University of Qom Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 1735-9791 26 1 2024 04 01 Evaluating Strong Emergentism: An Argument for Non-Physical Substential Strong Emergentism Evaluating Strong Emergentism: An Argument for Non-Physical Substential Strong Emergentism 67 84 2773 10.22091/jptr.2024.10175.2983 FA Mohammad Mehdipour PhD of Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran 0009-0009-5241-6503 Abdolrasoul Kashfi Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran 0000-0002-5702-2281 Journal Article 2023 12 09 Physicalists and dualists have been unable to give a convincing answer to the mind-body problem, because they sacrifice, respectively, the mental causation and the close relationship between mind and body. Consequently, some recent philosophers, like Timothy O'Connor and Jonathan Jacobs, have turned to the idea of strong emergentism considereing the mind as an emergent but physical substance that has independent causal powers. If this answer is defensible, it will be a promising approach to solve the mind-body problem. However, there are significant challenges facing the idea of strong emergentism. In this article, we have two objectives: firstly, to address these challenges and to show that even the most serious one, the Collapse Problem, cannot threaten a particular understanding of strong emergentism. Secondly, we argue that O'Connor and Jacobs's proposal, although thought-provoking, is not comprehensible and can only be understood clearly when we consider the emergent substance to be not merely physical. Physicalists and dualists have been unable to give a convincing answer to the mind-body problem, because they sacrifice, respectively, the mental causation and the close relationship between mind and body. Consequently, some recent philosophers, like Timothy O'Connor and Jonathan Jacobs, have turned to the idea of strong emergentism considereing the mind as an emergent but physical substance that has independent causal powers. If this answer is defensible, it will be a promising approach to solve the mind-body problem. However, there are significant challenges facing the idea of strong emergentism. In this article, we have two objectives: firstly, to address these challenges and to show that even the most serious one, the Collapse Problem, cannot threaten a particular understanding of strong emergentism. Secondly, we argue that O'Connor and Jacobs's proposal, although thought-provoking, is not comprehensible and can only be understood clearly when we consider the emergent substance to be not merely physical. https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2773_b42416c4eea101ed6d2509a7768714cc.pdf