عنوان مقاله [English]
In contradiction to the epistemological status of archetypes, Aristotle proposed the theory of active intellect. Peripatetics following him have had several conceptions of active intellect. Avicenna defined active intellect as an immaterial being and independent from soul, which is the last in the hierarchy of intellects and emanates cognitive and concrete forms into material world and souls. Active intellect emanates comprehended forms into capable souls which are ready to accept the emanation of active intellect through passing the stages of sensory, imaginary and intellectual abstraction. However, some of the Avicenna's intellectual foundations -such as longitudinal relationship between the stages of perception, considering science as an accident, denying the union between the intellect and the intelligible and negating substantial motion- are in contradiction to this epistemic approach and go against abstraction, so knowledge is nothing but emanation of active intellect. This necessitates accepting the independent existence of intelligibles before active intellect, or in other words, accepting archetypes in epistemic dimension, which is denied by Avicenna. Therefore, Aristotle's proposed active intellect, which was formed in contradiction to archetypes, returns into the theory of archetypes in the developmental course of philosophy.