دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 26 2 2024 06 21 An Option’s Moral Deontic Status is Grounded and Explained by Basic Normative Reasons دلایل هنجاری پایه بنیادگذار و تبیین‌کنندۀ وضعیت تکلیف اخلاقی انتخاب‌ها 5 30 2727 10.22091/jptr.2024.10239.2995 FA حسین اسناوندی دانشجوی دکتری، گروه فلسفه اخلاق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران. 0009-0005-8308-360X محسن جوادی استاد، گروه فلسفه اخلاق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران 0000-0003-4537-0518 Journal Article 2023 12 26 Normative ethics determine the options we ought to choose by ethically evaluating actions. In reason-based theory, the facts of what one ought to do are grounded and explained by virtue of the facts about reasons. According to this view, we demonstrate that the moral deontic status of options, which is derived from the normative deontic status of options, is determined by weighing the amount of normative weight of the basic practical normative reasons and based on the modified basic model. The modified basic model uses the weight of an unqualified all-things-considered reason for each option in a given situation as the input variables. To support our assumptions, we address the objections raised by opponents. These objections, respectively, include pro-tanto holism, source monism, normative pluralism, non-compositional holism, and the problem of normative options (merely permitted options). After evaluating these objections, we conclude that our assumptions will be defensible. Introduction The main aim of normative ethics is to give practical guidance to the agent. Practical guidance means determining the option’s moral deontic status. To determine the moral deontic status, we regarded the reason-based view. In this view, what “ought” to be done is grounded and explained by practical normative reasons. In this article, not “normative reasons” but “basic normative reasons” are considered to determine an option’s moral deontic status. Practical normative reasons In general, a practical normative reason is defined as a consideration that counts in favor of the action. Pro tanto and all-things-considered reasons: In a situation, a pro tanto reason can overcome or be defeated by another pro tanto reason, but the final consideration that must be taken into account in that situation depends on the all-things-considered reason. Normative reasons have direction and weight. A reason for action can only have two directions: in favor of or against an action. The feature of weight can carry numerous amounts. Basic normative reasons and pro-tanto holism objection Pro tanto reasons can be divided into two categories: derivative and non-derivative reasons. Derivative reasons do not have a normative force by themselves; they obtain it from the basic reasons. In this article, we defend the atomistic view against the holistic view. Holism and atomism about pro tanto reasons are rival accounts about the sensitivity of reasons to the context of an action. In the atomistic view, a consideration in favor of the action remains a reason in any situation, but in the holistic view, that consideration may not be a reason or even be considered a reason against the action. Because the defense of holism is usually done through argument from examples, we have shown that holism counter-examples cannot be extended to non-derivative or basic reasons. Moreover, by accepting the pluralist approach to basic reasons, the examples of holism can be explained from an atomistic perspective. Unqualified all-things-considered reason Sources pluralism is a common idea that believes that various normative sources (for example, ethical and prudential normative sources) provide different normative reasons. Source monism does not confirm this idea, but the monism objection does not seem to be correct because the same reason can have different explanations from the prudential standpoint than the moral standpoint. In addition, the same fact can provide conflicting prudential and moral reasons. Do reasons related to different normative sources (types of qualified reasons related to a normative field) that are relevant to a situation ground an unqualified all-things-considered reason and a plain ought? The answer to this question is negative in terms of normative pluralism. We have rejected normative pluralism because of its counterintuitive implications. The argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons shows why it is counterintuitive. Therefore, a good moral theory must determine the “moral ought” base on unqualified reasons. Weighing the basic reasons and the problem of non-compositional holism In this part, we have shown that the normative weight of all-things-considered reasons can be calculated with the additive theory. The problem of the non-compositional holism to additive theory does not apply to basic reasons and is therefore untenable. Weighing the reasons by the additive method: The most natural and closest view to common morality is to hold that the weight of reasons is the amount of normative support. In the additive method, the weight of each reason is added together in case of the same direction and subtracted otherwise. Problem of non-compositional holism: Based on this problem, the additive theory cannot explain cases where the combination of reasons with the same direction does not increase the weight of individual reasons. Critics have cited examples to illustrate these cases. According to these examples, non-compositional holism does not accept that the sum of the weights of the reasons is equal to the sum of the weights of the individual reasons because the combination of reasons can be very complex. In response to the above counter-examples, the additive theory must be modified in such a way that the reasons used in that method limited to basic, independent, or non-overlapping reasons. Determining the normative deontic status based on the modified basic model The basic model provides the most common way to determine the permitted and the required or the forbidden options, respectively, according to sufficient and decisive reasons. When the unqualified all-things-considered reason for an action has the greatest weight in competition with the weights of the unqualified all-things-considered reasons for alternative actions, our reason for doing that action is decisive; on the other hand, we have sufficient reason to perform an optional action when the unqualified all-things-considered reasons for alternative actions do not have more weight in that situation. The objection from normative options: The basic model is very simple compared to what is in the real world and cannot explain more complex normative and moral phenomena. On this basis, the objections from “merely permissible options” and “agent-centered options” are proposed and challenge the basic model. We believe that by adding more details to the basic model without fundamentally revising the structure of the basic model, these problems can be solved well. (In this article, we only dealt with the merely permissible options.) Merely permissible options: According to the basic model, the only way to explain merely permissible options or latitude is when the weight of the reasons for each action in a situation is equal. If we explain merely permissible options in this way, then it must be a rare phenomenon, but we know that latitude is very common. Moreover, in many situations, we are allowed to ignore an option supported by stronger reasons and to choose an option supported by weaker reasons. We responded to this problem by converting the absolute equality or superiority of the weights of the reasons into threshold equality or superiority. This response does not require a fundamental revision of the basic model because what “must” be done is still what there is the most reason to support. Conclusion The moral deontic status of each option is determined by the modified basic model. فلسفۀ اخلاق هنجاری به ارزیابی اخلاقی انتخاب‌ها می‌پردازد تا انتخاب‌هایی که «باید» انجام دهیم قابل تشخیص شوند. مطابق دیدگاه دلیل‌بنیاد در نظریات هنجاری، امور واقع دربارۀ دلایلْ بنیادگذار و تبیین‌کنندۀ امور واقع دربارۀ آنچه «باید» انجام دهیم است. در این مقاله نشان داده می‌شود که از این منظر، وضعیت تکلیف اخلاقی یک انتخاب -که به زعم ما اشتقاقی از وضعیت تکلیف هنجاری آن انتخاب است- بر اساس آنچه مُدل پایۀ اصلاح‌شده می‌خوانیم تعیین‌پذیر است. مُدل پایه از خروجی وزن کردن مقادیر وزنی دلایل هنجاری پایه در یک موقعیت بهره می‌گیرد تا وضعیت‌های تکلیفی واجب، ممنوع و جایز را از هم متمایز سازد. در دفاع از فرضیات فوق، اشکال‌هایی وارد می‌شود که به آنها می‌پردازیم. این اشکالات شامل کُل‌گرایی پروتنتو، یگانه‌گرایی دربارۀ منابع هنجاری، کثرت‌گرایی هنجاری، کُل‌گرایی در خصوص ترکیب‌پذیری و اشکال اختیارات می‌شود. پس از ارزیابی این اشکالات به هر یک پاسخ داده خواهد شد. در صورتی که استدلال‌های ما صحیح باشد، می‌توان به این نتیجه رسید که فرضیات مطرح‌شده قابل دفاع‌اند.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2727_1727697c7f3392b1df4bc372b700c70c.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 26 2 2024 06 21 Investigation and Analysis of the Philosophical Foundations of the Issue of Religious Realism and Non-Realism with Emphasis on Peter Byrne’s Point of View بررسی و واکاوی مبانی فلسفی مسئله رئالیسم و نارئالیسم دینی با تأکید بر نظرگاه پیتر برن 31 54 2876 10.22091/jptr.2024.10678.3046 FA جعفر شانظری دانشیار، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اهل البیت(ع)، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران. 1111-1111-1111-1111 علیرضا نهری دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد، گروه ادیان و عرفان تطبیقی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران 0009-0009-6098-9782 Journal Article 2024 04 28 This article, emphasizing Peter Byrne’s thought, one of the most important figures of contemporary religious philosophy, in addition to explaining his views on realism and non-realism as well as theism, religion, and theology, analyzes the philosophical foundations of this issue. Byrne’s critical approach to various dimensions of non-realism contains a fundamental distinction between theism and theology in adopting a realist and non-realist point of view about them; considering the separation of the two fields of theology and theism, he believes in the unrealistic nature of liberal theology as an academic discipline and the realism of religion, God, and theistic discourse; the purpose of the theistic discourse refers to an extra-mental, extra-mundane, transcendent entity. Ultimately, has analyzed the philosophical foundations of this issue; and Peter Byrne’s brief reference in examining the origin of the distinction between realism and non-realism, and also highlighted the modern non-realistic interpretation of religion, and in addition to analyzing the roots of the problem of religious realism and non-realism and by emphasizing the relationship between subject and object-especially in Kant’s philosophy, he has reviewed this philosophical foundation in the opinion of Peter Byrne. Introduction Peter Byrne is a professor of philosophy of religion and ethics at King’s College, London, and editor of the International Journal of Religious Studies in the field of philosophy of religion. The main focus of his research and studies is the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of ethics. This article tries to explain and analyze religious realism and non-realism and their philosophical foundations, considering Peter Byrne’s approach to the field of philosophy of religion. What is religious realism and non-realism? Do religion, religious propositions, religious beliefs, God, holy matter, etc. imply something real? Or is it just a representation of the human mind, history, and culture and has no external reality? Byrne’s answer to this problem is that he considers religion, God, and belief in God to be realistic and he believes in the unrealistic nature of liberal theology. In his works, he also makes a brief reference to Kant’s thought as the root of theological non-realism and in general, the formation of the distinction between realism and non-realism. This article, while examining and analyzing the roots of religious realism and non-realism, also criticizes it. Peter Byrne’s realist and non-realist views on theism, religion, and theology In Peter Byrne’s view, realism means that the concept of God and religion refers to a transcendent and sacred entity beyond us and the world. However, non-realism, for them, does not consider a reality beyond the representations of the subject. He says: “One can interpret theism realistically while interpreting theology non-realistically. One can take the realist intent of theism seriously without taking the realist intent of theology seriously” (Byrne, 2003, p. IX). He believes that “it is of the essence of religion in general and of theism in particular to attempt to refer to realities which exist beyond human representations” (Byrne, 2003, p. IX), and in Byrne’s opinion “all major religions make a common reference to the transcendent” (Byrne, 1995, p. 57). He also compared theology with natural sciences. “He offers a clear analysis of the problem, criticizes some of the major proponents of anti-realism, and defends his own view that theology is not properly understood as a realistic science” (Legenhausen, 2003). “He argues that the tradition exhibits no accumulation of insight into the nature and workings of God – that one could not claim to know anything more about the nature of God today than did the early Church Fathers” (Eshleman, 2005). He believes that “God is not an object among objects, an existent among existents” (Byrne, 1980, p. 4). So in his view, theism as a belief, action, and attitude centered on symbols that refer to Theos (God) is realistic, and theology as the theoretical, systematic exploration and adumbration of such belief, action, and attitude is non-realistic. Philosophical foundations of the issue of religious realism and non-realism In the analysis of this brief mention of Byrne, we can be guided to the issue that Byrne’s belief about the non-realistic nature of theology is formed by looking at the criticism of Kant’s thought and the relationship between subject and object. He says: “The roots of many of the themes in realist versus anti-realist debates lie in philosophical attempts from Kant onwards to tell us what the limits of knowledge and sense are” (Byrne, 2003, p. 3). Therefore, the proposal for this issue is based on a change in human thought and understanding that started from the Renaissance period. Byrne says: “My interpretation will emphasize the subjectivist strands in Kant’s treatment of religion, even while it acknowledges contrary tendencies toward objectivism. These are strands that make the truth and meaning of religious affirmations relative to human needs. In the jargon of contemporary philosophy of religion, there is a strongly anti-realist thrust in Kant on God” (Byrne, 2007, p. 5). So one of the foundations of realism and non-realism is modern epistemology. The evolution in the structure of the system of knowledge and cognition and its limits is one of the important elements of the new philosophy, which has reached its perfection in Kant’s critical philosophy. This issue indicates one of the most important historical developments of the new period and it is one of the principles of realism and non-realism. With this incident, in the new thinking and also considering the separation of noumenon and phenomenon in Kant’s view, the possibility of knowing the per se reality of objects has been ruled out, and human knowledge is focused only on the phenomenal aspect of things. Also, this knowledge is not the knowledge of the object, but the coordination of the object with the prior information of the subject’s understanding (Clarke et al, 1993, p. 86). Criticism of the philosophical foundations of the issue of religious realism and non-realism Thought is a historical thing and its critique should also respecthistory. Byrne’s thought is on the border of the critique of modern epistemology and liberal theology and on the threshold of a transition in the system of knowledge. Seeing theology as unrealistic for Byrne is associated with Kant’s critique. The discussion of religious realism and non-realism be accomplished in the field of modernity and its critique can open a way to the future; based on the foundations of modern philosophy, including Kant’s critique and considering our traditions and historical inheritances. Conclusion In the aegis of the relevance that a human being instates for existence, and with his understanding of it, history emerges and becomes consistent. During the Renaissance, the modern human being found another relation with existence; different from the previous human ratio, this change of respect is associated with the transition in the system of cognition, that is, the emergence of the subject and the dissolution of the object in the subject. In the postmodern era, with the critique of modern thinking, this all-encompassing absolutism of the subject is coming to an end. Because the critique of modern thought appears as a historical critique on the horizon of thinkers; it seems that by regarding the historical inheritances of the East, it is possible to find another relevance with existence and open a way to the future of history from this closed horizon. این مقاله با تأکید بر اندیشه پیتر برن، که یکی از مهم‌ترین چهره‌های شاخص فلسفه دین معاصر است، افزون بر تبیین دیدگاه او درباره رئالیسم و نارئالیسم و همچنین خداباوری، دین و الاهیات، به واکاوی و بررسی بنیان‌های فلسفی این مسئله پرداخته است. نظرگاه پیتر برن با این که یک رویکرد انتقادی به ابعاد مختلف نارئالیسم است، دربردارنده تمییزی اساسی میان خداباوری و الاهیات در اتخاذ نظرگاه رئالیستی و نارئالیستی درباره آن‌هاست. با توجه به تفکیک دو ساحت الاهیات و خداباوری، می‌توان چنین گفت که وی معتقد به نارئالیستی بودن الاهیات -لیبرال- به عنوان یک رشته علمی و آکادمیک و رئالیستی بودن دین، خدا و گفتمان خداباورانه است. در نظرگاه او، غایت گفتمان خداباورانه به موجودی فراذهنی، فرادنیایی و متعالی اشاره دارد. این نوشتار در نهایت به واکاوی و بررسی مبانی فلسفی این موضوع پرداخته و اشارت اجمالی پیتر برن در بررسی ریشه تمایز رئالیسم و نارئالیسم و همچنین تفسیر نارئالیستی مدرن از دین را مورد مداقه قرار داده و افزون بر واکاوی ریشه‌های مسئله رئالیسم و نارئالیسم دینی و با تأکید بر نسبت سوژه و ابژه - بالاخص در فلسفه کانت - به نقد و بررسی این بنیان فلسفی در نظرگاه پیتر برن پرداخته است.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2876_3d59a85d662483459c423b1c876e30a3.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 26 2 2024 06 21 Analysis and Examination of William Lane Craig’s Viewpoint on the Relationship between Religion and Ethics تحلیل و بررسی دیدگاه ویلیام لین کریگ در باب نسبت دین و اخلاق 55 78 2746 10.22091/jptr.2024.10145.2981 FA رضا نقوی دکتری فلسفه دین، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران 0000-0002-1556-6950 Journal Article 2023 12 03 This paper scrutinizes William Lane Craig’s perspective on the relationship between religion and ethics. According to Craig, knowledge of moral values and obligations is not inherently tied to theism, as he posits that God has embedded moral obligations within the human heart. However, in terms of ontology, Craig contends that theism provides the best explanation for moral realism. Atheistic realists, in avoiding the naturalistic fallacy, are urged to conceptualize moral properties as abstract Platonic entities akin to numbers and propositions, a stance unnecessary within the theistic framework where God, a concrete entity, serves as the supreme good and ultimate source of moral goodness. Critically assessing Craig’s viewpoint, the paper contends that 1) real property should not be conflated with an essential constituent. Drawing on Moore’s perspective, moral predicates are construed as second-order philosophical concepts inherently tied to the existence of subjects. 2) By centering on the existence of “moral evil,” Craig’s argument can be inverted, providing grounds for an argument supporting the existence of Satan. 3) The consequence of Craig’s argument is the negation of any moral obligation for atheists. 4) Positing obedience to God’s command solely for its own sake as irrational, Craig’s argument may potentially exhibit circular reasoning. Introduction The inquiry into the relationship between religion and ethics remains an active concern within the realm of philosophy of religion. William Lane Craig seeks to advocate for a novel iteration of the Divine Command Theory. According to Craig, knowledge of moral values and obligations is not inherently tied to theism, as he posits that God has embedded moral obligations within the human heart. However, in terms of ontology, Craig contends that theism provides the best explanation for the existence of moral values and obligations. This article aims to undertake a critical analysis and assessment of Craig’s framework. We will assert that Craig’s theory relies on a distinctive interpretation of moral realism, one that is subject to controversy. Additionally, his assertions exhibit certain inconsistencies and ambiguities, rendering his approach susceptible to scrutiny. Ontological dependence of ethics on religion As per Craig, moral realism involves acknowledging the existence of sui generis moral properties, such as goodness, love, justice, mercy, etc., serving as exemplars of moral concepts. Consequently, atheism is deemed insufficient in explaining moral realism, given its naturalistic stance that denies the presence of non-natural elements in the world. Thus, the only recourse for atheism to circumvent moral non-realism is to propose that moral properties be considered as abstract entities rather than concrete entities, placing them within a Platonic realm. However, this proposition is deemed unsound, as Craig highlights the principle of supervenience, indicating that moral properties supervene upon natural properties. Atheists must contend that moral properties, as abstract and non-natural entities, supervene upon concrete and natural entities. Craig argues that abstract and concrete entities differ significantly, rendering it irrational to assert that moral abstract entities supervene upon natural concrete entities. In contrast, theism posits that every moral good mirrors the existence of a perfect good (God) and, akin to God, possesses a concrete existence. Consequently, theism does not encounter the challenge of abstract entities supervening over concrete ones. Epistemological independence of ethics to religion According to Craig, ethics maintains epistemological independence from religion. This assertion stems from the belief that God has inherently instilled moral principles and laws within the hearts of all individuals, irrespective of their theological stance—be they theist or atheist. Consequently, every human possesses an innate awareness of God’s moral directives and prohibitions, rendering the knowledge of moral values and obligations detached from theism or scriptures. As a result, atheists can lead a moral life comparable to that of theists. Discussion The primary critique levied against Craig is his assertion that atheists confront a binary choice: they must either reject the existence of any moral properties (embracing non-realism) or adopt a Platonic perspective regarding the existence of moral properties. This dichotomy appears flawed, as atheists can potentially adopt a third option, positing that moral predicates are second-order philosophical concepts and cannot exist independently of the existence of subjects. This aligns with Moore’s stance in the ontology of ethics, where he contends that moral predicates, such as “goodness,” lack a natural essence perceptible through senses or an abstract existence in a Platonic realm. Instead, Moore argues that moral predicates are intrinsically tied to their subjects, existing in dependence on the existence of these subjects. Moreover, the potential to posit the existence of God through the appeal to moral goodness opens the door to arguing for the existence of Satan by invoking moral evils. All the premises that Craig assembles to establish the existence of God could equally serve to demonstrate the existence of Satan. In conclusion, if Craig persists in asserting that moral realism holds no significance within an atheistic framework, then he must also acknowledge that sincere atheists bear no moral obligations and cannot be censured for immoral actions, even though, from an objective moral standpoint, their behavior might be deemed erroneous. Craig appears unwilling to accept the ramifications of his theory. Conclusion Craig’s interpretation of the Divine Command Theory lacks defensibility as it relies on a flawed dichotomy between nihilism and Platonism. However, there exist other rational interpretations of moral realism beyond these two extremes, as mentioned earlier. Additionally, Craig’s viewpoint contains inconsistencies that render the theory implausible. On one hand, he maintains that in a world devoid of God, moral values and obligations must be dismissed, yet on the other hand, he argues that atheists are still bound by moral obligations and should be held accountable for their actions. در این مقاله به بررسی دیدگاه ویلیام لین کریگ در باب نسبت دین و اخلاق می‌پردازیم. از نظر کریگ، معرفت به ارزش‌ها و تکالیف اخلاقی ابتنائی بر خداباوری ندارد، زیرا خداوند وظایف اخلاقی را در قلب تمام آدمیان نگاشته است. با این حال، در ساحت هستی‌شناختی، بهترین تبیین برای واقع‌گرایی اخلاقی خداباوری است. واقع‌گرایان خداناباور، اگر بخواهند از مغالطۀ طبیعت‌گرایانه اجتناب بورزند، باید واقعیات اخلاقی را از سنخ هویات انتزاعی افلاطونی، مانند اعداد و گزاره‌ها، بدانند. در مقابل، خداباوری نیازی به تمسک به هویات افلاطونی ندارد؛ زیرا خداوند، به مثابه موجود انضمامی، خیر اعلی و منشأ هر گونه خیر اخلاقی است. در نقد دیدگاه کریگ بیان می‌شود که (1) ویژگی واقعی معادل با امر ماهوی نیست، و بنا بر یک خوانش از مور، محمولات اخلاقی جزء معقولات ثانیه فلسفی‌اند و به عین وجود موضوعات موجود هستند؛ (2) می‌توان، با تمرکز بر وجود «شر اخلاقی»، استدلال کریگ را معکوس نمود و استدلالی به نفع وجود شیطان نیز اقامه کرد؛ (3) لازمۀ استدلال کریگ نفی هر گونه تکلیف اخلاقی از خداناباوران است؛ (4) اطاعت از امر خدا، به خاطر امر خدا، نامعقول است و کریگ پاسخ مقنعی به اشکال دور نمی‌دهد.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2746_d5ce36c09a60882e5744f64b19fe8578.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 26 2 2024 06 21 Comparative Analysis of the Impact of Influx Theory on Descartes and Suárez’s Natural Teleology تحلیل تطبیقی اثر نظریه علیت اشرابی بر غایت‌شناسی طبیعی دکارت و سوارز 79 100 2804 10.22091/jptr.2024.9620.2916 FA محمدعلی سلطان‌مرادی دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه غرب، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران. 0009-0002-2664-8051 یوسف شاقول دانشیار، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران 0000-0002-6252-9319 غلامحسین توکلی دانشیار، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران. 0009-0005-1345-1016 Journal Article 2023 06 27 Proposing the theory of influx, Francisco Suárez argued that each of the four causes “inflows” its being into the effect. This theory takes the concept of four causes, especially the final cause, to be similar to the efficient cause. By this move, Suárez can account for God’s purposeless and free will as well as His purposeful action through nature. Influenced by Suárez’s theory, Descartes excluded the final cause from his philosophy, which paved the way for the mechanical explanation of nature. It was thus possible for a theory developed with theological objectives to provide the basis for the scientific explanation of nature. In this study, we examine the differences and similarities between Descartes’s and Suárez’s natural teleology. Comparing these two metaphysical systems reveals how two theories may be influenced by the same principles but produce contradictory results. Thus, we will first analyze the concept of the theory of influx. Following that, we present textual evidence to highlight the impact of influx theory on Descartes and Suárez’s natural teleology. Subsequently, we examine how Descartes took causal (viz. efficient) necessity as the only good in nature by developing Suárez’s theory of causality. Introduction Francisco Suárez proposed the influx theory. Some of Descartes’s philosophical writings also indicate that he presupposed the main principles of this theory. The influx theory reduces the characteristics of the four causes to the efficient cause. Comparing Descartes’s philosophy with that of a philosopher who influenced him has two positive aspects. Firstly, it provides insight into Descartes’s concept of finality, which is often overlooked by non-comparative studies. Secondly, it illustrates how two theories with different teleological viewpoints can share a common theoretical foundation. Discussion According to the influx theory, any property an effect possesses, including its existence must have been imparted by its cause. Therefore, each of the four causes contributes to the effect’s existence by inflowing its being into it. Consequently, the theory weakens the role of the other causes, especially the final cause, by making each of the four causes similar to the efficient cause. However, due to their differing paradigms, this theory appears differently in each philosopher’s teleology. There are theological reasons to undermine final causality in Suárez’s philosophy. Suárez believes that the key to understanding God as a free non-created being is to reject the possibility of His will being subjected to the influx of any cause. In his pursuit of this objective, Suárez employed various strategies to alter the traditional attitude toward causality. To begin with, Suárez denies the effect of the final cause on God’s will. He believes that, even though divine actions are purposeful, they can arise from a will that is not influenced by a final cause. Secondly, Suárez denies the purposefulness of natural elements’ actions. He argues that, due to their inherent necessity, elements’ actions “terminate” at some point. However, since God is the only agent responsible for nature’s movements, they can only reach their “terminus” if He approves. All nature is thus oriented toward the ultimate end of nature, which is the good of the whole, or, in other words, the manifestation of God himself. As a result, Suárez can maintain a sense of purpose for the system of nature without asserting the purposefulness of God’s will. Descartes’s natural theory is also rooted in theology. He regards the immutability of God’s acts as a theological axiom that deserves inclusion in a scientific philosophy. He further argued that the belief in the purposefulness of nature’s components is a result of childish imaginations and caused by ignorance of the real laws, mostly derived from efficient causation, that govern nature. Therefore, if we believe that bodies have a purposeful nature, it is necessary to accept that a sick body’s desire against its health is actually out of its nature and misleading. In his opinion, stating this would mean that God has instilled a deceptive power in our souls, a position he disagrees with. Consequently, we should not rely on teleology but rather explore and uncover nature’s mechanistic laws. In Descartes’s natural philosophy, the true good is the absence of any disturbance in God’s immutability as the true efficient cause of the universe. For this reason, we should exclude teleology from philosophy and focus on efficient causes in nature. Despite the many theoretical benefits of studying efficient causation as the only means of explaining nature, this approach, especially in its Cartesian form, may have some drawbacks. Nature, according to Descartes, is nothing more than God’s actions, so it would also be purposeless if God’s actions were aimless. Therefore, Descartes’s claim that the natural system proves God’s goodness and perfection may be deceptive. In this context, one may ask if we should accept that God’s actions have no purpose in Descartes’s philosophy. However, upon comparing Descartes and Suárez’s teleology, it is evident that there is no deception involved. It is important for Suárez to distinguish between the ends of the divine will and the natural system in order to emphasize the unique agency possessed by God. But the Cartesian version of this theory does not require a distinction, because it does not consider “the good” as the purpose of God’s acts. Descartes posits that divine acts are not purposeful, but rather identical to the good. In other words, God’s actions are not oriented towards a particular purpose or end but are inherently good in and of themselves. As a result, he dissolves the issue of how God’s actions relate to the good, instead of solving it. Conclusion We are confronted with two distinct causal theories, both derived from the influx theory. One of these theories, which sees theological issues at the top of its priorities, advocates preserving divine freedom in its entirety. It also maintains the purposefulness of nature in a relatively modest manner. However, to provide a certain foundation for science, the second theory accords primacy to the immutable and necessary laws of nature. This places the immutability of natural laws on the same level as natural purpose. This means that God’s actions as well as natural phenomena are inherently perfect, without the need for a specific goal or purpose. فرانسیسکو سوارز با ابداع نظریۀ علیت اشرابی ادعا کرد که علل اربعه وجود را به معلول اشراب می‌کنند. بدین ترتیب، نظریه اشرابی علّیت مفهوم هر چهار علّت -به ویژه علّت غایی- را شبیه علّت فاعلی می‌گرداند. از این رهگذر، سوارز می‌توانست در فلسفۀ خود ارادۀ آزاد و بی‌غایت الهی را با کنش غایتمند او در طبیعت جمع کند. دکارت نیز، با تأثیرپذیری از نظریه اشراب، علت غایی را از فلسفه خود حذف کرد تا راه را برای توضیح مکانیکی طبیعت هموار نماید. بدین نحو نظریه‌ای که با اهدافی الهیاتی ابداع شده بود، مبنای توضیح علمی طبیعت قرار گرفت. در این پژوهش تفاوت‌ها و شباهت‌های غایت‌شناسی طبیعی را در متافیزیک دکارت و سوارز بررسی می‌کنیم. مطالعۀ تطبیقی این دو نظام مابعدالطبیعی نشان می‌دهد که چگونه ممکن است دو نظریه از مبانی واحدی متأثر باشند، اما به نتایج متضادی بینجامند. بنابراین، در ابتدا مفهوم نظریۀ اشرابی علیت را تحلیل خواهیم کرد، پس از آن با تکیه بر شواهد متنی تأثیر نظریۀ اشراب بر غایت‌شناسی سوارز و دکارت را آشکار خواهیم ساخت. سپس بررسی می‌کنیم که چگونه دکارت، با بسط نظریه علیت سوارز، ضرورت علّی (فاعلی) را تنها خیر در طبیعت در نظر گرفت.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2804_e6dfb27d2f5fab84ac5efb3ba8e17d31.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 26 2 2024 06 21 The Methodology of Defining Conventional Concepts Based on Allamah Tabatabai’s Theory of Conventional Perceptions روش‌شناسی تعریف مفاهیم اعتباری براساس نظریه اعتباریات علامه طباطبایی 101 126 2726 10.22091/jptr.2024.9978.2956 FA جواد طالبی طادی دانشجوی دکتری، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران 0000-0001-9615-7245 عسکر دیرباز دانشیار، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران 0000-0001-9615-7245 احمد عابدی دانشیار، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران 0000-0001-7360-7020 Journal Article 2023 10 12 Based on Tabatabai’s theory and the method of logical analysis, the present research has dealt with the methodology of defining conventional concepts and presented fifteen methodological rules. The method of defining these concepts is the method of conceptual analysis, and some of the presented rules are dedicated to the basics of definition, some to its types, and some to methods for discovering the conceptual components of conventional concepts. According to these methods, it is possible to discover the components of these concepts and use these components in the definition using the method of conceptual analysis. Of course, it should be noted that the most important component of a conventional concept is its purpose, which must be used in any definition. The use of other components in the definition may vary according to each concept. Introduction The method used in logic to define concepts is in some cases only for real concepts. Also, the method of discovering the components of a concept is not stated in logic. Therefore, it is not possible to define conventional concepts in logic by the conceptual analysis method. Therefore, to define conventional concepts and discover their components, the methodology of defining conventional concepts is necessary. This methodology is used according to the requisites of Allamah Tabatabai’s Theory of Conventional Perceptions. Regarding the definition of conventional concepts, there are fifteen methodological rules about the definition of these concepts. The findings of this research are fifteen methodological rules for defining conventional concepts. Methodological rules for defining conventional concepts: The first rule: According to the Theory of Conventional Perceptions, there are three criteria for the being conventional of a concept: 1) It is only possible to assume conventional obligation in conventional concepts, 2) It is not possible to imagine the conventional concept without a similar and participant concept, and 3) conventional and real concepts are not predicated on each other except when both are considered the same: either conventional or real. The second rule: conventional concepts are defined by the method of conceptual analysis. The third rule: The definition of conventional concepts is divided into normative and non-normative based on three criteria: 1) being based or not based on the value system of society, 2) belonging to the current and desired status, and 3) the intention to recommend or describe. The fourth rule: In the religious approach to science, normative definitions in the sense of recommendation and purposes of conventional concepts must be compatible with the Islamic religion. The fifth rule: A conventional concept that has no effect or its effect is not in line with the purpose of being conventional is canceled. A conventional concept that has an effect and its effect is in line with its purpose is acceptable. Conventional concepts are divided into beneficial and non-beneficial. A conventional concept whose purpose is in line with human perfection is beneficial, and a conventional concept that is not is non-beneficial. The normative definition of a concept in the sense of recommendation must be acceptable. In addition to the recommended definition, for the descriptive definition of a conventional concept, it is also possible to evaluate the relationship between the effect, purpose, and end of that concept and provide a more precise definition. The sixth rule: To define conventional concepts, one must define the concept itself, not its effect, which is a real thing. The seventh rule: By knowing the definition or attributes of the real thing on which conventional concepts are based and the quality of the estimative faculty verb in that definition or attributes, one can know conventional concepts. The eighth Rule: By describing the emotional factors that are the origin of the conventional concepts, it will be easier for people who lack that concept even in their own culture to recognize those concepts. The ninth rule: Knowing each conventional concept depends on knowing its specific purpose. It is necessary to use purpose in defining all conventional concepts. The tenth rule: Recognizing the real concept obtained in a variable conventional concept, and the quality of the estimative faculty verb in that real concept, depends on knowing the quality of the change of conventional concepts. The eleventh rule: To recognize a concept that has a similar or opposite, one can use the characteristics of its similar or opposite to recognize that concept. The twelfth rule: If a conventional concept is one of the correlative concepts, it is necessary to include both of them in their definition. The thirteenth rule: In defining conventional concepts that are considered as post-social conventional concepts, it is necessary to pay attention to the society in which that concept was created and the characteristics of that society, and based on the characteristics of that society, recognize the factors affecting the being conventional of that concept. The fourteenth rule: Based on the real effects that are related to conventional concepts, it is possible to provide a criterion for the distinction of conventional concepts. The fifteenth rule: In the definition of conventional concepts, it is necessary to pay attention to the conditions stated in the logic for the definition. Conclusion conventional concepts are defined by conceptual analysis. To discover the components of conventional concepts, fifteen methodological rules can be used. Of course, it is necessary to use some of these rules, such as paying attention to the purpose and observing logical conditions in defining any concept. Conceptual analysis also applies to normative definitions. It should be noted that in the normative definitions that are made with the intention of recommending, the conceptual components are not discovered but are established. تحقیق حاضر براساس نظریۀ اعتباریات علامه طباطبایی و با روش تحلیل منطقی به روش‌شناسی تعریف مفاهیم اعتباری پرداخته و پانزده قاعدۀ روش‌شناختی در باب تعریف مفاهیم اعتباری را عرضه کرده است. روش تعریف این مفاهیم به روش تحلیل مفهومی است و قواعد عرضه‌شده برخی به مبانی تعریف، برخی به اقسام آن و برخی نیز به روش‌هایی برای کشف مؤلفه‌های مفهومی مفاهیم اعتباری اختصاص دارد. با توجه به این روش‌ها می‌توان مؤلفه‌های این مفاهیم را کشف کرد و در تعریف به روش تحلیل مفهومی از این مؤلفه‌ها بهره برد. البته باید توجه داشت مهم‌ترین مؤلفه یک مفهوم اعتباری غرض آن است، که باید در هر تعریفی به کار گرفته شود. به‌کارگیری دیگر مؤلفه‌ها در تعریف با توجه به هر مفهوم ممکن است متغیر باشد. نظر به تقسیم تعریف مفاهیم به هنجاری و غیرهنجاری، در تعاریف هنجاری به معنای توصیه‌ای نیز لازم است مؤلفه‌های مفهومی یک مفهوم اعتباری به دقت مورد توجه قرار گیرد و متناسب با غرض آن مفهوم در آن أخذ شود.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2726_e8db58b63c783daad8c91bac66ff1a87.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 26 2 2024 06 21 Examining Greco’s Solution to ‘The Garbage Problem’ in the Epistemology of Testimony بررسی راه‌حل گرکو برای «مسئلۀ زباله» در معرفت‌شناسی گواهی 127 148 2745 10.22091/jptr.2024.10010.2958 FA مرتضی متولی دکتری، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران 0000-0002-5305-6951 مهدی عظیمی دانشیار، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران 12321445356457568689 Journal Article 2023 10 20 Posing the issue of fallacies, Aristotle tried to keep safe the discursive reason-one of the sources of knowledge-from likely errors. Likewise, John Greco wants, in fact, to determine the reliable framework of testimony-another source of knowledge-by introducing the garbage problem. To solve the problem, he tries to consider the garbage problem as a generality problem. In this way, the relevant parameters-which are determined by the practical concerns/tasks that form the epistemic community -warrant reliability by narrowing the transmission channels. We will recognize some deficiencies in his view taking an analytical and critical approach and a comprehensive look at his epistemology of testimony in general. Therefore, we indicate that a better formulation of the problem can be offered. We cannot ignore the two following difficulties though the difficulty of letting luck into knowledge and the difficulty of a partly person-oriented solution being somehow resolvable. First, Greco does not explain how practical concerns lead us to the right results. Second, it is not that the practical tasks and the relevant parameters are always known. Introduction After theorizing in this domain for over ten years, Greco wrote a comprehensive book on the epistemology of testimony in 2020, The Transmission of Knowledge. In this book, he puts forward a new theory for solving many problems in literature; although he admits that he doesn’t dig into details too much. He uses the very theory to solve a problem that he, apparently, poses for the first time and calls it “the garbage problem.” It should be mentioned that he presents the problem and its solution in 2018 in the article “Transmitting faith (and garbage)” and in 2019 in the article “The transmission of knowledge and garbage”, but in this book, he puts it in a coherent system along with other problems. Knowledge is often transmitted alongside garbage. For example, parents transmit prejudice to their children in addition to the huge amount of information they give them. The problem is to explain how knowledge is transmitted along with garbage. Even if the hearer has good evidence for the competence and sincerity of the speaker, it is not usually so easy to sift out the knowledge from the garbage. Greco’s solution for the garbage problem Greco’s general strategy is to treat the garbage problem as a generality problem. Just as in other sources of justification and knowledge, like perception, the relevant parameters warrant the reliability of the process/faculty; in testimony, too, the relevant parameters bring reliability by narrowing the transmission channels and therefore preventing concomitant garbage. Here, the relevant parameters are determined by practical tasks/concerns–the concerns that constitute the epistemic community. Epistemic communities have two kinds of informational needs: acquiring the information relevant to their practical tasks and distributing that information to the people who need it. Norms or standards will guarantee the quality of this information for a well-functioning community. These are the parameters regarding the conditions and scope of adequate perception/testimony/etc. Different epistemic communities have different norms or standards depending on the tasks at hand. Now we can easily see how the garbage problem is solved. Suppose that you go to a skillful doctor to treat your medical problem. During the meeting, the doctor talks nonsense about politics and brings misconceptions to support his views. While the doctor is completely reliable in the first scope, he says garbage in the second scope. But considering that the purpose of going to the doctor is to get information about the condition of the disease, his garbage-talking is not important. That is, in this practical task, the reliable transmission channel between you and him in the community that has given him license is only the scope of medical information. Greco comes to an end by addressing a problem. The problem is that sometimes the relevant practical concerns or relevant parameters are not known. Greco’s answer is the same as Heller’s to the problem of generality: context fixes the relevant parameters, in a very complex way that cannot be easily codified in rules. It is not reasonable to try to find a rule that can determine the relevant parameters in each case. This is because, on the one hand, we don’t have access to the multitude of contextual features that play a role in determining the parameters, and, on the other hand, since we are adept enough in recognizing the reliability of a process for practical purposes, we don’t need such a rule. Objections Greco tries to solve the garbage problem with an externalist approach. Hence, we will move in the same framework in our examination of his view and avoid criticizing him from an internalist perspective. The first objection concerns Greco’s formulation of the problem. He considers his problem to be the explanation of how knowledge is transmitted right alongside garbage. But the answer he gives only specifies the transmission of knowledge and its correct scope. In other words, the problem and its answer are not consistent. The problem is how knowledge and garbage are transmitted together and side by side, not to explain the difference between the transmission of knowledge and the transmission of garbage. But the answer he puts forward determines the exact scope of knowledge transmission–that is, successful transmission channels versus unsuccessful transmission channels–by practical tasks constituting the epistemic community. Therefore, it is better to formulate the problem as follows: Based on other theories of knowledge transmission, knowledge is transmitted right alongside garbage, without making a distinction between them, and this is epistemically bad. How can we avoid it? In other words, in what ways can we prevent the garbage from entering our realm of knowledge? Based on this solution, we determine the relevant parameters guaranteeing reliability with due attention to the practical tasks. Now the question is: how do we know that paying attention to practical tasks results in knowledge or justified belief? We saw that Greco tried to answer with a kind of contextualism and relying on our adeptness, the objection that says that practical concerns or relevant parameters are not known. But his answer is not convincing, because if the context and our adeptness were enough to recognize the relevant parameters or degree of generality, basically there would be no generality problem or garbage problem. As it seems, Greco’s solution is rather individualistic. This is despite the fact that social and legal dimensions are very important in the transmission of knowledge, especially when we go beyond ordinary, unimportant, and infertile-for-lying matters and reach unfamiliar, important, and fertile-for-lying matters such as scientific or medical propositions. This solution still does not prevent luck. And knowledge is not luck for anything; otherwise, every true belief would be knowledge. Conclusion Greco solves the garbage problem using his information economy framework, with which he provides solutions to many problems in the epistemology of testimony. Though he puts his view in a coherent system adroitly, it is not a successful solution, as the preceding objections show. Because the garbage problem and the generality problem have a similar destiny, the former can be seen as a great challenge to the externalist theories of knowledge. In this way, the need for the internalist aspect of knowledge is felt more than before. ارسطو با پیش کشیدن بحث مغالطات تلاش داشت منبع معرفتِ عقل استدلالی را از خطاهای احتمالی به دور دارد. به گونه‌ای مشابه، گرکو با پیش کشیدن مسئلۀ زباله در واقع قصد دارد چارچوب اعتمادپذیرِ منبع معرفتِ گواهی را تعیین کند. او برای این منظور تلاش می‌کند مسئلۀ زباله را همچون «مسئلۀ عمومیت» به حساب آورد. در این صورت، پارامترهای مربوط -که دغدغه‌های/تکالیف عملیِ شکل‌دهندۀ جامعۀ معرفتیْ آنها را مشخص می‌سازند- اعتمادپذیری را با تنگ کردن کانال‌های انتقال تضمین می‌کنند. ما با رویکردی تحلیلی و انتقادی و نگاهی جامع‌نگر به معرفت‌شناسی گواهیِ گرکو به طور کلی کاستی‌هایی را در دیدگاه او شناسایی می‌کنیم. به این ترتیب، نشان می‌دهیم که می‌توان صورت‌بندی دقیق‌تری از مسئله پیش نهاد. اگر دو اشکال راهیابی بخت به معرفت و تا اندازه‌ای فرد-محور بودن راه‌حل را رفع‌شدنی بدانیم، از دو اشکال دیگر نمی‌توان چشم پوشید: نخست این که گرکو تبیینی از این که چگونه به میان آمدن دغدغه‌های عملی نتایج درستی را به بار می‌آورد ارائه نمی‌دهد؛ دوم این که این گونه نیست که تکالیف عملی و پارامترهای مربوط همیشه معلوم باشند.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2745_05c226408b70db9648c4b53e08eb637e.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 26 2 2024 06 21 Chain of Reasoning Connection and the Problem of Incommensurability of Scientific Theories پیوند زنجیرۀ استدلال و مسئلۀ ناهمسنجگی نظریه‌های علمی 149 174 2939 10.22091/jptr.2024.10018.2961 FA احسان جوادی ابهری دانشجوی دکتری رشته فلسفه علم، دانشکدۀ حقوق، الهیات و علوم سیاسی، واحد علوم و تحقیقات، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تهران، ایران. 0000-0003-2263-5771 حسین شیخ رضایی استادیار گروه مطالعات علم، مؤسسۀ پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران، تهران، ایران 0000-0003-4981-6695 Journal Article 2023 10 23 This article delves into Dudley Shapere’s approach to addressing semantic incommensurability, focusing on the “chain of reasoning connection.” We will start by reviewing the concept of incommensurability and its various types. Then, we will take a closer look at semantic incommensurability. Before examining Shapere’s solution, we will explore his thoughts on the history and philosophy of science. To understand the chain of reasoning connection, we introduce the traditional theory of meaning and the causal theory of reference and Shapere’s criticisms of them. We will investigate how reasoning chains originating from existing theories can create a connection between them and alternative theories, potentially bridging the gap between their terms. Shapere suggests that two distinct usages of a term in existing and new theories are linked through a chain of reasoning. While some or all descriptions may alter in this process, all changes are traceable through reasons. Lastly, we will present two historical examples that illustrate the challenges faced by the chain of reasoning solution. Shapere emphasizes that a chain of reasoning links existing and new theories to prevent incommensurability. However, issues arise when a new theory emerges from a rejected one. We will present a case in the history of optics. Also, we will demonstrate that the “chain of reasoning” solution to semantic incommensurability relies on scientific consensus and challenges its efficiency by presenting a case in the history of chemistry. Finally, we will highlight how Shapere’s argument is an obstacle to identifying concept relations in a theory or paradigm. Introduction In this paper, we will discuss Thomas Kuhn’s idea about the incommensurability of scientific theories. There are three types of incommensurability: observational, methodological, and meaning or semantic incommensurability. We will focus more on the meaning or semantic incommensurability in this article because of its significance in Kuhn’s latest work. Meaning or semantic incommensurability occurs when a change in scientific paradigm leads to alterations in the language and meaning of scientific terms. Terms and concepts that have specific meanings within one paradigm may acquire new, potentially incommensurable meanings in another. We will introduce the later works of Thomas Kuhn. In his latest work, Kuhn stated that meaning incommensurability arises among certain terms in competing theories or paradigms. Philosophers and historians of science have extensively responded to Kuhn’s theory in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and the controversial issue of the incommensurability of scientific paradigms. Among them, American philosopher Dudley Shapere has endeavored to find a resolution to this issue. This article presents his perspectives on these subjects and then discusses his proposed solution for the issue of meaning or semantic incommensurability. Shapere suggests that by tracing the “chain of reasoning” that leads to changes in the meaning of vocabularies in scientific theories, the problem of meaning incommensurability could be resolved. In this paper, we present three critiques of his argument or solution for the problem of meaning incommensurability. We provide two historical cases in science that demonstrate how the chain of reasoning in some instances cannot hinder the issue of meaning or semantic incommensurability. The third critique challenges the argument against essentialism, emphasizing that Shapere’s position overlooks the vital role of structural or essential properties in influencing the connections between scientific concepts within a specific theory or paradigm. Body In the introduction, we examine Dudley Shapere’s views on the philosophy of science, particularly his solution to the problem of meaning or semantic incommensurability. Shapere’s philosophy of science is based on two principles from the history of science: ”rejecting the possibility of predicting nature” and “principle of scientific internalization.” According to Shapere, scientific development is unpredictable, and he rejects any presuppositions about the evolution of scientific research. He emphasizes the internalization and autonomy within the scientific enterprise, suggesting that science gradually modifies its methods and concepts. This process allows for the revision, modification, and abandonment of methodological and substantive concepts within science. Shapere avoids presenting a general presupposition for the scientific activity that impedes explaining changes and developments in science. He considers changing or abandoning theories as a gradual process rather than a revolutionary one. Shapere argues that reasons create a link between the concepts and structures of existing and alternative theories, allowing for commensurability between the concepts of both. He criticizes both the traditional theory of meaning and the causal theory of reference. Shapere posits that supposing essential properties for concepts is the key factor in the emergence of the problem of incommensurability. He advocates a view that focuses on descriptions rather than on the reference, but none of these descriptions are essential or distinguished. Shapere suggests that two distinct usages of a term in existing and new theories are linked through a chain of reasoning. While some or all descriptions may alter in this process, all changes are traceable through reasons. This enables commensurability in meaning. Discussion As noted in the previous section, two critiques are historical case studies, and the third critique addresses Shapere’s arguments against essentialism. Shapere’s argument emphasizes that a chain of reasoning links existing and new theories to prevent incommensurability. However, issues arise when a new theory emerges from a rejected one, leading to disconnected chains of reasoning and incommensurability. For instance, in the 17th century, Newton’s particle theory clashed with Huygens’s wave theory in explaining light's nature. Newton’s theory became dominant in the 18th century, but a paradigm shift occurred in the 19th century with Thomas Young’s experiments, leading to the acceptance of Huygens’s wave theory. Notably, the alternative theory did not originate from the existing dominant theory but from a previously rejected theory. The “chain of reasoning” solution to semantic incommensurability relies on scientific consensus. When scientists accept a new theory, it bridges the gap between old and new concepts. However, disagreements within the scientific community can lead to the rejection of the “chain of reasoning,” hindering the transition to new theories. This is illustrated by the contrasting views of Joseph Priestley and Antoine Lavoisier on a newly discovered gas. Priestley saw it as “dephlogisticated air,” while Lavoisier identified it as oxygen. This difference in reasoning led to semantic incommensurability between their theories. Shapere proposes that the meaning of a concept is composed of a set of characteristics or properties. Changing the meaning of a concept involves adding or dropping one or more properties based on a reasoning process relevant to the problem at hand. These properties are not essential or necessary. Shapere acknowledges that some properties (structural properties) of natural entities are more prominent than others, but this does not mean they are essential or necessary. However, even though these properties can change, it is done through a chain of reasoning. Therefore, the change in the meaning of concepts by adding or removing a property is not considered a revolutionary change in meaning. Consequently, changes in the meaning of both new and old concepts will not cause semantic incommensurability. However, structural or essential properties are crucial as they establish hierarchical relationships among concepts and related examples. Change of core properties or inherent features can lead to semantic incommensurability, even if there is assumed continuity through a reasoning chain. Conclusion In this paper, we reviewed the meaning or semantic incommensurability problem in Thomas Kuhn’s works and then surveyed Dudley Shapere’s response to this issue, specifically his work The Chain of Reasoning, which is based on his perspective on the philosophy and history of science. As demonstrated in the final section, certain historical scientific cases do not align with Shapere’s framework regarding scientific evolution and his proposed resolution for the meaning or semantic incommensurability problem, leading to a resurgence of this issue. Furthermore, our analysis indicates that the refusal to acknowledge the existence of essential and intrinsic characteristics for concepts does not impede semantic incommensurability. در این مقاله کوشیده‌ایم راه‌حل دادلی شیپر را برای حل مسئلۀ ناهمسنجگی معنایی، یعنی پیوند از طریق زنجیرۀ استدلال، بررسی و ارزیابی کنیم. در ابتدا به معرفی ناهمسنجگی و انواع آن از نظر تامس کوون خواهیم پرداخت. در ادامه، به طور مشخص ناهمسنجگی معنایی توضیح داده خواهد شد. پیش از پرداختن به راه‌حل شیپر در مورد مسئلۀ ناهمسنجگی، به مرور آرا و نگاه وی در خصوص تاریخ و فلسفۀ علم خواهیم پرداخت. سپس با معرفی نظریۀ علّی ارجاع و نقدهای شیپر به آن، به توضیح ایدۀ زنجیرۀ استدلال و نقش آن در حل مسئلۀ ناهمسنجگی معنایی می‌پردازیم. خواهیم دید چگونه استدلال‌هایی که سرآغاز آن‌ها در دل نظریۀ موجود است پیوندی میان نظریۀ موجود و نظریۀ جایگزین ایجاد می‌کنند، به نحوی که امکان همسنجگی میان واژگان و اصطلاحات نظریۀ موجود و نظریۀ جایگزین فراهم می‌شود. در انتها، با ارائۀ دو مثال تاریخی نشان داده می‌شود راه‌حل زنجیرۀ استدلال با چه اشکالاتی روبه‌رو است. همچنین اشکالی نیز به استدلال شیپر در رد ذات‌انگاری مطرح خواهد شد.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2939_d3631faf5bfe38fbae74984b5d922629.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 26 2 2024 06 21 Madness in Avicenna’s Medicine and Philosophy جنون در طب و فلسفۀ ابن‌سینا 175 194 2922 10.22091/jptr.2024.10322.3009 FA سید مصطفی موسوی اعظم دانشیار، گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه یاسوج، یاسوج، ایران 0009-0000-6374-7740 محمود صیدی دانشیار، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه شاهد، تهران، ایران 0009-0002-8776-112x Journal Article 2024 01 16 Madness as a medical, social, literary, and philosophical issue has always been the focus of thinkers. Avicenna, as a philosopher-physician, investigated and analyzed this issue in two medical (physical) and philosophical (metaphysical) areas. In the framework of medical science, based on the mechanism of human temperament, he analyzes why madness occurs. However, temperamental disorders are the starting point of Avicenna’s philosophical explanation of melancholic illusions, and Avicenna’s innovation was sought in this field. Temperament disorder leads to a disorder in the functioning of the rūh-i bukhārī, and this leads to a disorder in the relationship between the rational soul (nafs-i nāteqah) and the body. Through this disorder, a disconnection is created between the mental forms of the madmen and reality, because the imaginative (mukhayyalah) faculty as the generator of imaginary forms, and the common sense (ḥiss al-mushtarak) as the home of tangible and imaginary forms due to the disconnection or weakening of their connection with the intellectual faculty, deprives the insane person of this possibility to separate the illusive forms from the real. The main problem that this research delves into is to explain the phenomenon of madness from Avicenna’s point of view with a descriptive-analytical approach, and it is an attempt to provide a detailed and comprehensive presentation of his point of view based on medical and philosophical foundations. Introduction Avicenna, the greatest philosopher of the Islamic world, is among the thinkers who looked at the issue of madness; however, his thoughts on this issue have not been comprehensively and accurately analyzed. The few works that have dealt with this issue have limited themselves to the experimental and medical approach. Avicenna’s medicine is deeply influenced by his philosophy; therefore, the foundations of his philosophy have a direct impact on this issue. Avicenna is influenced by physicians such as Hippocrates and Galen in the issue of mental diseases; nevertheless, with a philosophical approach, and in an epistemological way, which is derived from his anthropological foundations, he analyzes the mechanism of madness (and mental illnesses), something that was previously not been discussed among philosophers and physicians. Discovering and expressing this innovation of Avicenna is the innovation of this research. Medical explanation (physical analysis) The Humoral Theory of Hippocrates was a completely naturalistic framework for the explanation and treatment of diseases and led physicians to avoid supernatural explanations of earthly phenomena. In the framework of the theory of humors, Avicenna points out several factors that lead to temperamental changes and cause madness. According to Avicenna, every human being has a special temperament and the best temperament is the one closest to moderation. The physical causes of madness can be divided into two categories: intra-brain, which causes the brain’s temperament to go out of balance, and extra-brain, which causes the temperament of other organs to go out of balance and affects the balance of the brain’s temperament. Compared to his predecessors, Avicenna talks in more detail about these temperamental factors of mental diseases and mentions other types (at least four cases) in addition to the three diseases of melancholy, phrenitis, and mania, which were called types of madness in ancient Greece, and discussed the differences between them. Philosophical explanation (metaphysical analysis) In general, Avicenna’s most important metaphysical basis in analyzing the issue of madness and its epistemological dimensions is the relationship between the rational soul (nafs-i nāteqah) and the body. There are three things that can be found in Avicenna’s works; if there is a problem in them, it leads to the disruption of the relationship between the rational soul and the body and provides the basis for the realization of madness. These three are as follows: Rūh-i bukhārī: One of the important factors in the formation of this relationship is the correct and flawless functioning of the rūh-i bukhārī, which acts as a mediator between the rational soul and the body. Severe temperamental changes lead to a change in the rūh-i bukhārī and its performance, which ultimately ends in the disruption of the relationship between the rational soul and the body. Common sense: Common sense (ḥiss al-mushtarak), as one of the internal senses is responsible for communicating between the rational soul and the five external senses, and this is the key point in analyzing the issue of madness from Avicenna’s point of view. When the rational soul has a correct relationship with the body, the five external senses perform their actions correctly, so the rational soul does not usually make mistakes in its perceptions. But, if the relationship between the intellectual faculty and the body and especially the common sense is disrupted, the rational soul is not able to match its mental form with the external world and recognize their authenticity or inauthenticity. Imaginative faculty: If the imaginative (mukhayyalah) faculty, as one of the internal senses, is damaged or a complication occurs in it, the rational soul will not have sufficient control over it and its perceptions. At this time, the intellectual faculty will not be able to distinguish between real and unreal forms due to the lack of proper and healthy communication with the physical faculties. According to Avicenna, we have two types of imaginary forms: 1) Sometimes the perceptions resulting from the imaginative faculty are through the five external senses; 2) And sometimes there are forms that the imaginative faculty itself understands without the need for external sensory origin. When the imagination is disturbed, the rational soul will not be able to distinguish between the two types of perceptions. Conclusion In the physical and medical explanation, although Avicenna dealt with the issue of madness in more detail than his predecessors, such as Galen and Razi, and tried to get a more precise meaning of this phenomenon; however, its main innovation should be considered in his metaphysical analysis of madness. Avicenna’s emphasis on the examples that indicate the separation of madmen from reality leads us to the point that madness is not only a medical concept in Avicenna’s thought system; rather, it should be investigated as an epistemological and philosophical subject. جنون به مثابۀ یک مسئله پزشکی، اجتماعی، ادبی و فلسفی همواره مورد توجه صاحبان اندیشه قرار داشته است. ابن‌سینا، در مقام یک فیلسوف-پزشک، این موضوع را در دو ساحت پزشکی (فیزیکی) و فلسفی (متافیزیکی) مورد بررسی و تحلیل قرار داده است. در چارچوب علم پزشکی، او بر اساس سازوکار مزاج انسان به تحلیل چرایی وقوع جنون می‌پردازد. اما اختلالات مزاجی نقطه آغاز تبیین فلسفی ابن‌سینا از اوهام مالیخولیایی است، و نوآوری ابن‌سینا را باید در این ساحت جستجو کرد. اختلال مزاجی منجر به اختلال در عملکرد روح بخاری می‌گردد، و این منجر به اختلال در رابطه نفس (قوه عاقله) و بدن می‌شود. از رهگذر این اختلال، گسستی میان صور ذهنی فرد مجنون و واقعیت ایجاد می‌شود؛ چراکه قوه مخیله، به عنوان مولد صور خیالی، و حس مشترک، به عنوان موطن صور محسوس و خیالی، بر اثر قطع یا تضعیف ارتباطشان با قوه عاقله، امکان تفکیک صورِ موهم از واقعی را از فرد مجنون سلب می‌کنند. درمان‌هایی را که ابن‌سینا در جهت بهبودی جنون پیشنهاد می‌دهد باید در همین بستر، یعنی تقویت ارتباط نفس ناطقه با بدن، توجیه و تحلیل کرد. مسئلۀ اصلی این پژوهش تبیین پدیدۀ جنون از نگاه ابن‌سینا با رهیافتی توصیفی- تحلیلی است، و سعی بر آن است تقریر دقیق و جامع از دیدگاه او بر اساس مبانی طبی و فلسفی ارائه شود.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2922_43d33ebe5dbf370944ac28e166b2438f.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 26 2 2024 06 21 Analysis of the “Other” in Gadamer and Levinas’s Thought تحلیل مفهوم دیگری در اندیشه گادامر و لویناس 195 218 2875 10.22091/jptr.2024.10303.3002 FA ندا راه بار دانشجوی دکتری، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده زبان و ادبیات خارجی، دانشگاه تبریز، تبریز، ایران 0000-0003-2479-6544 محمد اصغری استاد، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده زبان و ادبیات خارجی، دانشگاه تبریز، تبریز، ایران 0000-0003-3874-4702 محمود صوفیانی دانشیار، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده زبان و ادبیات خارجی، دانشگاه تبریز، تبریز، ایران. 0000-0003-1800-8943 Journal Article 2024 01 12 In the present article, we are faced with two phenomenological philosophers who, in two different intellectual traditions, namely philosophical hermeneutics and moral phenomenology, have referred to the concept of the Other as the fundamental possibility of the individual. The other, as an ontological and common concept in the thought of Gadamer and Levinas, is the turning point of the condition for the possibility of understanding and ethics. Focusing on the concept of the other, while addressing the points of difference and commonality between Gadamer and Levinas, this article will show that Levinas’s preoccupation with the other as a philosopher refers to the foundations of ethics, and the condition for the possibility of foundations of ethics is encountering the other. In Gadamer, the turning point is the determination of the possibilities of understanding in dialectical and dialogue-oriented relationships. Without the other, in Levinas’s thought, ethics, and moral matter, and in Gadamer’s thought, the process of understanding will not occur in the form of a fusion of horizons. Therefore, this article shows that the other is a common concept between these two philosophers, which both of them cannot avoid in their philosophical analyses of ethics or the process of understanding. Introduction The analysis of ethics is one of the important and innovative achievements of Levinas’s philosophical intellectual structure. Levinas’s concern is to refer to the foundations of morality itself, regardless of institutionalizing the moral in the form of law, and the foundation of morality is in face-to-face relationships with others. Regardless of Levinas’s plan about the concept of the other, Gadamer imagines the determination of understanding in a new way in the face of the other. The other is the comprehensible strain in philosophical hermeneutics, in such a way that the process of understanding is formed by the presence of the other and the face-to-face encounter with it. According to Gadamer, the other is the factor of openness in the process of understanding. The fusion of horizons is the product of openness and mutual encounters in dialogue, which is not possible without the other. The other is the condition of determining the possibility of understanding in each of the parties who are allowed to reveal a part of their being and allow the other to open up and talk. In fact, understanding is a kind of event that is revealed in a two-way conversation in an event-like way. This type of understanding depends on the presence of another. The main focus of the research is the analysis of the concept of the other, which has been done with emphasis on two important works: Truth and method, Totality and infinity. Body & discussion In general, the process of understanding is a dialogical process, whether the other side of the conversation is a text or a person, the foundation of understanding is formed in a relationship with the other. Determining the other as an independent personality and a different perspective is an ontological determination. The other thinks and becomes meaningful beyond the subject or object and even beyond my intellectual position, it belongs to its own independent world and its own experience. In conversation, it plays a significant role in the production of truth. Openness provides the possibility of dialogue and mutual agreement. In dialogue, the final product is not reproduced. The other condition for the production of the final product is dialogue According to Gadamer, facing the other is facing his world. At the moment of facing me, the other makes his abstract aspects concrete and opens his lived experience to me. He believes that the question-and-answer process is a kind of encounter with the world of experience and openness toward it. According to Gadamer, the process of understanding is the result of dialectical-hermeneutic relations between me (the interpreter) and you (the other). The dialogical relationships that allow each other to enter the other’s history are relationships that are formed based on questions and answers. From Gadamer’s point of view, questions and answers are the opening of a new horizon based on tradition and contemporary history. Levinas phenomenologically refers to the philosophical tradition of the West to reread the process of the formation of the concept of the other. Many commentators and interpreters of Levinas’s works believe that it is possible to determine the foundations of ethics from Levinas’s point of view from face-to-face relationships. The condition for the possibility of morality is to pay attention to others. To describe another concept, Levinas analyzes the negative and positive aspects of this concept. In a negative way, Levinas first answers what the other is not, and for this reason, he criticizes the history of Western metaphysics and the criticism of Husserl and Heidegger’s phenomenology. Positively, the other is relative to me and different from me. The other is beyond subject and object. The other is not subjugated by any concept and recognizes its independent identity. The other and the encounter with him are the conditions for determining fundamental ethics from Levinas’s point of view. Another condition of concreteness refers to another person. According to Levinas, it is the condition for the formation of moral form. He believes that ethics is a kind of double encounter in the context of bilateral relations. Many moral concepts are formed in relation to a concrete other. In Levinas’s genealogy of ethics, we are faced with the presence of the other in a concrete way and with the subjectivity of the subject in an abstract and a priori way. Levinas specifies two approaches with the description of the other in the form of an infinite idea. First of all, there is an infinite gap between the other and the same. This issue shows its foreignness and otherness, its independence, and being true to its essence towards me. Second, it is the determination of another in a concrete or abstract form, which in both cases evokes an identity independent of me. Conclusion According to the explanations of the concept of the other in the thought of Gadamer and Levinas, we are faced with two phenomenological philosophers who have paid attention to the ontological aspects of the concept of the other in the fields of philosophical hermeneutics and ethics. In Gadamer’s thought, the other is an ontologically dialectical relationship between I-Thou and the starting point of the conversation process. The fusion of horizons is the turning point of the formation of the relation to the other, which is manifested in another area. The other has its own history, world, tradition, and authority, regardless of the formation of dialogical relationships, and has an independent identity. The other is allowed to share his lived experience in the conversation. The other creates new worlds. The other has opened himself and in return can be self-interpreting and self-revealing. Regardless, the other is the consistency of the complex relationship between language and the world. This form of bilateral relations, which is manifested in the presence of another, is a linguistic form that is the cause of a deep connection between language and the world. The other, whether concrete or abstract, is the turning point of our connection with the world in an ontological way. Regardless of Gadamer’s point of view, Levinas returns to another concept in his new thought project entitled “How to determine the possibilities of ethics.” According to Levinas, finding the foundations of ethics and determining the condition of moral possibilities is in facing the other and in face-to-face relationships. The other is concretely a kind of bilateral encounter which is the basis of many moral events and is manifested abstractly in the form of the subject’s subjectivity. This kind of infinite aspect of the other is revealed in subjectivity is implied in sense. Encountering another in an abstract form within itself is the encounter of the subject’s subjectivity with the sense, and the sense is in the encounter with the other. Sense is the basis of the subjectivity of the subject. Sense is a kind of concrete and visual face-to-face encounter that adds to the importance of determining another. Therefore, both Gadamer and Levinas raise many possibilities about the concept of the other, which shows the importance of this concept in the Western philosophical tradition. در نوشتار حاضر ما با دو فیلسوف پدیده‌شناس مواجه هستیم که در دو سنت فکری متفاوت یعنی هرمنوتیک و پدیده‌شناسی به مفهوم «دیگری» به مثابه امکان‌های بنیادین فرد اشاره داشته‌اند. دیگری، به عنوان مفهومی هستی‌شناختی و مشترک در اندیشه گادامر و لویناس، نقطه عطف شرط امکان فهم و اخلاق است. این نوشتار با تمرکز بر مفهوم دیگری، ضمن پرداختن به نکات افتراق و اشتراک میان دیدگاه گادامر و لویناس، نشان خواهد داد دلمشغولی لویناس، به عنوان فیلسوف دیگری، رجوع به بنیادهای اخلاق است و شرط امکان بنیادهای اخلاق مواجهه با دیگری است. در هرمنوتیک فلسفی گادامر، دیگری نقطه عطف تعین امکان‌های فهم در روابط دیالکتیکی و گفتگومحورانه است. بدون دیگری در اندیشه لویناس اخلاق و امر اخلاقی، و در اندیشه گادامر فرایند فهم در قالب امتزاج افق‌ها رخ نخواهد داد. بنابراین، این مقاله نشان می‌دهد که دیگری مفهومی مشترک بین این دو فیلسوف است که هر دو در تحلیل‌های فلسفی خودشان از اخلاق یا فرایند فهم گریز و گزیری از آن ندارند.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_2875_68913505288e8c086c00cd955b022223.pdf