عنوان مقاله [English]
The ideal of value free science has been at the heart of the philosophy of science and epistemology for decades, and its proponents have warned of the unfortunate consequences of this effect, arguing the necessity of scaling down the moral, social, Political, and so on. On the contrary, some have considered this ideal unattainable or inaccurate and have reported the unfortunate consequences of the lack of value for science. Inductive risk, by highlighting the potential adverse consequences of inductive epistemic error, which is a common practice in science, considers nonscientific values to be a measure of practical consequences in order to evade the available evidence. Since the science of efficiency is in practice, the process of justification will focus on practical consequences and scientist's moral and professional responsibility will require him to intervene in unscientific values to avoid possible adverse consequences. The important challenge of this argument is to extend the range of theories and assumptions to science and to bring practical and voluntary criteria into science. The link between the scientific application of science and its realism is the confusion between the two scientific and practical areas that paves the way for relativity to science.