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Contents

The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Necessarianism; Describing and Analyzing two Contemporary Approaches

Roozbeh Zare* ı Seyyed Hassan Hosseini**

Abstract

In contemporary analytic philosophy, the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) has been attacked due to its controversial results. Among these results, necessarianism (modal collapse) is the most significant one. Indeed, our intuition indicates that there are some things around us which are contingent which means that they could be in another way. Accepting the PSR seems to conflict with this common intuition; if all things have a sufficient reason, is it possible to have contingency or would all things be necessary? In response to this problem, several answers have been presented which we will recount briefly in this paper , nevertheless the main points that we have emphasized in this paper are: 1. explaining the problem of necessarianism based on the text of one of the pioneer thinkers in this regard (Van Inwagen) who refuted the principle and 2. an answer to this problem from one of the most important researchers on the issue (Pruss) who tries to solve the problem by denying causal necessity. Finally, we examine the solution of Muslim philosophers especially Ibn-Sina (Avicenna) who solved the problem without refuting causal necessity.

Keywords

Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), Necessarianism, Modal Collapse, Peter Van Inwagen, Alexander Pruss.[1]

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Introduction

The simple formulation of the principle of sufficient reason (hereafter, PSR) is that "e must have a reason or cause." If we accept a tempered version of this principle, we will seek a reason for any fact. Although PSR was coined by Leibniz and he was the first to call it by this name and, arguably, the first to formulate it with full generality, it should be noted that the content of the principle goes back nearly as far as philosophy itself.

The refutation of PSR has too many negative consequences. Suppose that "there are somethings that don't have a reason"; we also know that "there are some things that have a reason". Therefore, by refuting PSR we face the issue of criterion: when is it acceptable and when it is unacceptable for something to not have a reason? Those who deny this principle must place the limits where is not arbitrary or questionable.

According to some critics of PSR, acceptance of the principle is too costly due to its radical implications. These are said to include: 1) failure to conform to the findings of modern physics (quantum indeterminacy), 2) necessarianism, and 3) the existence of God. In this article, we will concentrate on necessarianism, which is considered to be the most important contemporary objection to PSR.

Summary

Necessarianism briefly means that there is no contingent being, and all beings are necessary; sometimes it is expressed as that there is no true contingent proposition and all truths are necessary. Necessarianism is refuted in two ways: 1) it is against the intuition that there are contingent beings or truths, and 2) with the addition of some other premises, it is placed against the intuition that we are free agents. In this article, we will not consider the second objection, which requires the explanation and deliberation of the consequence argument.

Inwagen is one of the main contemporary critics of PSR and his denial is mainly based on the problem of necessarianism. He believes that PSR has the consequence that all true propositions must be necessarily true. In short, his argument is that if there is a contingent proposition, then there is a set of all contingent propositions, but the explanation of any set of contingent propositions must be based on a contingent proposition outside of that set; therefore, the set of all contingent propositions cannot be explained. Hence, since, according to PSR, only those things can exist that have an explanation; only the necessary truths can exist.

Inwagen founds his argument on two claims about the nature of the contingent propositions:

1. A contingent proposition cannot explain itself.
2. A contingent proposition cannot be explained by a necessary proposition.

Similarly, both claims are grounded on the belief that if Q explains P, then Q entails P. Here entailment means that P is a logically necessary consequence of Q

(explanation is equivalent to logical implication). By rejection of this belief, Pruss proposes his tempered version of PSR.

Pruss explains that *sufficient reason* needs to be understood not as 'necessitating reason' but as 'sufficient explanation,' where we understand that a causal account is always sufficiently explanatory, even in an indeterministic approach. Hence, if you have found the cause of an event, then you have sufficiently explained it even though one may not be able to explain why another event has not taken place instead of this contingent one. Therefore, the key component that is refuted in Pruss's proposal, is the lack of contrastive explanation (to explain why a proposition is just so and also why it is not otherwise).

According to this explanation, Pruss will be able to refute both fundamental claims of Inwagen's argument. For instance, the truth of (2) depends on whether we accept that if Q explains P, then Q necessarily entails P. As we have already seen, it is not necessary for Pruss that an explanation logically entails what it explains, thus, a proposition may explain itself without logically entailing itself.

The response of Avicenna to necessarianism, in a nutshell, is that his modal ontology allows for contingency in the following sense: some existents are contingent where 'contingent' means possible in itself and necessary through another. According to him, all creatures are contingent when considered alone and necessary when their sufficient causes are considered. Both of these claims are compatible with our intuition and there is no need to sacrifice one for another. Causal determinism and therefore non-restricted PSR is compatible with the intuition of some beings being contingent in themselves.

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Theism And Cognitive Science of Religion: Compatibility or Incompatibility

Seyyed Mahdi Biabanaki[∗]

Abstract

From the beginning of the 21st century, a new field of cognitive science called "cognitive science of religion" (CSR) has attracted the attention of many scholars. Researchers in this branch seek to explore cognitive mechanisms that produce or reinforce religious beliefs in man. Theories and empirical evidence of CSR have led to many philosophical and theological questions. One of the most important questions is whether these findings show that belief in the existence of God is unjustified. Some philosophers respond positively to this question. They believe that the cognitive mechanisms studied in this area are a threat to the belief in God. Their reasons for this are largely based on the fact that these mechanisms are prone to substantial error, and the insensitivity of these mechanisms in relation to truth. Our aim in this paper is to show that none of the above reasons can show that religious beliefs are unjustified, especially belief in God. Our argument in this regard is based on the fact that natural and supernatural explanations are not mutually exclusive, and the fundamental limitation of cognitive mechanisms.

Keywords

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1. Introduction

CSR has led many philosophical and theological questions. One of the most important questions is: "Are the CSR's theories and evidences in conflict with the belief in God's existence?" This is a question that we are going to examine in this paper. Accordingly, we first introduce the main cognitive mechanisms that contribute to the formation or strengthening of belief in God. Then we formulate arguments that claim theism is unwarranted, and analyze and critique them.

2. Belief In God

There are various suggestions for explaining different aspects of religion as cognitive desires. But in terms of belief in God, the approach that has attracted the most attention is that belief in supernatural entities comes from a mental tool that is known as "Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device" (HADD). HADD allows us to consider the presence of agents in our environment, even if we do not observe those agents. From CSR's point of view, HADD has a fundamental role in our belief in supernatural essences (especially God).

3. Do Csr Findings Threaten Theism?

Some philosophers attempt to perceive CSR theories and evidence as arguments against theism. We categorize such arguments against theism in two groups, and examine each one separately.

3. 1. Debunking arguments against theism

These forms of arguments are based on HADD's error prone. The form of argument is:

  a) HADD plays an essential role in the formation of belief in God.
  b) HADD is susceptible to fundamental errors.
  c) Belief in God is unwarranted.

This form of argument faces two fundamental challenges:

   1. Premise (a) is based on the assumption that HADD and other mental tools can explain the natural causes of the formation of religious beliefs, including the belief in God's existence in us. But in this hypothesis, there is a significant skepticism. What HADD proposes is that humans are prone to believe in supernatural agents. This mechanism cannot explain why a person has a certain religious belief.

   2. In addition, CSR researchers have always emphasized that their attempt to find the natural causes of religious beliefs is not a "monopolistic" position on the originality of such beliefs. In other words, it is not that religious beliefs are formed solely on the basis of natural causes and there is no another cause that is instrumental in the formation of religious beliefs.

3. 2. Attenuating arguments against theism

These categories of arguments can be formulated as follows:

a) The CSR shows that the cognitive mechanisms of our evolved minds give us the greatest tendency to believe in God.

b) These mechanisms are prone to error, and therefore we cannot trust them in helping us reach the truth.

c) Since we cannot rely on these mental tools to reach the truth, we also cannot rely on our motives for believing in God.

d) As a result, the CSR attenuates belief in God.

Regarding this argument, in addition to the preceding points, there are two fundamental points that the defenders of this argument have not paid attention to:

1. From the CSR perspective, HADD is also responsible for some of our other beliefs. Now, if this mental tool does not produce any reliable beliefs due to its unreliability, , it will include all its output beliefs.

2. The defenders of the above argument have neglected the role of other mental tools in formation of our beliefs. In the process of forming, reinforcing and spreading of a belief, various cognitive mechanisms and tools are involved. These tools can reveal HADD errors to us.

Conclusion

CSR researchers seek to discover cognitive mechanisms that produce or reinforce religious beliefs in man. From their point of view, HADD has the greatest role in shaping and strengthening our belief in God. The defenders of the debunking and attenuating arguments believe that the cognitive mechanisms studied in this area are a threat to belief in God. In this paper, we show that their arguments face fundamental challenges.

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Avicenna
and the Logic of Understanding Religion

Mohammad Nasr Esfahani∗ | **Jafar Shanazari∗∗** | **Seyed Mehdi Emam Jomeh∗∗∗**

Abstract

The logic of understanding religion is a set of methodical rules which if adhered to can protect the mind of a religious exegete from errors in understanding. The necessity of such logic is clear to the intellectuals. Avicenna is one such intellectual in this regard. The concern of this study is "Avicenna and the logic of understanding religion". This study is foundational, historical, analytical and concern-centered and has been conducted using a library method and authentic sources. The findings of this study are that Avicenna's philosophical-scientific perceptions are not consistent with religious texts and this has resulted in him determining that there is a disharmony between rational premises and religious, revelation premises. The Prophet was a unique being and exalted in estimation, imagination and intellect. A large part of his perceptions of realities was not consistent with the general level of understanding. Presenting the bare findings has not been possible or useful. Accordingly, he presented it to people in the form of coded language, metaphors and parables so that they become familiar with the minimum of intellectual and human happiness. According to Avicenna, understanding the real meaning of texts is only possible through ontology. Ontology enables the exegete to become familiar with the writer of the text and his intent from the text and allows him to decode the text. He himself has done this and this is what has caused serious criticisms to be raised against him.
Keywords: Avicenna, logic of understanding, religious texts, hermeneutics, ontology.

Keywords

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Summary

If we consider Islam to be premises from the Koran and narrations, it is clear that the understanding of these premises is clear and manifest to the one who spoke of them more than anyone else. It is natural that he states his words in such a way that is understandable for his addressees. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him and his household) who is the immediate addressee of revelation, understands, recounts and explains the true intent of these words. Understanding of religion was better possible for the special companions and those who lived in his time too due to the element of training, closeness in time and space and familiarity with the environment in which God's words were revealed and the words and actions of His prophet. Understanding and explaining the text, has faced more problems and differences in opinions the more time and socio-culture distance there is from the age and environment of revelation, such that after 200 years, tens of creeds and schools have emerged in understanding and explaining religious texts, all of whom consider themselves the saved creed and introduce themselves as being more expert in understanding religion and even consider other groups to be so distant form the understanding of religion as to excommunicate them. Differences in opinion and sometimes contradictions in their perceptions of the Koran and narrations can also be seen in the narrative exegeses.

The question that usually comes to the mind of those who are slightly familiar with religious and historical texts is: what is the reason or cause for differences in opinion and the understanding of believers of "religious concepts" and "religious premises"? Why should there be such different positions regarding religion so that one explanation or view is unacceptable for some and the same is a certainty for others? What is the root of the difference in their understanding?

The present study is conducted using a concern-centered method in order to solve this epistemological problem in the thoughts of Avicenna as an intellectual who faced a hermeneutical problem and has a particular logic in the understanding and exegesis of religious concepts and premises.

1. The epistemological formation and personality of Avicenna resulted in him having a different understanding of "religious texts" and their "author" and delves into religious texts with a different expectation and follows a particular logic in understanding them which has essential differences with the common position held by others. His Avicenna's personality was formed in two types of schools, cultures and thoughts: one was Islamic training with a Shi'a-Ismaili tendency which is the most interpretative Islamic theological creed. The other was Aristotelian-philosophical training; Avicenna sought certain knowledge and the only knowledge he considered as providing certainty was acquired intellectual knowledge based on argument; an argument that has certain propositions or concludes in primary axioms and cannot be acquired. This belief was the reason why Avicenna accepts the content of religious texts, which are a heritage from our forefathers, only if it is consistent with the

intellect and intellectual argument.

2. Avicenna's view towards "text" is an ontological confrontation. The result of this is the occurrence of three happenings: a. some religious text premises are provable through the logic of understanding realities (ontology) by the intellect and argument; b. some are not provable through the logic understanding realities; c. the silence of religious premises in response to some essential questions regarding origin and resurrection.

3. Avicenna has specified the "author of the text", i.e. God, in view of the apparent aspect of the Koran and therefore must clarify the task of falsifiable premises in religious texts.

He believes that the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him and his household), through the strong sense of estimation that he possesses, receives the intellectual knowledge and with the help of the faculty of imagination, translates and "transforms" them into tangible and concrete realities to the extent that the people can understand them. Avicenna believed that the Prophet transformed the realities into "code", "metaphor" and "parable".

Avicenna's important assumption is that the sage and the prophet both receive sustenance from the same source with the difference that one does so with speed and easily, while the other attains it gradually and with difficulty. Therefore, discovering the reality of the Koran in the time of absence of the prophets and chosen servants of God is the task of the philosophers who explain reality through reality. Exegesis of reality with non-reality is known as "personal interpretation" and is forbidden.

According to Gazali, the most important critic of Avicenna, if words go beyond their apparent meaning without any religious reason and intellectual reason or necessity, religious words will lose their credence and the words of God and the prophet lose their usefulness. Gazali himself, at least for non-verbal and inner exegesis accepts it if that exegesis is consistent with: a. religious reason; b. intellectual necessity; c. intellectual reason. He considers interpretations to be falsifiable and has considered four approaches for its critique or nullification: a. contrary recurrence; b. contrary sense; c. dominant supposition on the contrary; d. union of contradictions.

The following are the findings of this study:

1. Understanding is a process which is a consequence of interaction between the ideas of the "exegete", "text" and the "author of the text" which is imprinted in the mind of the exegete and his thoughts are based on his intellectual system and structure which itself is influenced by training and education and the time in which the exegete has been brought up.

2. Avicenna felt a deep divide between the world in which the external text manifested and the world in which he himself lived and sought to bring these two closer. According to him, the understanding of the ancestors regarding the origin, resurrection, man, religious rituals and practices was very simple-

minded and childish.

3. Avicenna considers certain understanding to be an understanding that must be self-evident or consistent with findings that conclude in axioms and therefore, the premises of religious texts are acceptable if they are consistent with reasoning and rational argument that concludes in intellectual axioms.

4. The method of understanding and the logic of perceiving the realities of the Koran and narrations is based on ontology.

5. The inconsistence of religious premises with ontology is because the prophets presented intellectual realities through code language, metaphors and parables.

6. The logic of understanding religious realities is the decoding and "interpretation" of realities transformed to tangibles. Interpretation is the opposite of transformation, i.e. the exegete must restore the text from tangible to intellectual.

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Moore's Open-Question Argument in Moral Philosophy and its Challenge of the Analytical Paradox

Hossein Vale[*] | **Reza Naghavi**[**]

Abstract

The open-question argument is a connecting point in contemporary Analytical Ethics, in response to which many new views were addressed as positive or negative reactions to this argument. In this article, we strive to study and critique the open-question argument and its semantic suppositions and to show that this argument is an application of paradox of analysis and descriptive theory of meaning on ethical concepts. According to the paradox of analysis, the constituents of things contribute to their concepts and therefore, the real definitions which include the constitutents elements are tautological and lack new information. Going forward, we address the semantic views of Frege, logical positivism, Suhravardi-Locke and Kripke-Putnam in order to resolve the paradox of analysis and show that none of these views can be applied to ethical concepts and cannot be considered as a satisfactory answer to open-argument paradox. Finally, we have explained that another solution can be suggested for the paradox of analysis by taking inspiration from the Kripke-Putnam theory and linguistic inspiration. According to this solution, the primary reference of ethical terms to external instances happens without the mediation of concepts and through common intuitions of the linguistics and the precise concept of these terms is gradually addressed and formed in the process of analysis and by considering primary intuitions.

Keywords

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Introduction

George Edward Moore, in the book Foundations of Ethics, attacks the definability of ethical concepts (good and bad) by resorting to the open-question argument and claims that good and bad of concepts is mutually exclusive and are not definable through any other concept because if good was equivalent to another concept (a) and definable through it, then the predication of the concept of good on 'a' would be tautological and the negation of good from 'a' would be contradictory; whereas this claim is intuitably false and the negation of good from another concept would not result in contradiction. Therefore questions like "is a good?" are always open. This argument is based on a particular perception of the essence of a definition which is known as "the paradox of analysis" in terminology. Going forward we will address the semantic suppositions of the paradox of analysis and its solutions.

Summary

According to the paradox of analysis, philosophical analyses which seek to breakdown a subject to its simple parts, are always either tautological and lack new information (if they were able to correctly breakdown the subject to its simple parts) or are false (if they performed this action correctly). This issue has a long record in the history of philosophy and philosophers like Plato (in the treatise of Meno), Avicenna (in Remarks and Admonitions), Ayer (in *Language, Truth and Logic*) etc. have discussed it. In this study, possible solutions for the paradox of analysis have been evaluated using a philosophical analysis method (intuition and the contradiction of intuition) and ultimately, we suggest a solution that is apparently more in sync with our linguistic intuitions. It seems that the paradox of analysis is based on a particular understanding of the descriptive theory of meaning, according to which, the constituents of things contributes to their concept and therefore, philosophical analyses which seek to analyze and breakdown subjects to their constituents, will be tautological only if some premises are true.

In the works of philosophers various solutions for the paradox of analysis can be found. Some, relying in Ferge's distinction between meaning and referent, claim that philosophical analyses (good = pleasure) seek to explain that there is a conflict and instantial unity between the two sides of equality and these two concepts represent a single matter. Apparently this solution is unacceptable because philosophical analyses seek to analyze concepts not to explain instantial unity between different concepts.

Another solution which has been presented by philosophers like Ayer and Avicenna, is that in philosophical analyses the two sides of equality are equivalent both conceptually and instantially and the difference between them is solely in their compendiousness and detailness and it this very difference is

enough to convert them to premises that provide new information. This solution is also unjustifiable because it doesn't explain how we attain our ambiguous and capsulative concepts.

Sohravardi and Jon Locke have defended another understanding of the descriptive theory and claim that the concepts of terms are determined through the apparent attributes of their referents. For example, the concept of good is determined through attributes like creating practical motivation; whereas in philosophical analysis we predicate good's essential attributes to it. Therefore, philosophical analyses like "good = pleasure" are not tautological. Due to Kripkean objections to the descriptive theory of meaning, this solution is also not satisfactory.

Some have relied on Kripke's causal-historical theory in regards to meaning and referent and have strived to show that philosophical analyses can be compound and provide new information; because, according to this view, none of the essential or non-essential attributes of things contribute to their concepts. Miller too, by resorting to the distinction between tactful knowledge and propositional knowledge, claims that before philosophical analysis we can only use a term without knowing its precise definition; but after philosophical analysis we gain propositional knowledge regarding the intended term and can recognize its constituents.

It seems that the Miller and Kripkean solution is stronger and taking inspiration from them, one can suggest another solution for this paradox which is free of the deficiencies and ambiguities of these two views. In this solution, the primary reference of the terms to external instances takes place not through causal-historical chain but rather, through our intuitional and pre-conceptual perception regarding the way of applying these terms. According to Wittgenstein, it is through living within a moral linguistic game and moral intuitions that we generally learn how to use these terms and then by making these intuitional cases the intended meaning, we will strive discover adequate necessary and sufficient (constituents) conditions. Therefore, before the philosophical analysis of a concept, it does not exist even in an abstract way and dormant state; rather, it is created and addressed gradually in the process of analysis. Accordingly, philosophical analyses seek to explain the necessary and sufficient conditions of their subject; they are compound premises that express metaphysical necessity and are not analytical premises that express logical necessity.

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Saving the principle of Correlation
between Reason and Religion

Saeid Zibakalam*

Abstract

My goal in this paper is to analyze the relationship The Principle of Correlation maintains between reason and religion. I have not discussed any of the arguments put forward by various thinkers. Furthermore, I have refrained from any exegetical discussion of the Principle. I have raised and discussed three principal questions: first, is it the case that "whatever reason dictates religion does so too"? Second, what is to be done if dictates of reason and religion turn out to be different or incompatible? Third, how are we to ascertain that dictates of reason or inferences made by reason are Satanic/impure/vicious? Some of the Conclusions: 1. To find out whether any particular reason is or isn't Satanic/impure/vicious we have no choice but to evaluate the dictates of reason which in turn leads us into a series of intractable problems. 2. Calling reason virtuous or vicious does not solve the problem of evaluating each and every dictate or inference of reason. This approach is utterly futile and is effectively useless. These difficulties finally lead to The Problem of the Principle of Correlation which cannot be solved unless we somehow give up the independent authority of reason.

Keywords

The Principle of Correlation, reason's dictates, religion's dictates, Satanic/vicious reason.

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1.Introduction

My goal in this paper is to analyze the relationship The Principle of Correlation maintains between reason and religion. To do so, I have refrained from discussing arguments that various philosophers, theologians, and jurisprudents have hitherto put forward concerning The Principle. Furthermore, I have not engaged in any exegetical discussion about the propriety of various formulations or renderings of the Principle that different thinkers have proffered.

2. The Principle of Correlation

The first question to raise is that: is not it the case that "whatever reason dictates, religion dictates too"? Secondly, by "whatever reason dictates, religion dictates too" – which is one part of The Principle of Correlation – do we mean that *in principle* religion dictates whatever reason dictates? That is, is it the case that as a matter of principle religion takes the truth of the dictates reason for granted and, as a consequence, merely endorses the dictates of reason? Put differently, does The Principle maintain the comprehensive and fundamental perspective that religion *follows* the dictates of reason? Does it follow that the main objective of "whatever reason dictates, religion dictates too" is to constrain the dictates of religion? Thus understood, the implication of The Principle would be that if dictates of religion were not to conform with the dictates of reason, then we would have to conclude that dictates of religion have somehow been inferred incorrectly.

Conversely, could it be that The Principle is intended to constrain the dictates of reason? That is, relying on its own resources, religion makes its own pronouncements independently of reason's dictates. And similarly, reason independently of religion's dictates makes its own judgment. But this judgment ought to conform with dictates of religion. It is clear that if The Principle is taken to mean thus, then we can conclude that if reason's dictates do not conform with religion's dictates then either that reason has been pathological or malfunctioning, or has not been so but has been used incorrectly.

It is entirely possible that someone might find such an analysis misconceived, and then contend that: "The Principle of "whatever reason dictates, religion dictates too" neither intends to subjugate religion's dictates to reason's dictates nor the other way round. And that is because The Principle has a second part which equally importantly states that: "whatever religion dictates, reason dictates too". If the Principle is taken as a whole, it will be seen that it lays no claim about the foundation of any kind of pronouncements: religion pronounces independently of what reason pronounces, and likewise reason makes judgments independently of what religion judges. And the Principle states nothing more than that these two ways of making judgments always arrive at the same singularly unique judgments or dictates".

It would seem that one perfectly conceivable question here arises: what is to be done if dictates of religion and reason turn out to be incompatible or simply different?

Is it not clear that faced with such a situation it would be futile to start contriving an array of concepts and inventing a taxonomy of definitions, tautologies, and semi-hidden presuppositions to construct highly idealized systems which have no relevance whatsoever to the realities that we continuously see and hear and feel and face in our real lives?

One response to the objection made above is that: The reason whose dictates are incompatible with the dictates of religion is not reason at all but merely a Satanic or vicious one.

This response is ostensibly a plausible one for it forbids *in principle* the very constitution of the incompatibility, so that the subsequent problem of resolving the incompatibility between the two kinds of dictates will not arise.

Faced with this response, one question forcefully emerges: how are we to find out that the reason in question is vicious/Satanic, as a consequence of which its dictates are not rational? This seemingly simple and trivial question, in its more generalized formulations, entangles the story of reason and reason's dictates so deeply that major Western philosophers since the eighteenth century on have increasingly come to realize the complexity of what has come to be termed as the "The Problem of Reason".

3. Conclusion

Some of the main conclusions of the paper: 1. To find out whether any particular reason is or isn't Satanic/impure/vicious we have no choice but to evaluate the dictates of reason which in turn leads us into a series of intractable problems. 2. Calling reason virtuous or vicious does not solve the problem of evaluating each and every dictate or inference of reason. This approach is utterly futile and is effectively useless. These difficulties finally lead to The Problem of the Principle of Correlation which cannot be solved unless we somehow give up the independent authority of reason.

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A Revision of the Theory of Spiritualization of Man's Body According to Mulla Sadra as a Solution for the Issues Related to the Hereafter

Masud Esmaeily∗

Abstract

One of the views Mulla Sadra holds is that apart from the evolution of the soul, the body also has an intensifying journey ahead and can intensify from material level to the level of essential sufficiency and achieve a state known as spiritualization in which, although it remains in the material level, it becomes so subtle and takes on spiritual characteristics to the extent that it is as suitable as the soul to be present in the Hereafter. Accordingly, in the same way the soul initially only has a real albeit dependent constitution with the body and ultimately is one with it and in fact, becomes corporeal while preserving its spiritual identity; the body too can ultimately become spiritual and become one with the soul while preserving its corporeal identity. This theory (the spiritualization of man's body in the Hereafter) has been adopted from the mystics' views regarding the spiritualization of perfect human beings, which has been analyzed in his article and Mulla Sadra's view has been explained based on that. According to this theory, better and alternative explanations and solutions can be offered for a part of philosophical concepts and theories like material and immaterial, corporeal resurrection, the dependence of the soul on the body and the relation between the two etc.

Introduction

Mulla Sadra believes that at the onset of its creation, the soul is a faculty of the body and its existence is not separate from that of the body. And on the other

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hand, it also needs a sublime managing faculty in order to actualize its potential. The centre point for the study of the relation between body and soul in Sadrian philosophy revolves around three points: "coming into existence of the soul", "the essence of the worldly and afterlife body" and the "fate of the temporal body"; Mulla Sadra's views are recognized as "corporeal creation of the soul" in case of the first, "imaginality (i.e. having characteristics of the imaginal world) of the afterlife body" in case of the second and "annihilation of the material body" regarding the third. The aim of this article is a revision of the fate of the temporal body in the Hereafter based on the first two points which, as a result of research, concludes in a different foundation than the one aforementioned known as the spiritualization of the body.

The Theory of the Spiritualization of the Temporal Body in the Hereafter According to Mulla Sadra

In Mulla Sadra's initial view regarding corporeal resurrection, i.e. the corporeality of the imaginal body, the focus is on the faculty of imagination which can create an imaginal body similar to the physical body with its productive faculty and can also provide the sameness of these two bodies because it is the last survivor of the temporal body. In this process, two realities, the "observer" (faculty of imagination) and the "observed" (the body created by this observer) exist and the observed is an imaginal existent in consequence to the observer. However, besides this abovementioned view which is from the aspect of the observer, one can also have a primordial view of the observed itself and consider it to have the potential of evolution till the realm of the Hereafter; i.e. that the body, while preserving its essential characteristics and without leaving the material world, is present in the imaginal realm and has the capacity to be present in the Hereafter; if this description can be proven, not only will the soul preserve its unity and objectivity in the transfer from the material world to the Hereafter, but the natural and temporal body will also be eternal with its individuality.

Sadrian philosophy has a two-layered narration of this issue; in the initial level, the issue is addressed through the existential evolution of the observer; however, in a higher step, the evolution of the observed is addressed. Relying on the words of Ibn Arabi, Mulla Sadra explains that the attachment of the body and soul is a lower level of the relation between them which is manifest in the world and the reality is that the souls that have a body in the world, become corporeal in the Hereafter and the bodies that have souls in the world, become spiritual in the Hereafter; however, in the world, souls are dependent on bodies and do not become embodied and bodies too are dependent on souls and are not spiritual. In reality, this view has been adopted from the words of the mystics, particularly Ibn Arabi and his followers regarding the manifestation of a mystical state in man known as "spiritualization" (tarawhun).

Regarding the spiritualization of the body according to Mulla Sadra, one must say that based on the Reality and Diluted Reality Predication which Mulla Sadra believes in regarding realities like the soul and body, the body and soul are not dual and separate realities; rather, there is a unified constitution and necessary connection between the two. on the other hand, based on substantial motion theory, if the soul has the capacity to elevate to a higher level in its substance, the body too can actualize the spirituality of its substance while preserving its materiality and without completely transferring from the material to the imaginal world. This means that the body, like the soul, has an intensive motion during which it does not leave the material world; rather, it achieves higher levels and when it does so, it will attain the capacity to be present in the Hereafter like the soul albeit with a material rank. It seems that the real unity between the body and soul remains forever and it is clear that in this becoming, some of the characteristics of the body undergo changes; however, it must be noted that these changes do not cause the body to depart from the material level and enter into the imaginal level. Regarding how this softening takes place, Mulla Sadra explains that the body has a first and second nature like the soul and in the same way that the soul attain elevation from the its primary virtues which form its first nature, the body can also elevate from its first nature which is the need for a separate agent and limitation in time and space, and become spiritual. Here, those who can traverse this path in their worldly life will be accompanied by their subtlized body in the Hereafter and these are those who will enter Paradise; however, those who have not attained this secondary nature of the body in their life, the punishments of the Hereafter will soften their material forms. Mulla Sadra considers the unsubtlized temporal body as an attributive compound and the subtlized body of the Hereafter as a result of annexative relation of spiritual essences. Even though Mulla Sadra considers the body to be spiritualized, he considers it to be a power of the soul like the mystics and believes that the illumination of a soul that is connected to the higher levels spiritualizes its apparent material existence too.

The characteristics that stem from the spiritualization of the body, according to Mulla Sadra are as follows: essential self-sufficiency and independence from a separate agent; elevation from gradual becoming and perishing; control over time and space.

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The Theoretical and Practical Forces and Their Role in the Human Rights and Duties

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Abstract

One of the intellectual foundations of the human sciences is its human dimension. In defining the normative system and the philosophy of value also, philosophical, verbal, and experimental anthropological findings are very determinative. In this article, which deals with part of this research program, the main question is: what is the role and effect of the theoretical and practical faculties of the rational soul, in the formation of the legal system of rights and human duties? The purpose of this article is to provide an answer to this question; on the one hand, it is linked to philosophical-theological studies, and on the other hand to the philosophy of value, and in particular to ethical and legal values. This review will inevitably be done in an analytical and comparative way. Given the widespread scope of this question, its territory is therefore limited to the view points of the three prominent theoreticians: *Nasir al-Din Tusi, Allamah Hilli, and Mulla Sadra*. A logical sequencedictates that, after the problem is firstly explained, its conceptual foundations should be explained, and then the reasons and the circumstances for basing each right and duty on the theoretical and practical faculties of the human soul are separately explained. The result of this study proves that without the the abovementioned faculties in the human soul, the legal system does of rights and responsibilities does not have an external referent and is not justifiable.

Keywords

Theoretical faculties, practical faculties, rights and duties, Nasir al-Din Tusi, Allamah Hilli, Mulla Sadra.

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Introduction

The dominant approach of this paper is theological anthropology. Such an anthropology regards and recognizes mankind as the object of God's act and creation, and reflects on him from various aspects in such a situation. The three-fold aspects of nature, cause(s), and circumstances of man in the formative and legal form the basis of God's formative and legal relationship with mankind. In addition to the formative and legal systems separately, the noblest Divine system must also dominate the circumstances of human formative existence and the Divine legal system devised for him. Theoretical and practical faculties are among the most influential elements in the human intellectual soul. On the other hand, the element of right and duty constitute the most fundamental elements of the Divine legal and normative system. The present paper seeks to bring to light the relation between the theoretical and practical faculties of the soul and the right and duty from the viewpoints of Nasir al-Din Tusi, Allama Hilli, and Mulla Sadra. Within the Twelver Shi'ite Islamic context, there have been several independent research studies on the human faculties of soul from the viewpoints of Shi'ite theologians and philosophers. Furthermore, there have been several general or specific studies regarding right and duty, although the background of rights-oriented studies within the Shi'ite Islamic paradigm is not as extensive as the vast spectrum of duty-oriented studies. However, it seems that there has not been any serious study on the relationship of the faculties of the human soul and his rights and duties. This research has been conducted in descriptive-analytical method.

Summary

The main question of this study concerns the effects of the theoretical and practical faculties of mankind on the legislative system of human rights and duties from the viewpoints of the three aforementioned philosophers and theologians. In other words, what efforts do the human formative findings in the context of theoretical and practical reason play in depicting the human legislative and normative system? To put it differently, based on which epistemological and behavioral anthropology has God decided the human system of right and duties? Based on the present study, the following findings have been gained: (1) according to the abovementioned theologians and philosophers, conceptions and explanations of the human theoretical and practical faculties are largely the definitions formulated by the peripatetic philosophers. (2), [2.1.] based on Avicenna's formulation and Nasir al-Din Tusi's commentary of Avicenna's views, the theoretical intellect or force has the responsibility of recognizing existence or non-existence, or in other words, the facts and categories of existence; and [2.2.] the intellect or theoretical faculty first extracts the general rules of good and evil and normative musts and must-nots based on ontological data, and then applies them to subcategories and

instances and executes them with the help of the faculty of choice and will , and motivational tools at hand. (3) Human rights are formed based on the main right that man posseses regarding reaching his goal and purpose; man's purpose and God's aim in creating him and the purpose of his life cannot be understood without having identified and appreciated the facts of the human existence and the world, . Without the existence of the practical faculty in man, it would not be possible to discover man's main right, the rights that follow from it, and the possibility of applying it to more detailed cases, and giving them practical effects. (4) Duties in private and civil modes of life are a means for achieving rights andwithout the existence of theoretical and practical faculties in man it would not be possible for man to identify, justify, and execute the duties. In other words, if the theoretical reason and the practical reason, each of which constitute an aspect or aspects of pure or comprehensive reason, would not have existed formatively in man, a legal system of rights and duties would have been impossible for man.. Therefore, according to a Divine anthropological perspective, man endowed with theoretical and practical forces with the aforementioned nature and capabilities has become the subject of a Divine normative legal system of rights and duties.

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Semantics of Complex Demonstratives

Kamran Ghayoomzadeh∗

Abstract

The semantics of complex demonstratives is one of the most important and controversial topics in philosophy of language which has never been ceased to attract philosophers' interest and attention. In this article, we will examine the most fundamental problems regarding complex demonstratives including the question of whether complex demonstratives are rigid designators and directly referential or rather, are quantified expressions. We will also examine the question that in a demonstrative like "That F", does F play any role in a successful designation of the demonstrative. The last question is whether F has any share in the proposition of the content of the sentence in which the complex demonstrative has been used. Our answer to the first question is that complex demonstratives are directly referential and rigid designators. In response to the second question we will defend the idea that having the property F is a necessary condition for the referent if the complex demonstrative is to successfully refer to it, otherwise it won't refer to anything. Lastly, our answer to the third question is that F has no share in the proposition or the content of the sentence.

Keywords

1. Introduction

One of the most important topics in philosophy of language is the semantics of language words (subject and predicate of propositions) from the logical point of view. In this topic, the semantics of singular terms (proper names and definite

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descriptions), general terms and indexicals (pronouns and special and temporal expressions), which are usually the subject, hold a special status. In literature it is usual to include with indexicals other kinds of expression which have a salient and exacting semantic feature that changes as the context of use changes; for instance, demonstratives, such as "that man" or "this man"; so complex demonstratives are a kind of these words (Indexicals). In this Article, we will examine the most fundamental problems in the semantics of complex demonstratives which philosophers of language consider as serious problems. Complex demonstratives are, syntactically, expressions like "that F" or "this F" which can denote a singular object. In these expressions "this" and "that" are demonstrative pronouns and "F" is a simple or compound noun phrase. Since these expressions could also have a non- referring use, some direct reference theorists with semantic rules limited these expressions to referring pronouns; if we accept these circumstances, then will be able to pursue these fundamental problems.

2. Foundational Problems in the Semantics of Complex Demonstratives

The principal problems can be addressed in the following three questions:

1. Are complex demonstratives rigid designators and directly referential or are they rather quantified expressions?
2. In a complex demonstrative like "That F", does F play any role in a successful designation of the demonstrative? For example, must one be a student for the demonstrative 'that student' to correctly apply to him?
3. What does F share in the content of sentences in which the complex demonstrative has been used? For example, is being a student a part of the proposition which the sentence 'that student is intelligent' states?

3. Replies

In this Article, we will respond to these issues in the following way:

1. Our answer to the first question is that complex demonstratives are directly referential and rigid designators. Nothing comes between a complex demonstrative and its meaning. And only referents of a complex demonstrative are indicated by it.
2. In response to the second question, we will defend the idea that having the property F is a necessary condition for the referent if the complex demonstrative is to successfully refer to it, otherwise it won't refer to anything. For example: in the complex demonstrative of "that F" if this expression successfully were to signify an object, the role of "F" is very important and in fact without it this complex demonstrative cannot signify

anything. And therefore, in a sentence like "that F is B" we don't have any proposition for this sentence.

3. Lastly, our answer to the third question is that F has no share in the proposition or the content of the sentence. For instance, in the sentence "that F is B", if "that F" correctly denotes an object, this sentence has a proposition but the attribute "F" has no share and role in this proposition and is not a particle of it. In fact, it is only the object (designation of "that F") that is a particle of the proposition.

4. Conclusion

In this Article, we show that complex demonstratives like proper names, definite descriptions, general names and other indexicals have exact and explicit semantics. And with this semantics we can pursue their problems like other designators. In this Article, we reply to the three basic questions with some presuppositions. Although, other possibilities can also be considered; However, we have to remember that these sets of replies and hypotheses must have consistency and coherency in order to solve some other philosophical problems as well.

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