1) there is a relation between the practical terms in person’s meaning and the terms of divinity; 2) Although the main critique of the deity’s personality is the embodiment, it is not a crucial term in defining the person. That is why Michael Levin is in contradiction when he believes that divine unity doesn’t need to be a person or conscious, it is sufficient to be perfect. The question arises as to what perfection means without consciousness, power, and will? Isn’t a human being more complete due to the pantheistic divine unity? Accordingly, an analysis of perfection without addressing personal attributes puts pantheists in an apparent contradiction. Besides, impersonality faces a severe dilemma; if they do not take the personal attributes, according to Kant, the deity is reduced to an object. Instead, there could be some responses to anthropomorphism; firstly, the basis of the Pantheistic mistake is to generalize the meaning of finite consciousness or will to an infinite being, whereas temporality is an attribute of the deity’s knowledge or will’s objects, not of the deity’s knowledge and will. Secondly, the study shows where personality is interpreted to anthropomorphism, it focuses on the late idea in Christian thought about Jesus, while the history of attributing the deity to consciousness, will, and so forth, is much older. Finally, it is indicated that the critiques of the personality are not strong enough to challenge it. So, according to the “Principle of Simplicity”, believers in the personality of the deity have a more justified view.نسبت «شخصوارگی» و «امرِ الوهی»، همواره، از مسائل مهم الهیات و فلسفۀ دین بوده و سبب شکلگیریِ دوگانۀ «شخصوارگی» و «ناشخصوارگیِ» امرِ الوهی شده است. «شخصوارگی» به معنای داشتن اوصافی مانندِ علم، قدرت، اراده و خیر است که در انسان نیز، به صورت محدود، دیده میشود. «تئیزم» با نسبت دادن چنین اوصافی به امرِ الوهی، مهمترین مدافع شخصوارگی است. در مقابل، «پنتئیزم» چنین استدلال میکند که الف) شخص، مساوی انسان است؛ ب) جسمانیت، مشخصۀ بارز انسان است؛ ج) در نتیجه، داشتن صفاتی مانند علم و اراده مستلزمِ جسمانیت و مساوی انسانوارگی است. بنابراین، امرِ الوهیِ پنتئیستی از داشتن این اوصاف مبرّاست. چیستی نسبت میان الوهیت و شخصوارگی، پرسش اصلی مقالۀ حاضر است. نسبت جسمانیت با شخصوارگی و نسبت کمال با امرِ الوهیِ ناشخصوار، سؤالات فرعی پژوهش را تشکیل میدهند و بر آنیم تا نشان دهیم که شخصوارگی لازمۀ «الوهیت» است. این مسیر با بررسی مؤلفههای الوهیت، یعنی تعالی، تأثیرگذاری و عدمتناهی، و بیان دیدگاههای معارض پیگیری میشود. در پایان، روشن میشود که - بر خلاف ادعای منتقدان - «جسمانیت»، لازمۀ شخصوارگی نیست و همچنین انکار شخصوارگی امرِ الوهی و در عینحال، پذیرش مؤلفههای کمال مانند «آگاهی»، در گفتار قائلان به ناشخصوارگی تناقض آمیز و نامنسجم است.دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979123120210321An Analysis of Al-Kindi's View of Human Perfectionتحلیل دیدگاه کِندی دربارهٔ کمال انسان81102186310.22091/jptr.2021.6316.2443FAعین اللهخادمیاستاد فلسفه و کلام، دانشگاه تربیت دبیر شهید رجایی، تهران، ایران.0000-0002-1795-0713Journal Article20201203Perfection is an anthropological issue that is inherently human in nature, but in theory, Greek philosophers played a prominent role. They pursued this more as a virtue. The main question of this research is what analysis can be provided for Al-Kindi’s view of human perfection? This research was done using a descriptive-analytic method and its most important findings are: In analyzing the Al-Kindi’s view of perfection, we can divide it into two types – philosophical perfection and moral perfection. Philosophical perfection in this research means perfection in the field of theoretical reason. In his treatise on reason, he used it in four meanings, the second meaning of which refers to the reason considered in this research. Although he uses a degree of theoretical reason, we see a kind of ambiguity and weaknesses in his philosophical perfection. <br />What we mean by moral perfection in this research is the perfection of the practical intellect, which is called virtue. He is more morally influenced by Plato than Aristotle. And according to the powers of the human soul, it divides virtues into four parts – wisdom, prudence or courage, chastity, and justice. To explain further, a human being has many virtues, and human virtues refer to the same desirable human creation which is divided into two types, one of which is in the soul and the other surrounds the human body and is one of the effects in the soul. The kind that exists in the soul is divided into three types: wisdom, chastity and the one that surrounds the human body and one of the effects of this thing in the soul is justice. When a necessity arises, one does not fear death and repels something that is against his will; chastity is eating things to train the body and maintaining it after all. Virtues have two extremes and each of these two is a departure from moderation and vice. The soul is a slowly transcending light and after separating from the body, it becomes aware of everything in the world and no secret is hidden from it. <br />In this article, an attempt has been made to solve the problem of perfection from Al-Kindi’s point of view using a rational-descriptive method. The important point about Al-Kindi is that he was in the early stages of the translation movement and was not familiar enough with Greek works. Also, according to the available reports, not all of his works have reached us so it is difficult to judge definitively about his views on various issues, including perfection. However, from Al-Kindi’s point of view, perfection can be divided into philosophical and moral perfection but for the aforementioned reasons, both types of perfection are ambiguous and there seems to be more of an ambiguity regarding philosophical perfection in his works. <br /> «کمال» یکی از مسایل انسانشناسی است که از یک حیث عمرش به قدمت انسان است، اما ازحیث تِئوری، فیلسوفان یونان نقش برجستهای در این امر داشتند. آنها این امر را بیشتر تحت عنوان «فضلیت» پیگیری میکردند. پرسش اصلی این پژوهش آن است که چه تحلیلی برای دیدگاه کندی پیرامون کمال انسان میتوان ارائه داد؟ این پژوهش، به صورت توصیفی و تحلیلی انجام گرفت و اهم یافتههای آن عبارتند از: در تحلیل دیدگاه کندی پیرامون کمال، میتوانیم آن را به دو قسم (کمال فلسفی و کمال اخلاقی) تقسیم کنیم. مراد از «کمال فلسفی» در این پژوهش، کمال در حیطۀ عقل نظری است. او در رسالهٔ عقل خود، آن را به چهار معنا به کار برد که دومین معنای آن ناظر به عقلی است که در این پژوهش مدِّ نظر است. او مراتبی برای عقل نظری ذکر میکند، اما ما شاهد نوعی ابهام و نقاط ضعف در کمال فلسفی ایشان هستیم. مراد ما از «کمال اخلاقی»، کمال عقل عملی است که از آن به «فضایل» یاد میشود. او در کمال اخلاقی بیشتر از ارسطو، تحت تأثیر افلاطون است و بر اساس قوای نفس انسان، فضایل را به چهار قسم (حکمت، نجده / شجاعت، عفت و عدالت) - تقسیم میکند. از آن جا که کندی در مراحل اولیه نهضت ترجمه بوده و همهٔ اثارش بر اساس گزارشهای موجود به دست ما نرسیده است، داوری قطعی دربارهٔ دیدگاهش ناظر به مسایل مختلف و از جمله، «کمال» کاری صعب و دشوار است.دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979123120210321Zoroastrian Ethicsفلسفۀ اخلاق زردشتی103130186410.22091/jptr.2021.6119.2419FAشیرزادپیک حرفهاستادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه بینالمللی امام خمینی(ره)، قزوین ، ایران.Journal Article20201026This paper is an ‘interdisciplinary research’ on ‘ethics’ and ‘Iranian ancient culture and languages’ that describes ‘Zoroastrian Ethics’ by analyzing Avestan and Pahlavi texts such as <em>AVESTA</em>, <em><em>Dēnkard</em></em> (esp. Book VI), <em><em>The Book of Arda Viraf</em></em>, and <em><em>Wāzagēčand ī Ādurbād ī Mahraspandān</em></em><em> (<em>the Andarz of </em></em><em>Ādurbād son of Mahraspand</em> that is translated into Arabic and attributed to Ādurbād in Ebn Meskawayh’s <em><em>Jāvidān Kerad</em></em>. The main concern of ‘Zoroastrian religion’ is ‘ethics’ and its main interest does not generally center around ‘non-ethical pure and deep philosophical meditations and contemplations,’ but rather the ‘ethical implication of questions.’ The first consequence which directly flows from this ‘predominantly unmetaphysical character’ of ‘Zoroastrian religion’ is ‘pragmatism’ and the ‘positive view taken of life.’ The ‘utilitarian genius of Iranians’ instinctively avoided all attempts to adumbrate pure abstractions and thus evolved a view which is essentially ‘practical.’ <br />According to this paper, ‘Zoroastrian Ethics’ is a kind of ‘utilitarian and hedonistic global consequentialism’ that is totally based on ‘Zoroastrian theology, ontology, and metaphysics’ in which the whole universe is arrayed in two opposite camps. The fundamental opposition between ‘Good’ and ‘Bad, ’ ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain,’ and ‘forces of life’ and ‘forces of death’ in ‘Zoroastrian ethics’ is exactly based on <em>AVESTA</em> that posits ‘Good’ against ‘Evil,’ <em>Ahura Mazdā</em> against <em>Ahriman</em>, and <em>Spənta Mainyu</em> against <em>Aŋra Mainyu</em>. Pahlavi ethical texts, like <em><em>Dēnkard</em></em> <em>VI</em>, also emphasize that human beings should keep their bodies in joy and withhold from bodily disorder, pain, and suffering and believe those who allow them in their body can hardly perform good acts. This opposition is the joint between ‘Zoroastrian practical wisdom and ethics’ and ‘Zoroastrian theoretical wisdom, theology, ontology, and metaphysics. ’ The triumph of the ‘Good’ over the ‘Evil’ in this opposition will result in <em>Aša </em>in the world and is subject to the enjoyment of <em>Aša </em>and ‘good thoughts, good words, and good deeds’ by humans. The sum total of duty is expressed by <em>Aša </em>which may, in particular terms, be translated as righteousness or purity. Under the dominating influence of the idea, the whole world order is to be kept in its purest state, all its better elements advanced towards their promised realization, and its worse elements gradually made to disappear. This broad meaning of <em>Aša </em>isthe fundamental concept of ‘Parsi Ethics.’ <br />In ‘Zoroastrian theology, ontology, and metaphysics,’ the finite is not sacrificed on the altar of the infinite. The finite is made of the same stuff that constitutes the infinite and the infinite is the expansion of the finite; not quite different from or opposed to it. This theory has later been put forward in Suhrawardi’s ‘<em>Ishraqi</em> (illuminationist) school’ (who called himself the ‘reviver of the noble <em>Ishraqi</em> wisdom’ of ‘ancient Iran’) and the doctrine of <em>tashkik al-wujud </em>(modulation and gradation of existence) in Mulla Sadra’s <em>al-Hikma al-Muta’aliya</em> (transcendent philosophy). The consequence of the ‘relation between finite and infinite’ in ‘Zoroastrian theology, ontology, and metaphysics’ is the ‘firm belief in the reality of the individual soul, and in its capacity for activity’ in ‘Zoroastrian Ethics.’So, the main idea of ‘Parsi Ethics’ is the fullest realization of the vital forces and the consequent disappearance of the opposite tendencies. <br />The Persian genius for ‘utilitarianism’ and ‘pragmatism’ enters into the scheme of righteousness and justice. This ethics appreciates industry, self-control, and veracity in the individual life and righteousness, regularity, and social accord in the social life. The reverse of this ethics is an abstract stiffness that will not accommodate itself to life and whose irrational consequences are often inimical to life. This paper shows that so many years before a ‘linguistic turn’ and a ‘big change in the common opinion about life, industry, and innovation’ that occurred during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in northwestern Europe and caused the ‘Industrial Revolution,’ and then ‘modern economic growth,’ the main elements of ‘capitalism’ existed in ‘Zoroastrian Ethics. ’ <br /> <br /> این مقاله، «پژوهشی میانرشتهای» در «فلسفۀ اخلاق» و «فرهنگ و زبانهای ایران باستان» است که با رویکردی نوین «فلسفۀ اخلاق زردشتی» را تشریح میکند. این مقاله «فلسفۀ اخلاق زردشتی» را گونهای از «پیامدگراییِ فراگیرِ فایدهگرا و لذتگرا» میداند که برپایه «هستیشناسی، مابعدالطبیعه و الهیات زردشتی» بنا نهاده شده است. تضاد بنیادین میان «نیک» و «بد»، «لذت» و «درد» و «نیروهای زندگی» و «نیروهای مرگ» در «فلسفۀ اخلاق زردشتی»، مبتنی بر تضاد بنیادین میان «خیر» و «شر»، «اهورا مزدا» و «اهریمن» و <em>سپنته</em> <em>مینو</em> و <em>انگره</em> <em>مینو در اوستا</em> است. متون اخلاقی پهلوی، مانند <em>دینکرد ششم</em>، نیز بر این نکته تأکید میکنند که تن را باید در <em>رامش</em> و خوشی داشت و از درد و رنج پرهیز کرد و کار نیک کردن برای کسی که درد را در تن راه دهد دشوار است. این مقاله نشان میدهد، سالها پیش از «چرخش زبانی» و «تغییر بزرگ در افکار عمومی نسبت به زندگی، سازندگی و نوآوری» که در سدههای هفدهم و هجدهم در شمالغرب اروپا رخ داد و به «انقلاب صنعتی» و سپس «رشد اقتصادی در جهان مدرن» انجامید، بنیانهای اصلی «سرمایهگرایی» در «فلسفۀ اخلاق زردشتی» وجود داشتند.دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979123120210321Roy Bhaskar on Scientific Progress and the Fallibility of Cognition: A Critique of Four Approachesپیشرفت علم از منظر روی بسکار و خطاپذیری شناخت؛ نقدی بر چهار رویکرد131148186610.22091/jptr.2021.6359.2450FAمریمپوست فروشدانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه علم، گروه فلسفه علم، دانشگاه صنعتی شریف، تهران، ایران.0000-0002-1085-9957مصطفیتقویاستادیار گروه فلسفه علم، دانشگاه صنعتی شریف، تهران، ایران.0000-0002-7755-1375Journal Article20201216So far, various approaches have been proposed to explain the progress of science. These approaches, which fall under a fourfold classification, are as follows: semantic, functional, epistemic, and noetic approaches. Each of these approaches, based on the intended purpose of science, defines progress on the same basis. The semantic approach defines progress based on the approximation to the truth, the functional approach based on problem-solving, the epistemic approach based on knowledge accumulation, and the noetic approach based on increased understanding. With a stratified description of the world, Roy Bhaskar sees science as the movement toward deeper layers aimed at discovering productive mechanisms. He also explains progress based on the layering and acquisition of knowledge of the underlying layers. But because he believes in the social nature of science and considers knowledge a social product and subject to change, he acknowledges the fallibility of cognition. Hence, it is believed that moving to a new layer does not necessarily lead to the progress of science. However, it is possible that by acquiring knowledge about the new layer, our previous knowledge will be revised and corrected. In this article, while expressing the Bhaskar theory of scientific progress and explaining its contingency with respect to the fallibility of cognition, we pursue a basic goal. This goal is summarized in the review of all four approaches in order to show their lack of attention to the fallibility of cognition and its effect on explaining progress. <br />What has been done in this article is based on two phases: explaining the contingency of the progress of science for Bhaskar and examining the four approaches to the progress of science in order to show their inattention to the fallibility of cognition. In his philosophy, referring to the two dimensions of transitive and intransitive, Roy Bhaskar considers the purpose of science to be the acquisition of knowledge about intransitive objects, and this knowledge is achieved through a social activity. Since this cognition is a social product and belongs to the transitive dimension of science, it will be fallible and subject to change. Bhaskar concludes with philosophical arguments that the world contains generative mechanisms, but that it is the task of science to discover their nature and exactly what mechanisms are at work. This requires work in two theoretical dimensions, namely the use of conceptual tools and a practical dimension, that is, the use of experimental tools. Now, as the theoretical and technical conditions under which cognition is formed and evaluated are themselves expanding and subject to change and modification, our knowledge may also be expanded or corrected. In this study, it was found that the semantic approach is unaware of the effect of fallibility on the evidence used to estimate the approximation to the truth and, consequently, progress. The functional approach ignores this effect in solving the problems posed by theories. The epistemic approach does not take into account the fallibility of evidence used to justify and validate the evidence, and finally, the noetic approach neglects the effect of the fallibility on what the explanation and prediction are based on. These have led to these approaches, which consider the satisfaction of the criteria in question necessarily leads to progress. <br /> <br /> <br /> مهمترین رویکردها در تبیین پیشرفت علم، عبارتند از: رویکرد معنایی، کارکردی، معرفتی و ادراکی. هر کدام از این رویکردها با توجّه به هدفی که برای علم متصوّر است، پیشرفت را نیز بر همان مبنا تعریف میکنند. رویکرد معنایی، پیشرفت را مبتنی بر تقرّب به صدق، رویکرد کارکردی مبتنی بر حلّ مسئله، رویکرد معرفتی مبتنی بر انباشت دانش و رویکرد ادراکی نیز پیشرفت را مبتنی بر افزایش فهم، تعریف میکند. روی بسکار با توصیفی لایهمند از جهان، «علم» را حرکت به سمتِ لایههای عمیقتر دانسته که با هدفِ کشف مکانیزمهای مولّد انجام میشود. او «پیشرفت» را نیز مبتنی بر همین لایهمندی و کسبِ دانش نسبت به لایههای زیرین، تبیین میکند، امّا از آنجا که به اجتماعی بودنِ علم معتقد است و دانش را محصولی اجتماعی و در معرض تغییر میداند، به خطاپذیریِ شناختْ اذعان دارد و بر این باور است که حرکت به سمت لایۀ جدید، ضرورتاً به پیشرفت علم نمیانجامد؛ اگر چه این امکان وجود دارد که با کسبِ دانش نسبت به لایۀ جدید، دانشِ پیشینْ بازبینی و تصحیح شود. در این مقاله، ضمنِ شرح نظریۀ پیشرفت بسکار و تبیینِ امکانی بودنِ آن با توجّه به خطاپذیریِ شناخت، یک هدف اساسی را دنبال میکنیم. این هدف، در بررسیِ هر چهار رویکرد، به منظور نشان دادنِ عدم توجّه آنان به جنبۀ خطاپذیریِ شناخت و تأثیر آن در تبیین پیشرفت، خلاصه میشود.دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979123120210321Martin Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Ontological Distinction between Ground and Existence in Friedrich Schelling’s System of Freedomتفسیر مارتین هَیدگر از تمایز هستیشناختی بنیاد و وجود در نظام آزادی فردریش شلینگ149172186710.22091/jptr.2021.6100.2413FAالهام الساداتکریمی دورکیدانشجوی دکتری فلسفه غرب، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران.0000-0002-4788-8241محمدجوادصافیاندانشیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران.محمدمشکاتدانشیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران.Journal Article20201019The <em>Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom </em>(1809) is the most coherent form of Schelling’s attempt to describe the absolute system or the system of freedom. For the first time in the twentieth century, with Heidegger's careful reference to his treatise on freedom and his repeated commentary in 1936 and 1941, the importance of this treatise in the history of Western thought became apparent. Heidegger focuses on Schilling’s thinking, especially with Schilling’s treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, research into the formation of the system, and the question of the possibility of a system of freedom as a question of the essence of being. Schilling bases his research on the system of freedom on a correct ontological basis in order to transcend formal freedom as an independent determinant of mechanical causation and to achieve the true definition of freedom as the ability to do good and evil. And after proposing the inadequacy of formal freedom in the idealist systems before it, it introduces the real and living concept of freedom as the ability to do good and evil.
Heidegger demonstrates the independence of the Schelling system in comparison with the Fichte and Hegel systems, and his innovations in response to issues such as evil, freedom, identity, and the relation of being and “is” are most evident in the metaphysical realm of the will; however, remaining within the metaphorical framework also prevents Schilling from approaching the question of the truth of existence.
Schilling’s important issue is the elimination of the opposition between freedom and necessity, which, in his view, is the focus of philosophy. For this reason, the discussion of freedom is at the heart of the system in its true sense, and in his opinion, his dissertation is for the first time the design of a system based on the idea of human freedom. The possibility of a system of freedom must be created in accordance with the principle of identity, which does not ignore the meaning of the relation of theology. In Schelling’s Heideggerian interpretation of the principle of identity, the priority of ontological issues in matters of theological nature such as all theism is given more importance and the question of all theism as a question of the system to the question of “is” and how to connect the structure of beings as a whole.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze Heidegger’s interpretation of the concept of the system of freedom according to Schelling with emphasis on the ontological distinction between ground and existence. This study seeks to answer these two questions: how does the design of the real concept of freedom open the way to explain the ontological foundation of the possibility of evil and the possibility of freedom in the system? Also, how does the distinction between ground and existence lead to Schelling's main goal in resolving the conflict between system and freedom? Moreover, according to Heidegger, to what extent does this distinction arise from Schilling’s metaphysical and subject-centered thinking?
<em>پژوهشهای فلسفی در باب ذات آزادی انسان</em> (1809) منسجمترین صورت تلاش فردریش شلینگ برای شرح نظام مطلق یا نظام آزادی است. نخستینبار در قرن بیستم و با رجوع متأملانۀ مارتین هَیدگر به <em>رسالۀ آزادی</em> و تفسیر چندینبارۀ او در سالهای 1936 و 1941، اهمیت این رساله در تاریخ اندیشۀ غربی آشکار شد. تمرکز هَیدگر بر تفکر شلینگ بهویژه با نگارش <em>رسالۀ شلینگ در باب ذات آزادی انسان</em>، پژوهش در اصل شکلگیریِ نظام و پرسش از امکان نظام آزادی چونان پرسش در باب ذات هستی است. شلینگ برای عبور از آزادی صوری چونان تعینبخشیِ ناوابسته به علیت مکانیکی و دستیابی به تعریف واقعی آزادی بهعنوان توانایی انجام خیر و شر، پژوهش خود در باب نظام آزادی را بر مبنای هستیشناختی صحیح استوار میسازد. هدف مقالۀ حاضر، تحلیل تفسیرِ هَیدگر از مفهوم نظام آزادی در نگاه شلینگ، با تأکید بر تمایز هستیشناختی بنیاد و وجود است. این پژوهش در پی پاسخ به این دو پرسش است که جایگاه آزادی در نظام فلسفیِ بنیادمحور شلینگ چیست و چگونه طرح مفهوم واقعی آزادی، راه را برای تبیین بنیاد هستیشناختیِ امکان شر و امکان آزادی در نظام میگشاید؟ همچنین تمایز میان بنیاد و وجود چگونه به هدف اصلی شلینگ در حل تعارض نظام و آزادی میانجامد؟