دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 25 3 2023 11 24 Further Reflections on Lemos’s Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Action Further Reflections on Lemos’s Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Action 119 130 2622 10.22091/jptr.2023.9722.2929 FA Ishtiyaque Haji Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, Canada 0000-0000-0000-0000 Journal Article 2023 07 29 John Lemos defends an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will that is a variant of event-causal libertarian views. Many argue that these views are susceptible to the luck problem: an agent’s directly free choices are too luck infected for the agent to be morally responsible for them. The weightings model supposedly escapes this problem largely because in this model an agent’s reasons for choices do not come with pre-established values. Rather, an agent performs intentional acts of weighting that contribute to the value she assigns to her reasons. Decisions that are consequences of weightings are, thus, under the agent’s control and not subject to luck. In a recent paper, I argued that despite its weighting component, Lemos’s model succumbs to the luck problem. Lemos rejoins that my criticisms are based on misunderstandings and confusions. I deflect the charge of misperception and explain why the weightings model remains susceptible to the luck problem. John Lemos defends an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will that is a variant of event-causal libertarian views. Many argue that these views are susceptible to the luck problem: an agent’s directly free choices are too luck infected for the agent to be morally responsible for them. The weightings model supposedly escapes this problem largely because in this model an agent’s reasons for choices do not come with pre-established values. Rather, an agent performs intentional acts of weighting that contribute to the value she assigns to her reasons. Decisions that are consequences of weightings are, thus, under the agent’s control and not subject to luck. In a recent paper, I argued that despite its weighting component, Lemos’s model succumbs to the luck problem. Lemos rejoins that my criticisms are based on misunderstandings and confusions. I deflect the charge of misperception and explain why the weightings model remains susceptible to the luck problem. https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2622_dd9c333cff4ac08cc6948543886e8e2e.pdf