دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 28 1 2026 03 21 Peripatetic philosophy, Transcendent Philosophy, essential possibility, ontological poverty, God, Necessary Being, contingent being, infinite regress. Reexamining Ibn Sīnā's Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn: A Defense of the Avicennian Formulation Against the Critiques of Transcendent Philosophy 39 58 4400 10.22091/jptr.2026.15280.3508 FA محمد شفیعی دانشجوی دکتری، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران 0009-0006-2226-9678 محمد ذبیحی استاد گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران. 0000-0002-5749-0261 Journal Article 2026 02 04 The Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn, the most rigorous argument for God's existence in Islamic philosophy, has been formulated in various ways. After Mullā Ṣadrā, his formulation gained prominence, while Ibn Sīnā's original version faced three main criticisms from Transcendent Philosophy: that it is purely conceptual, that it relies on the refutation of infinite regress, and that it lacks distinction from the argument from essential possibility. This article reexamines Ibn Sīnā's formulation and defends its originality and sufficiency against these critiques. Through an analytical study of his primary texts, the article demonstrates that the charge of conceptuality arises from preconceptions about Ibn Sīnā's philosophy rather than a neutral reading of his work; that the proof does not depend on refuting infinite regress; and that it is an argument from existential poverty fundamentally distinct from essential possibility. The study further shows that Ibn Sīnā's proof satisfies all four criteria of the Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn: proceeding within the reality of existence, using self-evident premises, establishing the divine attributes, and requiring no appeal to divine acts. The article concludes that Ibn Sīnā's formulation does not fundamentally differ from Mullā Ṣadrā's and should be regarded as an authentic precursor to the proof in the fifth century AH. The Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn, the most rigorous argument for God's existence in Islamic philosophy, has been formulated in various ways. After Mullā Ṣadrā, his formulation gained prominence, while Ibn Sīnā's original version faced three main criticisms from Transcendent Philosophy: that it is purely conceptual, that it relies on the refutation of infinite regress, and that it lacks distinction from the argument from essential possibility. This article reexamines Ibn Sīnā's formulation and defends its originality and sufficiency against these critiques. Through an analytical study of his primary texts, the article demonstrates that the charge of conceptuality arises from preconceptions about Ibn Sīnā's philosophy rather than a neutral reading of his work; that the proof does not depend on refuting infinite regress; and that it is an argument from existential poverty fundamentally distinct from essential possibility. The study further shows that Ibn Sīnā's proof satisfies all four criteria of the Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn: proceeding within the reality of existence, using self-evident premises, establishing the divine attributes, and requiring no appeal to divine acts. The article concludes that Ibn Sīnā's formulation does not fundamentally differ from Mullā Ṣadrā's and should be regarded as an authentic precursor to the proof in the fifth century AH. https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_4400_07d70b97e70aaa1f85411a26214a29d3.pdf