University of QomJournal of Philosophical Theological Research1735-979127220250723Theism and the Cumulative ArgumentTheism and the Cumulative Argument532311710.22091/jptr.2024.10906.3080FAAhmadEbadiAssociate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran0000-0003-4719-2196MohammadEmdadi MasulehPh.D. Candidate, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran0000-0001-7907-910XJournal Article20240620In recent scholarly discourse, natural theology’s forefront initiative has been the construction of theistic arguments grounded in empirical observations. A notable focus within this domain is the cumulative argument (CA) approach. The CA posits that individually modest arguments, when synergized, can forge a more compelling collective case. This approach bifurcates into deductive and probabilistic methodologies, both scrutinized through a descriptive-analytical lens across three evaluative tiers: 1) Merits: The CA challenges atheistic and agnostic skepticism, bolstering theistic convictions. 2) Solvable critiques: The CA process is complex and challenging for the general public; it overlooks competing hypotheses, and a mere 50% likelihood assigned to premises fails to substantiate conclusive acceptance. 3) Critiques: The CA blurs distinctions between belief accuracy probability, and rationality degree; it also grapples with assigning definitive values to probability multipliers. This paper culminates with an exploration of the CA’s implementation within Islamic intellectual traditions, illustrating its application in affirming divine existence and underpinning methodologies like suspicious density and prophetic veracity, ultimately aiming to convince counterparts through reasoned dialogue. Although it has some limitations, CA is both rational and defensible when it effectively reinforces core theoretical beliefs and religious practices, including worship and ethics.
<strong> </strong>
Introduction
This article aims to analyze and critique the deductive and probabilistic formulations of the cumulative argument in natural theology. Additionally, it explores the historical application of the cumulative argument within Islamic thought.
Cumulative Argument: Deductive and Probabilistic Formulation
A cumulative argument consists of various yet converging proofs, where the aggregation of evidence brings the claim closer to being proven, even if each individual piece of evidence might not suffice on its own. “Cumulative” in this context means building up evidence sequentially to support the intended claim. In other words, when a conclusion cannot be proven by a single argument or piece of evidence due to its weaknesses, a stronger conclusion can be reached by considering the collective sum of all the evidence. This argument can be presented in both deductive and probabilistic<strong> </strong>formulations.
In a deductive argument, multiple arguments can be presented for a given attribute, resulting in justificatory overdetermination (for theism). When considering a probabilistic argument, Bayes’s theorem is commonly used. By combining numerous pieces of evidence, each providing some support to theism, the goal is to construct a case that significantly bolsters theism more effectively than any single argument could on its own. The cumulative argument can be evaluated on three levels:
1. Advantages and Strengths: Impact on Belief: While a single witness may not establish a belief, their testimony might challenge atheism or ignorance. Stabilizing Effect: The combined weight of cumulative evidence can reinforce believers’ faith.
2. Solvable Critiques: The cumulative argument is often seen as complex and impractical for the general public due to the necessity of collecting and analyzing diverse types of evidence, which requires philosophical training. This creates an accessibility problem, as most religious believers may not have the requisite background to benefit from such arguments. The question arises whether this argument is an effective way to defend theism to a general audience. The answer is that the general public can accept the epistemic justification from cumulative arguments with the support of philosophical experts, similar to how they accept scientific beliefs about phenomena like the existence of electrons. This method is common in the sciences, so it should be applicable to religious beliefs as well.
3. Critiques: a) In the deductive formulation of the cumulative argument, there is a linear relationship between the probability of a belief being correct and its degree of reasonableness. However, this formulation lacks a specific or objective standard for determining the threshold of reasonableness. b) The formulation of probabilities in cumulative reasoning emphasizes the multiplication of probabilities, but it does not assign specific values for this multiplication. This is considered a weakness in this approach.
Muslims Contributions
Islamic thought is not indifferent to the cumulative argument. Across various sciences, different versions or levels of argument accumulation have been proposed within the Islamic intellectual framework. Muslim thinkers have utilized this model not only in arguments for the existence of God but also in the broader methodology of beliefs. This indicates that contemporary theological debates in the Islamic intellectual space incorporate this pattern. Here are some examples demonstrating the presence and relevance of this pattern in Islamic thought:
Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: A group of Islamic jurists employs an accumulation model known as “suspicion density” to deduce jurisprudential issues. This approach involves gathering evidence and aggregating weaker suspicions, which individually lack validity and authority, to reach a higher level of knowledge that meets the criteria for validity and authority. It is not feasible to use reasons whose falsity is evident in the inference process. However, reasons whose falsity has not been established, even if their likelihood is weak, can still be effective in the inference process. Although the inference resulting from suspicion density is not exactly an inductive method, it is based on induction; thus, the two are similar. In both methods, the acquired knowledge is gradually strengthened through repeated observations and accumulating evidence. Consequently, some Islamic jurists have utilized the principles of inductive logic to explain the quality and feasibility of suspicions.
Philosophy: Muslim philosophers aim for the epistemological position of truth and certainty, but often recognize that this is difficult to achieve due to human cognitive weaknesses, which vary among individuals. Some people can attain certain knowledge, while others cannot. Given this challenge, an epistemological question arises: What should be done when certainty cannot be reached? Muslim philosophers suggest focusing on the epistemological value of suspicion and persuasive reasons, which are evaluated according to people’s varying perceptive abilities. When certainty is unattainable, persuasive reasons can prevent doubt about the possibility of knowledge. Another key question is whether certainty can arise from multiple doubts. According to Muslim philosophers, doubt holds epistemological validity due to its varying intensity. Accumulating suspicions can eventually lead to certainty and belief in a particular issue. Therefore, cumulative suspicions, when sufficiently aggregated, can achieve a level of validity.
Theology: Some Islamic theologians have used the accumulation pattern to substantiate the truth of prophethood claims. Beyond relying on miracles, they have considered other methods, particularly the collection of evidence. These theologians assert that gathering evidence is a rational approach to discovering the truth, commonly used by researchers in social and natural sciences to achieve specific results. Although each piece of evidence may not be sufficient to conclusively prove prophethood, the combination of multiple pieces of evidence diminishes the likelihood of deception regarding the prophet’s divine claim.
Conclusion
Human epistemology seeks truth and certainty, but this is often hindered by individual perceptual weaknesses. This raises the question of what to do when certainty cannot be attained. Muslim and Western thinkers have developed frameworks focusing on the accumulation pattern and the epistemological value of suspicion and persuasive reasons, considering perceptual differences. In cases where certainty is unachievable, they use the accumulation of suspicion and persuasive reasons to avoid doubting the possibility of knowledge.
In recent scholarly discourse, natural theology’s forefront initiative has been the construction of theistic arguments grounded in empirical observations. A notable focus within this domain is the cumulative argument (CA) approach. The CA posits that individually modest arguments, when synergized, can forge a more compelling collective case. This approach bifurcates into deductive and probabilistic methodologies, both scrutinized through a descriptive-analytical lens across three evaluative tiers: 1) Merits: The CA challenges atheistic and agnostic skepticism, bolstering theistic convictions. 2) Solvable critiques: The CA process is complex and challenging for the general public; it overlooks competing hypotheses, and a mere 50% likelihood assigned to premises fails to substantiate conclusive acceptance. 3) Critiques: The CA blurs distinctions between belief accuracy probability, and rationality degree; it also grapples with assigning definitive values to probability multipliers. This paper culminates with an exploration of the CA’s implementation within Islamic intellectual traditions, illustrating its application in affirming divine existence and underpinning methodologies like suspicious density and prophetic veracity, ultimately aiming to convince counterparts through reasoned dialogue. Although it has some limitations, CA is both rational and defensible when it effectively reinforces core theoretical beliefs and religious practices, including worship and ethics.
<strong> </strong>
Introduction
This article aims to analyze and critique the deductive and probabilistic formulations of the cumulative argument in natural theology. Additionally, it explores the historical application of the cumulative argument within Islamic thought.
Cumulative Argument: Deductive and Probabilistic Formulation
A cumulative argument consists of various yet converging proofs, where the aggregation of evidence brings the claim closer to being proven, even if each individual piece of evidence might not suffice on its own. “Cumulative” in this context means building up evidence sequentially to support the intended claim. In other words, when a conclusion cannot be proven by a single argument or piece of evidence due to its weaknesses, a stronger conclusion can be reached by considering the collective sum of all the evidence. This argument can be presented in both deductive and probabilistic<strong> </strong>formulations.
In a deductive argument, multiple arguments can be presented for a given attribute, resulting in justificatory overdetermination (for theism). When considering a probabilistic argument, Bayes’s theorem is commonly used. By combining numerous pieces of evidence, each providing some support to theism, the goal is to construct a case that significantly bolsters theism more effectively than any single argument could on its own. The cumulative argument can be evaluated on three levels:
1. Advantages and Strengths: Impact on Belief: While a single witness may not establish a belief, their testimony might challenge atheism or ignorance. Stabilizing Effect: The combined weight of cumulative evidence can reinforce believers’ faith.
2. Solvable Critiques: The cumulative argument is often seen as complex and impractical for the general public due to the necessity of collecting and analyzing diverse types of evidence, which requires philosophical training. This creates an accessibility problem, as most religious believers may not have the requisite background to benefit from such arguments. The question arises whether this argument is an effective way to defend theism to a general audience. The answer is that the general public can accept the epistemic justification from cumulative arguments with the support of philosophical experts, similar to how they accept scientific beliefs about phenomena like the existence of electrons. This method is common in the sciences, so it should be applicable to religious beliefs as well.
3. Critiques: a) In the deductive formulation of the cumulative argument, there is a linear relationship between the probability of a belief being correct and its degree of reasonableness. However, this formulation lacks a specific or objective standard for determining the threshold of reasonableness. b) The formulation of probabilities in cumulative reasoning emphasizes the multiplication of probabilities, but it does not assign specific values for this multiplication. This is considered a weakness in this approach.
Muslims Contributions
Islamic thought is not indifferent to the cumulative argument. Across various sciences, different versions or levels of argument accumulation have been proposed within the Islamic intellectual framework. Muslim thinkers have utilized this model not only in arguments for the existence of God but also in the broader methodology of beliefs. This indicates that contemporary theological debates in the Islamic intellectual space incorporate this pattern. Here are some examples demonstrating the presence and relevance of this pattern in Islamic thought:
Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: A group of Islamic jurists employs an accumulation model known as “suspicion density” to deduce jurisprudential issues. This approach involves gathering evidence and aggregating weaker suspicions, which individually lack validity and authority, to reach a higher level of knowledge that meets the criteria for validity and authority. It is not feasible to use reasons whose falsity is evident in the inference process. However, reasons whose falsity has not been established, even if their likelihood is weak, can still be effective in the inference process. Although the inference resulting from suspicion density is not exactly an inductive method, it is based on induction; thus, the two are similar. In both methods, the acquired knowledge is gradually strengthened through repeated observations and accumulating evidence. Consequently, some Islamic jurists have utilized the principles of inductive logic to explain the quality and feasibility of suspicions.
Philosophy: Muslim philosophers aim for the epistemological position of truth and certainty, but often recognize that this is difficult to achieve due to human cognitive weaknesses, which vary among individuals. Some people can attain certain knowledge, while others cannot. Given this challenge, an epistemological question arises: What should be done when certainty cannot be reached? Muslim philosophers suggest focusing on the epistemological value of suspicion and persuasive reasons, which are evaluated according to people’s varying perceptive abilities. When certainty is unattainable, persuasive reasons can prevent doubt about the possibility of knowledge. Another key question is whether certainty can arise from multiple doubts. According to Muslim philosophers, doubt holds epistemological validity due to its varying intensity. Accumulating suspicions can eventually lead to certainty and belief in a particular issue. Therefore, cumulative suspicions, when sufficiently aggregated, can achieve a level of validity.
Theology: Some Islamic theologians have used the accumulation pattern to substantiate the truth of prophethood claims. Beyond relying on miracles, they have considered other methods, particularly the collection of evidence. These theologians assert that gathering evidence is a rational approach to discovering the truth, commonly used by researchers in social and natural sciences to achieve specific results. Although each piece of evidence may not be sufficient to conclusively prove prophethood, the combination of multiple pieces of evidence diminishes the likelihood of deception regarding the prophet’s divine claim.
Conclusion
Human epistemology seeks truth and certainty, but this is often hindered by individual perceptual weaknesses. This raises the question of what to do when certainty cannot be attained. Muslim and Western thinkers have developed frameworks focusing on the accumulation pattern and the epistemological value of suspicion and persuasive reasons, considering perceptual differences. In cases where certainty is unachievable, they use the accumulation of suspicion and persuasive reasons to avoid doubting the possibility of knowledge.
https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_3117_ab2bd69cf27a2aae573cbe9f8aba6b0a.pdfUniversity of QomJournal of Philosophical Theological Research1735-979127220250723Protagoras: Pioneer of Relativism or
Pyrrhonian Skepticism?Protagoras: Pioneer of Relativism or
Pyrrhonian Skepticism?3364302510.22091/jptr.2024.10816.3071FAImanKhodafardPhD Candidate of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, IranSaeedBina-ye-MotlaghProfessor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.RezaKoorang BeheshtiAssistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran0000-0003-1613-2625Amir EhsanKarbasizadehAssociate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran0000-0001-9491-9023Journal Article20240531Protagoras has often been considered a relativist because he believed that man is the measure of all things (MM). This paper aims to show that focusing on MM and ignoring his other claims, which should be taken to be as epistemologically important as MM, has been the basis of this interpretation. First, in order to weaken the relativistic account, it has been shown that the only interpretation of MM is not a relativistic one. Second, focusing on the other epistemological fragments attributed to Protagoras, it has been claimed that a skeptical interpretation is a more consistent reading of Protagoras, since MM can be read as a skeptical fragment, but the others cannot be interpreted as relativistic slogans. The most important of these fragments, which we call Protagorean <em>Epochē</em> (PE), is doubt about the being and essence of gods in a Sextan conceptual framework. Furthermore, according to this interpretation, MM is the general form of the Ten Modes of Aenesidemean skeptical arguments. Thus, it leads to suspension of judgment instead of relativism.<br />Introduction<br />The aim of this paper is to show that reading Protagoras as a protagonist of skepticism is more reasonable than considering him as a relativist. In this regard, firstly, we try to show what is problematic with interpreting him as a relativist. We then argue that some skeptical features can be found in Protagoras’s fragments. At last, we don’t claim that Protagoras is a Pyrrhonian skeptic but that at the base of Pyrrhonian skepticism we can find the slogans and strategies which Protagoras introduced to the history of philosophy and especially to Ancient Skepticism.<br />MM and PE as Two General Rules for Two Different Kinds of Objects of Investigation<br />In the history of philosophy, the name of Protagoras has been attached to a famous slogan which says<br /><strong>MM (Man is Measure)</strong>: Of all things, the measure is man; of those that are, that they are; and of those that are not, that they are not.<br />MM has mostly been interpreted as the first formulation of relativism. However, besides MM, there are some fragments attributed to Protagoras, which are related to the realm of epistemology, that have received the least amount of attention in literature. One of the most important of them is the following:<br /><strong>PE (Protagorean <em>Epochē</em>): </strong>About the gods, I am able to know neither that they exist nor that they do not exist nor of what kind they are in form; for many things prevent me from knowing this, its ἀδηλόντης and the brevity of man’s life.<br />It can be asked, i) why MM has been considered the focal point of Protagoras’s epistemology and, ii) why it has been interpreted as the first formulation of relativism. We argue that perhaps Plato’s <em>Theaetetus </em>is responsible for both. We claim that, considering PE, MM can be read skeptically, but PE cannot be read relativistically. Therefore, in order to give a consistent interpretation of his fragments, it is better to read MM in a skeptical fashion.<br />But to show the skeptical burden of PE, we have called attention to the Pyrrhonian terminology which can be found in the word “ἀδηλόντης” (being unclear) in the mentioned fragment. Sextus Empiricus, the author of one of the longest treatises on Pyrrhonian skepticism, referring to the object of investigation, uses this word frequently and consciously as a term, against something which is πρόδηλον (clear). And in <em>AM</em> VIII.145, he introduces three types<br />of unclear or non-evident things: 1) absolutely non-evident, 2) naturally non-evident, and<br />3) temporarily non-evident. (1) and (2) are the objects of scientific and philosophical investigations. And a skeptic, unlike a dogmatist, thinks that finding the truth about these two kinds of objects is a long-term investigation which may be fruitful or not. This is why a skeptic suspends judgment about them. Being non-evident<em> </em>in conjunction with the brevity of man’s life can show that God as a subject of philosophical investigation is not absolutely unknowable, but it needs a long period of investigation so that we cannot determine if it is knowable at last or not. Thus, the result is a suspension of judgment.<br />If we consider PE as the focal point of interpreting Protagoras’s epistemology, it should be read as a general claim about unclear or non-evident objects and MM as a general claim about clear objects. Thus, we have MM* as follows:<br /><strong>MM* (Man is a measure of clear objects)</strong>: Of all <em>clear</em> <em>things</em>, the measure is man; of those that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not.<br />Following MM* does not force us to limit the scope of clear objects to perceptible things. And the same is correct about unclear objects which are not limited to imperceptible things. So the clear-unclear distinction is not a parallel for perceptible-imperceptible things. Therefore,<br />this line of interpretation is not necessarily equal to the thesis of Theaetetus that knowledge is perception.<br />The Other Skeptical Strategies<br />In order to support reading Protagoras as a prototype of Pyrrhonian skepticism, it has been mentioned in three steps (I–III) some phrases in fragments attributed to Protagoras which are similar, both in formulation and meaning, to some Pyrrhonian slogans and strategies.<br /><strong>(I) </strong>Sextus Empiricus in <em>PH </em>I.12 says that “[t]he chief constitutive principle of skepticism is the claim that to every account an equal account is opposed.” According to Diogenes Laertius (DL, ix.51) Protagoras “was the first to say that there are two sides to every question, opposed to each other; he even conducted his arguments in this manner, being the first to do so.” From<br />this quote, we can approach the Ten Modes of Skepticism attributed to Aenesidemus in a straightforward manner. Modes of Skepticism are some argumentative patterns in order to make a contrast between two phenomena or two statements or between a phenomenon and a statement. As Annas and Barnes (1985, pp. 24-25) say, they generally have the following structure:<br />(1) x appears <em>F</em> in situation <em>S</em>.<br />(2) x appears <em>F*</em> in situation <em>S*</em>.<br />Where “<em>F </em>and <em>F* </em>designate incompatible properties,” and “<em>S</em> and <em>S*</em> designate different situations,” and “‘<em>in</em> situation…’” is a shorthand for “depending on situation… (Annas & Barnes, 1985, pp. 24-25).” Since Sextus Empiricus calls Protagoras’s book (i.e., <em>Truth</em>)<em> Καταβάλλοντες</em> (<em>Knockdown Arguments</em>), Lee claims that the book <em>Truth </em>had such a structure and it contained some <em>Antilogiai </em>or <em>opposing arguments</em> (Lee, 2005, p. 29).<br /><strong>(II)</strong> In the first book of <em>Outlines of Skepticism</em>, Sextus introduces some skeptical phrases such as “I determine nothing” or “everything is inapprehensible.” In brief, it can be said that skeptical phrases are some temporary results of skeptical investigations. They are “temporary” because, in that part of <em>PH</em>, Sextus is at pains to formulate them so that they are not universal or necessary results. In other words, with some temporal and phenomenal adverbs, he makes them phenomenal or non-epistemic claims. The first skeptical phrase Sextus Empiricus introduces in <em>PH </em>I.188 is “οὐ μᾶλλον / <em>ou mallon</em> or οὐδὲν μᾶλλον / <em>ouden mallon</em>. As he says, these phrases are elliptical and by using them, he means “no more this than that.” That is to say, using these phrases, he means: I do not know which of these things I should assent to and which not assent to (PH, I.191).<br />Plutarch in <em>Reply to Colotes</em> (1109) attributed using οὐ μᾶλλον / <em>ou mallon</em> to Protagoras. These phrases are important in ancient skepticism because they are a route to the suspension of judgment.<br /><strong>(III)</strong> After introducing four groups of the Modes of Skepticism in the first book of <em>PH</em>, which can be used as a skeptical toolkit to argue against dogmatists, Sextus Empiricus devoted the main part of his writings to attacking the professors of theoretical disciplines in detail. As Lee (2005, pp. 39-41) argues, writing against or attacking “those who claim special epistemic authority” is a strategy that we find starts in Protagoras’s writings.<br />Conclusion<br />In conclusion, since there are other fragments attributed to Protagoras related to his epistemology and they have a skeptical burden, if we would like to give a consistent and uniform interpretation of his epistemology, then MM cannot be read as the first formulation of relativism anymore. Because MM can be read skeptically, but PE cannot be read relativistically. Notwithstanding, we don’t claim that Protagoras is a full-fledged Pyrrhonian skeptic, but that the Pyrrhonian strategies in order to weaken the dogmatic claims originally come from Protagoras as the first sophist and skeptic. The Ten Modes of Skepticism (attributed to Aenesidemus), arguing against the professors of theoretical disciplines and suspending judgment about non-evident objects of investigations, are the most important strategies that originally come from Protagorean skepticism.Protagoras has often been considered a relativist because he believed that man is the measure of all things (MM). This paper aims to show that focusing on MM and ignoring his other claims, which should be taken to be as epistemologically important as MM, has been the basis of this interpretation. First, in order to weaken the relativistic account, it has been shown that the only interpretation of MM is not a relativistic one. Second, focusing on the other epistemological fragments attributed to Protagoras, it has been claimed that a skeptical interpretation is a more consistent reading of Protagoras, since MM can be read as a skeptical fragment, but the others cannot be interpreted as relativistic slogans. The most important of these fragments, which we call Protagorean <em>Epochē</em> (PE), is doubt about the being and essence of gods in a Sextan conceptual framework. Furthermore, according to this interpretation, MM is the general form of the Ten Modes of Aenesidemean skeptical arguments. Thus, it leads to suspension of judgment instead of relativism.<br />Introduction<br />The aim of this paper is to show that reading Protagoras as a protagonist of skepticism is more reasonable than considering him as a relativist. In this regard, firstly, we try to show what is problematic with interpreting him as a relativist. We then argue that some skeptical features can be found in Protagoras’s fragments. At last, we don’t claim that Protagoras is a Pyrrhonian skeptic but that at the base of Pyrrhonian skepticism we can find the slogans and strategies which Protagoras introduced to the history of philosophy and especially to Ancient Skepticism.<br />MM and PE as Two General Rules for Two Different Kinds of Objects of Investigation<br />In the history of philosophy, the name of Protagoras has been attached to a famous slogan which says<br /><strong>MM (Man is Measure)</strong>: Of all things, the measure is man; of those that are, that they are; and of those that are not, that they are not.<br />MM has mostly been interpreted as the first formulation of relativism. However, besides MM, there are some fragments attributed to Protagoras, which are related to the realm of epistemology, that have received the least amount of attention in literature. One of the most important of them is the following:<br /><strong>PE (Protagorean <em>Epochē</em>): </strong>About the gods, I am able to know neither that they exist nor that they do not exist nor of what kind they are in form; for many things prevent me from knowing this, its ἀδηλόντης and the brevity of man’s life.<br />It can be asked, i) why MM has been considered the focal point of Protagoras’s epistemology and, ii) why it has been interpreted as the first formulation of relativism. We argue that perhaps Plato’s <em>Theaetetus </em>is responsible for both. We claim that, considering PE, MM can be read skeptically, but PE cannot be read relativistically. Therefore, in order to give a consistent interpretation of his fragments, it is better to read MM in a skeptical fashion.<br />But to show the skeptical burden of PE, we have called attention to the Pyrrhonian terminology which can be found in the word “ἀδηλόντης” (being unclear) in the mentioned fragment. Sextus Empiricus, the author of one of the longest treatises on Pyrrhonian skepticism, referring to the object of investigation, uses this word frequently and consciously as a term, against something which is πρόδηλον (clear). And in <em>AM</em> VIII.145, he introduces three types<br />of unclear or non-evident things: 1) absolutely non-evident, 2) naturally non-evident, and<br />3) temporarily non-evident. (1) and (2) are the objects of scientific and philosophical investigations. And a skeptic, unlike a dogmatist, thinks that finding the truth about these two kinds of objects is a long-term investigation which may be fruitful or not. This is why a skeptic suspends judgment about them. Being non-evident<em> </em>in conjunction with the brevity of man’s life can show that God as a subject of philosophical investigation is not absolutely unknowable, but it needs a long period of investigation so that we cannot determine if it is knowable at last or not. Thus, the result is a suspension of judgment.<br />If we consider PE as the focal point of interpreting Protagoras’s epistemology, it should be read as a general claim about unclear or non-evident objects and MM as a general claim about clear objects. Thus, we have MM* as follows:<br /><strong>MM* (Man is a measure of clear objects)</strong>: Of all <em>clear</em> <em>things</em>, the measure is man; of those that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not.<br />Following MM* does not force us to limit the scope of clear objects to perceptible things. And the same is correct about unclear objects which are not limited to imperceptible things. So the clear-unclear distinction is not a parallel for perceptible-imperceptible things. Therefore,<br />this line of interpretation is not necessarily equal to the thesis of Theaetetus that knowledge is perception.<br />The Other Skeptical Strategies<br />In order to support reading Protagoras as a prototype of Pyrrhonian skepticism, it has been mentioned in three steps (I–III) some phrases in fragments attributed to Protagoras which are similar, both in formulation and meaning, to some Pyrrhonian slogans and strategies.<br /><strong>(I) </strong>Sextus Empiricus in <em>PH </em>I.12 says that “[t]he chief constitutive principle of skepticism is the claim that to every account an equal account is opposed.” According to Diogenes Laertius (DL, ix.51) Protagoras “was the first to say that there are two sides to every question, opposed to each other; he even conducted his arguments in this manner, being the first to do so.” From<br />this quote, we can approach the Ten Modes of Skepticism attributed to Aenesidemus in a straightforward manner. Modes of Skepticism are some argumentative patterns in order to make a contrast between two phenomena or two statements or between a phenomenon and a statement. As Annas and Barnes (1985, pp. 24-25) say, they generally have the following structure:<br />(1) x appears <em>F</em> in situation <em>S</em>.<br />(2) x appears <em>F*</em> in situation <em>S*</em>.<br />Where “<em>F </em>and <em>F* </em>designate incompatible properties,” and “<em>S</em> and <em>S*</em> designate different situations,” and “‘<em>in</em> situation…’” is a shorthand for “depending on situation… (Annas & Barnes, 1985, pp. 24-25).” Since Sextus Empiricus calls Protagoras’s book (i.e., <em>Truth</em>)<em> Καταβάλλοντες</em> (<em>Knockdown Arguments</em>), Lee claims that the book <em>Truth </em>had such a structure and it contained some <em>Antilogiai </em>or <em>opposing arguments</em> (Lee, 2005, p. 29).<br /><strong>(II)</strong> In the first book of <em>Outlines of Skepticism</em>, Sextus introduces some skeptical phrases such as “I determine nothing” or “everything is inapprehensible.” In brief, it can be said that skeptical phrases are some temporary results of skeptical investigations. They are “temporary” because, in that part of <em>PH</em>, Sextus is at pains to formulate them so that they are not universal or necessary results. In other words, with some temporal and phenomenal adverbs, he makes them phenomenal or non-epistemic claims. The first skeptical phrase Sextus Empiricus introduces in <em>PH </em>I.188 is “οὐ μᾶλλον / <em>ou mallon</em> or οὐδὲν μᾶλλον / <em>ouden mallon</em>. As he says, these phrases are elliptical and by using them, he means “no more this than that.” That is to say, using these phrases, he means: I do not know which of these things I should assent to and which not assent to (PH, I.191).<br />Plutarch in <em>Reply to Colotes</em> (1109) attributed using οὐ μᾶλλον / <em>ou mallon</em> to Protagoras. These phrases are important in ancient skepticism because they are a route to the suspension of judgment.<br /><strong>(III)</strong> After introducing four groups of the Modes of Skepticism in the first book of <em>PH</em>, which can be used as a skeptical toolkit to argue against dogmatists, Sextus Empiricus devoted the main part of his writings to attacking the professors of theoretical disciplines in detail. As Lee (2005, pp. 39-41) argues, writing against or attacking “those who claim special epistemic authority” is a strategy that we find starts in Protagoras’s writings.<br />Conclusion<br />In conclusion, since there are other fragments attributed to Protagoras related to his epistemology and they have a skeptical burden, if we would like to give a consistent and uniform interpretation of his epistemology, then MM cannot be read as the first formulation of relativism anymore. Because MM can be read skeptically, but PE cannot be read relativistically. Notwithstanding, we don’t claim that Protagoras is a full-fledged Pyrrhonian skeptic, but that the Pyrrhonian strategies in order to weaken the dogmatic claims originally come from Protagoras as the first sophist and skeptic. The Ten Modes of Skepticism (attributed to Aenesidemus), arguing against the professors of theoretical disciplines and suspending judgment about non-evident objects of investigations, are the most important strategies that originally come from Protagorean skepticism.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_3025_b36491bfdfda7f9f7d913695fa926c0e.pdfUniversity of QomJournal of Philosophical Theological Research1735-979127220250723Stump and Hoffman on the Efficacy of
Petitionary Prayer: A Comparative ReviewStump and Hoffman on the Efficacy of
Petitionary Prayer: A Comparative Review6594303410.22091/jptr.2024.10566.3035FAVahidehFakhar NoghaniAssociate Professor, Department of Islamic Teachings, Faculty of Islamic Theology, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran0000-0001-6713-5944AmirRastin ToroghiAssistant Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy, Faculty of Islamic Theology, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran.0000-0002-2823-8649Journal Article20240328Some philosophers of religion have doubted the efficacy of prayer in the possible world created by the God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good. Eleanore Stump has questioned the possibility of explaining effective prayer due to the implications of God’s pure benevolence, like the necessity of guiding the world to the best possible state, and maintaining the world in that state. Joshua Hoffman, on the contrary, has defended the efficacy of prayer by explaining the possibility of its necessary condition and criticizing the opposing arguments against it. The comparative-analytical examination of the principles and premises of each of these two views reveals that the following presuppositions can play an important role in explaining the efficacy of prayer: the criterion for the efficacy of prayer, explaining the quality of the creation of the world(s) in light of divine attributes (either all or some of them), as well as the possibility of offering prayer in the best possible world. Al in all, it seems that neither Stump’s argument in challenging the efficacious prayer is strong enough, nor Hoffman’s defense strategy is effective enough.
Introduction
Eleanor Stump has formulated the problem of the inconsistency of effective prayer with some of God’s attributes in an argument with 12 premises. In the next step, however, from a moral point of view and relying on the role of prayer in balancing the divine-human relationship, she has offered a new theological account of the efficacy of prayer. Joshua Hoffman, in contrast, rejects both Stump’s argument as a serious threat to effective prayer and her account as a plausible solution. This article only deals with the first part of their claims.
Stump’s Argument
In her argument, Stump examines the positive or negative change that petitionary prayer may make in the current state of the world. She argues that a prayer that makes the world worse than it would otherwise be is ineffective because the absolute knowledge, power, and goodness of God logically prevent such a prayer from being answered. Also, if a prayer makes the world better than it would otherwise be, an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good God will do so even if no prayer has been made for it. Therefore, petitionary prayer has no change on the state of the world.
Hoffman’s Defense
Hoffman seeks to prove a relatively modest claim. He tries to show that what he takes to be a necessary (not sufficient) condition for the efficacy of petitionary prayer can be met on the traditional conception of God. According to Hoffman, petitionary prayer is the practice of making a request of God in the hope that one’s request will be granted and the belief that at least some of these requests are effective. In other words, God actualizes the petitioned state, <em>s</em>, because of the prayer made for it, <em>p</em>, not just for the sake of that which is prayed for. This implies that if <em>p</em> is an effective prayer, then God’s bringing about <em>s</em> is contingent upon the realization of <em>p</em>. It also implies that one’s praying for <em>s</em> is contingent. Accordingly, the necessary condition for a prayer to be effective (NC) can be stated in the form of a conditional proposition: “If a prayer for a state of affairs, <em>s, </em>is efficacious, then there is a possible world in which that prayer is not made, and in which <em>s</em> is not obtained.”
Threats Against NC
Hoffman’s strategy to defend his position is to disarm the arguments that seem to threaten his NC. He names these arguments as A, B, and C and tries to show that none of these can pose serious threats against the satisfaction of NC. Arguments A and B presuppose that God necessarily creates “the unique best possible world,” and thus, God must bring about <em>s</em> even if no one has prayed for it. By a logical analysis, Hoffman shows that the crucial condition in argument A is only trivially true, and therefore, it can pose no threat to his NC. Also, by challenging the assumption of the unique best possible world, he rejects the presupposition of both arguments A and B.
Argument C assumes that God creates an optimal world, but not a unique optimal world. Accordingly, if one prays for some state of affairs, <em>s, </em>which God subsequently brings about, then since God necessarily creates an optimal world, He would have brought about <em>s </em>even if one hadn’t prayed for <em>s.</em> Using the concept of “moral compensation,” Hoffman tries to show that it is possible to compensate for the lack of a desired state of affairs in an optimal possible world by replacing it with another state that enjoys equal good.
Discussion
One may criticize Stump’s argument on the ground of what follows: The premises of her argument ironically imply the possibility of the world’s improvability. Her argument disregards the concept of the current value of the world in relation to the past and future, and there is an ambiguity in the concept of being a better or worse state of the world compared to its current state and after the prayer is answered. In explaining effective prayer, her account ignores concepts such as the welfare and interest of the petitioner, and the wisdom and providence of God, and it provides a very limited definition of the criterion for the efficacy of prayer.
Against Hoffmann’s defense, one may raise these criticisms: misunderstanding of Stump’s argument, ignoring the standard rules in logic for the truth of counterfactual conditionals, the inconsistency of the necessity of creating the best possible world(s) with free will and with the Christian theological tradition, ambiguity in his hypothetical arguments (A, B, C), and choosing a long difficult path to prove NC.
Conclusion
Authors maintain that their own account, “Answering-by-Disclosure Model (ADM),” which is an account based on the principles of Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendent philosophy, can provide a more accurate explanation of the efficacy of petitionary prayer and avoid the criticisms.
Some philosophers of religion have doubted the efficacy of prayer in the possible world created by the God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good. Eleanore Stump has questioned the possibility of explaining effective prayer due to the implications of God’s pure benevolence, like the necessity of guiding the world to the best possible state, and maintaining the world in that state. Joshua Hoffman, on the contrary, has defended the efficacy of prayer by explaining the possibility of its necessary condition and criticizing the opposing arguments against it. The comparative-analytical examination of the principles and premises of each of these two views reveals that the following presuppositions can play an important role in explaining the efficacy of prayer: the criterion for the efficacy of prayer, explaining the quality of the creation of the world(s) in light of divine attributes (either all or some of them), as well as the possibility of offering prayer in the best possible world. Al in all, it seems that neither Stump’s argument in challenging the efficacious prayer is strong enough, nor Hoffman’s defense strategy is effective enough.
Introduction
Eleanor Stump has formulated the problem of the inconsistency of effective prayer with some of God’s attributes in an argument with 12 premises. In the next step, however, from a moral point of view and relying on the role of prayer in balancing the divine-human relationship, she has offered a new theological account of the efficacy of prayer. Joshua Hoffman, in contrast, rejects both Stump’s argument as a serious threat to effective prayer and her account as a plausible solution. This article only deals with the first part of their claims.
Stump’s Argument
In her argument, Stump examines the positive or negative change that petitionary prayer may make in the current state of the world. She argues that a prayer that makes the world worse than it would otherwise be is ineffective because the absolute knowledge, power, and goodness of God logically prevent such a prayer from being answered. Also, if a prayer makes the world better than it would otherwise be, an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good God will do so even if no prayer has been made for it. Therefore, petitionary prayer has no change on the state of the world.
Hoffman’s Defense
Hoffman seeks to prove a relatively modest claim. He tries to show that what he takes to be a necessary (not sufficient) condition for the efficacy of petitionary prayer can be met on the traditional conception of God. According to Hoffman, petitionary prayer is the practice of making a request of God in the hope that one’s request will be granted and the belief that at least some of these requests are effective. In other words, God actualizes the petitioned state, <em>s</em>, because of the prayer made for it, <em>p</em>, not just for the sake of that which is prayed for. This implies that if <em>p</em> is an effective prayer, then God’s bringing about <em>s</em> is contingent upon the realization of <em>p</em>. It also implies that one’s praying for <em>s</em> is contingent. Accordingly, the necessary condition for a prayer to be effective (NC) can be stated in the form of a conditional proposition: “If a prayer for a state of affairs, <em>s, </em>is efficacious, then there is a possible world in which that prayer is not made, and in which <em>s</em> is not obtained.”
Threats Against NC
Hoffman’s strategy to defend his position is to disarm the arguments that seem to threaten his NC. He names these arguments as A, B, and C and tries to show that none of these can pose serious threats against the satisfaction of NC. Arguments A and B presuppose that God necessarily creates “the unique best possible world,” and thus, God must bring about <em>s</em> even if no one has prayed for it. By a logical analysis, Hoffman shows that the crucial condition in argument A is only trivially true, and therefore, it can pose no threat to his NC. Also, by challenging the assumption of the unique best possible world, he rejects the presupposition of both arguments A and B.
Argument C assumes that God creates an optimal world, but not a unique optimal world. Accordingly, if one prays for some state of affairs, <em>s, </em>which God subsequently brings about, then since God necessarily creates an optimal world, He would have brought about <em>s </em>even if one hadn’t prayed for <em>s.</em> Using the concept of “moral compensation,” Hoffman tries to show that it is possible to compensate for the lack of a desired state of affairs in an optimal possible world by replacing it with another state that enjoys equal good.
Discussion
One may criticize Stump’s argument on the ground of what follows: The premises of her argument ironically imply the possibility of the world’s improvability. Her argument disregards the concept of the current value of the world in relation to the past and future, and there is an ambiguity in the concept of being a better or worse state of the world compared to its current state and after the prayer is answered. In explaining effective prayer, her account ignores concepts such as the welfare and interest of the petitioner, and the wisdom and providence of God, and it provides a very limited definition of the criterion for the efficacy of prayer.
Against Hoffmann’s defense, one may raise these criticisms: misunderstanding of Stump’s argument, ignoring the standard rules in logic for the truth of counterfactual conditionals, the inconsistency of the necessity of creating the best possible world(s) with free will and with the Christian theological tradition, ambiguity in his hypothetical arguments (A, B, C), and choosing a long difficult path to prove NC.
Conclusion
Authors maintain that their own account, “Answering-by-Disclosure Model (ADM),” which is an account based on the principles of Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendent philosophy, can provide a more accurate explanation of the efficacy of petitionary prayer and avoid the criticisms.
https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_3034_1cc683bcd5e8919b51cba2d08ebce5ea.pdfUniversity of QomJournal of Philosophical Theological Research1735-979127220250723Wittgensteinian Reflections on Justice with
an Emphasis on the Critique of Plato and
the Aristotelian-Aquinian Theory of ‘Analogy’Wittgensteinian Reflections on Justice with
an Emphasis on the Critique of Plato and
the Aristotelian-Aquinian Theory of ‘Analogy’95118309810.22091/jptr.2024.10803.3067FAHosseinShaqaqiAssistant Professor, Faculty of Contemporary Intercultural Studies, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran.Journal Article20240528Here, I will first mention the concept of justice as discussed in some of Plato’s works, and then I will try to present some reflections on this concept from the perspective of the philosophy of language. These reflections will be mainly from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language and especially his ideas of family resemblance and language games. In addition to the evaluation of the mentioned concept from the perspective of the idea of family resemblance, I will also evaluate this concept from the perspective of the Aristotelian-Aquinian theory of analogy – which according to some commentators is related to the idea of family resemblance of Wittgenstein – then I will provide a comparison between these two evaluations. I will argue that Wittgenstein’s evaluation of the mentioned concept, unlike the evaluation from the perspective of the Aristotelian-Aquinian theory of analogy, will not lead to the presentation of an alternative metaphysical theory for justice. Rather, the ideas of family resemblance and language games will lead us to a holistic approach to understanding justice.
Introduction
According to our ordinary conception, words serve as labels for meanings. Meanings are fixed, reside somewhere in the mind or a Platonic realm, and are designated by words. Regarding a concept like justice, it is assumed that justice is an identity, idea, or meaning in a Platonic realm or in the realm of human minds, which is labeled with the words “dike” (in Greek) and “justice” (in English).
This conception aligns with two views on the meaning of words: mentalism and Platonism. Wittgenstein disagrees with both. One of the important results of the idea of family resemblance and the identification of meaning and use, two Wittgensteinian ideas, is the rejection of the idea that meanings reside in a Platonic world. Wittgenstein’s argument against private language also critiques the mentalism that dominates the history of modern Western philosophy.
The Theory of Analogy and God’s Justice
Advocates of the theory of analogy in the Middle Ages (including Aquinas) presented this theory in response to issues in three areas: logic, theology, and metaphysics. Thomas Aquinas’s question is how we can apply properties that are used for humans or other creatures to God as well. According to Aquinas’s theory of analogy, we name what we do not have experience of through the words we use to name things we have experience of. This naming depends on some kind of similarity. For example, we do not have any sensory experience of God’s properties and actions, but by recognizing a similarity between them and what is called “just” in human actions, we call God’s action just.
The Idea of “Justice”: The Theory of Analogy Perspective vs. Wittgenstein’s Approach
In Wittgenstein’s thought, just like the Aristotelian-Aquinian theory of analogy, words do not necessarily have a common referent. As a result, one shouldn’t seek a shared referent among instances of the word “justice.” The similarity between Aquinas’s theory of analogy and Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblance also has a negative aspect; that is, a critical view of internalism and mentalism regarding meaning. Accordingly, it must be accepted that justice is not a concept or idea within the minds of humans.
However, the important difference between Wittgenstein’s theory of family resemblance and Aquinas’s theory of analogy is that Wittgenstein’s theory does not depend on the metaphysics that the theory of analogy relies on. The theory of analogy presupposes a metaphysical (or ontological) relationship between entities described by a particular property. In contrast, Wittgenstein’s theory is epistemological, focusing on the recognition of similarities by language users.
“Justice”: Subjective or Objective?
One of the issues regarding the term “justice” is whether our use of this term is objective and factual, like the use of the word “green,” or subjective and mental, like the use of the word “delicious.” Different societies and cultures consider different actions to be just. However, we cannot decisively say that “justice,” like “delicious,” is a subjective and arbitrary concept. This is because if someone claims that a certain situation is just, he/she must be prepared to justify his/her claim. Therefore, justice is neither completely subjective nor completely objective.
According to the Wittgensteinian perspective, the meaning of a term like “justice” depends on a network of relationships between that term and other related terms within the language game. For example, whether a player in a sports game considers the referee’s decision to be unjust depends on the use of the term “justice” in that game, as well as the relationships between this usage and the usage of terms such as “foul,” “penalty,” and so on.
Conclusion
From the perspective of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, especially the idea of family resemblance, justice is a family resemblance concept. Therefore, the Platonic view of concepts (which holds that instances of a concept share a common essence) is critiqued by Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. Aquinas’s theory of analogy regarding meanings relies on a metaphysics and thus does not go far beyond Plato. In contrast, Wittgenstein does not present a metaphysics and hence does not consider meanings to be dependent on any fixed essence or form, whether Platonic or Aristotelian.
Therefore, if we examine the concept of justice from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, there is no relationship between justice and a universal metaphysics (whether Platonic or otherwise) that is independent of cultural and social context. From this viewpoint, justice will be a dynamic and fluid concept, but this dynamism and fluidity does<br />not imply that the concept of justice is arbitrary, subjective, or individualistic. Based on Wittgenstein’s ideas of family resemblance and language games, the concept of justice depends on the context of social life. Any term that signifies something akin to the concept of justice in any language is tied to a network of terms within that language; therefore, any interpretation of justice must inevitably be holistic. The conclusion is that an essentialist view of the concept and meaning of justice (whether Platonic or alternative) cannot be defended.Here, I will first mention the concept of justice as discussed in some of Plato’s works, and then I will try to present some reflections on this concept from the perspective of the philosophy of language. These reflections will be mainly from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language and especially his ideas of family resemblance and language games. In addition to the evaluation of the mentioned concept from the perspective of the idea of family resemblance, I will also evaluate this concept from the perspective of the Aristotelian-Aquinian theory of analogy – which according to some commentators is related to the idea of family resemblance of Wittgenstein – then I will provide a comparison between these two evaluations. I will argue that Wittgenstein’s evaluation of the mentioned concept, unlike the evaluation from the perspective of the Aristotelian-Aquinian theory of analogy, will not lead to the presentation of an alternative metaphysical theory for justice. Rather, the ideas of family resemblance and language games will lead us to a holistic approach to understanding justice.
Introduction
According to our ordinary conception, words serve as labels for meanings. Meanings are fixed, reside somewhere in the mind or a Platonic realm, and are designated by words. Regarding a concept like justice, it is assumed that justice is an identity, idea, or meaning in a Platonic realm or in the realm of human minds, which is labeled with the words “dike” (in Greek) and “justice” (in English).
This conception aligns with two views on the meaning of words: mentalism and Platonism. Wittgenstein disagrees with both. One of the important results of the idea of family resemblance and the identification of meaning and use, two Wittgensteinian ideas, is the rejection of the idea that meanings reside in a Platonic world. Wittgenstein’s argument against private language also critiques the mentalism that dominates the history of modern Western philosophy.
The Theory of Analogy and God’s Justice
Advocates of the theory of analogy in the Middle Ages (including Aquinas) presented this theory in response to issues in three areas: logic, theology, and metaphysics. Thomas Aquinas’s question is how we can apply properties that are used for humans or other creatures to God as well. According to Aquinas’s theory of analogy, we name what we do not have experience of through the words we use to name things we have experience of. This naming depends on some kind of similarity. For example, we do not have any sensory experience of God’s properties and actions, but by recognizing a similarity between them and what is called “just” in human actions, we call God’s action just.
The Idea of “Justice”: The Theory of Analogy Perspective vs. Wittgenstein’s Approach
In Wittgenstein’s thought, just like the Aristotelian-Aquinian theory of analogy, words do not necessarily have a common referent. As a result, one shouldn’t seek a shared referent among instances of the word “justice.” The similarity between Aquinas’s theory of analogy and Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblance also has a negative aspect; that is, a critical view of internalism and mentalism regarding meaning. Accordingly, it must be accepted that justice is not a concept or idea within the minds of humans.
However, the important difference between Wittgenstein’s theory of family resemblance and Aquinas’s theory of analogy is that Wittgenstein’s theory does not depend on the metaphysics that the theory of analogy relies on. The theory of analogy presupposes a metaphysical (or ontological) relationship between entities described by a particular property. In contrast, Wittgenstein’s theory is epistemological, focusing on the recognition of similarities by language users.
“Justice”: Subjective or Objective?
One of the issues regarding the term “justice” is whether our use of this term is objective and factual, like the use of the word “green,” or subjective and mental, like the use of the word “delicious.” Different societies and cultures consider different actions to be just. However, we cannot decisively say that “justice,” like “delicious,” is a subjective and arbitrary concept. This is because if someone claims that a certain situation is just, he/she must be prepared to justify his/her claim. Therefore, justice is neither completely subjective nor completely objective.
According to the Wittgensteinian perspective, the meaning of a term like “justice” depends on a network of relationships between that term and other related terms within the language game. For example, whether a player in a sports game considers the referee’s decision to be unjust depends on the use of the term “justice” in that game, as well as the relationships between this usage and the usage of terms such as “foul,” “penalty,” and so on.
Conclusion
From the perspective of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, especially the idea of family resemblance, justice is a family resemblance concept. Therefore, the Platonic view of concepts (which holds that instances of a concept share a common essence) is critiqued by Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. Aquinas’s theory of analogy regarding meanings relies on a metaphysics and thus does not go far beyond Plato. In contrast, Wittgenstein does not present a metaphysics and hence does not consider meanings to be dependent on any fixed essence or form, whether Platonic or Aristotelian.
Therefore, if we examine the concept of justice from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, there is no relationship between justice and a universal metaphysics (whether Platonic or otherwise) that is independent of cultural and social context. From this viewpoint, justice will be a dynamic and fluid concept, but this dynamism and fluidity does<br />not imply that the concept of justice is arbitrary, subjective, or individualistic. Based on Wittgenstein’s ideas of family resemblance and language games, the concept of justice depends on the context of social life. Any term that signifies something akin to the concept of justice in any language is tied to a network of terms within that language; therefore, any interpretation of justice must inevitably be holistic. The conclusion is that an essentialist view of the concept and meaning of justice (whether Platonic or alternative) cannot be defended.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_3098_15c4ec5ac5cf9de367e15757ba2497d5.pdfUniversity of QomJournal of Philosophical Theological Research1735-979127220250723A Defense of the Realism of Time: Analysis and
Critique of McTaggart’s Theory of Non-Realism in
the Metaphysics of TimeA Defense of the Realism of Time: Analysis and
Critique of McTaggart’s Theory of Non-Realism in
the Metaphysics of Time119140322010.22091/jptr.2024.10640.3044FAAyoubAfzaliPhD Candidate in Comparative Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Humanities, Shahid Motahari University, Tehran, Iran0009-0008-3362-6575AliMahjorAssistant Professor, Department of Religious Studies, Institute of Contemporary Religious Thought, Qom, Iran.Journal Article20240424McTaggart’s argument is the most famous argument in contemporary philosophy for the unreality of time. He proposes two models for explaining time: A-series and B-series. The A-series is a model that explains time based on the three concepts of past, present, and future. The B-Series is a model that explains time based on a dual model of the concepts of “earlier” and “later.” McTaggart contends that the B-series fails to explain change, which is a condition for the realization of time, and that the A-series possesses internal contradiction. Consequently, by rejecting the possibility of both models being real, he concludes that time is unreal. This article analyzes and critiques McTaggart’s view, and inspired by the linguistic analysis method of the late Wittgenstein, we show that, first of all, some things cannot be explained solely by a theoretical model. Therefore, time is a multi-level reality based on theoretical reflections and linguistic intuitions. Secondly, the B-series can indeed explain change. Also, the A-series is not contradictory; in this view, the objective aspect of time is explained by the B-series, and the subjective aspect of that is explained by the A-series. Therefore, time is a multi-level reality that cannot be explained by a single conceptual model.
Introduction
The aim of this article, aside from critical discussions, is to defend a specific approach to realism in the metaphysics of time that considers time as a multi-level reality necessitating a multi-level explanation. This approach is partly inspired by the philosophy of linguistic analysis, especially the philosophy of late Wittgenstein, which, instead of giving primacy to a single theory, considers attention to multiple meanings and applications as a way to solve philosophical problems. Unlike the late Wittgenstein, however, this article also focuses on theoretical models in the philosophy of time and does not limit itself to linguistic analysis and conceptual treatment. The innovation of this article lies in 1) presenting an innovative reading of the A-series;<br />2) offering a specific reading of the multi-level explanation regarding the reality of time; and<br />3) combining the method of linguistic analysis with the theory-based method.
Body
McTaggart proposes two conceptual models (A-series and B-series) to explain time. The<br />B-series is criticized for its inability to demonstrate change, while the realization of time without change is not meaningful. Although the A-series can demonstrate change, it suffers from a self-defeating contradiction. In the A-series, on the one hand, each of the past, present, and future states are non-summable determinations because each event must have one of those states (e.g., the future) to be attributed to that state (e.g., the future), but on the other hand, each of the points attributed to the past, present, or future can simultaneously be attributed to the other three temporal determinations. This contradiction becomes clearer when there is no end point to find the beginning of this chain and the stability of temporal determinations, and it will continue into infinite regression. In our view, McTaggart’s main claims, including the inability of the B-series to explain change, the dependence of the B-series on the A-series, and the self-defeating contradiction in the A-series, are based on a misunderstanding of the A-series and B-series. Attention to linguistic and conceptual analyses leads us to a new understanding of them, as well as the metaphysical gap between the concept of time in these two models and the difference in their characteristics.
Discussion
A careful analysis of the A-series and B-series reveals that, in addition to proving realism, they can be used as two independent and complementary explanatory models. The approach that makes it possible to use two independent models in explaining time is a multi-level explanation of the reality of time. Our first criticism of McTaggart is that both of his proposed models assume the quantitative nature of time, while denying that the two quantitative perceptions of time is not a valid reason to deny the qualitative perception of time (e.g., Heidegger’s view). Secondly, contrary to McTaggart’s claim, the B-series has explanatory power in explaining time independently of the A-series, because each of them belongs to different ontological realms. From this perspective, the B-series represents and explains an epiphenomenal reality. Thirdly, the realization of time in the A-series, which is equivalent to the realization of time in the human mental world, is not conditioned by change. Rather, for the realization of the A-series, merely the flow of mental awareness of the three states (future, present, and past) is sufficient.
Conclusion
In this article, we have gone beyond single-level approaches to the metaphysics of time and have explained the reality of time at two levels: objective and subjective (mental-linguistic). However, the qualitative/existential aspect of time has been omitted due to article limitations. In our opinion, both the A-series and B-series are successful options in explaining the reality of time, although in the B-series, change is a condition for the realization of time; in the A-series, such a condition is not necessary. The A-series explains the subjective aspect of time in the human mental world and their awareness of time, while the B-series elucidates its objective aspect in correspondence with the events of the external world, and hence time has an epiphenomenal reality in relation to objective events.McTaggart’s argument is the most famous argument in contemporary philosophy for the unreality of time. He proposes two models for explaining time: A-series and B-series. The A-series is a model that explains time based on the three concepts of past, present, and future. The B-Series is a model that explains time based on a dual model of the concepts of “earlier” and “later.” McTaggart contends that the B-series fails to explain change, which is a condition for the realization of time, and that the A-series possesses internal contradiction. Consequently, by rejecting the possibility of both models being real, he concludes that time is unreal. This article analyzes and critiques McTaggart’s view, and inspired by the linguistic analysis method of the late Wittgenstein, we show that, first of all, some things cannot be explained solely by a theoretical model. Therefore, time is a multi-level reality based on theoretical reflections and linguistic intuitions. Secondly, the B-series can indeed explain change. Also, the A-series is not contradictory; in this view, the objective aspect of time is explained by the B-series, and the subjective aspect of that is explained by the A-series. Therefore, time is a multi-level reality that cannot be explained by a single conceptual model.
Introduction
The aim of this article, aside from critical discussions, is to defend a specific approach to realism in the metaphysics of time that considers time as a multi-level reality necessitating a multi-level explanation. This approach is partly inspired by the philosophy of linguistic analysis, especially the philosophy of late Wittgenstein, which, instead of giving primacy to a single theory, considers attention to multiple meanings and applications as a way to solve philosophical problems. Unlike the late Wittgenstein, however, this article also focuses on theoretical models in the philosophy of time and does not limit itself to linguistic analysis and conceptual treatment. The innovation of this article lies in 1) presenting an innovative reading of the A-series;<br />2) offering a specific reading of the multi-level explanation regarding the reality of time; and<br />3) combining the method of linguistic analysis with the theory-based method.
Body
McTaggart proposes two conceptual models (A-series and B-series) to explain time. The<br />B-series is criticized for its inability to demonstrate change, while the realization of time without change is not meaningful. Although the A-series can demonstrate change, it suffers from a self-defeating contradiction. In the A-series, on the one hand, each of the past, present, and future states are non-summable determinations because each event must have one of those states (e.g., the future) to be attributed to that state (e.g., the future), but on the other hand, each of the points attributed to the past, present, or future can simultaneously be attributed to the other three temporal determinations. This contradiction becomes clearer when there is no end point to find the beginning of this chain and the stability of temporal determinations, and it will continue into infinite regression. In our view, McTaggart’s main claims, including the inability of the B-series to explain change, the dependence of the B-series on the A-series, and the self-defeating contradiction in the A-series, are based on a misunderstanding of the A-series and B-series. Attention to linguistic and conceptual analyses leads us to a new understanding of them, as well as the metaphysical gap between the concept of time in these two models and the difference in their characteristics.
Discussion
A careful analysis of the A-series and B-series reveals that, in addition to proving realism, they can be used as two independent and complementary explanatory models. The approach that makes it possible to use two independent models in explaining time is a multi-level explanation of the reality of time. Our first criticism of McTaggart is that both of his proposed models assume the quantitative nature of time, while denying that the two quantitative perceptions of time is not a valid reason to deny the qualitative perception of time (e.g., Heidegger’s view). Secondly, contrary to McTaggart’s claim, the B-series has explanatory power in explaining time independently of the A-series, because each of them belongs to different ontological realms. From this perspective, the B-series represents and explains an epiphenomenal reality. Thirdly, the realization of time in the A-series, which is equivalent to the realization of time in the human mental world, is not conditioned by change. Rather, for the realization of the A-series, merely the flow of mental awareness of the three states (future, present, and past) is sufficient.
Conclusion
In this article, we have gone beyond single-level approaches to the metaphysics of time and have explained the reality of time at two levels: objective and subjective (mental-linguistic). However, the qualitative/existential aspect of time has been omitted due to article limitations. In our opinion, both the A-series and B-series are successful options in explaining the reality of time, although in the B-series, change is a condition for the realization of time; in the A-series, such a condition is not necessary. The A-series explains the subjective aspect of time in the human mental world and their awareness of time, while the B-series elucidates its objective aspect in correspondence with the events of the external world, and hence time has an epiphenomenal reality in relation to objective events.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_3220_ab1d88fd384dce4a74ce3ce52489a0c9.pdfUniversity of QomJournal of Philosophical Theological Research1735-979127220250723Avempace’s Reading of the Theory of GraceAvempace’s Reading of the Theory of Grace141160336210.22091/jptr.2025.11600.3173FAHasanAbasi Hosain AbadiAssociate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Payam-e-Noor University, Tehran, Iran0000-0001-8869-1309Journal Article20241106Avempace (Ibn Bajja) has discussed “grace” in several paragraphs of his collection of philosophical treatises. The subject and central question of this article are Avempace’s reading and understanding of the theory of grace. Did he use the theory of grace in an existential meaning and existential function? The hypothesis is that Avempace has proposed the theory of grace based on the theory of grace in the<em> Book of Causes</em>, which has achieved a new and different plan from the theory of the ten intellects. In this article, we have reached the following findings through a descriptive-analytical method: Grace in Avempace’s philosophy is explained under different titles, “superior nature” (<em>Fiṭrah</em>), “gift” and “vision”, “revelation and inspiration” and “predestination” and in two meanings, “gift and divine illumination” and “existential.” In conclusion, Avempace, in addition to the epistemological function, also believes in the existential function of grace in the theory of grace and has proposed a different plan from the theory of ten intellects in which he presents an account of the cooperation of the active intellect and celestial bodies in the production of the universe of corruption.
Introduction
In his philosophical treatises, Avempace has discussed the concept of Grace (<em>fayz</em>). Al-Jaberi’s emphasis on the absence of the theory of grace in Avempace due to the lack of attention to astronomical minds is the starting point for the article “Avempace’s reading of the theory of grace.” If Al-Jaberi’s statement is true, how did Avempace discuss grace in several sections? What does the application of grace mean for Avempace, and does the existential function of the theory of grace for him explain how beings come into being? Regarding the research background of Avempace’s theory of grace, no research has been conducted in Arabic, English, or Persian.
Research Findings
Avempace’s theory of grace is presented in two meanings: divine gift and illumination, and existential meaning. One of the functions of grace is the imparting of knowledge and forms to beings. For Avempace, God is the source of knowledge, and He imparts His knowledge and goodness to beings and creatures, and every being accepts the perfection of existence according to its existential level. God imparts His scientific form to all beings, whether they are in the genesis and corruption realm (i.e., material realm) or the intellectual realm, through mediation or without mediation.
In another paragraph, Avempace explains “Grace” by talking about “superior nature” (<em>Fiṭrah</em>), and it mainly refers to the cognitive function of grace. The superior nature is ready to accept human perfection with the same readiness to accept human reason and then divine reason from God Almighty. The superior nature is a gift that is not in the control of man, and man has no influence on its existence.
Grace is accompanied by light and blessing, and since this grace and illumination from above are necessary and not acquired, Avempace brings in the concept of predestination; in the sense that God knows everything and the scientific form of all beings is in divine knowledge and by imparting forms to every being, He creates them.
Avempace by moving away from al-Farabi’s theory of ten intellects, has proposed a different plan in which, influenced by the <em>Book of Causes</em>, he explains the theory of grace in the expression of the forms, knowledge, and goodness of beings and creatures, as well as the emergence of beings in the realm of creation and corruption (i.e., the material realm). In fact, the active intellect places the forms of objects in celestial souls, and the celestial bodies create the details in the material realm according to the forms that the active intellect imparts to it.
Therefore, the existential meaning of grace can be explained in two ways: one in terms of the active intellect and cooperation with the celestial bodies in the emergence of multiplicity, and the other in terms of predestination and the diffusion of the forms of beings to all beings, even the beings of the material realm. Thus, grace, according to Avempace, is the diffusion of forms, knowledge, and perfections from God to creatures.
Conclusion
What was obtained from this article speaks of the participation and cooperation of the active intellect and the celestial bodies in Avempace’s thought. In fact, it is true that the ten intellects and celestial bodies in the Farabian sense are not mentioned in Avempace, but he has not eliminated the role of celestial bodies in general in the emergence of multiplicity.
In terms of the fact that the theory of grace in Avempace has both a cognitive function and the diffusion of knowledge and forms, as well as an existential function, by combining the Aristotelian theory of reason and the theory of grace in the Explanation of the Pure Good, Avempace proposes a plan in explaining the emergence of multitudes in such a way that true agency belongs to God and the proximate agent is involved in the emergence of beings and multitudes. And that proximate agent of heavenly bodies is in the cooperation of the active intellect. Therefore, in Avempace’s theory of grace, the “First” has the position of creative agency and is the true and praiseworthy agent, and the active intellect holds the position of the “custodian” of the First.
The theory of grace in Avempace is in line with the theory of grace in the <em>Book of Causes</em>. He speaks of the one diffusion and grace, of the first and second intellects, and the hierarchy of intellects in receiving grace. He speaks of light, illumination, the illumination of light from above and higher intellects to lower intellects and intellect of man, which has an Aristotelian basis but its illuminating and Neoplatonic color is much stronger when all of this is combined with the Islamic perspective, so that he also speaks of destiny, gift, vision, and the different levels of gifts in humans.
<strong> </strong>
Avempace (Ibn Bajja) has discussed “grace” in several paragraphs of his collection of philosophical treatises. The subject and central question of this article are Avempace’s reading and understanding of the theory of grace. Did he use the theory of grace in an existential meaning and existential function? The hypothesis is that Avempace has proposed the theory of grace based on the theory of grace in the<em> Book of Causes</em>, which has achieved a new and different plan from the theory of the ten intellects. In this article, we have reached the following findings through a descriptive-analytical method: Grace in Avempace’s philosophy is explained under different titles, “superior nature” (<em>Fiṭrah</em>), “gift” and “vision”, “revelation and inspiration” and “predestination” and in two meanings, “gift and divine illumination” and “existential.” In conclusion, Avempace, in addition to the epistemological function, also believes in the existential function of grace in the theory of grace and has proposed a different plan from the theory of ten intellects in which he presents an account of the cooperation of the active intellect and celestial bodies in the production of the universe of corruption.
Introduction
In his philosophical treatises, Avempace has discussed the concept of Grace (<em>fayz</em>). Al-Jaberi’s emphasis on the absence of the theory of grace in Avempace due to the lack of attention to astronomical minds is the starting point for the article “Avempace’s reading of the theory of grace.” If Al-Jaberi’s statement is true, how did Avempace discuss grace in several sections? What does the application of grace mean for Avempace, and does the existential function of the theory of grace for him explain how beings come into being? Regarding the research background of Avempace’s theory of grace, no research has been conducted in Arabic, English, or Persian.
Research Findings
Avempace’s theory of grace is presented in two meanings: divine gift and illumination, and existential meaning. One of the functions of grace is the imparting of knowledge and forms to beings. For Avempace, God is the source of knowledge, and He imparts His knowledge and goodness to beings and creatures, and every being accepts the perfection of existence according to its existential level. God imparts His scientific form to all beings, whether they are in the genesis and corruption realm (i.e., material realm) or the intellectual realm, through mediation or without mediation.
In another paragraph, Avempace explains “Grace” by talking about “superior nature” (<em>Fiṭrah</em>), and it mainly refers to the cognitive function of grace. The superior nature is ready to accept human perfection with the same readiness to accept human reason and then divine reason from God Almighty. The superior nature is a gift that is not in the control of man, and man has no influence on its existence.
Grace is accompanied by light and blessing, and since this grace and illumination from above are necessary and not acquired, Avempace brings in the concept of predestination; in the sense that God knows everything and the scientific form of all beings is in divine knowledge and by imparting forms to every being, He creates them.
Avempace by moving away from al-Farabi’s theory of ten intellects, has proposed a different plan in which, influenced by the <em>Book of Causes</em>, he explains the theory of grace in the expression of the forms, knowledge, and goodness of beings and creatures, as well as the emergence of beings in the realm of creation and corruption (i.e., the material realm). In fact, the active intellect places the forms of objects in celestial souls, and the celestial bodies create the details in the material realm according to the forms that the active intellect imparts to it.
Therefore, the existential meaning of grace can be explained in two ways: one in terms of the active intellect and cooperation with the celestial bodies in the emergence of multiplicity, and the other in terms of predestination and the diffusion of the forms of beings to all beings, even the beings of the material realm. Thus, grace, according to Avempace, is the diffusion of forms, knowledge, and perfections from God to creatures.
Conclusion
What was obtained from this article speaks of the participation and cooperation of the active intellect and the celestial bodies in Avempace’s thought. In fact, it is true that the ten intellects and celestial bodies in the Farabian sense are not mentioned in Avempace, but he has not eliminated the role of celestial bodies in general in the emergence of multiplicity.
In terms of the fact that the theory of grace in Avempace has both a cognitive function and the diffusion of knowledge and forms, as well as an existential function, by combining the Aristotelian theory of reason and the theory of grace in the Explanation of the Pure Good, Avempace proposes a plan in explaining the emergence of multitudes in such a way that true agency belongs to God and the proximate agent is involved in the emergence of beings and multitudes. And that proximate agent of heavenly bodies is in the cooperation of the active intellect. Therefore, in Avempace’s theory of grace, the “First” has the position of creative agency and is the true and praiseworthy agent, and the active intellect holds the position of the “custodian” of the First.
The theory of grace in Avempace is in line with the theory of grace in the <em>Book of Causes</em>. He speaks of the one diffusion and grace, of the first and second intellects, and the hierarchy of intellects in receiving grace. He speaks of light, illumination, the illumination of light from above and higher intellects to lower intellects and intellect of man, which has an Aristotelian basis but its illuminating and Neoplatonic color is much stronger when all of this is combined with the Islamic perspective, so that he also speaks of destiny, gift, vision, and the different levels of gifts in humans.
<strong> </strong>
https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_3362_10e6a54184094d48be58cbc1ed147e32.pdfUniversity of QomJournal of Philosophical Theological Research1735-979127220250723Incompatibility of Theories of Fiction in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy with Theories of MythIncompatibility of Theories of Fiction in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy with Theories of Myth161183318510.22091/jptr.2024.11146.3110FAMohammadhadiSoleimaniPhD in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Logic, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran0009-0008-0190-9992DavoodHosseiniAssociate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Logic, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran0000-0002-0851-1003Journal Article20240809A large literature on the ontology of fictional entities has developed in recent decades. These ontologies can be categorized into different groups, ranging from realist to anti-realist approaches. The philosophers of this literature, despite their fundamental differences, agree that whatever can be said about the metaphysics and ontology of fictional entities can also be extended to mythical entities. However, if we look at the characteristics of mythical entities based on the mythologies of the last century, we can conclude that these entities have a function in the real world, include some collective and unconscious dimensions, and can be realized in different realizers. These characteristics require implications for an appropriate ontology to extend to mythical entities. Applying these implications to the ontologies of fictional objects, it becomes clear that these ontologies cannot be extended to mythical entities. Accordingly, ontologists of mythical objects have to create their distinctive literature based on mythological research and analytical tools.
Introduction
The literature of fictional entities is one of the literatures in analytic philosophy. Despite great differences in the analysis of fictional objects, they all have in common that the extension of this analysis to mythical objects isn’t problematic. To assess this claim, we first introduce these approaches to fictional objects and then apply the implications of non-analytic mythological theories to these approaches to determine the legitimacy of these extensions.
Fictional Entities in Analytic Tradition
Some analytic theories of fictional objects emphasize that the fictional object exists as an abstract entity created by writers. These approaches may be creationist or abstractionist (Kroon, 2015), or conclude their existence based on easy arguments from common sense or ordinary language (for example, in (Thomasson, 2015) and (Schaffer, 2009)), and/or consider fictional objects as possible objects without any interaction with the real world (Hart, 2012). Antirealist approaches that deny the existence of fictional entities include viewing fictional works as props in a make-believe game (in the pretense account of Walton (Walton, 1990) or the syncretistic account of Voltolini, although he accepts creationism (Voltolini, 2006)), concluding the nonexistence of fictional entities due to the lack of explanatory value in adding them to the world (i.e., fictionalism) (Brock, 2015), considering fictional entities as mere grammatical objects created only from language (Crittenden, 1991), and appealing to speech-act theory to justify metaphysics for fictional statements (Pavel, 1986). Neo-Meinongian approaches, with their distinction between objectivity and existence, make room for nonexistent objects, such as fictional objects. They use the distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties (Parsons, 1980), or the ambiguity of predication in natural language (Zalta, 1988; 2023), or the possible and impossible worlds (Priest, 2005). In these views, fictional objects have only the nuclear properties that the author ascribes to them, or encodes these properties, and/or have them as real objects, only in the worlds of fictional works.
Myth’s Features in Mythological Research
On the other hand, in non-analytic mythologies, especially in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, various approaches to myths are presented. These approaches include Freudian and Jungian psychological approaches, sociological approaches based on Durkheim’s achievements, from Malinowski to the present day, combined approaches using both psychological and sociological approaches, structuralist approaches of Levi-Strauss and his followers, existentialist approaches of Junas, Bultman and Hatab, and finally postmodern and deconstructivist approaches to mythology.<sup>[1]</sup> Despite the diversity of their findings, they all agree that 1) myth has a function in culture, society, the mind or psyche of human beings; 2) this function has a collective aspect;<br />3) The individuation and identification of a mythical object does not depend on its temporary and usually accidental realizers from story and real or apocryphal history; 4) a myth is related to an unconscious or preconscious situation.
Analyzing the Competency of Ontological Theories of Fictional Entities for Mythical Entities
These results inevitably lead to some implications for the theory of mythical objects in analytic philosophy. A) The function of myths in the real world influences ontological decisions about myths. B) Regarding the collectivity of myths, merely individualistic accounts of the existence and persistence of mythical objects seem problematic. C) The unconsciousness of myths precludes any explanation of myths that appeals to merely conscious activities, such as everyday language and common sense. D) Any theory of the identity of mythical objects must explain how a mythical object can reproduce itself in different stories and histories.
Applying these implications to the extension of analytic theories of fiction to myths, it seems that these extensions are disappointing. The reasons are as follows:
1) The ontologies that try to prove the existence of fictional objects on the basis of natural language cannot prove mythical objects in the same way. These ontologies don’t care about the unconscious process of myth.
2) Questioning the process of conscious creation of mythical objects, characters, and entities, they exclude the extension of creationism and abstractionism of fictional entities to mythical ones. They consider the mythical object as the creation of a kind of individual creative process. In the same way, mythical objects aren’t just unreal grammatical objects created by writings.
3) From the function of myths in the real world, the extended version of the theory of pretense, which regards a myth as a mere make-believe game, should be rejected. In this way, a myth can’t also be a grammatical object. Moreover, a myth has an explanatory value in the world against the extension of fictionalism to mythical objects.
4) The functionality of the myth and its causal interaction with the entities of the real world argue against the extensions of fictional ontologies that regard the mythical entity as a non-existent object or merely an (im)possible object in (im)possible worlds.
5) The functionality of myths also implies that the mythical discourse, as discussed in mythologies, is fundamentally different from fictional discourse. Indeed, even if fictional discourse belongs to a different category of speech acts than ordinary assertoric sentences, this can’t be said for mythical ones.
6) The nature of the co-identity of mythical objects does not limit the co-identity of entities to a particular work, time, or place, and intention of the author or audience. Thus, the most realist and antirealist theories of fiction, which don’t satisfy this implication, cannot be extended to mythical entities.
Conclusion
Therefore, there is no theory in the analytic ontology of fictional objects that can be conservatively extended to mythical objects without disastrous deviations. Accordingly, analytic philosophy must develop separate theories of mythical entities, independent of theories of fictional objects.A large literature on the ontology of fictional entities has developed in recent decades. These ontologies can be categorized into different groups, ranging from realist to anti-realist approaches. The philosophers of this literature, despite their fundamental differences, agree that whatever can be said about the metaphysics and ontology of fictional entities can also be extended to mythical entities. However, if we look at the characteristics of mythical entities based on the mythologies of the last century, we can conclude that these entities have a function in the real world, include some collective and unconscious dimensions, and can be realized in different realizers. These characteristics require implications for an appropriate ontology to extend to mythical entities. Applying these implications to the ontologies of fictional objects, it becomes clear that these ontologies cannot be extended to mythical entities. Accordingly, ontologists of mythical objects have to create their distinctive literature based on mythological research and analytical tools.
Introduction
The literature of fictional entities is one of the literatures in analytic philosophy. Despite great differences in the analysis of fictional objects, they all have in common that the extension of this analysis to mythical objects isn’t problematic. To assess this claim, we first introduce these approaches to fictional objects and then apply the implications of non-analytic mythological theories to these approaches to determine the legitimacy of these extensions.
Fictional Entities in Analytic Tradition
Some analytic theories of fictional objects emphasize that the fictional object exists as an abstract entity created by writers. These approaches may be creationist or abstractionist (Kroon, 2015), or conclude their existence based on easy arguments from common sense or ordinary language (for example, in (Thomasson, 2015) and (Schaffer, 2009)), and/or consider fictional objects as possible objects without any interaction with the real world (Hart, 2012). Antirealist approaches that deny the existence of fictional entities include viewing fictional works as props in a make-believe game (in the pretense account of Walton (Walton, 1990) or the syncretistic account of Voltolini, although he accepts creationism (Voltolini, 2006)), concluding the nonexistence of fictional entities due to the lack of explanatory value in adding them to the world (i.e., fictionalism) (Brock, 2015), considering fictional entities as mere grammatical objects created only from language (Crittenden, 1991), and appealing to speech-act theory to justify metaphysics for fictional statements (Pavel, 1986). Neo-Meinongian approaches, with their distinction between objectivity and existence, make room for nonexistent objects, such as fictional objects. They use the distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties (Parsons, 1980), or the ambiguity of predication in natural language (Zalta, 1988; 2023), or the possible and impossible worlds (Priest, 2005). In these views, fictional objects have only the nuclear properties that the author ascribes to them, or encodes these properties, and/or have them as real objects, only in the worlds of fictional works.
Myth’s Features in Mythological Research
On the other hand, in non-analytic mythologies, especially in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, various approaches to myths are presented. These approaches include Freudian and Jungian psychological approaches, sociological approaches based on Durkheim’s achievements, from Malinowski to the present day, combined approaches using both psychological and sociological approaches, structuralist approaches of Levi-Strauss and his followers, existentialist approaches of Junas, Bultman and Hatab, and finally postmodern and deconstructivist approaches to mythology.<sup>[1]</sup> Despite the diversity of their findings, they all agree that 1) myth has a function in culture, society, the mind or psyche of human beings; 2) this function has a collective aspect;<br />3) The individuation and identification of a mythical object does not depend on its temporary and usually accidental realizers from story and real or apocryphal history; 4) a myth is related to an unconscious or preconscious situation.
Analyzing the Competency of Ontological Theories of Fictional Entities for Mythical Entities
These results inevitably lead to some implications for the theory of mythical objects in analytic philosophy. A) The function of myths in the real world influences ontological decisions about myths. B) Regarding the collectivity of myths, merely individualistic accounts of the existence and persistence of mythical objects seem problematic. C) The unconsciousness of myths precludes any explanation of myths that appeals to merely conscious activities, such as everyday language and common sense. D) Any theory of the identity of mythical objects must explain how a mythical object can reproduce itself in different stories and histories.
Applying these implications to the extension of analytic theories of fiction to myths, it seems that these extensions are disappointing. The reasons are as follows:
1) The ontologies that try to prove the existence of fictional objects on the basis of natural language cannot prove mythical objects in the same way. These ontologies don’t care about the unconscious process of myth.
2) Questioning the process of conscious creation of mythical objects, characters, and entities, they exclude the extension of creationism and abstractionism of fictional entities to mythical ones. They consider the mythical object as the creation of a kind of individual creative process. In the same way, mythical objects aren’t just unreal grammatical objects created by writings.
3) From the function of myths in the real world, the extended version of the theory of pretense, which regards a myth as a mere make-believe game, should be rejected. In this way, a myth can’t also be a grammatical object. Moreover, a myth has an explanatory value in the world against the extension of fictionalism to mythical objects.
4) The functionality of the myth and its causal interaction with the entities of the real world argue against the extensions of fictional ontologies that regard the mythical entity as a non-existent object or merely an (im)possible object in (im)possible worlds.
5) The functionality of myths also implies that the mythical discourse, as discussed in mythologies, is fundamentally different from fictional discourse. Indeed, even if fictional discourse belongs to a different category of speech acts than ordinary assertoric sentences, this can’t be said for mythical ones.
6) The nature of the co-identity of mythical objects does not limit the co-identity of entities to a particular work, time, or place, and intention of the author or audience. Thus, the most realist and antirealist theories of fiction, which don’t satisfy this implication, cannot be extended to mythical entities.
Conclusion
Therefore, there is no theory in the analytic ontology of fictional objects that can be conservatively extended to mythical objects without disastrous deviations. Accordingly, analytic philosophy must develop separate theories of mythical entities, independent of theories of fictional objects.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_3185_2c0e18111e9a41e60fc7ad9e646b474f.pdf