%0 Journal Article %T The Saying/Showing Distinction in Early Wittgenstein and Its Implications %J پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی %I دانشگاه قم %Z 1735-9791 %A Morvarid, Jafar %D 2011 %\ 11/22/2011 %V 13 %N 1 %P 51-62 %! The Saying/Showing Distinction in Early Wittgenstein and Its Implications %K The Saying-Showing- Distinction %K Early Wittgenstein %K Its Implications %R 10.22091/jptr.2011.1479 %X  Jafar Morvarid[1]  In this paper, I shall try to clarify the saying/showing distinction and to emphasize the role of this distinction in constructing a coherent picture of language and the world. In order to properly understand the differences between the sayable and the showable, I will throw light on the limits of language and the world. I will explain why it is impossible to say the showable and why it leads to non-sense. I will elucidate the relation between mysticism and the saying/showing distinction and show that both of them are better understood in light of Wittgenstein's solipsism. I will explain how Wittgenstein's transcendental solipsism is different from classical solipsism and how the former leads to pure realism. At several points, I will use the Kantian framework to explain Wittgenstein's view, especially when justifying Wittgenstein's realism. [1]. Assitant Professor , Ferdowsi University of Mashhad %U https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1479_68eb73b9c4ca8966d4540d30525da685.pdf