A Critical Study of Karl Barth's Opposition to Natural Theology
Michel
Aghamalian
PhD candidate, Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
author
Amir Abbas
alizamani
Associate professor, Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran. Tehran. Iran
author
Abbas
Yazdani
Associate professor, Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran. Tehran .Iran
author
text
article
2019
per
Critical analysis of Karl Barth's opposition to natural theology shows that it is demonstrably based on a narrow understanding of natural theology and is mostly shaped through his reaction to the misuse of theological concepts during the heydays of Hitler's rule over Germany. In his increasing opposition to natural theology in its various implications and forms, Barth seems to have been basing his arguments on ontological, epistemological, biblical and practical grounds as he leaned heavily on revelation as the sole basis of all that pertains to the formation of faith and dogma. By engaging Barth in the aforementioned areas, it will be shown that Barth's arguments fall short of consistency in that they contain false designations of natural theology by focusing on a limited and out-dated version of it, an inherent vicious circularity, a highly selective interpretation of respective biblical texts as well as a fallacy of relevance. It will be argued that the concept of revealed theology is not necessarily opposed to a constructive approach to natural theology, which seeks to appreciate the manifest glory of God in creation as an unfolding secret observed and understood through the rational faculties within the human mind.
Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
University of Qom
1735-9791
21
v.
4
no.
2019
5
27
https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1411_629f72618277701d75616f447d543936.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22091/pfk.2017.2309.1702
Nihilism and Information Technology
Alireza
Mansouri
Associate Professor, philosophy of science and technology, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies,Tehran, Iran
author
Ali
Paya
Professor of Philosophy, The Islamic College (affiliated with Middlesex University), London, UK; Adjunct Professor, National Research Institute for Science Policy. Tehran. Iran
author
text
article
2019
per
Søren Kierkegaard, in his essay "The Present Age," takes a hostile stance towards the press. This is because he maintains that the press prepares the ground for the emergence of nihilism. Hubert Dreyfus extends this idea to other information technologies, especially the Internet. Since Kierkegaard-Dreyfus’ attitude towards various forms of information technology originates from philosophical anthropology and a particular conception of the meaning of life, assessing the viability of the attitude they hold requires further critical scrutiny. This paper aims to show that, although, Kierkegaard’s and Dreyfus' insights are important in understanding the dangers of information technology their approach concerning the meaning of life and human identity is a one-sided analysis of the problem situation; In particular, their reliance on "Unconditional Commitment" could bring about new undesired consequences. This paper emphasizes that an appropriate stance towards information technology needs, among other things, a richer and more effective philosophical anthropology; one that by utilizing religious-moral wisdom in a sensible manner, provides an effective way to safely benefit from various types of technology without falling into the abyss of nihilism. The paper further argues that we also need to provide an institutional control of technology through piecemeal social engineering in a democratic process.
Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
University of Qom
1735-9791
21
v.
4
no.
2019
29
54
https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1508_3ba27f9fca5b8256daab1fcd9bf89133.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22091/jptr.2019.4903.2218
Form of Life: A Foundational Concept for Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy
Asgar
Dirbaz,
Associate professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
author
Mojtaba
Tasdighi Shahrezaie
Ph.D Student, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
author
text
article
2019
per
“Form of life” is considered one of the most significant concepts in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. This term is one of his most ambiguous philosophical concepts. This paper tries to explain the specific and fundamental role of “form of life” as a cornerstone for the whole of Wittgenstein's later philosophy; a role that has not attracted much attention in Wittgenstein scholarship. From the author's perspective, describing the form of life as a condition for the possibility of language can put an end to some of the challenges in Wittgenstein's later philosophy such as Behavioralism, being trapped in general linguistic relativity and the reduction of all reality to linguistic principles. This study attempts to prove the fundamental role of this concept by studying Wittgenstein’s later position toward philosophical explanation in general and pictorial theory of language in particular, and by analyzing in detail the concept of form of life in his later works. Finally, the authors will provide a possible fifth path entitled “Phenomenological Interpretation” through a critical analysis of the four existing interpretations on the concept of form of life.
Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
University of Qom
1735-9791
21
v.
4
no.
2019
55
80
https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1509_9c7a2069f4d46c4772f7868e4606b757.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22091/jptr.2020.4800.2203
A Study and Explanation of the Teleological Theory of Mental Content with Emphasis on the Views of Dretske and Millikan
mahdi
zakeri
Associate Prof. of Philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
author
Hossein
Esfandiar
Master’s graduate, Philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
author
text
article
2019
per
One of the issues of Philosophy of Mind is the intentionality of the mind. The topic of this article is the study of the two related aspects of this issue, i.e. the possibility of intentionality and how mind content is determined in the Teleological Theory of Mental Content. According to this theory, the natural evolution of a living organism and the teleological functions based on this determines mental content and one can present a natural and physical explanation of intentionality and mental content with help from that. In this article, after explaining the foundations of this theory, i.e. realism in regards to intentionality, naturalism and the principle of natural evolution of species, we will first address two main versions of this theory, i.e. Dretske’s Indicator Semantics and Millikan Consumer Semantics and then evaluate them. The most important problem of this theory is that it cannot explain the content and meaning of philosophical and logical concepts nor non-existence concepts and therefore, it faces issues concerning the above concepts.
Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
University of Qom
1735-9791
21
v.
4
no.
2019
81
102
https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1408_64bed1c64abfefad949c1f37eeaf5882.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22091/jptr.2019.4210.2096
A Critical Study of Four Definitions of Privacy From The Viewpoint of Western Ethics
Hamid
Shahriari
Assistant Professor of Institute for Research and Development of Humanities (SAMT), Iran
author
text
article
2019
per
This article addresses four definitions of privacy. Initially, the literal meaning of privacy is mentioned; It then discusses the meaning of the term “privacy” in Ethics. The first meaning is the right to be alone and free. The second meaning of privacy is informational and is divided into two types: one is the definition based on expectation and another is a definition based on the state of awareness. The third type is the definition that defines privacy based on control. In this paper, these definitions are reviewed one by one and the limitations noted by others are expressed and evaluated. The fourth type is a multi-dimensional or clustered definition. According to this definition, we should define privacy on a descriptive rather than a normative basis and avoid using any normative concept in its definition. According to this kind of definition, we can break the concept of privacy into three independent components. These three elements are secrecy, anonymity, and loneliness. Although this definition is not devoid of deficits, it is the most comprehensive one in this article because it refers to more privacy-related features Privacy, the right to loneliness, control, anonymity, secrecy, cluster definition.
Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
University of Qom
1735-9791
21
v.
4
no.
2019
103
128
https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1405_51280ea57e4888e1658533dfa94fd4d2.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22091/jptr.2019.4639.2178
Late Islamic Philosophy and Knowledge by Presence
ُSeyed Ali
Taheri Khorramabadi
Assistant Professor, Philosophy of Science Department, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
author
text
article
2019
per
Some of the contemporary advocates of Islamic Philosophy believe that the view of the modern Islamic philosophers regarding knowledge by presence can solve some of the issues present in the theory of knowledge. The origins of this belief are probably two popular theories: Allama Tabatabai’s view that acquired knowledge comes back to knowledge by presence and Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi’s view regarding the reference of basic axioms to knowledge by presence. According to the first view, all acquired knowledge is rooted in knowledge by presence. The main issue is regarding sensory beliefs and the circumstances of the justified relationship between sensory experience on one hand and sensory beliefs on the other; however, in this theory, no explanation has been provided regarding how knowledge by presence can be converted to acquire knowledge which has been derived from it. Therefore, this view does not help in solving that important issue. Similarly, according to Ayatollah Misbah’s view, the guarantee of the validity of basic axioms is because they are based on knowledge by presence. However, various reasons show knowledge by presence cannot provide the validity guarantee for basic axioms.
Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
University of Qom
1735-9791
21
v.
4
no.
2019
129
152
https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1510_fe95a11324488010c878019a1bda1f25.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22091/jptr.2019.4351.2121
Dependency of the Mean Upon the Right Rule; A Critique of the Aristotelian Mean’s Interpretation as an Autonomous Ethical Action’s Criterion
Seyed Jamaleddin
Mirsharafoddin
PhD. Graduate in philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Iran
author
text
article
2019
per
The mean has mostly been considered in the history of Aristotelian Ethics’ commentaries as the main idea of his ethical thought so that it transformed from an ethical concept to his ethical theory. Thus, the validity of the Aristotelian ethical attitude is evaluated by the mean as the central thesis. However, it becomes apparent by pursuing the procedure of the Aristotelian investigation in the text of the Nicomachean Ethics that the mean is first presented as a possibility for the necessity of the best choice’s understanding in every given practical situation. The final signification and the substantial content of the mean is that the best choice must be chosen by every individual agent at any particular action considering all the multiple, variable and conditioned factors. Because the mean is an individual intuitive grasping, it needs a right rule; relying on which, as a universal criterion, we determine any particular mean in every special circumstance. The right rule itself consists of the right reason. Having surveyed various kinds of knowledge, Aristotle arrives at practical reason, which is an agent’s dispositional power generally and in comprehending and actualizing the best particular option particularly. The mean, therefore, depends on the right rule which itself relies on the correct reason or practical understanding (Phronesis).
Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
University of Qom
1735-9791
21
v.
4
no.
2019
153
176
https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1406_6e5c131285867c9e77b1f317d9e6cd0b.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22091/jptr.2019.4388.2129