University of Qom Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 1735-9791 10 3 2009 05 22 The Paradox of the Determination of Bound The Paradox of the Determination of Bound 41 60 209 10.22091/pfk.2009.209 FA Mohammad Reza Abdoll
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h Nasri 0009-0005-0285-491X Journal Article 2015 08 15 Based on the description of the real structure of our conception of the world, P. F. <br />Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics, similar to Kant’s empirical Realism, deals with <br />determining the limitations of empirical knowledge of the world. In this case, Kant’s <br />transcendental Idealism seems to be an incoherent doctrine which can yield a <br />skepticism which the critical philosophy seeks to solve. Strawson rejects Kant’s <br />Transcendental Idealism in that it considers two limits, which leads to the paradox of <br />delimitation. Yet, the question is: Can Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics depict the <br />limitations of our knowledge without considering both limits? It seems that he has <br />adopted a language that chains us to some metaphysical constraint, which is opposed <br />to the sketch of the descriptive metaphysics. Thus, he is engaged in the same <br />paradox which he discovered in Kant. It seems that thinking on the limit is <br />essentially paradoxical; so skepticism can not be solved by appealing to it. <br />  Based on the description of the real structure of our conception of the world, P. F. <br />Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics, similar to Kant’s empirical Realism, deals with <br />determining the limitations of empirical knowledge of the world. In this case, Kant’s <br />transcendental Idealism seems to be an incoherent doctrine which can yield a <br />skepticism which the critical philosophy seeks to solve. Strawson rejects Kant’s <br />Transcendental Idealism in that it considers two limits, which leads to the paradox of <br />delimitation. Yet, the question is: Can Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics depict the <br />limitations of our knowledge without considering both limits? It seems that he has <br />adopted a language that chains us to some metaphysical constraint, which is opposed <br />to the sketch of the descriptive metaphysics. Thus, he is engaged in the same <br />paradox which he discovered in Kant. It seems that thinking on the limit is <br />essentially paradoxical; so skepticism can not be solved by appealing to it. <br />  https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_209_af6a0cb89a7ffe14ecc59edddebaf405.pdf