University of QomJournal of Philosophical Theological Research1735-979124420221222A Critique of the Argument for Panpsychism through Refutation of the Emergence of ConsciousnessA Critique of the Argument for Panpsychism through Refutation of the Emergence of Consciousness530236610.22091/jptr.2022.8277.2720FAMohammadJavadElahieaslPh.D. student in Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran0000-0001-6640-2430MahdiZakeriAssociate Professor, Department of philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran0000-0003-1243-7130Journal Article20220608Panpsychism, as opposed to physicalism and dualism, offers a third way to explain consciousness. According to panpsychism, some fundamental physical entities have conscious states. One of the important arguments for this view is the refutation of the emergence of consciousness. According to emergentism about consciousness, the consciousness of human beings and other beings is a property that emerges at the non-fundamental physical level from the fundamental physical nonconscious level. In the contemporary era, Galen Strawson first argued in detail for panpsychism through the refutation of the emergence of consciousness. Strawson divides emergentism into two types, true and inexplicable emergentism; he takes the true emergence of consciousness to be impossible, and inexplicable emergence to be fundamentally incoherent. The claim of this paper is that according to the historical background of emergentism, it turns out that a third type of emergentism can be assumed, which is, firstly, coherent and, secondly, the emergence of consciousness based on it is possible. In this type, the emergent property is only partially dependent upon the fundamental level. The dependence of the emergent property upon the fundamental level is nomological, and the laws of nature are fundamental (nomism), not reducible to powers (powerism).<br /><strong> </strong><br />Introduction<br />According to emergentism, the consciousness is a property that emerges at the non-fundamental physical level from the fundamental physical nonconscious level. In the contemporary era, Galen Strawson first argued in detail for panpsychism through the refutation of the emergence of consciousness. His argument is a dilemma. According to it, emergence is either true or brute. The aim of this paper is to critically assess Strawson’s argument. We show that according to the historical background of emergentism, it turns out that a third type of emergentism can be assumed, which is, firstly, coherent and, secondly, the emergence of consciousness based on it is possible. We conclude that Strawson's argument does not work.<br />Strawson’s argument<br />Strawson argues that the emergence of consciousness is either true or brute. In true emergence, the emergent property is wholly dependent upon the fundamental level and is explainable by it (in other words, knowledge of the emergent property is deducible from complete knowledge of the fundamental level). In brute emergence, although the emergent property is wholly dependent upon the fundamental level, it is unexplainable by it. Therefore, the main feature of the emergence in Strawson's definition is the whole dependence of the emergent property upon the fundamental level. Because of this feature, Strawson considers brute emergence in general (it doesn't matter whether it is about consciousness or not) as impossible, for the assumption of the whole dependence of the emergent property upon the fundamental level is inconsistent with the assumption that it is not deducible from the fundamental level (even in the case of complete knowledge of the fundamental level). Strawson also takes the true emergence of consciousness to be impossible; because if the emergence of consciousness is true emergence, then the existence of consciousness must be explainable in terms of the fundamental nonconscious level. But this explanation intuitively is as impossible as an explanation of extended things in terms of non-extended things. Therefore, neither true emergence of consciousness from the nonconscious fundamental level nor the brute one is possible. So, Strawson concludes that the only reasonable and naturalistic explanation of the existence of consciousness at the non-fundamental physical level (such as in humans) is panpsychism.<br />Ontological emergence<br />We offer a comprehensive conceptual framework for emergentism that includes the views of most contemporary emergentists. The main features of emergentism are hierarchical ontology, supervenience of higher levels on lower levels, the novelty and unpredictability of the emergent, and inexplicability and irreducibility of the emergent. So, one may consider a version of emergentism in which the emergent mental properties are nomically supervenient on the basic properties and thus are wholly dependent on the basic biological bases according to the laws of the current world.<br />Why Strawson’s argument does not work<br />The offered conceptual framework for emergentism shows that one can assume another type of emergence besides the true and brute types. In this type, the emergent property is only partially dependent upon the fundamental level. In other words, the dependence of the emergent property upon the fundamental level is nomological. So, in a world with different relevant laws of nature, the emergent property does not exist, even if exactly the same fundamental level exists. This third type of emergence can be found in Broad’s view, the most famous British emergentist. Broad divides laws of nature into intra-ordinal laws and trans-ordinal laws. He believes that the existence of a fundamental level with the laws of nature within it (intra-order laws) is not enough for emergence unless the relevant trans-ordinal law also holds. Then, to avoid Strawson’s dilemma, we need to determine the ontological status of laws of nature (specifically, trans-ordinal laws). In other words, we need to decide whether the laws of nature are fundamental (nomism) or reducible to powers, counterfactual conditionals, or the Humean Mosaic. It seems that Strawson’s argument presumes a certain ontological status of laws of nature, i.e., powerism. According to powerism, the truths of powers are fundamental and truths of laws of nature are reducible to them. So, the trans-ordinal laws of nature are reducible the to truths of powers at the fundamental level. It concludes that the emergent property is wholly dependent upon the fundamental level. But on the contrary, Broad avoids Strawson’s dilemma by assuming a different ontological status of trans-ordinal laws, i.e., nomism.<br />Conclusion<br />The historical background of emergentism (Broad's view) shows that Strawson's dilemma is not enough to deny the emergence of consciousness and to defend panpsychism; Because, by assuming the whole dependence of the emergent only on its base, Strawson has assumed only two types of correct and brute emergence. On the one hand, he has considered brute emergence to be incoherent, and on the other hand, he has considered correct emergence to be impossible. But according to an emergentist such as Broad, the dependence of emergent properties, including mental properties, on the basic properties is not whole dependence, even considering intra-order laws of the basic level; On the contrary, the emergent properties are totally dependent on the basic level (basic level properties and intra-order laws), considering trans-ordinal laws.Panpsychism, as opposed to physicalism and dualism, offers a third way to explain consciousness. According to panpsychism, some fundamental physical entities have conscious states. One of the important arguments for this view is the refutation of the emergence of consciousness. According to emergentism about consciousness, the consciousness of human beings and other beings is a property that emerges at the non-fundamental physical level from the fundamental physical nonconscious level. In the contemporary era, Galen Strawson first argued in detail for panpsychism through the refutation of the emergence of consciousness. Strawson divides emergentism into two types, true and inexplicable emergentism; he takes the true emergence of consciousness to be impossible, and inexplicable emergence to be fundamentally incoherent. The claim of this paper is that according to the historical background of emergentism, it turns out that a third type of emergentism can be assumed, which is, firstly, coherent and, secondly, the emergence of consciousness based on it is possible. In this type, the emergent property is only partially dependent upon the fundamental level. The dependence of the emergent property upon the fundamental level is nomological, and the laws of nature are fundamental (nomism), not reducible to powers (powerism).<br /><strong> </strong><br />Introduction<br />According to emergentism, the consciousness is a property that emerges at the non-fundamental physical level from the fundamental physical nonconscious level. In the contemporary era, Galen Strawson first argued in detail for panpsychism through the refutation of the emergence of consciousness. His argument is a dilemma. According to it, emergence is either true or brute. The aim of this paper is to critically assess Strawson’s argument. We show that according to the historical background of emergentism, it turns out that a third type of emergentism can be assumed, which is, firstly, coherent and, secondly, the emergence of consciousness based on it is possible. We conclude that Strawson's argument does not work.<br />Strawson’s argument<br />Strawson argues that the emergence of consciousness is either true or brute. In true emergence, the emergent property is wholly dependent upon the fundamental level and is explainable by it (in other words, knowledge of the emergent property is deducible from complete knowledge of the fundamental level). In brute emergence, although the emergent property is wholly dependent upon the fundamental level, it is unexplainable by it. Therefore, the main feature of the emergence in Strawson's definition is the whole dependence of the emergent property upon the fundamental level. Because of this feature, Strawson considers brute emergence in general (it doesn't matter whether it is about consciousness or not) as impossible, for the assumption of the whole dependence of the emergent property upon the fundamental level is inconsistent with the assumption that it is not deducible from the fundamental level (even in the case of complete knowledge of the fundamental level). Strawson also takes the true emergence of consciousness to be impossible; because if the emergence of consciousness is true emergence, then the existence of consciousness must be explainable in terms of the fundamental nonconscious level. But this explanation intuitively is as impossible as an explanation of extended things in terms of non-extended things. Therefore, neither true emergence of consciousness from the nonconscious fundamental level nor the brute one is possible. So, Strawson concludes that the only reasonable and naturalistic explanation of the existence of consciousness at the non-fundamental physical level (such as in humans) is panpsychism.<br />Ontological emergence<br />We offer a comprehensive conceptual framework for emergentism that includes the views of most contemporary emergentists. The main features of emergentism are hierarchical ontology, supervenience of higher levels on lower levels, the novelty and unpredictability of the emergent, and inexplicability and irreducibility of the emergent. So, one may consider a version of emergentism in which the emergent mental properties are nomically supervenient on the basic properties and thus are wholly dependent on the basic biological bases according to the laws of the current world.<br />Why Strawson’s argument does not work<br />The offered conceptual framework for emergentism shows that one can assume another type of emergence besides the true and brute types. In this type, the emergent property is only partially dependent upon the fundamental level. In other words, the dependence of the emergent property upon the fundamental level is nomological. So, in a world with different relevant laws of nature, the emergent property does not exist, even if exactly the same fundamental level exists. This third type of emergence can be found in Broad’s view, the most famous British emergentist. Broad divides laws of nature into intra-ordinal laws and trans-ordinal laws. He believes that the existence of a fundamental level with the laws of nature within it (intra-order laws) is not enough for emergence unless the relevant trans-ordinal law also holds. Then, to avoid Strawson’s dilemma, we need to determine the ontological status of laws of nature (specifically, trans-ordinal laws). In other words, we need to decide whether the laws of nature are fundamental (nomism) or reducible to powers, counterfactual conditionals, or the Humean Mosaic. It seems that Strawson’s argument presumes a certain ontological status of laws of nature, i.e., powerism. According to powerism, the truths of powers are fundamental and truths of laws of nature are reducible to them. So, the trans-ordinal laws of nature are reducible the to truths of powers at the fundamental level. It concludes that the emergent property is wholly dependent upon the fundamental level. But on the contrary, Broad avoids Strawson’s dilemma by assuming a different ontological status of trans-ordinal laws, i.e., nomism.<br />Conclusion<br />The historical background of emergentism (Broad's view) shows that Strawson's dilemma is not enough to deny the emergence of consciousness and to defend panpsychism; Because, by assuming the whole dependence of the emergent only on its base, Strawson has assumed only two types of correct and brute emergence. On the one hand, he has considered brute emergence to be incoherent, and on the other hand, he has considered correct emergence to be impossible. But according to an emergentist such as Broad, the dependence of emergent properties, including mental properties, on the basic properties is not whole dependence, even considering intra-order laws of the basic level; On the contrary, the emergent properties are totally dependent on the basic level (basic level properties and intra-order laws), considering trans-ordinal laws.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2366_b83c06a3ffc97cd695903505422e88f8.pdfUniversity of QomJournal of Philosophical Theological Research1735-979124420221222A Critical Study of Subjective and Objective Components
of Thaddeus Metz’s Theory of Meaning in lifeA Critical Study of Subjective and Objective Components
of Thaddeus Metz’s Theory of Meaning in life3152235410.22091/jptr.2022.8559.2758FAMahbubePakdelPh.D. Student of Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran0000-0002-2174-0695Mohammad RezaBayatAssistant Professor, Department of Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran0009-0003-6873-4078Journal Article20220902Thaddeus Metz, by developing a non-consequentialist theory on meaning in life, has tried to provide a relatively complete explanation of the meaning of most people's lives. Metz’s theory is based on two components: 1) “rational nature” as a subjective component and 2) “the fundamental conditions of human existence” as an objective component. This article through an analytical-critical approach, first examines Metz's argument and its components, then explains some important objections raised against the components of Metz's theory, that is, :1) defending the meaning-conferring of the consequentialist view of the meaning in life, 2) the incompatibility of Metz’s theory with human intuition, 3) lack of attention to the role of emotional aspects, 4) meaning-conferring of some necessary conditions, 5)the problem with the sufficiency of fundamental conditions for meaning, 6) the inability of fundamental conditions to explain the meaning of some works of art, and 7) ignoring the meaningfulness of an artificial intelligence’s actions. Although Metz’s theory is considered defensible to most of the objections, it has been shown that his theory in the subjective aspect is problematic. Based on the Robot Problem, it can be argued that without the need for transcendence and going beyond the animal nature, meaningfulness is possible. If it is possible to regard the computational aspect of artificial intelligence as a part of the rational nature of humans, the subjective component of Metz’s theory cannot be defended.<br /><strong> </strong><br />Introduction<br />Thaddeus Metz proposes a principle that captures, under naturalist and non-consequentialist assumptions, the way in which the good, the true, and the beautiful are able to confer great meaning on life. He also shows how previous attempts to do so have failed.<br />His criticism of other theories and his replies to possible objections to his own, improved theory suggest that he is an objectivist. Metz’s theory has two main components, which might be called the subjective component and the objective component.<br />Metz’s proposal is probably the best theory available today of the meaning of life as self-transcendence under naturalist and non-consequentialist assumptions, and there are good reasons to prefer his suggestion to others. His theory, however, has been between criticism and defense.<br />In this paper, while acknowledging the importance of the contribution of Metz’s theory to the literature, only the objections against two components of his theory will be explained. Iddo Landau, Stephen Kershnar, and Minao Kukita are critics whose objections are examined in the present paper.<br />In addition to the most important critiques, this paper has posed another challenge to the subjective component of Metz’s theory and also provided an answer for it, yet it contends that his theory requires further critical attention to this aspect.<br />Metz’s theory<br />The most basic statement of the fundamentality theory of meaning in life is:<br />A human person’s life is more meaningful the more that she employs her reason and in ways that positively orient rationality towards fundamental conditions of human existence.<br />Thus, Metz’s theory is based on 1) the subjective component, a matter of positively orienting one’s rational nature towards objective values, and 2) the objective component, the fundamental conditions of human existence.<br />Metz also explains the way of identifying meaningful objective values. That is, with respect to the good, the true, and the beautiful, Metz’s account in virtue of when and why they confer great meaning in life is that they involve substantial exercises of human intelligence directed towards fundamental conditions of human existence.<br />The way he construes ‘rational nature” as a subjective component is broad. What Metz means by such a phrase, signifies not merely cognition and intentional action, but also any ‘judgment-sensitive attitude’ that includes a variety of propositional attitudes.<br />Metz also argues that the basic idea of fundamental conditions of human existence is that of conditions that are largely responsible for many other non-fundamental conditions. He notes that a fundamental condition should not be conflated with a necessary condition. A necessary condition of an object is something that is required for that object to obtain, whereas a fundamental condition is something that is responsible for that object. Not every necessary condition is a fundamental condition. Likewise, a condition could be fundamental and yet not be a necessary one.<br />More specifically, he suggests the relevant conditions of human existence are those of 1) a typical human person’s life, 2) the life of our species, or 3) the environment in which we live. Hence, Metz by distinguishing between fundamental conditions and non-fundamental conditions suggests that firstly, the meaningfulness of people’s life can be explained only by appealing to “fundamental conditions of human existence” and secondly, people, by orienting their rational nature, positively and substantially, towards fundamental conditions of human existence, can achieve a meaningful life.<br />Objections to the theory’s components<br />Some objections have been raised against Metz’s theory: The incompatibility of Metz’s theory with human intuition and lack of attention to the role of emotional aspects are critiques about the subjective component, and meaning-conferring of some necessary conditions, the problem with the sufficiency of fundamental conditions for meaning and the inability of fundamental conditions to explain the meaning of some works of art, are among the objections to the objective component.<br /><br /><strong> Objections to the subjective component</strong><br />a) Landau’s major objection to the subjective component is that contouring rationality towards fundamental conditions is not always enough to obtain great meaning. He points out that those ‘who just study or understand’ the works of Einstein are positively orienting their intelligence towards fundamental conditions, but are not intuitively obtaining great meaning thereby.<br />b) Since reasoning is at the center of the theory, Kershnar believes Metz’s theory is over-intellectualized. He suggests reasoning instrumentally helps people connect to reality and what makes people’s life meaningful is not merely deliberation and reasoning.<br /><strong> Objections to the objective component</strong><br />a) According to Landau, on some occasions, orienting one’s intelligence towards merely necessary conditions for human existence can confer great meaning on a person’s life. Landau contends that the meaningfulness to be found in these cases is not fundamental.<br />b) Minao Kukita also believed Metz’s theory does not work for a work of art to confer meaning and fundamentality is not essential as Metz is claiming.<br /><br />Metz in reply to these objections provides some answers and this paper has tried to defend Metz’s theory against the mentioned objections.<br />Notwithstanding some answers, the subjective component of the theory cannot be defended. Because it has been argued without the rational orientation of humans, meaning is possible. As the computational aspect of artificial intelligence is identical to a human’s, if a robot based on its program helped people enjoy autonomy, this robot’s life would be meaningful. If so, meaning<br />can be realized without requiring to go beyond animal nature.<br />Conclusion<br />Metz’s theory is invulnerable to the disadvantages of the previous theories and is thus a significant contribution to the literature on the meaning of life. Although his theory in facing most critiques is defensible, it has ignored the meaningfulness of the actions of artificial intelligence.Thaddeus Metz, by developing a non-consequentialist theory on meaning in life, has tried to provide a relatively complete explanation of the meaning of most people's lives. Metz’s theory is based on two components: 1) “rational nature” as a subjective component and 2) “the fundamental conditions of human existence” as an objective component. This article through an analytical-critical approach, first examines Metz's argument and its components, then explains some important objections raised against the components of Metz's theory, that is, :1) defending the meaning-conferring of the consequentialist view of the meaning in life, 2) the incompatibility of Metz’s theory with human intuition, 3) lack of attention to the role of emotional aspects, 4) meaning-conferring of some necessary conditions, 5)the problem with the sufficiency of fundamental conditions for meaning, 6) the inability of fundamental conditions to explain the meaning of some works of art, and 7) ignoring the meaningfulness of an artificial intelligence’s actions. Although Metz’s theory is considered defensible to most of the objections, it has been shown that his theory in the subjective aspect is problematic. Based on the Robot Problem, it can be argued that without the need for transcendence and going beyond the animal nature, meaningfulness is possible. If it is possible to regard the computational aspect of artificial intelligence as a part of the rational nature of humans, the subjective component of Metz’s theory cannot be defended.<br /><strong> </strong><br />Introduction<br />Thaddeus Metz proposes a principle that captures, under naturalist and non-consequentialist assumptions, the way in which the good, the true, and the beautiful are able to confer great meaning on life. He also shows how previous attempts to do so have failed.<br />His criticism of other theories and his replies to possible objections to his own, improved theory suggest that he is an objectivist. Metz’s theory has two main components, which might be called the subjective component and the objective component.<br />Metz’s proposal is probably the best theory available today of the meaning of life as self-transcendence under naturalist and non-consequentialist assumptions, and there are good reasons to prefer his suggestion to others. His theory, however, has been between criticism and defense.<br />In this paper, while acknowledging the importance of the contribution of Metz’s theory to the literature, only the objections against two components of his theory will be explained. Iddo Landau, Stephen Kershnar, and Minao Kukita are critics whose objections are examined in the present paper.<br />In addition to the most important critiques, this paper has posed another challenge to the subjective component of Metz’s theory and also provided an answer for it, yet it contends that his theory requires further critical attention to this aspect.<br />Metz’s theory<br />The most basic statement of the fundamentality theory of meaning in life is:<br />A human person’s life is more meaningful the more that she employs her reason and in ways that positively orient rationality towards fundamental conditions of human existence.<br />Thus, Metz’s theory is based on 1) the subjective component, a matter of positively orienting one’s rational nature towards objective values, and 2) the objective component, the fundamental conditions of human existence.<br />Metz also explains the way of identifying meaningful objective values. That is, with respect to the good, the true, and the beautiful, Metz’s account in virtue of when and why they confer great meaning in life is that they involve substantial exercises of human intelligence directed towards fundamental conditions of human existence.<br />The way he construes ‘rational nature” as a subjective component is broad. What Metz means by such a phrase, signifies not merely cognition and intentional action, but also any ‘judgment-sensitive attitude’ that includes a variety of propositional attitudes.<br />Metz also argues that the basic idea of fundamental conditions of human existence is that of conditions that are largely responsible for many other non-fundamental conditions. He notes that a fundamental condition should not be conflated with a necessary condition. A necessary condition of an object is something that is required for that object to obtain, whereas a fundamental condition is something that is responsible for that object. Not every necessary condition is a fundamental condition. Likewise, a condition could be fundamental and yet not be a necessary one.<br />More specifically, he suggests the relevant conditions of human existence are those of 1) a typical human person’s life, 2) the life of our species, or 3) the environment in which we live. Hence, Metz by distinguishing between fundamental conditions and non-fundamental conditions suggests that firstly, the meaningfulness of people’s life can be explained only by appealing to “fundamental conditions of human existence” and secondly, people, by orienting their rational nature, positively and substantially, towards fundamental conditions of human existence, can achieve a meaningful life.<br />Objections to the theory’s components<br />Some objections have been raised against Metz’s theory: The incompatibility of Metz’s theory with human intuition and lack of attention to the role of emotional aspects are critiques about the subjective component, and meaning-conferring of some necessary conditions, the problem with the sufficiency of fundamental conditions for meaning and the inability of fundamental conditions to explain the meaning of some works of art, are among the objections to the objective component.<br /><br /><strong> Objections to the subjective component</strong><br />a) Landau’s major objection to the subjective component is that contouring rationality towards fundamental conditions is not always enough to obtain great meaning. He points out that those ‘who just study or understand’ the works of Einstein are positively orienting their intelligence towards fundamental conditions, but are not intuitively obtaining great meaning thereby.<br />b) Since reasoning is at the center of the theory, Kershnar believes Metz’s theory is over-intellectualized. He suggests reasoning instrumentally helps people connect to reality and what makes people’s life meaningful is not merely deliberation and reasoning.<br /><strong> Objections to the objective component</strong><br />a) According to Landau, on some occasions, orienting one’s intelligence towards merely necessary conditions for human existence can confer great meaning on a person’s life. Landau contends that the meaningfulness to be found in these cases is not fundamental.<br />b) Minao Kukita also believed Metz’s theory does not work for a work of art to confer meaning and fundamentality is not essential as Metz is claiming.<br /><br />Metz in reply to these objections provides some answers and this paper has tried to defend Metz’s theory against the mentioned objections.<br />Notwithstanding some answers, the subjective component of the theory cannot be defended. Because it has been argued without the rational orientation of humans, meaning is possible. As the computational aspect of artificial intelligence is identical to a human’s, if a robot based on its program helped people enjoy autonomy, this robot’s life would be meaningful. If so, meaning<br />can be realized without requiring to go beyond animal nature.<br />Conclusion<br />Metz’s theory is invulnerable to the disadvantages of the previous theories and is thus a significant contribution to the literature on the meaning of life. Although his theory in facing most critiques is defensible, it has ignored the meaningfulness of the actions of artificial intelligence.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2354_9101f8b10528823d535ffdb7d7c9260d.pdfUniversity of QomJournal of Philosophical Theological Research1735-979124420221222The Unity of Man Acts as a Supreme Parable
of the Unity of Divine Acts in Transcendent WisdomThe Unity of Man Acts as a Supreme Parable
of the Unity of Divine Acts in Transcendent Wisdom5374236810.22091/jptr.2022.8662.2782FAMojtabaAfsharpourAssistant Professor, Theology Department, Wisdom and Studies of Religions Higher Education Complex, Al-Mustafa International University, Qom, Iran0000-0002-6392-4900Mohammad MahdiGorjianProfessor, Philosophy Department, Faculty of Philosophy and Ethics, Baqir al-olum University, Qom, Iran0000-0003-0852-7061Journal Article20221017In Transcendent Wisdom, the human soul is a supreme parable of God. Almighty God has created the human soul in its nature, attributes, and actions as a parable of Himself, so that contemplation on its three aspects is a ladder to the knowledge of the three divine aspects. The Theory of the Unity of Human Actions is one of the aspects of the supreme parable of God. In an innovative Theory of the Unity of Human Actions and by proposing the opinion that the unity of human acts is the highest parable of the unity of divine acts, Mulla Sadra doubles the effort to provide a precise explanation of the unity of divine acts. The meaning of the unity of man acts is that while a single act is really and essentially attributed to that faculty, it is also really and essentially attributed to the soul in the same sense. In the same way, an important point in explaining the unity of divine acts is that a singular act, while truly and essentially being related to a possible agent, is also truly and essentially related to the divine agent.<br />In this article, using a descriptive-analytical method, in order to analyze the aspects of the supreme parable of the unity of human acts for the unity of divine acts, we have analyzed the most important aspects of this theory with a comprehensive view of Transcendental Wisdom. We have concluded seven points from this theory while explaining the unity of acts both in the human and the divine spheres.<br />Introduction<br />The unity of divine acts and the relationship between God’s acts and those of creation, especially freely human acts, have been emphasized in Islam as one of the most important levels of Unity. At the same time, it is one of the most difficult theological issues.<br />Transcendental Wisdom, by creating fundamental changes in philosophical thinking and related fields, in this important issue too, has presented new analyses and arguments while paying attention to its exact points. Mulla Sadra believes that the important point in explaining the unity of divine acts is that a singular act, while truly and essentially related to a possible agent, is also truly and essentially related to the divine agent, and at the same time, the divine agent is a close agent for the possible agent and for his action. And the possible agent is not an independent existence before the existence of the divine agent while the act is related to him.<br />Since the understanding and analysis of the unity of divine acts is difficult and exhausting, Mulla Sadra invented a theory and called it the Unity of Human Actions. He considered its understanding to be the best aid in understanding the unity of divine acts because the unity of human actions is like the supreme parable of the unity of divine actions.<br />The body<br />The idea of the unity of human actions is one of the aspects of the supreme parables of God. Mulla Sadra, in the general framework of this theory, tries to make easy the difficult way to the unity of divine actions. By initiating the Theory of the Unity of Human Actions and by proposing the opinion in which the unity of human acts is the highest parable of the unity of divine acts, he doubles the effort to provide a precise explanation of the unity of divine acts.<br />The meaning of the unity of human action is that the true agent of various actions and works that are performed by the human being is his soul, and the act that the soul performs through its faculties is both attributed to the specific faculty and attributed to the soul as well. In such a way, while it is an act of the specific faculty, it is also an act of the soul. In other words, a single act, while it is really and essentially attributed to that faculty, is also really and essentially attributed to the soul in the same sense.<br />In this article, we will explain that to achieve its purpose in explaining the unity of human actions, the views of Transcendental Wisdom should not be interpreted as the relationship between the soul and faculties according to any of the following models: a) The common relationship of two subjects for a single action; b) the relationship between a craftsman and the tools of the industry; c) the relationship between the employer and employee. Acceptance of the faculties along with the denial of the above relations, will not bring an analysis other than that a single action is attributed to soul and faculty from the same point of view.<br />Discussion<br />In this article, by using a descriptive-analytical method, in order to analyze the aspects of the supreme parable of the unity of human actions for the unity of divine acts, we have analyzed the most important aspects of this theory with a comprehensive view of Transcendental Wisdom.<br />Conclusion<br />We have concluded seven points from this theory while explaining the unity of acts both in the human and the divine spheres.<br /><br />a) The unity of human acts and divine acts have the same process in Transcendental Wisdom.<br />b) In the second analysis, according to the same method that the soul is the faculties or the faculties are the soul, the Simple Truth is the objects, and the objects are the Simple Truth.<br />c) The third analysis of the supreme parable of divine acts is about the agency of the superior agent for the weaker agent and also for this agent itself.<br />d) The relationship between the faculties and the soul and their role in the realization of human actions is a supreme parable of the relation of possible agents with Almighty God and their role in the realization of divine actions.<br /><br />e)The fifth analysis explains the real connection between the freely chosen acts of the objective human and the creator of existence by using the conception and creation of free human beings and the relationship of his actions with his imaginative creator.<br /><br />f) The three levels of realization of the soul’s action is a supreme parable for the three levels of realization of God’s actions.<br />g) Obedience without violation in forces that have no identity other than the identity of the soul is a supreme parable for obedience without violation and without the legal command and prohibition in some creatures of the Almighty God.In Transcendent Wisdom, the human soul is a supreme parable of God. Almighty God has created the human soul in its nature, attributes, and actions as a parable of Himself, so that contemplation on its three aspects is a ladder to the knowledge of the three divine aspects. The Theory of the Unity of Human Actions is one of the aspects of the supreme parable of God. In an innovative Theory of the Unity of Human Actions and by proposing the opinion that the unity of human acts is the highest parable of the unity of divine acts, Mulla Sadra doubles the effort to provide a precise explanation of the unity of divine acts. The meaning of the unity of man acts is that while a single act is really and essentially attributed to that faculty, it is also really and essentially attributed to the soul in the same sense. In the same way, an important point in explaining the unity of divine acts is that a singular act, while truly and essentially being related to a possible agent, is also truly and essentially related to the divine agent.<br />In this article, using a descriptive-analytical method, in order to analyze the aspects of the supreme parable of the unity of human acts for the unity of divine acts, we have analyzed the most important aspects of this theory with a comprehensive view of Transcendental Wisdom. We have concluded seven points from this theory while explaining the unity of acts both in the human and the divine spheres.<br />Introduction<br />The unity of divine acts and the relationship between God’s acts and those of creation, especially freely human acts, have been emphasized in Islam as one of the most important levels of Unity. At the same time, it is one of the most difficult theological issues.<br />Transcendental Wisdom, by creating fundamental changes in philosophical thinking and related fields, in this important issue too, has presented new analyses and arguments while paying attention to its exact points. Mulla Sadra believes that the important point in explaining the unity of divine acts is that a singular act, while truly and essentially related to a possible agent, is also truly and essentially related to the divine agent, and at the same time, the divine agent is a close agent for the possible agent and for his action. And the possible agent is not an independent existence before the existence of the divine agent while the act is related to him.<br />Since the understanding and analysis of the unity of divine acts is difficult and exhausting, Mulla Sadra invented a theory and called it the Unity of Human Actions. He considered its understanding to be the best aid in understanding the unity of divine acts because the unity of human actions is like the supreme parable of the unity of divine actions.<br />The body<br />The idea of the unity of human actions is one of the aspects of the supreme parables of God. Mulla Sadra, in the general framework of this theory, tries to make easy the difficult way to the unity of divine actions. By initiating the Theory of the Unity of Human Actions and by proposing the opinion in which the unity of human acts is the highest parable of the unity of divine acts, he doubles the effort to provide a precise explanation of the unity of divine acts.<br />The meaning of the unity of human action is that the true agent of various actions and works that are performed by the human being is his soul, and the act that the soul performs through its faculties is both attributed to the specific faculty and attributed to the soul as well. In such a way, while it is an act of the specific faculty, it is also an act of the soul. In other words, a single act, while it is really and essentially attributed to that faculty, is also really and essentially attributed to the soul in the same sense.<br />In this article, we will explain that to achieve its purpose in explaining the unity of human actions, the views of Transcendental Wisdom should not be interpreted as the relationship between the soul and faculties according to any of the following models: a) The common relationship of two subjects for a single action; b) the relationship between a craftsman and the tools of the industry; c) the relationship between the employer and employee. Acceptance of the faculties along with the denial of the above relations, will not bring an analysis other than that a single action is attributed to soul and faculty from the same point of view.<br />Discussion<br />In this article, by using a descriptive-analytical method, in order to analyze the aspects of the supreme parable of the unity of human actions for the unity of divine acts, we have analyzed the most important aspects of this theory with a comprehensive view of Transcendental Wisdom.<br />Conclusion<br />We have concluded seven points from this theory while explaining the unity of acts both in the human and the divine spheres.<br /><br />a) The unity of human acts and divine acts have the same process in Transcendental Wisdom.<br />b) In the second analysis, according to the same method that the soul is the faculties or the faculties are the soul, the Simple Truth is the objects, and the objects are the Simple Truth.<br />c) The third analysis of the supreme parable of divine acts is about the agency of the superior agent for the weaker agent and also for this agent itself.<br />d) The relationship between the faculties and the soul and their role in the realization of human actions is a supreme parable of the relation of possible agents with Almighty God and their role in the realization of divine actions.<br /><br />e)The fifth analysis explains the real connection between the freely chosen acts of the objective human and the creator of existence by using the conception and creation of free human beings and the relationship of his actions with his imaginative creator.<br /><br />f) The three levels of realization of the soul’s action is a supreme parable for the three levels of realization of God’s actions.<br />g) Obedience without violation in forces that have no identity other than the identity of the soul is a supreme parable for obedience without violation and without the legal command and prohibition in some creatures of the Almighty God.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2368_9d966bc4d790057d25ba2afb69a40a67.pdfUniversity of QomJournal of Philosophical Theological Research1735-979124420221222Intuitive Knowledge according to Allamah Tabatabai
and Rejecting Claims Disaffirming its ValidityIntuitive Knowledge according to Allamah Tabatabai
and Rejecting Claims Disaffirming its Validity75100236710.22091/jptr.2022.8225.2715FAAhmadrezaSharokhiAssistant Prof., Islamic Philosophy and Theology Department, University of Qom, Qom, IranKhadijeAkbari AqdamPh.D. Candidate of Theology, Islamic Philosophy and Theology Department, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.Journal Article20220608Alongside acquired-conceptual knowledge, intuitive knowledge, as one of the instances of knowledge holds a very important position among Islamic philosophers as well. Allamah Tabatabai also mentions presential knowledge with importance while discussing acquired knowledge, and ultimately, considers presential knowledge to precede acquired knowledge. In this paper, using an analytic method, we have tried to explain his theoretical foundations regarding presential-intuitive knowledge and rationally defending its cognitive validity. An important finding of this paper is that presential-intuitive knowledge, apart from being the base of acquired knowledge, also provides a convincing rational defense regarding cognitive validity. The basis of this validity is that accessing reality is the main goal of knowledge and if we can verify that reality itself is available to us in presential-intuitive knowledge, we would have no further concerns epistemological concerns. According to Allamah Tabatabai, just as sensory intuition creates a certainty of being in accordance with reality in ourselves, presential-intuitive knowledge also contains similar dominance over reality. At the end of this paper, some instances of views that claim to disaffirm the validity of presential-intuitive knowledge have been addressed, analyzed, and explained so that the epistemic validity of presential-intuitive findings is objectively proven.<br /> <br />Introduction<br />Islamic philosophers, being aware of the findings of past philosophers, have made valuable innovations regarding knowledge. In the works of Avicenna, Suhravardi, and Mulla Sadra there are priceless and authentic points regarding presential-intuitive knowledge and they have opened up new areas in intuitive knowledge and have paid attention to its rational explanation. One of the important epistemological elements in the ideas of Allamah Tabatabai is this very type of knowledge.<br />In this paper, we have strived to explain the theoretical foundations of Allamah Tabatabai regarding presential-intuitive knowledge, rationally defend its cognitive validity, and refute the claims that disaffirm its validity using an analytical method. The important finding and result of this study is that, apart from being the base of acquired knowledge, a claim to knowledge cannot be made without presential-intuitive knowledge because the real agent of knowledge is the human immaterial soul that provides a convincing rational defense regarding epistemic validity.<br />Intuitive knowledge according to Allamah Tabatabai<br />Terminologically, intuition (<em>shuhūd</em>) is direct knowledge that is achieved in the soul as soon as it is directly received, considered, and reflected upon. Such specific knowledge that manifests with purification and self-refinement is not of the category of concepts. Rather, it is attained through existential connection and unity with reality and is not directly attributed to truth or falsehood and other mental concepts. To reach such a level, the soul requires complete and sincere attention to God and to stay away from worldly diversions. It is in this case that it can gain dominion over reality when encountering it through the illuminative power it has achieved and control over it.<br />It is with intuitive knowledge that the witness arrives at a level of insight and perfection where he observes the realities in the Imaginal realm and in the form of images and at a higher level, is able to witness intelligible realities and ascends. It is in this case that knowledge becomes intelligible.<br />Explaining the foundations of intuitive knowledge<br />According to Allamah, the relation between the material world and the realms above the material is the relation between imperfections to perfection and diluted reality to reality. According to him, exoteric realities that are observed cannot be without intuitive knowledge of the esoteric because the exoteric existence is a manifestation of the esoteric existence and is its link. Thus, by witnessing the exoteric, intuitive knowledge of the esoteric is attained. Allamah considers the human intuition of his own essence as one of the most important instances of presential-intuitive knowledge and presents intuitive knowledge of the reality of the soul as one of the meanings of the narration, one who knows his self knows his Lord and shows its dependency on God considering this narration. It is in such a state that he considers his own actions to be complete dependence on the real agent and the intuition of such a reality takes the witness to a higher level of perfection and in the next step, takes him to a higher level of intuitive knowledge where he sees his own attributes as absorbed into the attributes of God to the extent that he becomes the interpretation of the famous narration of Imam al-Sadiq (peace be upon him) about whom God has stated: I am the ears, eyes, tongue, speech and hands and feet of my beloved. Arriving at such a potential is achieved through the grace of God and presential-intuitive knowledge.<br />The precedence of presential-intuitive knowledge over acquired-conceptual knowledge<br />Allamah Tabatabai holds that presential knowledge precedes acquired knowledge such that acquired knowledge is based upon knowledge-by-presence. Pure rational concepts, which are abstract concepts such as cause and effect, substance and accident, are not obtained through quiddites; rather, the soul discovers their referents through presential-intuitive knowledge and then attains a concept from them. In other words, when the soul arrives at a reality and truth and existentially connects to it, at another level, the faculty of imagination transforms that presential intuitive knowledge into acquired knowledge and forms and archives an image of it in the memory. Thus, the basis and foundation of all our acquired knowledge is presential-intuitive knowledge and its criterion is the existential unity and connection of the soul with the reality of the perceived thing.<br />Refuting some views that claim to disaffirm the validity of intuitive knowledge<br />According to Allamah Tabatabai, presential-intuitive knowledge always corresponds to reality; however, some do not accept such a view and present views refuting this and we will address some of those views here. In some instances, perceiving biological perceptions such as the feeling of hunger and thirst can be fallible, or you have knowledge of pain, itchiness, and burning of an amputated limb, and sometimes, as a side-effect of taking medication, one has unreal perceptions, and even though every person’s knowledge is presential in relation to his own soul; however, there are differing opinions on whether they are material or immaterial and all these instances show the infallibility of presential-intuitive knowledge. In response to the aforementioned disaffirmed instances, it can generally be said that the sources of perceiving unreal biological perceptions, are interpretations and explanations that are attained through acquired knowledge and this is unrelated to the fallibility of knowledge-by-presence. Preciseness regarding knowledge-by-presence and its contents reveals the negation of supposed errors.<br /> Alongside acquired-conceptual knowledge, intuitive knowledge, as one of the instances of knowledge holds a very important position among Islamic philosophers as well. Allamah Tabatabai also mentions presential knowledge with importance while discussing acquired knowledge, and ultimately, considers presential knowledge to precede acquired knowledge. In this paper, using an analytic method, we have tried to explain his theoretical foundations regarding presential-intuitive knowledge and rationally defending its cognitive validity. An important finding of this paper is that presential-intuitive knowledge, apart from being the base of acquired knowledge, also provides a convincing rational defense regarding cognitive validity. The basis of this validity is that accessing reality is the main goal of knowledge and if we can verify that reality itself is available to us in presential-intuitive knowledge, we would have no further concerns epistemological concerns. According to Allamah Tabatabai, just as sensory intuition creates a certainty of being in accordance with reality in ourselves, presential-intuitive knowledge also contains similar dominance over reality. At the end of this paper, some instances of views that claim to disaffirm the validity of presential-intuitive knowledge have been addressed, analyzed, and explained so that the epistemic validity of presential-intuitive findings is objectively proven.<br /> <br />Introduction<br />Islamic philosophers, being aware of the findings of past philosophers, have made valuable innovations regarding knowledge. In the works of Avicenna, Suhravardi, and Mulla Sadra there are priceless and authentic points regarding presential-intuitive knowledge and they have opened up new areas in intuitive knowledge and have paid attention to its rational explanation. One of the important epistemological elements in the ideas of Allamah Tabatabai is this very type of knowledge.<br />In this paper, we have strived to explain the theoretical foundations of Allamah Tabatabai regarding presential-intuitive knowledge, rationally defend its cognitive validity, and refute the claims that disaffirm its validity using an analytical method. The important finding and result of this study is that, apart from being the base of acquired knowledge, a claim to knowledge cannot be made without presential-intuitive knowledge because the real agent of knowledge is the human immaterial soul that provides a convincing rational defense regarding epistemic validity.<br />Intuitive knowledge according to Allamah Tabatabai<br />Terminologically, intuition (<em>shuhūd</em>) is direct knowledge that is achieved in the soul as soon as it is directly received, considered, and reflected upon. Such specific knowledge that manifests with purification and self-refinement is not of the category of concepts. Rather, it is attained through existential connection and unity with reality and is not directly attributed to truth or falsehood and other mental concepts. To reach such a level, the soul requires complete and sincere attention to God and to stay away from worldly diversions. It is in this case that it can gain dominion over reality when encountering it through the illuminative power it has achieved and control over it.<br />It is with intuitive knowledge that the witness arrives at a level of insight and perfection where he observes the realities in the Imaginal realm and in the form of images and at a higher level, is able to witness intelligible realities and ascends. It is in this case that knowledge becomes intelligible.<br />Explaining the foundations of intuitive knowledge<br />According to Allamah, the relation between the material world and the realms above the material is the relation between imperfections to perfection and diluted reality to reality. According to him, exoteric realities that are observed cannot be without intuitive knowledge of the esoteric because the exoteric existence is a manifestation of the esoteric existence and is its link. Thus, by witnessing the exoteric, intuitive knowledge of the esoteric is attained. Allamah considers the human intuition of his own essence as one of the most important instances of presential-intuitive knowledge and presents intuitive knowledge of the reality of the soul as one of the meanings of the narration, one who knows his self knows his Lord and shows its dependency on God considering this narration. It is in such a state that he considers his own actions to be complete dependence on the real agent and the intuition of such a reality takes the witness to a higher level of perfection and in the next step, takes him to a higher level of intuitive knowledge where he sees his own attributes as absorbed into the attributes of God to the extent that he becomes the interpretation of the famous narration of Imam al-Sadiq (peace be upon him) about whom God has stated: I am the ears, eyes, tongue, speech and hands and feet of my beloved. Arriving at such a potential is achieved through the grace of God and presential-intuitive knowledge.<br />The precedence of presential-intuitive knowledge over acquired-conceptual knowledge<br />Allamah Tabatabai holds that presential knowledge precedes acquired knowledge such that acquired knowledge is based upon knowledge-by-presence. Pure rational concepts, which are abstract concepts such as cause and effect, substance and accident, are not obtained through quiddites; rather, the soul discovers their referents through presential-intuitive knowledge and then attains a concept from them. In other words, when the soul arrives at a reality and truth and existentially connects to it, at another level, the faculty of imagination transforms that presential intuitive knowledge into acquired knowledge and forms and archives an image of it in the memory. Thus, the basis and foundation of all our acquired knowledge is presential-intuitive knowledge and its criterion is the existential unity and connection of the soul with the reality of the perceived thing.<br />Refuting some views that claim to disaffirm the validity of intuitive knowledge<br />According to Allamah Tabatabai, presential-intuitive knowledge always corresponds to reality; however, some do not accept such a view and present views refuting this and we will address some of those views here. In some instances, perceiving biological perceptions such as the feeling of hunger and thirst can be fallible, or you have knowledge of pain, itchiness, and burning of an amputated limb, and sometimes, as a side-effect of taking medication, one has unreal perceptions, and even though every person’s knowledge is presential in relation to his own soul; however, there are differing opinions on whether they are material or immaterial and all these instances show the infallibility of presential-intuitive knowledge. In response to the aforementioned disaffirmed instances, it can generally be said that the sources of perceiving unreal biological perceptions, are interpretations and explanations that are attained through acquired knowledge and this is unrelated to the fallibility of knowledge-by-presence. Preciseness regarding knowledge-by-presence and its contents reveals the negation of supposed errors.<br /> https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2367_f4c0bd0d728d94db827bdee57a2f9bff.pdfUniversity of QomJournal of Philosophical Theological Research1735-979124420221222A Critical Review of Mario Alai’s Solution to the Problem
of Underdetermination of Quantum Mechanics Theories
in Defense of Scientific RealismA Critical Review of Mario Alai’s Solution to the Problem
of Underdetermination of Quantum Mechanics Theories
in Defense of Scientific Realism101126236510.22091/jptr.2022.8473.2744FAJalalAbdollahiM.A. in the Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology; Physics Teacher in Ministry of Education, Tehran, Iran0000-0002-9907-2076Seyyed HedayatSajadiAssistant Professor of Philosophy of Science and Technology, Department of Physics Education, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran0000-0002-5568-8020Journal Article20220804Empirical underdetermination is one of the problems that challenges the position of scientific realism regarding the unobservable level of scientific theories. In response to this problem, Mario Alai claims that underdetermination cannot seriously trouble the realist’s position. Like other realists, he introduces theoretical virtues to break the underdetermination and offers special solutions to get rid of the objections to using theoretical virtues. Although Alai believes that theoretical virtues can break the existing underdetermination in most cases, he admits that today, despite using theoretical virtues, the underdetermination between the alternatives of quantum mechanics theories – Standard Quantum Mechanics (SQM) and Bohmian Quantum Mechanics (QBM) – cannot be broken. For this reason, defending the realist position in this special case, he proposes (and brings up) a new solution that pays attention to the unobservable agreements assumed in the ontologies of alternative theories. In this article, by critically examining Mario Alai'’s approach to the problem of empirical underdetermination, it is shown that his solutions to solving the objections of using theoretical virtues are not without difficulties. Also, after examining some similarities of Alai’s new proposed solution to maintain a realist position regarding quantum mechanics theories with the approach of structural realists, it is shown that his solution faces three drawbacks: 1) Reducing alternative theories to each other and dismantling the problem instead of dealing with it, 2) inconsistency and ambiguity in the truth of parts of the agreements of alternative theories, and 3) lack of guarantee in the existence of parts of the agreements, and ineffectiveness to generalize the solution for other possible cases.<br />Introduction<br />According to scientific realism, scientists are not blocked by underdetermination because they don’t look just for empirical data. Rather, they seek theories that have theoretical virtues such as simplicity, explanatory power, unification, and consistency with accepted theories and background beliefs.<br />Theoretical virtues and their inconclusive objections<br />But the utilization of theoretical virtues has two following objections: First, the concepts of these virtues are somewhat vague, and context-dependent, so they may be borderline and ambiguous cases. In reply, Alai claims that there is no reason to deny that they have epistemic value at least in clear-cut and univocal cases. For instance, he mentioned the Copernican and Ptolemaic systems that are underdetermined by empirical data. Alai says some unifying and explanatory features of the Copernican system speak for the truth of this system today just as they did five centuries ago, in a completely different cultural and epistemic situation. But the example that Alai narrated is not compatible with historical facts. In late 16<sup>th</sup>-century astronomy, there is a struggle between three theories: Ptolemaic geocentrism, Copernican heliocentrism, and Tycho Brahe’s geoheliocentricism. While Alai ignores Brahe’s theory and does not consider its coherence with accepted theories and background beliefs. Brahe’s compromise system preserved the explanatory achievements of the Copernican approach and remained in agreement with most of the received physics and cosmology. Hence, the scientific community chose this theory. It is unclear why Alai ignores Brahe’s theory and its coherence. Thus, the example that Alai presents is defective.<br />Second, different theoretical virtues may recommend different theories: If theory T has virtue X and theory T′ has virtue Y, we may be uncertain which one to choose. Alai says that scientists want a theory to have (to a reasonable extent) all of those virtues, for they assume that a true and informative theory would have all of them. But it is seem that this reply hided an unnecessary assumption. Alai assumes that only one theory can have all of the virtues, yet there is no obstacle that we meet many (not only one) theories that have all of the virtues. By the usage of <em>epistemic underdetermination </em>concept, we try to exemplify why Alai’s assumption is incorrect.<br />Alai’s solution to the underdetermination of Quantum Mechanics Theories<br />Alai focuses on alternative theories in quantum mechanics and admits that the theoretical virtues cannot break the underdetermination between those theories. For example, the following theoretical shortcomings can be mentioned: BQM postulates an instant dependence of everything on everything that the scientific community evaluates as an implausible and unsupported idea; SQM avoids the above shortcomings, but it provides no picture of the unobservable mechanisms and no explanation of the empirical regularities. Now, the position of scientific realism is faced with a serious threat. For this reason, Alai proposes a new solution that pays attention to the unobservable agreements assumed in the ontologies of alternative theories. He says all theories associate the quantum state with a peculiar physical field, all include the Schrödinger equation centrally in the dynamics, all endorse a strong form of ontic-structural nonseparability, and all agree on geometrical relations between sub-systems. Now, those agreements (and unobservable) matters about which realists have well-founded beliefs and probably even knowledge.<br />Assessment and evaluation of Alai’s solution<br />But, it seems that this solution faces three criticisms. Regarding the first criticism, relying on making the agreements between the two alternative theories – SQM and BQM – leads to the problem that many basic components of Bohmian quantum mechanics theory (including the quantum potential) are ignored, and that means that BQM doesn’t have a distinctive characteristic from SQM, and this cannot be accepted by the advocates of the Bohmian theory in any way. Because it is demonstrated that without the existence of these conceptual components of Bohmian theory, BQM reduces SQM. So, that causes us to dismantle the problem instead of dealing with it.<br />Concerning the second criticism, inconsistency, and ambiguity in the truth of parts of the agreements, Alai says the serious theoretical shortcomings of alternative theories indicate that, despite their compatibility with available evidence, none of them is true. In defense of the realist position, he proposes that we could rely on unobservable entities of agreements as part of alternative theories. It is not clear how the unobservable agreement parts of alternative theories (none of which are true due to theoretical shortcomings) can be considered true. On the one hand, Alai considers none of the theories to be true due to theoretical shortcomings; on the other hand, he considers the agreement parts of the theories to be true!<br />Finally, the third criticism is the lack of guarantee in the existence of parts of the agreement and the ineffectiveness to generalize the solution for other possible cases. According to Alai’s view, the different theories and interpretations are constrained by the empirical findings, which limit the possible options. But there is no reason to accept that constrained theories by empirical data can guarantee existing great agreement in alternative theories. The same empirical underdetermination is a good reason to confirm that we can construct greatly different theories with equal empirical data.<br />Furthermore, some differences and similarities between the approach of structural realists and Alai’s solution are pointed out. For example, it seems that the main idea of Alai is approximately similar to the view of structural realists. Because both attribute the claim of truth (and successful empirical predictions in scientific theories) to the commonality between alternative theories.Empirical underdetermination is one of the problems that challenges the position of scientific realism regarding the unobservable level of scientific theories. In response to this problem, Mario Alai claims that underdetermination cannot seriously trouble the realist’s position. Like other realists, he introduces theoretical virtues to break the underdetermination and offers special solutions to get rid of the objections to using theoretical virtues. Although Alai believes that theoretical virtues can break the existing underdetermination in most cases, he admits that today, despite using theoretical virtues, the underdetermination between the alternatives of quantum mechanics theories – Standard Quantum Mechanics (SQM) and Bohmian Quantum Mechanics (QBM) – cannot be broken. For this reason, defending the realist position in this special case, he proposes (and brings up) a new solution that pays attention to the unobservable agreements assumed in the ontologies of alternative theories. In this article, by critically examining Mario Alai'’s approach to the problem of empirical underdetermination, it is shown that his solutions to solving the objections of using theoretical virtues are not without difficulties. Also, after examining some similarities of Alai’s new proposed solution to maintain a realist position regarding quantum mechanics theories with the approach of structural realists, it is shown that his solution faces three drawbacks: 1) Reducing alternative theories to each other and dismantling the problem instead of dealing with it, 2) inconsistency and ambiguity in the truth of parts of the agreements of alternative theories, and 3) lack of guarantee in the existence of parts of the agreements, and ineffectiveness to generalize the solution for other possible cases.<br />Introduction<br />According to scientific realism, scientists are not blocked by underdetermination because they don’t look just for empirical data. Rather, they seek theories that have theoretical virtues such as simplicity, explanatory power, unification, and consistency with accepted theories and background beliefs.<br />Theoretical virtues and their inconclusive objections<br />But the utilization of theoretical virtues has two following objections: First, the concepts of these virtues are somewhat vague, and context-dependent, so they may be borderline and ambiguous cases. In reply, Alai claims that there is no reason to deny that they have epistemic value at least in clear-cut and univocal cases. For instance, he mentioned the Copernican and Ptolemaic systems that are underdetermined by empirical data. Alai says some unifying and explanatory features of the Copernican system speak for the truth of this system today just as they did five centuries ago, in a completely different cultural and epistemic situation. But the example that Alai narrated is not compatible with historical facts. In late 16<sup>th</sup>-century astronomy, there is a struggle between three theories: Ptolemaic geocentrism, Copernican heliocentrism, and Tycho Brahe’s geoheliocentricism. While Alai ignores Brahe’s theory and does not consider its coherence with accepted theories and background beliefs. Brahe’s compromise system preserved the explanatory achievements of the Copernican approach and remained in agreement with most of the received physics and cosmology. Hence, the scientific community chose this theory. It is unclear why Alai ignores Brahe’s theory and its coherence. Thus, the example that Alai presents is defective.<br />Second, different theoretical virtues may recommend different theories: If theory T has virtue X and theory T′ has virtue Y, we may be uncertain which one to choose. Alai says that scientists want a theory to have (to a reasonable extent) all of those virtues, for they assume that a true and informative theory would have all of them. But it is seem that this reply hided an unnecessary assumption. Alai assumes that only one theory can have all of the virtues, yet there is no obstacle that we meet many (not only one) theories that have all of the virtues. By the usage of <em>epistemic underdetermination </em>concept, we try to exemplify why Alai’s assumption is incorrect.<br />Alai’s solution to the underdetermination of Quantum Mechanics Theories<br />Alai focuses on alternative theories in quantum mechanics and admits that the theoretical virtues cannot break the underdetermination between those theories. For example, the following theoretical shortcomings can be mentioned: BQM postulates an instant dependence of everything on everything that the scientific community evaluates as an implausible and unsupported idea; SQM avoids the above shortcomings, but it provides no picture of the unobservable mechanisms and no explanation of the empirical regularities. Now, the position of scientific realism is faced with a serious threat. For this reason, Alai proposes a new solution that pays attention to the unobservable agreements assumed in the ontologies of alternative theories. He says all theories associate the quantum state with a peculiar physical field, all include the Schrödinger equation centrally in the dynamics, all endorse a strong form of ontic-structural nonseparability, and all agree on geometrical relations between sub-systems. Now, those agreements (and unobservable) matters about which realists have well-founded beliefs and probably even knowledge.<br />Assessment and evaluation of Alai’s solution<br />But, it seems that this solution faces three criticisms. Regarding the first criticism, relying on making the agreements between the two alternative theories – SQM and BQM – leads to the problem that many basic components of Bohmian quantum mechanics theory (including the quantum potential) are ignored, and that means that BQM doesn’t have a distinctive characteristic from SQM, and this cannot be accepted by the advocates of the Bohmian theory in any way. Because it is demonstrated that without the existence of these conceptual components of Bohmian theory, BQM reduces SQM. So, that causes us to dismantle the problem instead of dealing with it.<br />Concerning the second criticism, inconsistency, and ambiguity in the truth of parts of the agreements, Alai says the serious theoretical shortcomings of alternative theories indicate that, despite their compatibility with available evidence, none of them is true. In defense of the realist position, he proposes that we could rely on unobservable entities of agreements as part of alternative theories. It is not clear how the unobservable agreement parts of alternative theories (none of which are true due to theoretical shortcomings) can be considered true. On the one hand, Alai considers none of the theories to be true due to theoretical shortcomings; on the other hand, he considers the agreement parts of the theories to be true!<br />Finally, the third criticism is the lack of guarantee in the existence of parts of the agreement and the ineffectiveness to generalize the solution for other possible cases. According to Alai’s view, the different theories and interpretations are constrained by the empirical findings, which limit the possible options. But there is no reason to accept that constrained theories by empirical data can guarantee existing great agreement in alternative theories. The same empirical underdetermination is a good reason to confirm that we can construct greatly different theories with equal empirical data.<br />Furthermore, some differences and similarities between the approach of structural realists and Alai’s solution are pointed out. For example, it seems that the main idea of Alai is approximately similar to the view of structural realists. Because both attribute the claim of truth (and successful empirical predictions in scientific theories) to the commonality between alternative theories.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2365_49554f754b6918f9309ca7cc402a6ff2.pdfUniversity of QomJournal of Philosophical Theological Research1735-979124420221222Nietzsche’s Criticism of Kant’s Categorical
Imperative: An InquiryNietzsche’s Criticism of Kant’s Categorical
Imperative: An Inquiry127145236910.22091/jptr.2022.8568.2762FAMohammadAnbarsoozPhD Graduate of Philosophy, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, IranSheydaKaviani TabrizMA Graduate of Philosophy, Isfahan University, Isfahan, IranJournal Article20220905Friedrich Nietzsche, one of the most influential philosophers in the field of ethics, in his criticism of elder ethical systems, undercuts the philosopher’s ethics and considers it inefficient. This essay, taking Nietzsche’s criticism as its canon, scrutinizes his critiquess of Kant’s Categorical Imperative and clarifies that most of his reproves of Christian morality and philosophical ethics is, in fact, a reaction against the Categorical Imperative and the generalization latent in it. The essay at hand studies notions like Will, Reason, and Instinct before arriving at the conclusion that, the extreme contrast in ethics and opposition is due to two different perspectives adopted towards the human being and his will. Finally, we will find out that the canon of ethics is the Categorical Imperative and general maxim for Kant while Nietzsche, by reevaluating the values, introduces a moral criterion that recommends we seek the morality of any action in its conformity with the will to power. At the end of the article, we will show that Nietzsche’s attack on the philosopher’s morality, is concerned with Kant’s Categorical Imperative more than every other moral system. Regarding this interpretation, we show that Nietzsche’s reaction to Kant’s Categorical Imperative does not mean that Kant’s Ethics can be denied. These approaches are formed in separate discourses and we can just interpret them as continuous steps of progress in the history of Ethics. Nietzsche’s approach to morality can’t be considered without Kant’s account of the Categorical Imperative.<br /> <br />Introduction<br />Nietzsche’s criticism of morality is an important part of his thought. Through this approach, he traces morality to a new realm which is usually called metaethics. This paper demonstrates that while the basic element of moral value in Kant’s viewpoint is the Categorical Imperative, for example, the general moral law (the generality of morality), Nietzsche, by reevaluating values, believes in the compatibility of morality with the will to power as a criterion for recognizing moral actions (an individual approach).<br />Answering a famous criticism in moral philosophy that accuses Nietzsche of returning to the same Kantian Categorical Imperative would be our objective too.<br />Philosophical foundation<br />We can straight away approach the main topic of this essay by considering the essential element of Kant’s philosophical system and then investigating Nietzsche’s reaction to them. The concept of duty plays a central role in Kant’s moral thought, so every action has moral value based on the condition that it is done out of duty, not because of the results it brings about. This point is also one of the most important differences between Kant’s thought and Nietzsche’s because Nietzsche does not attach importance to duty and tries to replace it with will directed to power.<br />Nietzsche, refusing noumenon or anything like that, replaces Kant’s metaphysical approach to ethics with a focus on human nature. Furthermore, considering the human faculties, Kant appreciates reason and renounces desire and instinct in his investigations; while Nietzsche establishes his account of morality based on the superman’s human instinct. The contrast between reason and instinct sets Nietzsche's <em>Will to Power</em> against Kant’s <em>Critique of Practical Reason</em> and <em>Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals</em>.<br />Categorical Imperative vs. The Superman’s Will<br />The contrast which we explained above, in this paper is interpreted in the light of Kant’s account of the Categorical Imperative from Nietzsche’s point of view. The purpose of this essay is to compare the two ways of interpreting morality to make Nietzsche and Kant relevant. In fact, the problem of this paper is to reinterpret the roots of Nietzsche’s reaction to Kant’s Categorical Imperative, analyzing the philosophical and intellectual foundations of Kant and Nietzsche.<br />As a matter of discussion, we will show that the Categorical Imperative, as Kant formulates it, contains three different formulations all of which are rejected by Nietzsche because of different reasons. Typically his perspective leads him to reject every noumenon and avoid any result which presupposes that.<br />Based on the explanation of the philosophical foundations of Kant and Nietzsche on this issue and interpreting the contrast between the Categorical Imperative versus the Will to power, we can conclude that Nietzsche’s approach to the human being is entirely individualistic, and, accordingly, he criticizes Kant for trying to generalize the Categorical Imperative to all human beings. It seems that Kant’s metaphysics of morals turns into moral naturalism in Nietzsche’s thought. In other words, Nietzsche aims to put forward natural interpretations of human life instead of metaphysical interpretations.<br />Will to Power<br />Nietzsche’s reaction to Kant’s view, which criticized moral philosophy and the values in Kant’s account, is broadly accepted by most scholars in contemporary thought. This approach forms by claiming the reevaluation of values originated from the crucial ethical principle that slave morality should be replaced with the superman’s morality in order to preserve the vital human values and provide the basis for the flourishing of human will. Nietzsche’s reason for paying attention to the instinct is rooted in the difference between human entities. He considers a noble’s morality to be perfect and affected from vital instinct. Nietzsche, who considers the Categorical Imperative as the cause of the degrading of the superman’s instinct, rejects any reference to the affairs of the supernatural world.<br />Conclusion<br />At the end of the article, we will show that Nietzsche’s attack on the philosopher’s morality, is concerned with Kant’s Categorical Imperative, more than every other moral system. Regarding this interpretation, we show that Nietzsche’s reaction to Kant’s Categorical Imperative does not mean that Kant’s Ethics can be denied. These approaches are formed in separate discourses and we can just interpret them as continuous steps of progress in the history of ethics.Friedrich Nietzsche, one of the most influential philosophers in the field of ethics, in his criticism of elder ethical systems, undercuts the philosopher’s ethics and considers it inefficient. This essay, taking Nietzsche’s criticism as its canon, scrutinizes his critiquess of Kant’s Categorical Imperative and clarifies that most of his reproves of Christian morality and philosophical ethics is, in fact, a reaction against the Categorical Imperative and the generalization latent in it. The essay at hand studies notions like Will, Reason, and Instinct before arriving at the conclusion that, the extreme contrast in ethics and opposition is due to two different perspectives adopted towards the human being and his will. Finally, we will find out that the canon of ethics is the Categorical Imperative and general maxim for Kant while Nietzsche, by reevaluating the values, introduces a moral criterion that recommends we seek the morality of any action in its conformity with the will to power. At the end of the article, we will show that Nietzsche’s attack on the philosopher’s morality, is concerned with Kant’s Categorical Imperative more than every other moral system. Regarding this interpretation, we show that Nietzsche’s reaction to Kant’s Categorical Imperative does not mean that Kant’s Ethics can be denied. These approaches are formed in separate discourses and we can just interpret them as continuous steps of progress in the history of Ethics. Nietzsche’s approach to morality can’t be considered without Kant’s account of the Categorical Imperative.<br /> <br />Introduction<br />Nietzsche’s criticism of morality is an important part of his thought. Through this approach, he traces morality to a new realm which is usually called metaethics. This paper demonstrates that while the basic element of moral value in Kant’s viewpoint is the Categorical Imperative, for example, the general moral law (the generality of morality), Nietzsche, by reevaluating values, believes in the compatibility of morality with the will to power as a criterion for recognizing moral actions (an individual approach).<br />Answering a famous criticism in moral philosophy that accuses Nietzsche of returning to the same Kantian Categorical Imperative would be our objective too.<br />Philosophical foundation<br />We can straight away approach the main topic of this essay by considering the essential element of Kant’s philosophical system and then investigating Nietzsche’s reaction to them. The concept of duty plays a central role in Kant’s moral thought, so every action has moral value based on the condition that it is done out of duty, not because of the results it brings about. This point is also one of the most important differences between Kant’s thought and Nietzsche’s because Nietzsche does not attach importance to duty and tries to replace it with will directed to power.<br />Nietzsche, refusing noumenon or anything like that, replaces Kant’s metaphysical approach to ethics with a focus on human nature. Furthermore, considering the human faculties, Kant appreciates reason and renounces desire and instinct in his investigations; while Nietzsche establishes his account of morality based on the superman’s human instinct. The contrast between reason and instinct sets Nietzsche's <em>Will to Power</em> against Kant’s <em>Critique of Practical Reason</em> and <em>Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals</em>.<br />Categorical Imperative vs. The Superman’s Will<br />The contrast which we explained above, in this paper is interpreted in the light of Kant’s account of the Categorical Imperative from Nietzsche’s point of view. The purpose of this essay is to compare the two ways of interpreting morality to make Nietzsche and Kant relevant. In fact, the problem of this paper is to reinterpret the roots of Nietzsche’s reaction to Kant’s Categorical Imperative, analyzing the philosophical and intellectual foundations of Kant and Nietzsche.<br />As a matter of discussion, we will show that the Categorical Imperative, as Kant formulates it, contains three different formulations all of which are rejected by Nietzsche because of different reasons. Typically his perspective leads him to reject every noumenon and avoid any result which presupposes that.<br />Based on the explanation of the philosophical foundations of Kant and Nietzsche on this issue and interpreting the contrast between the Categorical Imperative versus the Will to power, we can conclude that Nietzsche’s approach to the human being is entirely individualistic, and, accordingly, he criticizes Kant for trying to generalize the Categorical Imperative to all human beings. It seems that Kant’s metaphysics of morals turns into moral naturalism in Nietzsche’s thought. In other words, Nietzsche aims to put forward natural interpretations of human life instead of metaphysical interpretations.<br />Will to Power<br />Nietzsche’s reaction to Kant’s view, which criticized moral philosophy and the values in Kant’s account, is broadly accepted by most scholars in contemporary thought. This approach forms by claiming the reevaluation of values originated from the crucial ethical principle that slave morality should be replaced with the superman’s morality in order to preserve the vital human values and provide the basis for the flourishing of human will. Nietzsche’s reason for paying attention to the instinct is rooted in the difference between human entities. He considers a noble’s morality to be perfect and affected from vital instinct. Nietzsche, who considers the Categorical Imperative as the cause of the degrading of the superman’s instinct, rejects any reference to the affairs of the supernatural world.<br />Conclusion<br />At the end of the article, we will show that Nietzsche’s attack on the philosopher’s morality, is concerned with Kant’s Categorical Imperative, more than every other moral system. Regarding this interpretation, we show that Nietzsche’s reaction to Kant’s Categorical Imperative does not mean that Kant’s Ethics can be denied. These approaches are formed in separate discourses and we can just interpret them as continuous steps of progress in the history of ethics.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2369_ec2408a2e839bfba258caf54d0d0360b.pdf