دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979124120220321A Comparative Study of Cognitive Science
of Religion and Reformed Epistemologyبررسی مقایسهای علوم شناختی دین و معرفتشناسی اصلاحشده520200010.22091/jptr.2021.7115.2569FAجواددرویش آقاجانیپژوهشگر پسادکتری فلسفه علم، دانشگاه صنعتی شریف، تهران، ایران0000-0003-0915-4471Journal Article20210704Reformed epistemology, based on the reliability of the functions of cognitive faculties, holds that one can believe in God directly without argument or evidence. Alvin Plantinga, one of the proponents of this view, replaces justification with warrant in the classical definition of knowledge and considers true belief, which has a warrant as knowledge. On this basis, he considers it reasonable to believe in the existence of God because it has a warrant and arises from our healthy cognitive faculties without the need for an independent argument. Some defenders of the cognitive science of religion also seek to provide evidence from cognitive science to explain religious beliefs in such a way as to show that there is a natural mechanism in man to know God. They argue based on this mechanism in favor of the existence of God. Justin Barrett, one of the leading proponents of this view, uses a mental bias called the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD), which is evolutionarily developed in humans, to explain the process of generating belief in supernatural intentional beings, including God. In recent years, efforts have been made to integrate these two approaches and use the experimental results of cognitive science to validate reformed epistemology. The 2010 joint paper by Barrett and Clark, the former a cognitive scientist and the latter a reformed epistemologist, is a prime example of this effort. Although this paper lists some of the differences between the various perspectives in cognitive sciences of religion and reformed epistemology, its ultimate goal is to show the correlation and convergence of the two approaches. One of the similarities emphasized in this article is related to a particular type of cognitive faculty, called the sense of divinity or Sensues Divintatus, and in both approaches is mentioned by various terms.<br />While acknowledging some similarities between the two theories, the present paper seeks to undermine the view that tries to use the cognitive science of religion as a scientific basis for validating reformed epistemology. This task has been done in this article by pointing out and providing evidence in favor of the fundamental differences between the two theories. In this article, two arguments are presented to show their fundamental differences.<br />The first argument is based on differences in the origins and roots of the two theories. According to this argument, HADD as a cognitive tool in Barrett’s theory can be counted as a mediator, proof, or scientific evidence to prove God; while the foundation of reformed epistemology is to put aside these intermediaries and explain the rationality of belief in God, without resorting to an argument. As the scholars of the cognitive science of religion agree, what creates human bias towards intelligent factors is a spandrel or byproduct property that is not adoptive in the human evolutionary process. Some of them consider the generation of this property as the reason for the existence of God, but regardless of whether this argument is true or false, human cognitive biases in this argument are mediations to prove the existence of God. Accordingly, the two theories, despite their apparent similarities, are fundamentally different.<br />The second argument emphasizes the difference in the goals or visions of the two theories. The main concern of the cognitive science of religion, according to Barrett, is how to produce belief; while the main concern of reformed epistemology is the rationality of belief. In fact, by relying on HADD, one can only remark on how a belief is made, regardless of its rationality. However, this does not meet the purpose of reformed epistemology. In reformed epistemology, Plantinga considers belief in God to be a kind of basic belief that we are reasonable to accept. Here, some have said, the belief produced in the evolutionary process can also be reasonable. This claim can be examined in its place, but so far as the ultimate goal of the cognitive science of religion is the explanation of belief production, and it is different from the ultimate goal of the reformed epistemology, that is, the explanation of the rationality of belief, it is sufficient for this article to show their differences.<br /> در معرفتشناسی اصلاحشده، بر اساس قابل اعتماد بودن کارکردهای قوای شناختی، گفته میشود که بدون برهان یا شواهد طبیعی میتوان به صورت بیواسطه به خداوند باور داشت. برخی از مدافعان علوم شناختی دین نیز در صدد فراهم آوردن شواهدی از علوم شناختی برای تبیین باورهای دینی هستند، به نحوی که نشان دهند به صورت طبیعی در انسان سازوکاری برای شناخت خداوند وجود دارد تا آن را دلیلی بر وجود خدا قرار دهند. در سالهای اخیر تلاشهایی برای ترکیب این دو رویکرد و استفاده از نتایج تجربی علوم شناختی در جهت تأیید معرفتشناسی اصلاحشده صورت گرفته است. مقاله پیش رو، ضمن اذعان به برخی شباهتها بین این دو نظریه، درصدد انکار منتج بودن تلاشهایی است که علوم شناختی دین را مبنایی علمی برای تأیید معرفتشناسی اصلاحشده میدانند. این کار در این مقاله از طریق اشاره و ارائه دلیل به نفع تفاوتهای بنیادین این دو نظریه صورت گرفته است. دو استدلال برای نشان دادن تفاوت بنیادین آنها ارائه میشود. استدلال اول مبتنی بر تفاوت در خاستگاه دو نظریه است. طبق این استدلال، ابزار بسیار فعال کشف عامل در علوم شناختی دین یک واسطه، برهان یا شاهد علمی برای اثبات خداست، در حالی که بنای معرفتشناسی اصلاحشده بر کنار گذاشتن این واسطهها و تبیین معقولیت باور به خدا بدون توسل به برهان است. طبق بیان برخی نظریهپردازان علوم شناختی دین، آنچه موجب سوگیری انسانها نسبت به عوامل هوشمند میشود، یک ویژگی فرعی و غیرسازگار در چرخۀ تکاملی انسان است. عدهای از آنها، ایجاد این ویژگی را دلیل بر وجود خدا میدانند، اما فارغ از درست یا غلط بودن این استدلال، سوگیریهای شناختی انسان در این استدلال، یک حد وسط و یک قرینه برای اثبات وجود خداست. استدلال دوم پیرامون تفاوت دو نظریه، بر روی نتیجۀ آنها تأکید میکند. مسئلۀ علوم شناختی دین تولید باور است، در حالی که مسئلۀ معرفتشناسی اصلاحشده عقلانیت باور است. با تمسک به ابزار بسیار فعال کشف عامل صرفاً میتوان در مورد چگونگی ایجاد یک باور، صرفنظر از عقلانی بودن آن، اظهارنظر کرد. اما این مقصود معرفتشناسی اصلاحشده را تأمین نمیکند.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2000_482050d7ee10113491435c6e4cf477f1.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979124120220321An Argument against Bernard Williams’
Account of Reason Internalismاستدلالی علیه تقریر ویلیامزی از درونیگرایی در دلایل عملی2142199910.22091/jptr.2021.7395.2616FAمحمدحیدرپوردکتری فلسفه اخلاق، پژوهشگر دانشکدۀ فلسفه، دانشگاه ادیان و مذاهب، قم، ایران0000-0002-0027-4138حسیندباغاستادیار، مؤسسه آموزش عالی علومشناختی، تهران، ایرانJournal Article20210923Bernard Williams in his “<em>Internal and External Reasons</em>” argues for internalism about reasons. He holds that according to internalism of reasons, agent A has reason to Φ if and only if he has a desire ψ which will be satisfied by Φ-ing and he also believes that it is so. Williams maintains that if one does not have a preceding desire and cannot form any desires through deliberation then it will be rational to claim that he does not have reason to Φ. Clearly desires play a crucial role here because if an agent does not have such desires, then he does not have reasons for action. Williams goes beyond this claim and says only internal reasons are reasons for action. In this article, we argue against his claim. After explaining descriptive and normative senses of rationality and alternative views regarding the rationality of beliefs and desires, in virtue of the idea of blameworthiness, responsibility, and having practical reason, we show that there are a set of actions for which moral agents are blameworthy and they, therefore, have reasons at least for certain actions which are not dependent upon their desires. This idea would be supported by the facts that most people consider a person who violates hedonic, prudential, and moral norms as much as possible to be irrational, that they consider the act of counting him as rational to be counterintuitive, and finally that societies have founded institutions for restraining such a person.<br />Our argument from blameworthiness can be formulated as follows:<br />(1) If a moral agent performs an action X for which he can justly be blamed, then he will be responsible and he ought not to perform X (the concept of blameworthiness entails responsibility).<br />(2) If a moral agent is responsible and he ought not to perform X, then there is a reason for him not to perform X (responsibility entails having reason).<br />(3) There are a set of actions, S, that moral agents can be justly blamed for performing.<br />(4) So moral agents are responsible for performing an action in S (from 1 and 3).<br />(5) So there are reasons for moral agents not to perform an action in S (from 2 and 4).<br />By falsifying the negation of premise (3), we show that (3) is true. To falsify that it is not the case that there are actions for which moral agents can be justly blamed, we presented an example of an extremely immoral, imprudent, and pain-seeking agent who forms abnormal desires and acts against moral, prudent, and hedonic norms as much as possible. Since there are not any desires for such norms in his psychology, and his actions are based on these desires, he is not regarded as rational by most people and social institutions such as psychiatric clinics and courts. In addition, it would be irrational to hold that he is rational in his having immoral, imprudent, and pain-seeking desires and acting accordingly because it is a rational, prevalent, conventional practice to believe so and any theory which denies its rationality should provide convincing reasons.برنارد ویلیامز در مقالۀ «دلایل درونی و بیرونی»، به سود درونیگرایی در دلایل برای عمل استدلال میکند. طبق تقریر او از درونیگرایی در دلایل، فاعل A دلیل دارد که عمل Φ را انجام دهد، اگر و تنها اگر A میلی به ψ داشته باشد که انجام Φ آن را برآورده کند و همچنین باور داشته باشد که با انجام Φ میل او به ψ برآورده میشود. به باور ویلیامز، اگر شخص A میل سابق به ψ نداشته باشد و از طریق تأمل دربارۀ فکتهای مرتبط به آن عمل هم نتواند میلی در خود به انجام دادن آن ایجاد کند، آنگاه معقول است که ادعا کنیم A دلیلی برای انجام دادن آن عمل ندارد. ویلیامز ادعا میکند که تمام دلایل عملی منحصر در دلایل درونی هستند. در این مقاله علیه نگاه ویلیامز استدلال خواهد شد. پس از توضیح عقلانیت توصیفی و هنجاری، و بررسی دیدگاههای رقیب درباره عقلانیت امیال و باورها، از طریق ایدۀ سزاوار ملامت بودن، مسئولیت، و داشتن دلیل عملی نشان داده میشود که اعمالی وجود دارد که فاعلهای اخلاقی برای انجام دادن آنها سزاوار ملامت هستند، و در نتیجه دستکم برای شماری از اعمالِ خود دلیل عملی نامبتنی بر میل دارند. ضدشهودی بودنِ عاقل شمردنِ فردِ اخلاقگریز و منفعتگریز در نظر اکثر مردم و وجود نهادهای اجتماعی مهارکنندۀ اعمال او مدعای فوق را تأیید میکند.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1999_299a271104b88dda55c0c8cf135af38e.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979124120220321Literal or Darwinian Approach
to Evolutionary Epistemology
from the Viewpoint of Michael Ruseرویکرد تحتاللفظی یا داروینی در معرفتشناسی تکاملی از نگاه مایکل روس4366212410.22091/jptr.2022.7894.2683FAوحیدگرامیدانشجوی دکتری فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه زنجان، زنجان، ایرانمحسنجاهددانشیار، گروه فلسفه و کلام، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایرانJournal Article20220208There are two main approaches to evolutionary epistemology: the analogical or Spencerian approach, and the literal or Darwinian approach. The analogical approach claims that the process of the development of culture – particularly the development of science – is purely like that of living creatures and is based on natural selection. Michael Ruse calls this approach the “traditional approach” or the “analogical approach”, and sometimes calls it the “Spencerian approach.” In the latter approach, which this essay is going to consider from the viewpoint of Michael Ruse, the claim is that not only the development and evolution of animal bodies but also the development of the structures of their mind is a product of natural selection. The proponents of these approaches are divided into two groups: first, theorists like Lorenz, Reidl, and Wuketits, who believe that evolutionary epistemology is complementary to the critical philosophy of Kant. Second, theorists like Clark link evolutionary epistemology to Humean skepticism. Ruse, like Clark, believes that evolutionary epistemology is complementary to Humean philosophy and that the human mind isn’t a blank slate, but it is provided with innate capacities or secondary epigenetic rules. So, Ruse like Quine, believes that there isn’t any difference between analytic and synthetic propositions and that they all are synthetic propositions and posteriori. The difference is that Quine appeals to philosophical reasons, and Ruse appeals to biological ones. Moreover, there isn’t any necessity in knowledge according to Quine but rather, a pragmatic necessity; while Ruse believes that there is a type of necessity, that is, according to the present framework of our minds, based on our evolutionary history, we are condemned to think causally and mathematically, but we may lose this framework in the evolutionary process. It seems that Ruse’s viewpoint corresponds more with our common sense than that of Quine because we always put up resistance against those who believe that the principles of mathematics and logic are contingent. The viewpoint of Ruse was criticized, and he responds to his critics. We believe that some of his answers aren’t plausible.<br />One of the most important criticisms against Ruse’s evolutionary epistemology is that it is self-contradictory, that is, what is important for evolutionary epistemologists is success in survival and reproduction, and the truth doesn’t matter to him, so he should accept that we need to believe that the principles of evolution itself can possibly be false. Ruse, responds to this criticism by distinguishing between the reality of common sense and metaphysical reality.<br />We show in this essay that this solution doesn’t work because Ruse doesn’t suggest any criterion for distinguishing between beliefs based on common sense and beliefs based on metaphysical reality so we can express doubts about the examples he gives for common-sense beliefs. Furthermore, even if it were to be accepted that common-sense beliefs are infallible the problem still exists because natural selection isn’t a common-sense belief, so according to this, all of our beliefs might be mistaken, including the natural selection mechanism itself, and applying it to human knowledge.<br /><strong> </strong>دو رویکرد اصلی در معرفتشناسی تکاملی وجود دارد: رویکرد تمثیلی یا اسپنسری، و رویکرد تحتاللفظی یا داروینی. در رویکرد دوم، که پژوهش حاضر به بررسی آن از نگاه مایکل روس خواهد پرداخت، مدعا آن است که نه تنها رشد و تکامل بدن حیوانات و انسانها محصول و نتیجۀ انتخاب طبیعی است، بلکه رشد ساختارهای ذهنی آنها نیز محصولِ انتخاب طبیعی است. حامیانِ این رویکرد خود به دو دسته تقسیم شدهاند: نخست، معرفتشناسانی چون<em> </em>لورنز، ریدل و ووکتیتس، که معرفتشناسی تکاملی را مکمِّلِ فلسفۀ انتقادی کانت میدانند؛ دوم، معرفتشناسانی چون<em> </em>کِلارک که معرفتشناسی تکاملی را به شکّاکیت هیومی مرتبط میکنند. روس نیز همچون کِلارک معرفتشناسی تکاملی را مکمِّلِ فلسفه هیوم میداند و بر این باور است که ذهن انسان مانند لوحی سفید نیست، بلکه به واسطۀ استعدادها و ظرفیتهای فطری یا قواعد اپیژنتیکِ ثانوی مجهز شده است. بنابراین، روس نیز نظیر کواین تمایزی میان گزارههای تحلیلی و ترکیبی نمیگذارد، بلکه همۀ آنها را از سنخ گزارههای ترکیبی و پسینی میداند، با این تفاوت که کواین برای تأیید مدعای خود به دلایل فلسفی تمسّک جسته است، اما روس به دلایل زیستشناختی استناد میکند. دیدگاه روس با نقدهای گوناگونی مواجه شده و روس به آنها پاسخ داده است. در این مقاله، ابتدا گزارشی از دیدگاههای مذکور ارائه و مبانی و مؤلفههای نظریات فوق استخراج میشود، و سپس مورد نقد و بررسی قرار میگیرد. در نهایت این نتیجه حاصل میشود که هرچند معرفتشناسی روس نسبت به معرفتشناسی کواین از وجوه برتری برخوردار است، اما خود اشکالاتی از جمله دوری و خودشکن بودن دارد.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2124_ae5a0d602588e7213b4dd3cc1e342b2c.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979124120220321The Tension Between Faith and Reason
in Islamic Tradition: A Case Study
of Imam Muhammad Ghazaliچالش عقل و ایمان در سنّت اسلامی: پژوهش موردی امام محمد غزالی6788218910.22091/jptr.2022.7659.2646FAاعظمقاسمیاستادیار، گروه فلسفۀ دین، پژوهشکده مطالعات فلسفی و تاریخ علم، پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، تهران، ایرانdoi: 10.22091/jptr.2Journal Article20211212While there is no real tension between faith and reason for Muslim scholars, in post-Kantian philosophy of religion there have been serious doubts about the rationality of religious doctrines. It is noteworthy that Ghazali’s critiques of philosophical reasoning are totally different from Kant’s. Ghazali denied the reliability of pure reasoning without the help of faith, while Kant denied the access of reason to the intangible world. By paying attention to Kant’s philosophy for understanding the very difference of the faith/reason tension in Islamic tradition and contemporary philosophy of religion and employing an extra-religious approach and an analytical-critical method, the present research has studied Ghazali’s corpus and concluded what concerned Ghazali was faith, not reason; since he held that only a pious believer could be saved from the hell. He was not concerned about reasoning without revelation and religious belief. Ghazali maintained that philosophical reasoning falls short of the truth of affairs. One could say, from a different point of view, he was aware of the limits of reasoning in the same way as Kant was; but unlike Kant, through faith, he arrived at matters which are far from the access of reason. Finally, although in Kant’s thoughts, faith has lost its rational bases, Ghazali was not in the same situation. He held that mystical, prophetical reasoning, which he called “al-Qalb” (the Heart), could obtain the truth and has no conflict with faith and revelation, and it is just human reasoning that makes judgments that could come in conflict with religious beliefs. Previous research saw Ghazali as fideistic; although thinking of him of rationalist or fideistic, could be easy based on his Ashʿari commitment, but after enough reflection on his works, it turns out to be difficult to do so because one could find both evidence for his rationality or fideism. Regarding his prioritizing faith over reason, there is a lot of textual evidence in his corpus; his tendency toward reason is not very explicit but can be perceived implicitly from his works. Despite his efforts to emphasize revelation and faith, as well as left human reasoning for revelation, what arises afterward, which has a kind of validity even for him, is the same common reason. Ghazali interpreted the prima facie meaning of Quranic verses which are impossible from a rational viewpoint, such as the corporeality of God. There is no middle ground between faith and reason, and yet Ghazali still stands in the very middle; thus, he could not be seen as just fideistic. If he wanted to demarcate what could be interpreted, he would have taken the side of reason. At the same time, comparing his rationality with Descartes’ is a naïve position to hold. Mystic-minded Ghazali did not see the issue of faith and reason like a philosopher and, ultimately, due to his obedience to God, as well as the fact that his main concern is salvation, he prioritized faith over reason. It is not possible to speak of tension or competence for a mystic-minded like him.نزد متفکران مسلمان چالش حقیقی بین عقل و ایمان نیست، در حالی که در فلسفۀ دین پساکانتی تردیدهای جدی در عقلانی بودن آموزههای دینی پیش میآید. این پژوهش، که با رویکرد بروندینی و با روش تحلیلی- انتقادی به بررسی آثار غزالی پرداخته، به این نتیجهگیری رهنمون شده است که غزالی دغدغۀ ایمان دارد، و نه عقل؛ زیرا او تنها مؤمن را سعادتمند و نجاتیافته از آتش دوزخ میداند. عقلانیت مستقل از بندگی و دین برای او موضوعیتی ندارد. غزالی عقل فیلسوفان را از دستیابی به حقایق امور قاصر میداند. ولی معتقد است عقل صوفیان و پیامبران، که از آن تعبیر به قلب میشود، قادر به درک حقایق است و هیچ تعارضی با ایمان و دین ندارد. تنها عقل ناقص بشری است که احکامی صادر میکند که ممکن است با آموزههای دینی متعارض باشد. در پژوهشهای پیشین غزالی را ایمانگرا نامیدهاند. نوآوری پژوهش حاضر در این است که با تعمق در آثار او شواهدی از عقلگرایی او یافته است. با این حال هیچ تفسیری از عقلگرایی غزالی خامتر از این نیست که با عقلگرایی به معنای دکارتی مقایسه شود. غزالیِ صوفی همچون فیلسوف به مسئلۀ عقل و ایمان ننگریسته و در نهایت، به دلیل خشیت از خدا، ایمان را بر عقل مقدم کرده است.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2189_c15767aece03db972c98a2f4202729e6.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979124120220321Moral Challenges of Liberal Eugenics
Based on the Principle of Justiceچالشهای اخلاقی اصلاح نژاد لیبرال بر اساس اصل عدالت89112219410.22091/jptr.2021.6980.2545FAناصرنورمحمددکتری مدرسی اخلاق، دانشگاه باقرالعلوم(ع)، قم، ایرانعلیرضاآل بویهاستادیار، پژوهشکده فلسفه و کلام، پژوهشگاه علوم و فرهنگ اسلامی، قم، ایران0000-0002-6443-4583Journal Article20210526For a long time, human beings have been wishing to improve the genetic composition of their generation and clearing it of some disabilities and defects, and this concern has always been pursued in different ways in different eras. The existence of authoritarian and racist policies and discriminatory methods in the old Eugenics made it easy to rule that it was immoral, but it is somewhat difficult to judge the liberal and new Eugenics because one group, citing the scientific contexts and social contexts resulting from the advances in genetics and the values of liberal societies, dictates its moralization, while the other group, despite these contexts, still retains the relevant ethical challenges.<br />One of these important challenges is the violation of the principle of justice, albeit in a different way than in the past. Injustice in the old Eugenics was discriminatory due to the imposition of a Eugenics program on a particular class, and the manifestation of injustice in the new Eugenics is that by prescribing that its benefits belong to certain classes, it is not possible for the public to benefit from it. The author of this article believes that various ethical challenges still exist in the liberal and modern Eugenics program with a focus on the principle of justice, and the present article seeks to identify, examine and analyze them from a point of view.<br />The findings of this paper are that some of the ethical considerations related to the application of the principle of justice to Eugenics are:<br /><br />Although some solutions may be effective at some level, it is not possible to provide an absolute and general solution for all cases of breeding.<br />Bioethical issues such as Eugenics due to their multifaceted nature, need the consideration of the requirements of various principles and some contextual considerations related to cultural and social conditions and indigenous and regional situations.<br />It is necessary to have appropriate programs to eliminate the factors that incite immoral attitudes and prejudices against the disabled.<br />Despite the context in which it has been made, advocates of liberal Eugenics themselves admit that the challenge of discrimination remains and have an unprecedented impact on genocide and the rise of racism.<br />The well-being of individuals in society depends on the fair distribution of the benefits and resources of Eugenics in a fair social context, and the prescription and distribution of these resources in a society with defective and unjust structures will not have the desired effect.از دیرباز بشر در آرزوی بهسازی ترکیب ژنتیکی نسل خود و پاکسازی آن از برخی معلولیتها و نقصها بوده و همواره در عصرهای مختلف این دغدغه به سبکهای مختلف پیگیری شده است. وجود سیاستهای اقتدارگرا و نژادپرستانه و روشهای تبعیضآمیز در اصلاح نژاد قدیم، حکم به غیراخلاقیبودن آن را آسان مینمود، اما قضاوت درباره اصلاح نژاد لیبرال و جدید قدری دشوار است. زیرا گروهی با استناد به زمینههای علمی و بسترهای اجتماعی ناشی از پیشرفتهای علم ژنتیک و ارزشهای جوامع لیبرالی حکم به اخلاقیشدن آن میکنند و در مقابل گروه دیگر با وجود این زمینهها، چالشهای اخلاقی مربوط را همچنان باقی میدانند. یکی از این چالشهای مهم، نقض اصل عدالت، البته به گونهای متفاوت با گذشته، است. بیعدالتی در اصلاح نژاد قدیم به سبب تحمیل برنامه اصلاح نژاد به صورت تبعیضآمیز بر طبقه خاصی بود و نمود بیعدالتی در شیوه جدید اصلاح نژاد این است که مزایایش در صورت تجویز در دسترس اقشار خاصی قرار میگیرد و امکان بهرهبرداری همگانی از آن نیست. تجویز بیقید و شرط اصلاح نژاد بدون بررسی برخی ملاحظات اخلاقی، پیامدها و چالشهای اخلاقی دیگری را نیز به دنبال خواهد داشت. چالشهای اخلاقی متنوعی همچنان در برنامه اصلاح نژاد لیبرال و جدید با محوریت اصل عدالت وجود دارد. نوشتار حاضر در پی شناسایی، بررسی و تحلیل اخلاقی آنها است.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2194_cf989681f4cab848e659d6b926a529ff.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979124120220321The Relationship between Kant’s Philosophy
of Ethics and the Decline of Political Thought
in His Philosophyنسبت فلسفه اخلاق کانت با زوال اندیشه سیاسی در فلسفه او113136219510.22091/jptr.2021.7043.2558FAمحسنباقرزاده مشکی بافدکتری فلسفه، دانشگاه تبریز، تبریز، ایران1235478965234785Journal Article20210614In this article, the author claims that Kant’s political thought is formed both in the break from his moral thought and in the continuation and decline of his moral thought in politics. Kant has previously struggled in the field of ethics to realize autonomy in external and internal nature, as well as in institutions, on the premise that man is evil and that the world of phenomena or experience lacks rationality. And to escape from this problem, he either seeks refuge in the unknown future or in God and theoretically never has a theory to establish a relationship between the world of phenomena and phenomena, or in other words, the subjective and objective. In such a state, the person stands outside nature with his free inside, and the experience or object appears to him as something threatening. Kant brings all these problems with him to his world of understanding of politics. And because it has already created a disconnect between the two realms of subject and object, this continues also in political thought, because it cannot use the capacity of its new understanding of human freedom to achieve the theory of public will and its embodiment outside. Instead, it seeks to establish the government of law and ensure it by forcing the state to achieve good citizenship for society. Thus Kant’s political thought separated from the freedom of autonomy and it falls into utilitarian thought.<br />In this article, the author not only believes that there is a gap between freedom and autonomy in Kant’s moral thought and his political philosophy but also believes that Kant’s theoretical decline in political thought is due to the weakness of his moral thought. That is, not establishing a relationship with the real world or phenomena or experience in Kant’s moral thought and not realizing his autonomy outside, whether on the basis of anthropology based on man’s evil or on the irrationality of the outside world and also not accepting its institutions which is the embodiment of human desires and wishes; all of these have had an inevitable impact on his political thought. in such a way that whenever Kant speaks of politics in the real world, he can never speak of the transcendental freedom embodied in it. Thus, that conflict between subject and object or morality and nature or human desires with social institutions in politics has been reproduced again. In such a situation, as Kant has not been able to bring that abstract moral man into the realm of politics and in concrete cases, explain the conditions of its realization in case of public will, inevitably, one must turn to the government for the realization of both private and public will in the field of politics which is not at all the embodiment of the public will of individuals, but a master who prepares man for social life by coercion and its metaphysical repression. Thus, autonomy is not realized in politics as in ethics in the external sphere, and empirical coercion in the form of government will impose itself on the abstraction of autonomy like God in Kant’s moral thought.اندیشه سیاسی کانت هم در گسست از اندیشه اخلاقی او و هم در تداومِ رو به زوال آن شکل میگیرد. کانت پیشتر در ساحت اخلاق برای تحقق خودآیینی در طبیعت بیرونی و درونی و همچنین در نهادها با این پیشفرض که انسان شرور است و جهان فنومن یا تجربه نیز فاقد عقلانیت است، به مشکل برمیخورد. برای فرار از این مشکل یا به آیندهای نامعلوم یا به خدا پناه میبرد و از لحاظ نظری هرگز برای ایجاد نسبت و سنخیت میان عالم نومن و فنومن یا به عبارت دیگر سوبژکتیو و ابژکتیو نظریهای ندارد. در چنین حالتی، فرد با درون آزاد خود، بیرون از طبیعت میایستد و تجربه یا ابژه به شکل امری تهدیدزا برایش نمایان میشود. کانت تمامی این مشکلات را با خود به دنیای فهم خویش از سیاست میآورد و چون پیشتر انقطاعی میان دو ساحت سوژه و ابژه ایجاد کرده است در اندیشه سیاسی نیز چون نمیتواند از ظرفیت فهم جدید خویش از آزادی انسان یاری بگیرد و از طریق آن به نظریه اراده عمومی و تجسم آن در خارج دست یابد به جای آن به دنبال ایجاد حکومت قانون و تضمین آن از طریق اجبار دولت برای دستیابی به شهروندی خوب برای جامعه میکوشد. بنابراین، اندیشه سیاسی خویش را با جدایی از آزادی خودآیین به اندیشهای فایدهگرایانه سقوط میدهد.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2195_3f702783692075eaed5b4963ddb9e0a3.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979124120220321Philosophical Foundations of Criminalization:
Analysis of Moral Vices from the Perspective of the Theory
of Self-Government and the Principle of Harmمبانی فلسفی جرمانگاری؛ تحلیل رذایل اخلاقی از چشمانداز نظریه خودحاکمیتی و اصل آسیب137158219610.22091/jptr.2021.7055.2561FAکامرانمحمودیان اصفهانیدانشجوی دکتری حقوق کیفری و جرمشناسی، گروه حقوق کیفری و جرمشناسی، دانشکده حقوق، الهیات و علوم سیاسی، واحد علوم و تحقیقات، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تهران، ایرانمحمدعلیاردبیلیاستاد، گروه حقوق جزا و جرمشناسی، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایراننسرینمهرادانشیار، گروه حقوق جزا و جرمشناسی، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایرانJournal Article20210619As a normative ethics theory, virtue ethics theory can present a criterion for criminalization. The revival of this theory brought about a great new change in new ethics philosophy in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Its effects on criminalization are just like the two sides of a coin. On the one hand, it has the capacity of promoting ethics to reach its climax and even act as a permit for criminal intervention in the internal qualities of the individuals and on the other hand, it can decriminalize most of the vicious actions in order to make citizens virtuous.<br />In the field of the philosophy of the law of virtue, the theory of the ethics of virtue is used for the philosophical justification of criminalization. Therefore, in order to present a virtuous criminal theory, special attention is paid to moral vices. In the theory of virtuous criminalism, we are faced with two main axes: one, flourishing, and the second, vice. The presentation of a legislative theory in the philosophy of virtue-based law takes into account human flourishing. Proponents of liberalism, on the other hand, argue that criminalizing moral depravity violates privacy; while the problem is not simple. For this reason, the criminalization of vicious behavior faces challenges including the threat of self-ownership and the justification of these behaviors from the perspective of the principle of harm. The main question now is, to what extent is the criminalization of moral vices in the context of the theory of self-government? One might also ask how virtuous criminal theory can be justified by a reading of the principle of harm. The present paper has achieved the following approach with a descriptive-analytical method: The criminalization of some moral vices violates the right of citizens to self-government. Therefore, criminalizing these behaviors will not be justified. On the other hand, from the perspective of the theory of virtuous criminalism, moral vice is not a sufficient and even necessary condition for criminalization. For this reason, assuming that the criminalization of a vice is justified on the basis of a reading of the principle of harm, it can not necessarily be claimed that the application of criminal law against this behavior is effective. In addition, the purpose of this study is to explain the limits and challenges of the theory of virtuous criminalism in the context of the theory of self-government and the principle of harm. In addition, in this article, readers are introduced to the concerns of liberals. And they will realize that criminalization in the context of virtue-based philosophy of law does not necessarily violate privacy, that is, we will not face maximum criminalization. In addition to the analysis of the nature of virtue ethics, the present thesis dissertation reviews argumentative methods of virtuous criminalization in the context of virtue-oriented criminal law jurisprudence and criticizes hurdles and methods of creating a liberal approach.در عرصه فلسفه حقوقِ فضیلت، نظریه اخلاق فضیلت برای توجیه فلسفی جرمانگاری به کار میرود. از همینرو، به منظور مطرحکردن نوعی نظریه جرمانگارانه فضیلتگرا به گرانیگاه این نظریه، یعنی رذایل اخلاقی، توجه ویژه میشود. جرمانگاری رفتارهایِ رذیلانه با دشواریهایی مواجه است، از جمله تهدید خودمالکیتی و توجیه این رفتارها در ترازوی اصل آسیب. اکنون پرسش اصلی این است که: گسترۀ جرمانگاریِ رذایل اخلاقی در بستر نظریه خودحاکمیتی تا کجا است؟ همچنین، میتوان این پرسش را مطرح کرد که: چگونه نظریه جرمانگار فضیلتگرا میتواند بنا بر خوانشی از اصل آسیب توجیه شود؟ نوشتار حاضر با روشی توصیفیتحلیلی به این رهیافت نائل شده است که جرمانگاری بعضی از رذایل اخلاقی موجب میشود حق خودمختاری شهروندان نقض شود. از اینرو جرمانگاری این رفتارها موجه نخواهد بود. از دیگر سو، از چشمانداز نظریه جرمانگاری فضیلتگرا، رذیلت اخلاقی شرط کافی و حتی لازم برای جرمانگاری نیست. به همین دلیل، با فرض اینکه جرمانگاری رذیلتی، بر اساس خوانشی از اصل آسیب، موجه باشد، آنگاه الزاماً نمیتوان ادعا کرد که بهکارگیری حقوق کیفری علیه این رفتار کارآمد است. افزون بر این، هدف از پژوهش پیش رو، تبیین حدود و دشواریهایِ نظریه جرمانگاری فضیلتگرا در بستر نظریه خودحاکمیتی و اصل آسیب است.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2196_c97144d7e35f7183bcb420f682e5d92e.pdf