دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979126120240401Consciousness, subjective facts and physicalism – 50 years since Nagel’s bat.Consciousness, Subjective Facts, and Physicalism – Fifty Years since Nagel’s Bat205287710.22091/jptr.2024.10424.3021FARobertVan GulickProfessor, Philosophy Department, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, US.0000-0000-0000-0001Journal Article20240220The existence of subjective facts in the epistemic sense defined by Thomas Nagel’s famous article, “What is like to be a bat?”, might be taken to support an anti-physicalist conclusion. I argue that it does not. The combination of nonreductive physicalism and teleo-pragmatic functionalism is not only consistent with such subjective facts but predicts their existence. The notion that conscious minds are self-understanding autopoietic systems plays a key role in the argument. Global Neuronal Workspace theory is assessed in terms of its potential to answer David Chalmers’ Hard Problem of consciousness. A suggestion is made for augmenting the theory that involves another sense in which facts about conscious experience are subjective. The idea of conscious minds as self-understanding systems again plays an important role.The existence of subjective facts in the epistemic sense defined by Thomas Nagel’s famous article, “What is it like to be a bat?” might be taken to support an anti-physicalist conclusion. I argue that it does not. The combination of nonreductive physicalism and teleo-pragmatic functionalism is not only consistent with such subjective facts but predicts their existence. The notion that conscious minds are self-understanding autopoietic systems plays a key role in the argument. Global Neuronal Workspace Theory is assessed in terms of its potential to answer David Chalmers’ Hard Problem of consciousness. A suggestion is made for augmenting the theory that involves another sense in which facts about conscious experience are subjective. The idea of conscious minds as self-understanding systems again plays an important role.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2877_385a85fa06b27c30ee8731f7a365cab7.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979126120240401Property Dualism Implies Substanc DualismProperty Dualism Implies Substance Dualism2146272810.22091/jptr.2024.10209.2989FARalphWeirAssociate Member, Faculty of Theology and Religion, University of Oxford; Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Lincoln, UK.0000-0001-7159-3497Journal Article20231219Abstract: According a widely held view in the philosophy of mind, property dualism is a respectable theory whereas substance dualism need not be taken seriously. This paper argues that property dualism, as it is usually understood, is incoherent. The commitments that are meant to lead to property dualism actually lead to substance dualism. The argument presented here adds weight to David Chalmers’ suggestion that the serious nonphysicalist options are in fact various kinds of panpsychism and substance dualism. Along the way I offer an account of the substance/property distinction, argue against the existence of substrata as distinct from substances and properties, and describe a new position which I call ‘transcendent panpsychism’. I identify some reasons why philosophers of mind might have overlooked the incoherence of property dualism and finish with some thoughts on the significance of my conclusion for developmental psychology<br /><br />Abstract: According a widely held view in the philosophy of mind, property dualism is a respectable theory whereas substance dualism need not be taken seriously. This paper argues that property dualism, as it is usually understood, is incoherent. The commitments that are meant to lead to property dualism actually lead to substance dualism.According to a widely held view in the philosophy of mind, property dualism is a respectable theory whereas substance dualism need not be taken seriously. This paper argues that property dualism, as it is usually understood, is incoherent. The commitments that are meant to lead to property dualism actually lead to substance dualism. The argument presented here adds weight to David Chalmers’ suggestion that the serious nonphysicalist options are in fact various kinds of panpsychism and substance dualism. Along the way, I offer an account of the substance/property distinction, argue against the existence of substrata as distinct from substances and properties, and describe a new position that I call ‘transcendent panpsychism’. I identify some reasons why philosophers of mind might have overlooked the incoherence of property dualism and finish with some thoughts on the significance of my conclusion for developmental psychology.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2728_ac6215627aec096d65c16be0c33671d1.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979126120240401On the concepts of time, space, vacuum and domain of investigation
among contemporary physics, philosophy and theological reflectionOn the Concepts of Time, Space, Vacuum and Domain of Investigation among Contemporary Physics, Philosophy, and Theological Reflection4766275710.22091/jptr.2024.10113.2974FAPaoloDi SiaSchool of Science and School of Engineering, University of Padova, Padova, Italy.
School of Medicine, Applied Technical Sciences, University of Verona, Verona, Italy.0000-0002-6405-0483Journal Article20231120Contemporary theology is realizing the importance of integrating the knowledge of<br />modern/contemporary physics into the metaphysical and ontological categories used<br />to consider God and the God-world relationship. Time is a complex notion with<br />different meanings, characterized by a plurality of uses. The concept of time opens up<br />to broader conceptions than those of physics, mathematics and philosophy and reveals<br />that the human being, the earth and the cosmos are not the center of space or time.<br />The concepts of space, time and matter, to which the concept of vacuum is connected,<br />are of central importance in any modern physical theory, and particularly in the<br />theories of unification. It is being discovered that spacetime is absent at the most<br />fundamental level and only emerges at an appropriate limit. This emerging image of<br />time leads to new conceptual challenges that must be faced in parallel with<br />philosophy and theological research to achieve its correct understanding. It is a<br />comparison of the viewpoints of the three investigative domains concerned with<br />understanding the nature of consciousness, namely science, philosophy and<br />metaphysics. This thought process is connected to the intuitions of the contemplative<br />and mystical traditionsContemporary theology is realizing the importance of integrating the knowledge of modern/contemporary physics into the metaphysical and ontological categories used to consider God and the God-world relationship. Time is a complex notion with different meanings, characterized by a plurality of uses. The concept of time opens up to broader conceptions than those of physics, mathematics, and philosophy and reveals that the human being, the earth, and the cosmos are not the center of space or time. The concepts of space, time, and matter, to which the concept of vacuum is connected, are of central importance in any modern physical theory, and particularly in the theories of unification. It is being discovered that spacetime is absent at the most fundamental level and only emerges at an appropriate limit. This emerging image of time leads to new conceptual challenges that must be faced in parallel with philosophy and theological research<br />to achieve its correct understanding. It is a comparison of the viewpoints of the three investigative domains concerned with understanding the nature of consciousness, namely science, philosophy, and metaphysics. This thought process is connected to the intuitions of the contemplative and mystical traditions and seems to be in line with current scientific thought, which can be mathematically expressed. Recent scientific research struggles to grasp the subjective aspect of consciousness; subjective experience is in conflict with the figure of the observer classically understood in the scientific sense. The evolution of life and the relationship with the transcendent could have their information basis in a hyper-complex multi-dimensional space; recent efforts try to explain how mental states exist in the higher dimensions of this hyperspace; some recent models of unification integrate matter and consciousness through the use of this primordial multi-dimensional dynamic space. Ontological interpretations of quantum theory have been given, leading to patterns of bidirectional flow of consciousness between an explicate and an implicate order, supporting both local and non-local phenomena in the cosmos. The paper aims to offer an overview of the indicated issues with a trans-disciplinary method and through interesting hints for thought.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2757_8d625540a71db47cb7c64467cd1210f3.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979126120240401Evaluating Strong Emergentism:
An Argument for
Non-Physical Substential Strong EmergentismEvaluating Strong Emergentism: An Argument for Non-Physical Substantial Strong Emergentism6784277310.22091/jptr.2024.10175.2983FAMohammadMehdipourPhD of Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran0009-0009-5241-6503AbdolrasoulKashfiProfessor, Department of Philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran0000-0002-5702-2281Journal Article20231209Physicalists and dualists have been unable to give a convincing answer to the mind-body problem, because they sacrifice, respectively, the mental causation and the close relationship between mind and body. Consequently, some recent philosophers, like Timothy O'Connor and Jonathan Jacobs, have turned to the idea of strong emergentism considereing the mind as an emergent but physical substance that has independent causal powers. If this answer is defensible, it will be a promising approach to solve the mind-body problem. However, there are significant challenges facing the idea of strong emergentism. In this article, we have two objectives: firstly, to address these challenges and to show that even the most serious one, the Collapse Problem, cannot threaten a particular understanding of strong emergentism. Secondly, we argue that O'Connor and Jacobs's proposal, although thought-provoking, is not comprehensible and can only be understood clearly when we consider the emergent substance to be not merely physical.Physicalists and dualists have failed to provide a convincing answer to the mind-body problem. This is because they, respectively, sacrifice mental causation and neglect the close relationship between the mind and the body. To tackle this, some contemporary philosophers, such as Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan Jacobs, have turned to the concept of strong emergentism. This perspective views the mind as an emergent physical substance with autonomous causal powers. If this standpoint is tenable, it holds promise for resolving the mind-body problem. Nevertheless, the idea of strong emergentism faces substantial challenges. This article aims to achieve two objectives. First, it addresses these challenges and asserts that, even in the face of the most serious concern, “the collapse problem”, a specific interpretation of strong emergentism remains unthreatened. Second, we contend that while O’Connor and Jacobs present a thought-provoking proposal, its clarity is hindered, and a thorough understanding is only possible when we perceive the emergent substance as more than merely physical.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2773_b42416c4eea101ed6d2509a7768714cc.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979126120240401What are the ethical implications of panpsychism?What are the Ethical Implications of Panpsychism?85106286110.22091/jptr.2024.10501.3030FAMahdiZakeriAssociate professor,Department of Philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.0000-0003-1243-7130Journal Article20240309People usually think that phenomenal consciousness is unique to humans and animals, but panpsychism extends it to other beings and considers consciousness to be fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world. This extension is the common claim of panpsychists and has ethical implications. Panpsychists differ from each other in the extent of extension of consciousness. Micropsychism extends consciousness to the fundamental particles at the micro-level, and macropsychism extends it to cosmos and all physical objects in the universe. According to micropsychism, fundamental particles have moral status and significant moral standing, but this truth has no practical moral consequences and does not require us to change our behavior towards them. According to macropsychism, the universe has moral status and significant moral standing, and we should act in a way that increases the pleasure and decreases the pain of all beings that we know the cause of their pleasure and pain. Also, macropsychism requires admitting the moral status and significant moral standing of all animate and inanimate beings, and we must behave in such a way that the pleasure of animals and plants increases and their pain decreases, but we do not have any moral obligation regarding inanimate beings.People often think that phenomenal consciousness is unique to humans and animals,<br />but panpsychism extends it to other beings, considering consciousness as fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world. This extension claim, which is shared by all panpsychists, carries ethical implications. Panpsychists vary in their views of the scope of extending consciousness. Micropsychism extends consciousness all the way down to fundamental particles at the micro-level, while macropsychism extends it to the cosmos and all physical objects in the universe. While micropsychism suggests that fundamental particles have moral status and significant moral standing, this truth does not necessarily translate into practical moral consequences, nor does it require us to change our behavior towards them. On the other hand, macropsychism implies that the universe holds moral status and significant moral standing. Advocates of this view argue that we should act in a way that maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain for all beings in which we can discern the causes of pleasure and pain. Additionally, macropsychism requires recognizing the moral status and significant moral standing of all animate and inanimate entities. We should therefore behave in such a way that enhances the pleasure and alleviates the suffering of animals and plants, although we do not have any moral obligation regarding inanimate beings.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2861_e112b1899d6c325687a611134d8a67e5.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979126120240401Materiality of Knowledge in the Epistemology of Islamic TheologiansThe Materiality of Knowledge in the Epistemology of Islamic Theologians107120286310.22091/jptr.2024.10700.3054FAHasanAhmadizadeAssociate Professor of Comparative Philosophy, University of Kashan, Kashan, Iran.0000-0002-1125-1441Journal Article20240502The process of self-awareness and awareness of the surrounding world for Muslim scholars has been categorized into divisions such as experiential and acquired awareness. However, the ontology of awareness, meaning the discussion of whether awareness is immaterial or material, as well as the material or immaterial nature of the origin and end of awareness, has been a particularly challenging topic among Muslim theologians. Some Muslim scholars, denying the existence of a factor beyond the human body for his movement and life, considered both awareness and the process of awareness formation in humans and the factor shaping awareness in humans to be within the same body. They engaged in critiquing the perspectives and foundations of philosophers, especially Ibn Sina, on this matter and, utilizing specific principles in their philosophical physicalistic psychology, regarded awareness as a material entity. In this discussion, after examining the foundations of this group of Muslim theologians regarding the material nature of awareness and their criticisms of considering awareness as immaterial, we will focus on the philosophical and epistemological consequences arising from their materialistic view of awareness in their thought.The process of self-awareness and awareness of the surrounding world for Muslim scholars has been categorized into divisions such as experiential and acquired awareness. However, the ontology of awareness, meaning the discussion of whether awareness is immaterial or material, as well as the material or immaterial nature of the origin and end of awareness, has been a particularly challenging topic among Muslim theologians. Some Muslim scholars, denying the existence of a factor beyond the human body for his movement and life, considered both awareness and the process of awareness-formation in humans and the factor-shaping awareness in humans to be within the same body. They engaged in critiquing the perspectives and foundations of philosophers, especially Avicenna on this matter and, utilizing specific principles in their philosophical physicalist psychology, regarded awareness as a material entity. In this discussion, after examining the foundations of this group of Muslim theologians regarding the material nature of awareness and their criticisms of considering awareness as immaterial, we<br />will focus on the philosophical and epistemological consequences arising from the materialistic view of awareness in their thought.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2863_a7a210e19e5ba2ddede1e408ed7ff9d1.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979126120240401Understanding the Self from Embodied Cognition ParadigmUnderstanding the Self from the Embodied Cognition Paradigm121140282810.22091/jptr.2024.9899.2947FAAkhil KumarSinghResearch Associate, Centre for Human Sciences, Rishihood University, Sonipat, Haryana, India.0000-0001-7024-9053Journal Article20230922Over the centuries, the concept of the self has remained a prominent subject of philosophical inquiry. However, recent years have witnessed a notable shift, with empirical investigations in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology directing their focus toward unravelling the mysteries of the self. These multidisciplinary endeavours have yielded profound insights into the nature of the self, particularly its intricate connection to the physical body. This article centres on a prevailing theory in contemporary discourse: the concept of the embodied self. Central to this theory is the proposition that the self is not an abstract entity but is fundamentally constituted by and inseparably linked with the corporeal form. The article provides an analytical examination of the theoretical scaffolding supporting this theory, drawing substantiation from recent empirical studies spanning diverse disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. Additionally, it delves into the realm of phenomenology, briefly delving into Merleau-Ponty's philosophical contributions.Over the centuries, the concept of the self has remained a prominent subject of philosophical inquiry. However, recent years have witnessed a notable shift, with empirical investigations in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology directing their focus toward unraveling the mysteries of the self. These multidisciplinary endeavors have yielded profound insights into the nature of the self, particularly its intricate connection to the physical body. This article centers on a prevailing theory in contemporary discourse: the concept of the embodied self. Central to this theory is the proposition that the self is not an abstract entity but is fundamentally constituted by<br />and inseparably linked with the corporeal form. The article provides an analytical examination of the theoretical scaffolding supporting this theory, drawing substantiation from recent empirical studies spanning diverse disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. Additionally, it delves into the realm of phenomenology, briefly delving into Merleau-Ponty's philosophical contributions.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2828_e8d22cb3fc52bdc710aa239a927dc19c.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979126120240401Emergent God in Neutral MonismEmergent God in Neutral Monism141170283110.22091/jptr.2024.10162.2982FAAlfredoPereira Jr.Professor, Graduate Philosophy Program, State University of São Paulo (UNESP).0000-0002-5960-041XJournal Article20231204The aim of this paper is to dissociate Metaphysics and Theology. In Metaphysics, I propose a Neutral Monist foundation of the Being of Reality, which is, therefore, not material or ideal, but a cosmic field of possibilities that generate both domains. God is conceived as one possibility embedded in the Being of Reality that may or may not become actual, depending on conditions established by the evolution of the Cosmos. As far as we know, the conditions for actualization of God are satisfied by human consciousness. The relation between the Being of Reality and its outcomes, as the realization of God in human society, is one of actualization of potentialities, as in Aristotelian philosophy. This approach leads to a Feuerbachian view of God as emergent in social conscious experience, achieving embodied expression in human social practices, from the legitimate symbolic message of prophets, in sacred texts, rituals, images, buildings and social institutions implemented by religious organizations.The aim of this paper is to dissociate Metaphysics and Theology. In Metaphysics, I propose a Neutral Monist foundation of the Being of Reality, which is, therefore, not material or ideal, but a cosmic field of possibilities that generates both domains. God is conceived as one possibility embedded in the Being of Reality that may or may not become actual, depending on conditions established by the evolution of the Cosmos.<br />As far as we know, the conditions for the actualization of God are satisfied by human consciousness. The relation between the Being of Reality and its outcomes, as the realization of God in human society, is one of actualization of potentialities, as in Aristotelian philosophy. This approach leads to a Feuerbachian view of God as emergent in social conscious experience, achieving embodied expression in human social practices, from the legitimate symbolic message of prophets, in sacred texts, rituals, images, buildings, and social institutions implemented by religious organizations.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2831_1cd46ca16514384524b4dec97f354847.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979126120240401Knowing One's Own Consciousness: The Epistemic Ontology of Consciousness and Its Implication for the Explanatory Gap Argument(s)Knowing One’s Own Consciousness: The Epistemic Ontology of Consciousness and Its Implication for the Explanatory Gap Argument(s)171193280510.22091/jptr.2024.10108.2975FABiplabKarakPhD Research Scholar, School of Liberal Arts, Indian Institute of Technology, Jodhpur, India.0000-0001-6818-0210Journal Article20231121It is usually, and without much disagreement, regarded that 'knowing one's own consciousness' is strikingly and fundamentally different from 'knowing other things.' The peculiar way in which conscious subjects introspectively know their own consciousness in their immediate awareness is of immense importance with regard to the understanding of consciousness insofar as it has a direct bearing upon consciousness’ fundamental existence. However, when it comes to the understanding of consciousness, the role of consciousness’ introspective knowledge is rather downplayed or not given much importance with regard to its ontology. With this in the background, the whole purpose of this paper is, first, to make the rather obvious point that the very existence of consciousness in its most fundamental form is constituted by this introspective knowledge of it or its epistemic dimension, whereby its ontology gets its epistemological or epistemic nature. Second, it aims to strengthen the explanatory gap argument by appealing to our enhanced understanding of consciousness in terms of its epistemic ontology.It is usually, and without much disagreement, regarded that ‘knowing one’s own consciousness’ is strikingly and fundamentally different from ‘knowing other things’. The peculiar way in which conscious subjects introspectively know their own consciousness in their immediate awareness is of immense importance with regard to the understanding of consciousness insofar as it has a direct bearing upon consciousness’ fundamental existence. However, when it comes to the understanding of consciousness, the role of consciousness’ introspective knowledge is rather downplayed or not given much importance with regard to its ontology. With this in the background, the whole purpose of this paper is, first, to make the rather obvious point that the very existence of consciousness in its most fundamental form is constituted by this introspective knowledge of it or its epistemic dimension, whereby its ontology gets its epistemological or epistemic nature. Second, it aims to strengthen the explanatory gap argument by appealing to our enhanced understanding of consciousness in terms of its epistemic ontology.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2805_fc0e725ee8fcba22e97850afe88b94b4.pdf