نگاه متفاوت برنارد ویلیامز به مسئولیت اخلاقی

نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسنده

دانشگاه قم

10.22091/jptr.2020.5597.2345

چکیده

مقاله حاضر با نگاهی تحلیلی-انتقادی به بررسی دیدگاه برنارد ویلیامز در مورد مسئولیت اخلاقی می‌پردازد. در حالیکه شهودات اخلاقی ما و نظریه‌های اخلاقی‌ مبتنی بر آنها مانند کانت، بر آن است که تمام انسانها به لحاظ برخورداری یکسان از عقل و اختیار، از مسئولیت اخلاقی برابری برخوردارند یعنی تحسین و سرزنش آنها مشروط به این عناصر غیرتجربی و عمل حاصل از آنهاست، برنارد ویلیامز با نگاهی ارسطومآبانه بنیان مسئولیت اخلاقی را تجربی دانسته و با گسستن پیوند ضروری بین اختیار و مسئولیت اخلاقی، شهودات اخلاقی ما و نظریه‌ کانت و امثال آن را به چالش می‌کشد. وی با ابتکار شانس اخلاقی و استناد به آن، حتی عمل ارادی انسان را متأثر از شانس مقوم (یعنی ظرفیتها، استعدادها، و تواناییهای درونی هر فرد) و شانس منتج (یعنی عوامل مختلف روانشناختی، اجتماعی، فرهنگی، سیاسی و ... مؤثر بر نتیجه عمل) دانسته و با نقض عمل کاملا اختیاری، مسئولیت اخلاقی را مفهومی سطحی و یا ناخالص قلمداد می‌کند. وی در مواجهه با مشکل مسئولیت اخلاقی تقریری خاص از سازگارگرایی و مشروط به جدایی از شهودات اخلاقی ارائه می‌دهد. این مقاله با مقدمه‌ای درباره ویلیامز و بحث مسئولیت اخلاقی، به تبیین مفهوم و شرایط مسئولیت اخلاقی ویلیامز می‌پردازد. سپس با نقد ویلیامز بر سازگارگرایان و ناسازگارگرایان، تقریر سازگارگرایی خاص او را بیان می‌کند. در نهایت، با ارزیابی دیدگاه ویلیامز، آن را دیدگاهی به واقع جبرگرایانه و ناقض اختیار و مسئولیت اخلاقی دانسته و پایه مستندات و استدلالات آن را ضعیف می‌یابد. به همین دلیل، پذیرفتن آن را سخت و دشوار و غیرقابل دفاع می‌داند.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Bernard Williams's different view of moral responsibility

نویسنده [English]

  • Fatemeh Tamadon Fard
University of Qom
چکیده [English]

The present article studies Williams ’s view on moral responsibility with an analytical-critical look. The discussion of moral responsibility includes the definition, conditions and problem of moral responsibility. In Western philosophical texts, moral responsibility is used to mean the praise and blame of the agent by himself or others for an act he has committed. Also, according to our moral intuitions and theories such as Kant, moral responsibility is conditional on free action, and every healthy human being, due to the equal enjoyment of reason and free will, has the capacity for moral understanding and the ability to act accordingly and deserve moral praise and blame for one's actions. Thus, the foundation of moral responsibility is empirical and safe from factors beyond control, that is, luck. In addition, the problem of moral responsibility is the conflict of free will or freedom with determinism, which Different philosophers have theorized the three approaches of compatibility, incompatibility, and impossibility. Bernard Williams, a great philosopher on ethics, with an Aristotelian view, although he does not seem to define moral responsibility as opposed to what has been mentioned, offers a completely different view of the conditions and problem of moral responsibility and challenges our moral intuitions and theories such as Kant and distinguishes between morality and ethical. he considers voluntary action to be the result of delibration and intention, but, by initiating moral luck and citing to it, he even considered human voluntary action to be influenced by constitutive luck (ie, capacities, talents, and inner abilities of each person) and resultant luck (ie. various social, cultural, factors and etc. which affect the outcome of the action). Therefore, by violating a completely voluntary act, it breaks relation between freedom and moral responsibility and considers moral responsibility as a superficial or depended on luck concept and gives it an empirical basis. Faced with the problem of moral responsibility, he criticizes compatibilists and incompatibilists in three ways. According to Williams, there is a misunderstanding in the concept of blame used by compatibilitists and incompatibilitists. In addition, compatibilitists must compatibility between the three items of determinism, psychological concepts, and moral responsibility. Also, the compatibilitists did not pay attention to the difference between what free will is and the will we have. In other side, incompatibilitists have used determinism in the sense of fatalism. Finally, the incompatibilitism view fails to establish a relationship between choice, intention, and action. By claiming a compatibilitism view that is safe from these problemes, Williams argues that there is a compatibility between the three above-mentioned items if we separate ourselves from our moral intuitions and the present ethical. This article explains Williams' moral responsibility, with an introduction to Williams and moral responsibility. Then, with Williams' critique of compatibilitism and incompatibilitism, it express Williams’s compatibilitsm. Finally, by assessing Williams's view, it sees it as a truly deterministic view that violates freedom and moral responsibility and basis of its documentation and arguments is weak. For this reason, it finds out it difficult and unacceptable to accept it.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Bernard Williams
  • moral responsibility
  • free will
  • Freedom
  • voluntrary action
  • moral luck
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