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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه قم</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>1735-9791</Issn>
				<Volume>26</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>01</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Consciousness, subjective facts and physicalism – 50 years since Nagel’s bat.</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Consciousness, Subjective Facts, and Physicalism – Fifty Years since Nagel’s Bat</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>20</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>5</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">2877</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22091/jptr.2024.10424.3021</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Robert</FirstName>
					<LastName>Van Gulick</LastName>
<Affiliation>Professor, Philosophy Department, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, US.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0000-0000-0001</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>02</Month>
					<Day>20</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>The existence of subjective facts in the epistemic sense defined by Thomas Nagel’s famous article, “What is like to be a bat?”, might be taken to support an anti-physicalist conclusion. I argue that it does not. The combination of nonreductive physicalism and teleo-pragmatic functionalism is not only consistent with such subjective facts but predicts their existence. The notion that conscious minds are self-understanding autopoietic systems plays a key role in the argument. Global Neuronal Workspace theory is assessed in terms of its potential to answer David Chalmers’ Hard Problem of consciousness. A suggestion is made for augmenting the theory that involves another sense in which facts about conscious experience are subjective. The idea of conscious minds as self-understanding systems again plays an important role.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">The existence of subjective facts in the epistemic sense defined by Thomas Nagel’s famous article, “What is it like to be a bat?” might be taken to support an anti-physicalist conclusion. I argue that it does not. The combination of nonreductive physicalism and teleo-pragmatic functionalism is not only consistent with such subjective facts but predicts their existence. The notion that conscious minds are self-understanding autopoietic systems plays a key role in the argument. Global Neuronal Workspace Theory is assessed in terms of its potential to answer David Chalmers’ Hard Problem of consciousness. A suggestion is made for augmenting the theory that involves another sense in which facts about conscious experience are subjective. The idea of conscious minds as self-understanding systems again plays an important role.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">consciousness</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">subjective facts</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">physicalism</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">self-understanding</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2877_385a85fa06b27c30ee8731f7a365cab7.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
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