دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 22 4 2020 12 21 The Libertarian Approaches in Response to the Luck Argument رویکردهای اختیارگرایان در پاسخ به استدلال شانس 5 26 1788 10.22091/jptr.2020.5090.2253 FA جمال کدخداپور دکتری فلسفه تطبیقی دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8219-5718 عسگر دیرباز دانشیار گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران. 0000-0001-9615-7245 Journal Article 2019 12 30 The argument that free will and indeterminism are incompatible is known as the Luck Argument. This argument has been put forward against the libertarians who deny determinism to prove free will. The basic idea of the argument is that in an undetermined world, free will cannot be imagined. There are various formulations for this argument. They all seek to explain why, if the choice is undetermined, it is by chance; but the focus of this article is on the explanatory formulation. The basic idea of this formulation is that in undetermined situations, there is no contrastive explanation and in this case, there is no free will. This argument is formulated as follows: If a choice is undetermined, it means that it is possible to make a different choice by assuming the past before the choice is completely identical. If it is possible to make different choices (different futures) with the same past, it is not possible to provide a contrastive explanation for the choice. If there is no contrastive explanation for choice, then that choice is by chance. If a choice happens by chance, it's not free. Therefore, if a choice is undetermined, it is not free. Libertarian responses to this argument can be divided into three main categories. The first group confesses that the argument is question-begging. The main contention is that since only in determined situations is it possible to have contrastive explanations, it is impossible to seek them for undetermined situations. However, this is not the case in this particular case, and the claim is another form of the combination of the first and second premises. The second group of responses to the Luck Argument focusing on the third premise of the argument argues that although there is no contrastive explanation for undetermined choices, another type of explanation which is non-contrastive is possible. In this case, the choice is no longer by chance and it is free. But it seems that non-contrastive explanations are not sufficient for explaining undetermined choices. The third answer claims that it is not that we do not have contrastive explanations for all undetermined situations, and that there is a contrastive explanation at least for some undetermined choices. In fact, this group argues that the combination of the first and second premise of the Luck Argument – that if a choice is undetermined, there is no contradictory explanation - is wrong. Among the different perspectives of this category, is the focus on describing and evaluating Clark's response. He proposes different scenarios to answer this argument. Their evaluation shows that in the first and second scenarios, there was a different definition of indeterminism and although at first glance, they were considered a response to the Luck Argument, the evil consequence of this presupposition and its incompatibility with free choices has been explained. Clark's third scenario is consistent with the definition of indeterminism that the Luck Argument had in the first premise, but Clark himself also acknowledges that we have no contrastive explanations for such situations. Taken together, with all of these scenarios, Clark's attempt to illustrate the contrast between undetermined choices seems to have failed. In conclusion, Evaluation of the three responses presented in the explanatory formulation of the Luck Argument shows that they have failed to solve the problem and explaining free will in undetermined situations continues to be challenging. اختیارگرایان، معتقدند تنها در یک جهان نامتعیّن است که می‌‌توان انسان را دارای ارادۀ آزاد دانست‌‌، اما نامتعیّن بودن جهان منجر به شانسی و اتفاقی شدن امور آن و نفی ارادۀ آزاد می‌شود. بنابراین، «استدلال شانس» مهم‌ترین مشکل اختیارگرایان است. پاسخ‌‌های آنان در برابر صورت‌‌بندی تبیینی این استدلال را به سه دسته می‌‌توان تقسیم کرد. دسته اول، به مصادره به مطلوب بودن این استدلال قائلند و تبیین تقابلی را تنها برای انتخاب‌‌های متعیّن ممکن می‌‌دانند و طلب آن را از موقعیت‌های نامتعیّن، غیر منطقی و دوری می‌‌دانند. گروه دوم، باور دارند با این ‌که برای انتخاب‌‌های نامتعیّن تبیین تقابلی نداریم، اما می‌‌توان آزادی کُنش‌گر در انتخاب‌‌های نامتعیّن را با تبیین غیر تقابلی توضیح داد. دسته سوم، با ارائهٔ مثال‌هایی در صدد ارائهٔ تبیین تقابلی برای برخی از انتخاب‌‌های نامتعیّن بر‌آمده‌اند؛ در این صورت، شانسی دانستن انتخاب‌‌های نامتعیّن و نفی ارادۀ آزاد در چنین شرایطی رد می‌‌شود. در این مقاله بعد از مقدمه‌‌ای در باب چیستی اِشکال شانس، به انواع صورت‌‌بندی آن و پاسخ‌های اختیارگرایان به صورت تبیینی این استدلال پرداخته و در نهایت‌‌، به این نتیجه می‌‌رسیم که اختیارگرایان از عهدهٔ پاسخ به این اِشکال بر نیامده‌‌اند و «اِشکال شانس» هنوز به صورت چالشی حل ناشده پیشِ روی آنهاست.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1788_46954fdfa7dbcd1e1d5841d4133bf3d9.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 22 4 2020 12 21 A Study and Explanation of the Theory of General Justice in the View of St. Thomas Aquinas بررسی و تبیین نظریهٔ عدالتِ عام در دیدگاه توماس آکوئیناس 27 49 1790 10.22091/jptr.2020.5516.2322 FA عبدالله عابدی فر دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه اخلاق دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران. محسن جوادی استاد گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی دانشگاه قم ، قم، ایران. 0000-0003-4537-0518 Journal Article 2020 05 11 General Justice is a virtue that leads people to the community order and goods through which they can achieve well-being. This article explains the theory of general justice from the perspective of Aquinas and examines the common good and its role as the subject of general justice in directing and regulating the law. Aquinas counts general justice with the influence of Aristotle and Christian theology as a general virtue that has a particular subject, i.e., the common good. General Justice is the same as virtue which is the same in substance but different in concept. The theory of general justice according to Aquinas is both a kind of legal debt that obliges a person to obey the law and a kind of moral debt that obliges a person to observe the virtue of moral virtue. Aquinas’ theory of general justice finds meaning in societies that meet the criterion of general justice if the ruler formulates a positive law according to divine law and natural law. Thus this theory ultimately depends on the intentions of the ruler and the type of government that lead individuals to a common good in society and well-being. The purpose of this article is to explain the theory of general justice from the perspective of Aquinas and to examine the common good and its role as the subject of general justice in the regulation of law. To achieve goods, we can consider three types of command in the community, which correspond to three types of justice. One commands the components among themselves; another commands the whole to the components and command the components to the whole. Commutative justice is a virtue that regulates the goods of the components among themselves. Distributive justice is a virtue that regulates the goods of the whole into its components. Finally, general justice regulates the goods of the components into the goods of the whole. General Justice is more important than these two virtues of justice because the subject of general justice is the common good. The common good is a kind of order that is necessary for human society so that human beings can achieve their moral, political, and legal goals. The virtues that are private to the individual when they occur in society are directed to the common good through general justice; therefore, general justice is a general virtue. In Aquinas’s works can find different interpretations of general justice being a general virtue. In this article, it is shown that Aquinas’ theory of general justice finds meaning in societies that meet the criterion of general justice if the ruler formulates a positive law according to divine law and natural law. When the rulers and the government are properly instructed to act according to the principles of this society, both the government and the rulers achieve their goal of common good and well-being. When we consider God’s commandments to be the criterion of the common good, then the ruler must be able to interpret the divine law correctly. عدالتِ عام فضیلتی است که افراد را به نظم و خیرات جمعی دعوت می‌کند تا به‌وسیله آن به سعادت برسند. مقالۀ حاضر به بررسی و تبیین نظریۀ عدالتِ عام و خیر مشترک و نقش آن در جهت‌دهی و تنظیم قانون از دیدگاه توماس آکوئیناس می‌پردازد. آکوئیناس - با تأسی از ارسطو و الهیات مسیحی‌‌ - عدالتِ عام را فضیلتی عام می‌‌داند که دارای موضوع خاص، یعنی «خیر مشترک» است. عدالتِ عام همان فضیلت است که از جهت محتوا و جوهر با فضیلتْ یکسان و از جهت مفهوم یا صورت با آن متفاوت است. نظریهٔ عدالتِ عام در آکوئیناس‌‌‌‌ هم به‌‌نوعی دِین قانونی(الزام به رعایت قانون جامعه) را فرمان می‌‌دهد و هم به ‌نوعی دِین اخلاقی(الزام به رعایت فضیلت اخلاقی) را در دستور کار خود دارد. این نظریه مدِّ نظر آکوئیناس‌‌‌‌ در جامعه‌‌ای معنا پیدا می‌‌کند که در آن اگر حاکم قانون وضعی را بر اساس قانون الهی و قانون طبیعی درستْ تدوین و ترویج کند، معیار این نظریه را برآورده می‌‌کند. بنا‌براین‌‌، نظریهٔ عدالتِ عام - در نهایت - به ‌قصد حاکم و نوع حکومتی وابسته است که در آن جامعه در جریان است تا افراد را به خیرات مشترکشان هدایت کنند و به سعادت حقیقی‌‌شان برساند.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1790_8729235ba4b39fa69ed6890309c1852c.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 22 4 2020 12 21 An Appraisal of Rorty’s Approach to Epistemology from a Critical Rationalist Perspective ارزیابی رویکرد ریچارد رورتی به معرفت‌شناسی بر اساس آموزه‌‌های عقلانیت نقّاد 51 70 1785 10.22091/jptr.2020.5559.2336 FA مصطفی شعبانی دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه علم و فناوری، پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، تهران، ایران 0000-0002-8391-980X علیرضا منصوری دانشیار گروه فلسفه علم و فناوری، پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، تهران، ایران 0000-0003-1488-5754 Journal Article 2020 05 22 A large part of Richard Rorty’s works focus on criticizing the received view about philosophy. He argues, in his historical reconstruction of philosophical activity, that there has always been a misconception about philosophy in the history of philosophy. This misconception assumes that philosophy aims to grasp the ultimate knowledge, so it desperately engages in an attempt to achieve “truth”. In this view, which he calls representationalism and points to it by the metaphor of the mirror of nature, knowledge aims to represent something out of mind, and the duty of philosophy is to put forward a theory about the representation. According to Rorty, based on this popular view philosophy is a foundational discipline that aims to evaluate epistemological claims of other disciplines. Rorty attempts to criticize and reject this Cartesian epistemological agenda for philosophy. Rorty’s approach to philosophy is therapeutic, that is, he tries to resolve philosophical problems rather than solving them. By adopting a historical method, Rorty seeks to show that “philosophy as epistemology” is a result of the dominance of what he calls the metaphor of the mirror of nature. From a critical rationalist perspective, the present article intends to critique Rorty’s views on epistemology. In this paper, Rorty’s historiographical approach is criticized in several ways. First, Rorty offers a one-sided and biased reconstruction of the history of philosophy to fit the abovementioned metaphor. Secondly, he treats history as rigid data from which it is possible to draw doctrinal conclusions. Whereas, as critical rationalists have said time and again, history by itself has no meaning. Moreover, Rorty's justificationism is criticized. Rorty maintains that knowledge needs to be justified, and since it cannot be justified through representation, it must be justified by the consent of a society. In other words, agreement in a group of people can provide an epistemic authority. Thus, both Rorty’s view and foundationalism, despite their differences, share on justificationism in epistemology. That is, they both believe that knowledge needs to be justified. On the other hand, as critical rationalists have shown, justification in any shape and form, whether internal or external, is neither possible nor necessary. We also attempt to illustrate how Rorty’s epistemological approach results in confusion between epistemology and psychology; moreover, his epistemological behaviorism still suffers from some sort of justificationism. In conclusion, Rorty expresses his critique of epistemology with the metaphor of the mirror of nature. According to him, foundationalism is the result of the conflation of the Platonic conception of knowledge as something unchangeable, with the Cartesian mind that seeks certainty. However, his ignorance of the main crux of the matter in epistemology causes his own suggestion of epistemological behaviorism to suffer from the same problem, that is, justification, which now appears in another form, i.e., social consensus. While, as critical rationalists repeated time and again, justification is neither possible nor necessary and not even desirable. They have shown that a non-justificationist approach to knowledge aimed at truth as a regulative idea could be a better suggestion. به اعتقاد ریچارد رورتی، همواره یک تلقی نادرست از فلسفه وجود داشته است که هدف فلسفه را دستیابی به دانشی جاودان و گرفتار تلاشی مذبوحانه برای رسیدن به هدفی به نام «‌حقیقت‌» یا «‌واقعیت‌» می‌شمارد. او با استفاده از استعارۀ ادراکی «آینۀ طبیعت» معرفت‌شناسی بعد از دکارت را حول دو محور مبناگرایی و بازنمودگرایی نقد کرده و رویکرد بدیلی با عنوان «رفتارگرایی معرفت‌شناختی» ارائه می‌کند. رورتی هدف خود را نه ارائۀ راه حل‌هایی برای مسائل فلسفی، بلکه کنار گذاشتن این گونه از فلسفه‌ورزی می‌داند. در مقالۀ حاضر با تکیه بر آموزه‌های عقلانیت نقّاد، ضمن نقد رویکرد تاریخ‌نگارانۀ رورتی نشان داده می‌شود که بازسازی او از تاریخ فلسفه یک‌جانبه است. به علاوه موجّه‌گرایی رورتی مورد نقد قرار می‌گیرد. دیدگاه مبناگرایانه و دیدگاه رورتی با وجود تفاوت‌‌هایی که با هم دارند هر دو به رویکرد موجّه‌‌گرایانه در معرفت‌‌شناسی تعلق دارند، به این معنا که معرفت را نیازمند توجیه می‌انگارند؛ در حالی‌که - چنان‌که عقل‌گرایان نقّاد نشان داده‌اند - موجّه‌‌سازی - چه درونی و چه بیرونی‌‌ - نه ممکن است و نه لازم. در واقع، او بین معرفت‌شناسی و روان‌شناسی خلط کرده و افزون بر این، به دلیل غفلت از معرفت‌شناسی غیرموجّه‌گرا، پیشنهاد ایجابی او، یعنی رفتارگرایی معرفت‌شناسانه‌‌، نیز دچار معضل موجّه‌گرایانه است.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1785_8df91d78af2ab91e18ee2128d33842dc.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 22 4 2020 12 21 The Place of Ethical Subjectivism in Nietzsche and Levinas’s Thought جایگاه سوبژکتیویسم اخلاقی در اندیشۀ نیچه و لویناس 71 91 1789 10.22091/jptr.2020.5675.2359 FA بیان کریمی پژوهشگر فرادکتری، دانشکدۀ زبان و ادبیات خارجی‌‌، دانشگاه تبریز‌‌، تبریز‌‌، ایران. 0000000000000000 محمد اصغری دانشیار گروه فلسفه‌‌، دانشکدۀ زبان و ادبیات خارجی‌‌، دانشگاه تبریز‌‌، تبریز‌‌، ایران. 0000-0003-3874-4702 Journal Article 2020 06 24 Nietzsche and Levinas are the most prominent contemporary philosophers who have emphasized on the necessity of passing over rational subjectivity. They tried to rethink the meaning of ethics in a world where neither religion nor other moral philosophies could create a strict and reliable source for the crisis of the contemporary human being. In an attempt to overcome rational subjectivism, Nietzsche and Levinas redefined concepts such as morality and the subject. The purpose of the paper is to describe the attitudes of Nietzsche and Levinas towards their critiques of rational subjectivism. Then examine Nietzsche’s naturalistic reading and Levinas’ transcendental reading of the subject and their encounter with the other and also introduce their critiques of traditional ethics and propose a new kind of ethics in their thoughts. We will then evaluate their alternative concepts in the problem of overcoming rational subjectivism and finally, we will compare these two attitudes. Although Nietzsche and Levinas initially adopted common points of view for the critique of subjectivism and traditional ethics and common criticisms in the field, they presented different results, goals, and methods. Based on these approaches, each has proposed different principles and conclusions about ethics and overcoming rational subjectivism. Nietzsche’s problem is the genealogy of values, and Levinas’s question is the possibility of a moral condition. The answer to the first question is not related to the second question. The present paper shows that both Levinas and Nietzsche have presented different insights into the meaning of subjectivity. Their efforts to find the meaning of subjectivity have also been accompanied by the necessity to destruct the meaning of morality. Accordingly, by focusing on the overman (Nietzsche) and the other (Levinas), they have sought to reevaluate values (Nietzsche) and asymmetric moral responsibility (Levinas). In this regard, they have adopted a completely different view from the traditional view of ethics. Although both of them start with a common point of view, their methods, interpretations, and results are different. With a genealogical approach, Nietzsche considered the will of power in the active subject and the birth of the overman to be desirable and practical to end the history of the development of nihilism. And Levinas, with a phenomenological approach to the concept of asymmetric responsibility in the passive subject, has put an end to the history of neglect of the other and rational subjectivism. The final suggestion is that Nietzsche and Levinas are both looking for a new meaning of morality that resides not in the mind but in the body. In Levinas, the relationship between the body and morality is evolving and transcendental, with concepts of responsibility and suffering, but in Nietzsche, this kind of connection fluctuates between naturalistic and transcendentalist views and considers the concepts of power and instinct important. Nietzsche’s attitude about the human being is a combination of a naturalistic and over-humanist approach, and with the precedence of selfhood, he has expressed a negative view of the other. However, Levinas’ philosophy is more humanistic and inter-subjectivity because of ethical ideals, and ethics begin with recognition of the priority of the other. نیچه و لویناس از برجسته‌‌ترین فیلسوفان معاصر هستند که بر ضرورت گذر از سوبژکتیویسم عقلانی تأکید کرده‌‌اند. آن‌‌ها به دنبال تلاش برای اندیشۀ دوباره در باب معنای اخلاق در جهانی بودند که نه دین و نه فلسفه‌‌های اخلاقی دیگر نمی‌‌توانستند مراجع یقینی و محکمی را برای بحران انسان معاصر ایجاد کنند. لویناس و نیچه هر دو در تلاش برای معنای سوبژکتیویته، بینش‌‌های مختلفی ارائه کرده‌‌اند و تلاش آن‌‌ها در یافتن معنای سوبژکتیویته با ضرورت واسازی معنای اخلاق نیز همراه بوده است. بر همین اساس، با محور قرار دادن ابَرانسان (نیچه) و دیگری (لویناس) به جست‌وجوی باز ارزش‌گذاریِ ارزش‌‌ها (نیچه) و مسئولیت اخلاقی نامتقارن (لویناس) پرداخته و در این راستا، نگاه کاملاً متفاوتی با نگاه سنّتی به اخلاق اتخاذ کرده‌‌اند. برغم آن که این دو فیلسوفْ با نقطه نظرهای مشترکی آغاز می‌‌کنند‌‌، اما روش‌‌‌‌، تفسیر و نتایجشان با هم متفاوت است. نیچه با رویکردی تبارشناسانه‌‌، ارادهٔ قدرت در سوژه فعّال و تولد ابَرانسان را به قصد پایان دادن به تاریخ بسط نیهیلیسمْ مطلوب و عملی شمرده و لویناس با رویکردی پدیدارشناسانه و با طرح مفهوم «مسئولیت نامتقارن» در سوژه منفعل‌‌، پایان تاریخ غفلت از دیگری و سوبژکتیویسم عقلانی را مطرح کرده است. پیشنهاد نهایی این است که نگرش‌‌های نیچه دربارۀ انسان ترکیبی از رویکرد طبیعی‌‌گرایانه و فراانسان‌‌گرایانه است و با تقدم خودگزینی‌‌، نگاهی منفی به دیگری ابراز کرده است؛ در حالی که فلسفۀ لویناس انسان‌‌گرایانه‌‌ و بیناذهنی است و اخلاق با بازشناسی تقدم دیگری آغاز می‌‌شود.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1789_82c3bdffe77241a59c9ee0334fd2c9a2.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 22 4 2020 12 21 Qualitative Identity; A New Approach in the Combine of the Theory of Shabah Al-Mohaki and Wojud Al-Zehni این‌همانیِ عرفی؛ رویکردی نو در جمع میان نظریۀ شَبَح مُحاکی و وجودِ ذهنی 93 113 1787 10.22091/jptr.2020.5452.2321 FA حجت ایمانی کیا دکترای فلسفه، پژوهشگر گروه حکمت و کلام، پژوهشکده اسلام تمدنی، پژوهشگاه علوم و فرهنگ اسلامی، مشهد، ایران 0000-0002-0048-2578 فاطمه انصاری دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه اسلامی، دانشگاه ادیان و مذاهب، قم، ایران. Journal Article 2020 05 11 The purpose of the present study is to combine the two theories of Shabah al-Mohaki (the representative image), and Wojud al-Zehni (the mental existence). In the context of Islamic philosophy, the relationship between mental and external realities has been a controversial issue among philosophers. It is well known that proponents of Shabah al-Mohaki believe that there is a dissimilarity between mental and external realities, and their rivals, the proponents of mental existence, believe that there is an essential identity between mental and external realities. This group claims that objects have two types of existence; "objective" which is the same reality in the external world, and “subjective” which is called "mental existence". It seems that in their view, subjective and objective realities are numerically identical. The representative theorists on the other side reject this claim. By investigating and analyzing the texts of the two theories, the author found that the two speak of identity but qualitative and not numerical identity. As far as the mental existence theory is concerned, when we analyze the claim of mental existence theorists and numerical identity, it turns out that they do not say anything better and more than what representative theorists claim. This analysis is done through the two principles of indiscernibility of identicals and identity of indiscernibles. According to the first, if two things are identical then they must be not be different from one another with respect to all of their properties. The principle speaks of numerical identity. The second principle (although it is controversial) states that if two things have the same properties in every respect then they are identical. This principle does not have the logical truth and speaks of qualitative identity. If one considers the case of mental existence, the claim that mental existence and objective reality are numerically identical, then he identifies that these two are not only identical but they have different properties. For instance, the subjective reality such as the image of a book or fire has the property of being mental and the objective reality of that image, the book or fire in the external world, has the property of being external. This shows that they are two different things because they have different properties. Therefore, the only way to say that these two are the same (identical), is that they are qualitatively but not numerically, identical. On the other side, the identity claim (qualitative identity) between subjective and objective realities is found in the texts of proponents of representative theorists. For instance, Shamsuddin Isfahani argues that what is ascribed to mental existence is an image of objective reality and the image of that particular object is contrary to the objective reality itself, although in some respects it is identical to that external reality in such a way that what is obtained from the object in the mind is the same as the external reality. This shows that representative theorists also accept the claim of identity in some respect but qualitative and not numerical identity between subjective and objective reality. دو نظریۀ شَبَح مُحاکی و وجود ذهنی در مسئلۀ رابطه صورت ذهنی با واقعیّتِ خارجی‌‌، رقیب یک‌دیگرند. اگر چه برخی عباراتِ طرفداران نظریهٔ شَبَح مُحاکی حاکی از آن است که صورت ذهنی با واقعیّتِ خارجی این‌همانی نداشته و بلکه تباین دارد‌‌، امّا با استناد به برخی عباراتِ دیگر‌‌، می‌توان گفت که هواداران این نظریه، این‌همانی صورت ذهنی با واقعیّتِ خارجی را قبول دارند. از سویی‌‌، هوادارن نظریهٔ وجود ذهنی، بر این ادعا هستند که این‌همانیِ ماهوی میان صورت ذهنی با واقعیت خارجی برقرار است. با تحلیلِ مفهومِ این‌همانیِ ماهوی و نیز با تمرکز بر دو اصل تمایزناپذیریِ این‌همان‌ها و این‌همانیِ تمایزناپذیرها‌‌، روشن می‌شود که اولاً، ادّعای این‌همانیِ ماهوی در نظریۀ وجود ذهنی گزاره‌ای تحلیلی و همان‌گویانه است و یا دست‌کم مقصود آنان را نمی‌رساند و ثانیاً، در نهایت‌‌، منظورِ طرفدارانِ آن‌‌، همان ادّعای طرفدارانِ شَبَح مُحاکی است. در این پژوهش - با روش توصیفی۔تحلیلی و به شیوه‌ای نو - نشان داده شده است که ادّعای این‌همانیِ صورت ذهنی با واقعیّتِ خارجی از منظر هر دو دیدگاهِ پیش‌گفته درست است، امّا‌‌ منظورِ هردو دیدگاه از این‌همانیِ صورت ذهنی با واقعیّت خارجی‌‌، این‌همانیِ عرفی بوده است و نه این‌همانیِ عددی.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1787_ba2190943cc3eb09d1c3f181f89ab2dd.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 22 4 2020 12 21 A Critique and Evaluation of the Methodological Foundations of Open Theism According to Clark Pinnock نقد و ارزیابی مبانی روش‌‌شناختی الهیات گشوده با تبیین دیدگاه کلارک پیناک 115 1136 1786 10.22091/jptr.2020.5974.2395 FA محمد ابراهیم ترکمانی دانشجوی دکتری کلام امامیه، دانشگاه قرآن و حدیث، قم، ایران 0000-0001-5237-5769 احمد کریمی استادیار گروه کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه قرآن و حدیث، قم، ایران 0000-0002-5525-2024 رسول رضوی دانشیار گروه کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه قرآن و حدیث، قم، ایران Journal Article 2020 09 15 In this article, we try to study Clark Pinnock’s point of view in explaining the methodological foundations of the Open Theism Theory with a descriptive-analytical method so that we can have a fair critique of the strengths and weaknesses of this theory while also understanding it correctly. Pinnock can be considered one of the most important theorists and founders of Open Theism. In his view, Open Theism is one of the theological-philosophical theories that have emerged in the critique of the teachings of traditional Christian theology and consider its claims to be logically and narratively contradictory. Pinnock believes that open theists (unlike traditional theists) sanctify God as acknowledged in the Bible and that some of the attributes of God in traditional theology should be revised and modified based on the text of the Bible. They believe that God is the God of the Bible; someone who is truly connected to the world, a relationship that requires the most mobility, not immobility. In this view, God is portrayed as a triune relationship-oriented truth, which seeks romantic relationships with human beings and thereby grants them true freedom. Finally, since open theists believe that theology should be understood by the people of the present age, a better explanation of theology depends on reliance on modern philosophy (rather than ancient philosophy) and its effects. In modern philosophy (considering the idea that the truth of things does not appear to man), method and methodology have become very important. In general, methodology is the knowledge that recognizes “how to go” and the fundamental methodology reveals the hidden principles of each theory and creates the basis for its basic critique. Of course, the purpose of this article is specifically to examine the “basics” of Pinnacle’s method, not his “method.” In fact, the report presented by his method is a platform for examining the basics. From the author’s point of view, most of the mistakes that have been made in traditional theology are also reflected in Open Theism; leading in another way! That is to say, most of the objections that Pinnock made to traditional theologians also apply to him. For example, why is it bad to be influenced by (ancient) Greek philosophy, but Open Theism’s claims can be influenced by modern philosophy? Do ancient philosophy and modern philosophy have precise and acceptable boundaries at all? On what basis do open theists claim that modern philosophy is more acceptable to modern people than ancient philosophy? Can mere simultaneity justify it? If we take as a basis the claim of open theists – that every thought comes “from somewhere” and that no thought is pristine – the encounter of open theists with the text of the Bible is also done with the presuppositions of modern philosophy, and their pivotal mindset has influenced their understanding of the Bible. How can one be sure that the path taken by theology is more correct than the path taken by its predecessors? Since a better understanding of each theory is gained by reflecting on its foundations, in this article we intend to examine the methodological foundations of Open Theism by looking at the book Most Moved Mover. In general, from Pinnock’s point of view, the method of open theism can be based on the three main bases of the critical study of the interpretation of traditional theologians, return to the Bible and overcoming Hellenism, and attention to modern philosophy, which we will describe and critique. «الهیات گشوده»، گرایشی الهیاتی۔فلسفی است، که تفسیر نوینی از برخی صفات خداوند و لوازم آن ارائه می‌‌دهد. این دیدگاه، بسیاری از آموزه‌‌های الهیات سنّتی (همچون منزّه بودن خداوند، علم پیشین مطلق، قدرت مطلق و ویژگی‌‌هایی از این دست) را نه مبتنی بر کتاب مقدّس، بلکه الهام‌گرفته از فلسفهٔ یونان دانسته، و در مقابلْ تصویری از خداوند ارائه می‌کند که مبتنی بر تشخّص، تغییر‌پذیری و تعامل او با انسان است. یکی از مؤسسین الهیات گشوده، کلارک پیناک است. به اعتقاد او - در ترسیم اعتقادات دینی - اگر چه سنّت و فلسفه باید مورد توجه قرار گیرد، اما «کتاب مقدّس» بیشترین اهمیت را دارد و بر این مبنا، آموزه‌‌های الهیات سنّتی باید مورد نقّادی قرار گیرد. پیناک، گرچه ره‌‌آورد تقریرش را «آزادی واقعی خدا و انسان» می‌‌داند، اما به‌‌نظر می‌‌رسد مبانی روشی او به لحاظ منطقی نامنسجم‌اند. از این‌رو، این پژوهش به ارزیابی دیدگاه پیناک در مبانی روش‌‌شناختی «الهیات گشوده» می‌‌پردازد. به‌‌نظر می‌‌رسد به رغم آن که پیناک - در برخی موارد - ضعف‌های الهیات سنّتی مسیحی، در تبیین معارف الهیاتی را به‌‌خوبی بیان کرده، اما تلاش او در ارائهٔ راهکار - به لحاظ روشی - قابل نقد است. این مقاله با روش توصیفی۔تحلیلی و با رویکرد روش‌‌شناسی بنیادین، در صدد ارزیابی آرای پیناک در مبانی روش‌‌شناختی «الهیات گشوده» است.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1786_7339ba93fa9572bcdc1f6c4cff7364e2.pdf