University of Qom Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 1735-9791 24 3 2022 09 23 The Memorial of Prof. William J. Wainwright The Memorial of Prof. William J. Wainwright 5 6 2363 10.22091/jptr.2022.8906.2823 FA Zahra Khazaei professor of Comparative Philosophy, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology,, University of Qom, Qom, Iran 0000-0001-8302-9674 Journal Article 2022 12 19 Editor's Note The Memorial of Prof. William J. Wainwright The member of Editorial Board of Journal of Philosophical Theological Research William “Bill” Judson Wainwright (1935-2020), a distinguished professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, was the member of the Editorial Board of the Journal of Philosophical Theological Research (JPTR). Wainwright is the author of several books in various fields of philosophy, especially the philosophy of religion, and numerous articles and chapters. Monotheism and Hope In God (2020), Reason, Revelation, and Devotion: Inference and Argument in Religion (2015), Religion and Morality (2005), and Heart and Reason (1995) are among his published books. His last published article is “God, Love and Inter-religious Dialogue”1, which was published by the Journal of Philosophical Theological Research in the autumn of 2020. Wainwright gave final approval to his paper but unfortunately could not see its publication. He passed away on November 5, 2020, a few days before we published his article. May he be in peace and God’s grace. I never met him but I understood from my contacts with him that “He was a very kind, respected, noble, and patient philosopher.” We decided to dedicate a special issue titled “Theology, Philosophy, and Ethics”: In Memory of William J. Wainwright to him. I would like to express my gratitude to all the philosophers who accepted my invitation and generously and kindly helped us in publishing this special issue by writing their valuable articles. We hope that Wainwright would be pleased with the publication of this issue. I will end my words with this wish, which was Wainwright's wish too, that: I wish that the followers of monotheistic religions can establish peace and tranquility in the world through inter-religious dialogue, mutual understanding, and extending their love for God to each other. 1. Wainwright, W.J. (2020), God, Love, and Interreligious Dialogue, Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 22(85), 5-13. Editor's Note The Memorial of Prof. William J. Wainwright The member of Editorial Board of Journal of Philosophical Theological Research William “Bill” Judson Wainwright (1935-2020), a distinguished professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, was the member of the Editorial Board of the Journal of Philosophical Theological Research (JPTR). Wainwright is the author of several books in various fields of philosophy, especially the philosophy of religion, and numerous articles and chapters. Monotheism and Hope In God (2020), Reason, Revelation, and Devotion: Inference and Argument in Religion (2015), Religion and Morality (2005), and Heart and Reason (1995) are among his published books. His last published article is “God, Love and Inter-religious Dialogue”1, which was published by the Journal of Philosophical Theological Research in the autumn of 2020. Wainwright gave final approval to his paper but unfortunately could not see its publication. He passed away on November 5, 2020, a few days before we published his article. May he be in peace and God’s grace. I never met him but I understood from my contacts with him that “He was a very kind, respected, noble, and patient philosopher.” We decided to dedicate a special issue titled “Theology, Philosophy, and Ethics”: In Memory of William J. Wainwright to him. I would like to express my gratitude to all the philosophers who accepted my invitation and generously and kindly helped us in publishing this special issue by writing their valuable articles. We hope that Wainwright would be pleased with the publication of this issue. I will end my words with this wish, which was Wainwright's wish too, that: I wish that the followers of monotheistic religions can establish peace and tranquility in the world through inter-religious dialogue, mutual understanding, and extending their love for God to each other. 1. Wainwright, W.J. (2020), God, Love, and Interreligious Dialogue, Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 22(85), 5-13. https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2363_e0b4e6f131ca75db411014f5fc883040.pdf

University of Qom Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 1735-9791 24 3 2022 09 23 An Appreciation and Extension of William Wainwright’s Insights on Interreligious Dialogue An Appreciation and Extension of William Wainwright’s Insights on Interreligious Dialogue 7 28 2356 10.22091/jptr.2022.8598.2769 FA Nancey Murphy Ph.D., Th.D., Senior Professor of Christian Philosophy, Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, CA, USA. 0000-0002-6358-0941 Journal Article 2022 09 14 Abstract In honor of William Wainwright, this article takes up his interest in interreligious dialogue. It pursues two goals simultaneously: One is to provide a better model for understanding philosophy of religion. Terrence Tilley claims that there is the standard model which is mistaken in that it takes arguing for religious beliefs to be equivalent to justifying commitment to a religion. He promotes a practical model, which has its ancestry in the writings of Michel de Montaigne and Blaise Pascal. This model begins with the lived practices of religion and justifies its intellectual content as explanation for the rightness of this way of life. Wainwright’s work fits into the practical model, but Tilley provides a description and a stronger basis for it. The second goal is to provide much more adequate epistemological resources than those used by the standard model, with contributions from Catholic modernist theologian George Tyrrell, recent philosopher of science Imre Lakatos, and Alasdair MacIntyre, who became interested in evaluating traditions, in science, in moral reasoning, and finally what he came to call large-scale traditions. The problem he needed to overcome is the fact that such traditions carry their own, often different, concepts of reasoning. The possibility of fruitful rational conversation between religions is illustrated here by an account of dialogue between Christianity and Shi’ia Islam, as exemplified in David Burrell’s ability to use conversation with Islamic thought to clarify for Christians their own doctrines of the Trinity, the mediation of Christ, and original sin. Abstract In honor of William Wainwright, this article takes up his interest in interreligious dialogue. It pursues two goals simultaneously: One is to provide a better model for understanding philosophy of religion. Terrence Tilley claims that there is the standard model which is mistaken in that it takes arguing for religious beliefs to be equivalent to justifying commitment to a religion. He promotes a practical model, which has its ancestry in the writings of Michel de Montaigne and Blaise Pascal. This model begins with the lived practices of religion and justifies its intellectual content as explanation for the rightness of this way of life. Wainwright’s work fits into the practical model, but Tilley provides a description and a stronger basis for it. The second goal is to provide much more adequate epistemological resources than those used by the standard model, with contributions from Catholic modernist theologian George Tyrrell, recent philosopher of science Imre Lakatos, and Alasdair MacIntyre, who became interested in evaluating traditions, in science, in moral reasoning, and finally what he came to call large-scale traditions. The problem he needed to overcome is the fact that such traditions carry their own, often different, concepts of reasoning. The possibility of fruitful rational conversation between religions is illustrated here by an account of dialogue between Christianity and Shi’ia Islam, as exemplified in David Burrell’s ability to use conversation with Islamic thought to clarify for Christians their own doctrines of the Trinity, the mediation of Christ, and original sin.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2356_571585fc7c929c66951b1133a57b3f7a.pdf

University of Qom Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 1735-9791 24 3 2022 09 23 Passional Reasoning and the Accessibility of Truth: William Wainwright on Arguing About Religion Passional Reasoning and the Accessibility of Truth: William Wainwright on Arguing About Religion 29 48 2357 10.22091/jptr.2022.8443.2743 FA William Hasker Distinguished Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, Huntington University, Huntington, USA 0000-0003-4480-9876 Journal Article 2022 08 01 Abstract This essay presents William Wainwright’s conception of religious reasoning. He rejects the view that proper reasoning in religion must be limited to “neutral technical reason” (NTR), modes of reasoning that are neutral and acceptable to all parties in a religious disagreement. He emphasizes that religious reasoning, as seen in outstanding practitioners from different religious traditions, incorporates additional elements, such as appeals to revelation, emphasis on religious reading, rhetoric, acknowledgment of mystery, and especially “passional reason,” in which the arguments presented and the conclusions accepted depend essentially on the state of the reasoner’s heart. The essay goes on to consider how Wainwright deals with issues surrounding religious diversity: he rejects all of the standard methods by which it has been argued that differences in belief between traditions either do not really exist or do not ultimately matter. Special attention is given to religious pluralism, as advocated by John Hick and Peter Byrne. This leads to a consideration of exclusivism, in which it is held that the fundamental doctrines of one religion are true, and those of other religions, insofar as they differ from those of the favored religion, are false. Wainwright finds the standard objections against exclusivism to be ineffective or inconclusive. Finally, the essay addresses a question suggested but not resolved by Wainwright’s work: Does religious diversity have the consequence that truth in religion is not accessible to us? Abstract This essay presents William Wainwright’s conception of religious reasoning. He rejects the view that proper reasoning in religion must be limited to “neutral technical reason” (NTR), modes of reasoning that are neutral and acceptable to all parties in a religious disagreement. He emphasizes that religious reasoning, as seen in outstanding practitioners from different religious traditions, incorporates additional elements, such as appeals to revelation, emphasis on religious reading, rhetoric, acknowledgment of mystery, and especially “passional reason,” in which the arguments presented and the conclusions accepted depend essentially on the state of the reasoner’s heart. The essay goes on to consider how Wainwright deals with issues surrounding religious diversity: he rejects all of the standard methods by which it has been argued that differences in belief between traditions either do not really exist or do not ultimately matter. Special attention is given to religious pluralism, as advocated by John Hick and Peter Byrne. This leads to a consideration of exclusivism, in which it is held that the fundamental doctrines of one religion are true, and those of other religions, insofar as they differ from those of the favored religion, are false. Wainwright finds the standard objections against exclusivism to be ineffective or inconclusive. Finally, the essay addresses a question suggested but not resolved by Wainwright’s work: Does religious diversity have the consequence that truth in religion is not accessible to us?

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2357_36ff550a1903299ac6a1d48c564c42cd.pdf

University of Qom Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 1735-9791 24 3 2022 09 23 Reasons, Emotions, and Evidentialism: Reflections on William Wainwright’s Reason and the Heart Reasons, Emotions, and Evidentialism: Reflections on William Wainwright’s Reason and the Heart 49 76 2358 10.22091/jptr.2022.8638.2774 FA Muhammad Legenhausen Professor of Philosophy, The Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, Qom, Iran. 0000-0001-8578-6062 Journal Article 2022 10 01 Abstract In Reason and the Heart, William Wainwright defends a kind of religious evidentialism, one that takes int consideration the promptings of the heart, provided the heart is a virtuous one; and he claims that this view is able to avoid relativism. Here, Wainwright’s evidentialism is examined in relation to other views that have gone by that name. Wainwright’s position is briefly stated together with an expression of doubt about its ability to fend off relativism. Following this, an outline of the history of evidentialism is presented. It is concluded that Wainwright’s view is not really a form of evidentialism at all. Evidentialism may be weakened in two ways: (1) redefining “evidence” to include elements that are not recognized by objectifying inquiry; (2) allowing subjective factors, such as religious emotions, to govern the interpretation of the evidence. Wainwright describes his view as a form of evidentialism because it does not avail itself of (1); but it is only misleadingly called “evidentialism” because of (2). After making this case, several reasons are presented for rejecting evidentialism. It is argued that evidentialists focus attention of what the evidence is to determine whether beliefs are justified or rational, while how the evidence is treated is of no less importance when beliefs are supported by reasons. Furthermore, there are beliefs the justification of which is a practical matter of commitment to a more general framework rather than inference from some body of evidence. It is suggested that some religious beliefs may fall into this category. Abstract In Reason and the Heart, William Wainwright defends a kind of religious evidentialism, one that takes int consideration the promptings of the heart, provided the heart is a virtuous one; and he claims that this view is able to avoid relativism. Here, Wainwright’s evidentialism is examined in relation to other views that have gone by that name. Wainwright’s position is briefly stated together with an expression of doubt about its ability to fend off relativism. Following this, an outline of the history of evidentialism is presented. It is concluded that Wainwright’s view is not really a form of evidentialism at all. Evidentialism may be weakened in two ways: (1) redefining “evidence” to include elements that are not recognized by objectifying inquiry; (2) allowing subjective factors, such as religious emotions, to govern the interpretation of the evidence. Wainwright describes his view as a form of evidentialism because it does not avail itself of (1); but it is only misleadingly called “evidentialism” because of (2). After making this case, several reasons are presented for rejecting evidentialism. It is argued that evidentialists focus attention of what the evidence is to determine whether beliefs are justified or rational, while how the evidence is treated is of no less importance when beliefs are supported by reasons. Furthermore, there are beliefs the justification of which is a practical matter of commitment to a more general framework rather than inference from some body of evidence. It is suggested that some religious beliefs may fall into this category.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2358_d74a3cbd9a2b18c39e9fd1e6a5d53a6b.pdf

University of Qom Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 1735-9791 24 3 2022 09 23 Criticism of the classical Divine Command Ethics : A comparative study of Wainwright's objection with the objections of Muslim rationalist theologians Criticism of the classical Divine Command Ethics : A comparative study of Wainwright's objection with the objections of Muslim rationalist theologians 77 92 2361 10.22091/jptr.2022.8895.2817 FA Mohsen Javadi Professor, Philosophy of Ethics Department,, university of Qom 0000-0003-4537-0518 Journal Article 2022 12 15 This article first explains the classical version of the Divine command ethics in both Christian and Islamic traditions, and then by pointing out its coherency, at least in appearance, with Divine sovereignty and absolute power, it tries to show why this idea is not accepted by a significant number of the Christian and Muslim theologians. William Wainwright answers this question by using Ralph Cudworth’s objections to Divine command ethics. In total, he considers seven objections and criticisms as the main reasons for Christian theologians’ turning away from the theory. By presenting these seven objections, which are mainly taken from Ralph Cudworth’s book, we try to find similar examples in the Islamic tradition and compare them with Wainwrights’ arguments. Some of these objections can be seen in both Christian and Islamic traditions of moral rationalism. But some of them, despite the similarity in content, have different formulations. Also, some objections are specific to Christian or Islamic theology. Last but not least, there are intra-religious objections based on revelations in Islam and Christianity against the theory of Divine command, which is not the subject of my discussion in this article. This article first explains the classical version of the Divine command ethics in both Christian and Islamic traditions, and then by pointing out its coherency, at least in appearance, with Divine sovereignty and absolute power, it tries to show why this idea is not accepted by a significant number of the Christian and Muslim theologians. William Wainwright answers this question by using Ralph Cudworth’s objections to Divine command ethics. In total, he considers seven objections and criticisms as the main reasons for Christian theologians’ turning away from the theory. By presenting these seven objections, which are mainly taken from Ralph Cudworth’s book, we try to find similar examples in the Islamic tradition and compare them with Wainwrights’ arguments. Some of these objections can be seen in both Christian and Islamic traditions of moral rationalism. But some of them, despite the similarity in content, have different formulations. Also, some objections are specific to Christian or Islamic theology. Last but not least, there are intra-religious objections based on revelations in Islam and Christianity against the theory of Divine command, which is not the subject of my discussion in this article.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2361_f6be82675a3ebc428f5deb51119321bd.pdf

University of Qom Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 1735-9791 24 3 2022 09 23 The Promise of Passional Reason The Promise of Passional Reason 93 114 2359 10.22091/jptr.2022.8379.2730 FA Brad Kallenberg Professor of Theology & Ethics, College of Arts and Sciences: Religious Studies, University of Dayton, Dayton, OH, USA. Journal Article 2022 07 06 In some contexts, philosophical debate can be rancorous even when the volume is kept low. In other contexts, certain stripes of “evangelical apologetics” can be equally adversarial and inimical in tone. In the name of preserving a professional, if not an irenic spirit, some unspoken ground rules have been adopted for interreligious dialogue. First is the demand to avoid all appearance of circular reasoning, which is to say avoid making any rhetorical moves that depend upon metaphysical presuppositions about the reality of God. Second, it is understood that (supposedly) unimportant theologically-laden details are to be left off until the (supposedly) prior task of establishing God’s reality is achieved. Such ground rules put philosophical theologians at a distinct disadvantage in interreligious dialogue as they sideline the very voices that have the highest stake in the conversation. William Wainwright offers the concept of “passional reason” as a way to counter the ground rules. Wainwright has shown that charges of circularity and subjectivism fail in the cases of such thinkers as Jonathan Edwards, John Henry Newman, and William James. Read in one way, Wainwright’s work may be taken as a strategic defense that prevents antagonists from excluding religious voices from philosophical conversation. I argue that there is an even more fruitful way to read Wainwright. Simply put, Wainwright’s recapture and rehabilitation of “passional reason” for philosophy of religion simultaneously opens the door for more constructive approaches to interreligious dialogue than an agonistic-styled philosophical debate can allow. In some contexts, philosophical debate can be rancorous even when the volume is kept low. In other contexts, certain stripes of “evangelical apologetics” can be equally adversarial and inimical in tone. In the name of preserving a professional, if not an irenic spirit, some unspoken ground rules have been adopted for interreligious dialogue. First is the demand to avoid all appearance of circular reasoning, which is to say avoid making any rhetorical moves that depend upon metaphysical presuppositions about the reality of God. Second, it is understood that (supposedly) unimportant theologically-laden details are to be left off until the (supposedly) prior task of establishing God’s reality is achieved. Such ground rules put philosophical theologians at a distinct disadvantage in interreligious dialogue as they sideline the very voices that have the highest stake in the conversation. William Wainwright offers the concept of “passional reason” as a way to counter the ground rules. Wainwright has shown that charges of circularity and subjectivism fail in the cases of such thinkers as Jonathan Edwards, John Henry Newman, and William James. Read in one way, Wainwright’s work may be taken as a strategic defense that prevents antagonists from excluding religious voices from philosophical conversation. I argue that there is an even more fruitful way to read Wainwright. Simply put, Wainwright’s recapture and rehabilitation of “passional reason” for philosophy of religion simultaneously opens the door for more constructive approaches to interreligious dialogue than an agonistic-styled philosophical debate can allow.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2359_2f6fdbc0d803e39372377dea71f51ba8.pdf

University of Qom Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 1735-9791 24 3 2022 09 23 Libertarianism and Luck Libertarianism and Luck 115 134 2360 10.22091/jptr.2022.8297.2723 FA Ishtiyaque Haji Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, Canada. 0000-0000-0000-0000 Journal Article 2022 06 13 According to event-causal modest libertarian accounts of free action, the sort of control an agent requires to perform free actions consists in the action’s being nondeviantly and indeterministically caused by apt reasons of the agent. It has been argued that these modest views succumb to a problem of luck because they imply that, given exactly the same past up to the time of action, and the same laws of nature, at this time the agent could have performed a different action, or no action at all. Hence, it appears that whatever the agent does at this time as a result of indeterministic deliberation is a matter of freedom- or responsibility-undermining luck. In this paper, I argue that neither Robert Kane’s variant of modest libertarianism, which combines a form of non-traditional agent causation with indeterministic event causation, nor John Lemos’ weightings variant, in which agents perform intentional acts of assigning weights to their reasons, circumvents the luck objection. According to event-causal modest libertarian accounts of free action, the sort of control an agent requires to perform free actions consists in the action’s being nondeviantly and indeterministically caused by apt reasons of the agent. It has been argued that these modest views succumb to a problem of luck because they imply that, given exactly the same past up to the time of action, and the same laws of nature, at this time the agent could have performed a different action, or no action at all. Hence, it appears that whatever the agent does at this time as a result of indeterministic deliberation is a matter of freedom- or responsibility-undermining luck. In this paper, I argue that neither Robert Kane’s variant of modest libertarianism, which combines a form of non-traditional agent causation with indeterministic event causation, nor John Lemos’ weightings variant, in which agents perform intentional acts of assigning weights to their reasons, circumvents the luck objection.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2360_b1a332f499c2610c1681d4116a3ea9ca.pdf