دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 27 4 0621 03 23 Editorial سخن سردبیر 5 8 4256 10.22091/jptr.2025.4256 FA زهرا خزاعی استاد گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی دانشگاه قم. قم. ایران. 0000-0001-8302-9674 Journal Article 1970 01 01 In this issue, we present a collection of innovative and methodologically rigorous studies situated at the confluence of religious epistemology, metaphysics, and contemporary philosophy of religion. These articles, while grounded in the rich tradition of Islamic philosophy—engaging with luminaries such as Farabi, Mulla Sadra, and Aqa ‘Ali Mudarres Zunuzi—simultaneously enter into a critical dialogue with modern Western thinkers including Hume, Feldman, and Draper. Collectively, they demonstrate that contemporary philosophy and theology not only engage with empirical data and analytical arguments but, through this very engagement, rediscover and deepen their own conceptual foundations. The dynamism of thought is contingent upon the cultivation of innovative, well-documented, and problem-driven research. Such scholarship avoids the confines of mere repetition and synopsis; instead, it opens new horizons on both foundational and emergent questions, thereby upholding the standard of rigorous argumentation while addressing the imperative questions of our time. In this context, the authenticity of a study is determined not solely by the novelty of its subject matter, but by its meticulousness and its capacity to critically re-examine the intellectual heritage, formulate the problem with precision, and offer an analysis that opens up new vistas of understanding. In this edition, we have endeavored to assemble articles that embody these principles, each contributing a unique perspective to the fundamental problems of philosophy and theology. The issue commences with “An Evaluation of an Empathic Reading of Faith in Hume’s Philosophy with a Focus on Contemporary Psychological Interpretations,” a stellar example of this approach. Moving beyond the conventional interpretation that positions Hume merely as a critic of natural theology, the author offers a sympathetic yet well-documented reading, exploring the possibility of "non-demonstrative faith" within his philosophy. By drawing on contemporary psychology of religion, this research reveals new dimensions of Hume's thought, interpreting him not simply as a theoretical atheist, but as a theorist of a humble, human-centered faith. In the domain of Islamic philosophy, “Evaluating Two Different Interpretations of the Physical Temporality of the Soul” presents a precise, problem-oriented investigation into one of the most challenging tenets of the Transcendent Philosophy. By identifying two distinct readings of this theory among Sadrian commentators, and by grounding the analysis in the systematic approach of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, the author argues that the correct interpretation posits the soul, at the moment of its origination, as being not merely dependent on the body, but as itself corporeal and a body. This study navigates the seemingly paradoxical statements of Mulla Sadra, employing principles such as substantial motion and the existential union of soul and body, to open a new horizon for understanding the soul-body problem and bodily resurrection. Two further articles engage in a meticulous re-examination of the Islamic philosophical tradition, revealing its latent theoretical capacities. “The Position of Tarawwi (Deliberation) in Farabi’s Thought and Its Theoretical and Practical Functions” analyzes this concept as a rational-practical process, elucidating its role in bridging theory and practice, explaining the phenomenon of akrasia (weakness of will), and offering a strategy for moral education. Concurrently, “A Re-examination of the Views of the Two Zunūzī Theosophers on the Problem of Mental Existence” provides a comparative study of their perspectives, demonstrating how the theory of mental existence interacts with a radical interpretation of the principality of existence, thereby exploring the internal innovations and challenges inherent in this view. Within the field of analytic philosophy of religion, this issue features two significant articles. “An Examination and Critique of Paul Draper’s View on the Problem of Evil” employs an analytical-critical method to scrutinize the evidential argument from evil, exposing its weaknesses in defining gratuitous evil, calculating prior probabilities, and its restrictive presuppositions concerning divine aims. The second, “The Philosopher Disagreeing with Oneself: On Feldman’s View about Reasonable Religious Disagreement,” offers a deep exploration of Richard Feldman's work, revealing an internal inconsistency in his position. The article demonstrates how Feldman's later adoption of a broader conception of reasonableness ultimately challenges the skeptical conclusions of his earlier work. Finally, “Rereading Memories or a New Experience: A Critical Review of the Theory of Rereading Memories in Near-Death Experiences” represents an exemplary piece of original interdisciplinary research. The author subjects the naturalistic "memory recall" hypothesis—one explanation for near-death experiences—to rigorous philosophical critique. By appealing to empirical evidence, such as the experiences of congenitally blind individuals and cross-cultural commonalities, the article presents a strong argument against this reductive explanation, underscoring the necessity of considering the transphysical dimensions of the human soul. It is our hope that the articles in this volume will serve as a clear mirror, reflecting a portion of the dynamism and depth inherent in contemporary philosophical-theological research. May they pave the way for deeper inquiry and constructive dialogue among scholars in this field. Zahra Khazaei سخن سردبیر در شماره 106 فصلنامه پژوهش‌های فلسفی۔کلامی، مجموعه‌ای از پژوهش‌های نوآورانه و روشمند ارائه شده که همگی در پیوندگاه معرفت‌شناسی دینی، متافیزیک و فلسفه دین معاصر قرار دارند. این مقالات، با تکیه بر سنت غنی حکمت اسلامی (فارابی، ملاصدرا، زنوزی) و گفت‌وگوی انتقادی با متفکران غربی معاصر (هیوم، فلدمن، دریپر)، نشان می‌دهند که فلسفه و کلام امروز نه تنها از مواجهه با داده‌های تجربی و استدلال‌های تحلیلی گریزان نیست، بلکه در همین مواجهه، عمق و غنای خود را بازمی‌یابد. بی‌شک، پویایی اندیشه در گرو استقبال از پژوهش‌های نوآورانه، مستند و مسئله‌محور است. آثاری که نه در حصار تکرار و تلخیص، که با گشودن دریچه‌های تازه به مسائل پایه‌ای و نوپدید، هم عیار استدلال را پاس می‌دارند و هم ضرورت پرسش‌های زمانه را دریافته‌اند. در این مسیر، آنچه اصالت یک پژوهش را می‌سازد، نه صرفِ نو بودن موضوع، بلکه اتقان و اثرگذاری آن در بازخوانی انتقادی میراث فکری، صورت‌بندی دقیق مسئله، و ارائه تحلیلی است که بتواند افق‌هایی تازه‌ بگشاید. در این شماره نیز کوشیده‌ایم با گردآوری مقالاتی از این دست، گامی در مسیر تحقق این اهداف برداریم. آنچه در این شماره پیش روی خوانندگان قرار می‌گیرد، مقالاتی است که هر یک از منظری متفاوت به مسائل بنیادین فلسفه و کلام نظر دوخته‌اند. مقاله «ارزیابی خوانش همدلانه از ایمان در فلسفۀ هیوم با تکیه بر تفسیرهای روان‌شناختی معاصر» نمونه‌ای درخشان از این رویکرد است. نویسنده با عبور از تفسیر رایج که هیوم را صرفاً نقاد الهیات طبیعی می‌داند، می‌کوشد خوانشی همدلانه و در عین حال مستند از امکان «ایمان غیراثباتی» در فلسفه او ارائه دهد. این پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که چگونه می‌توان با بهره‌گیری از روان‌شناسی دین معاصر، ابعاد تازه‌ای از یک فیلسوف را آشکار ساخت و او را نه در جایگاه خداناباوری نظری، بلکه نظریه‌پرداز ایمانی فروتنانه و انسان‌محور تفسیر کرد. در حوزه فلسفه اسلامی، مقاله «ارزیابی دو تفسیر متفاوت از حدوث جسمانی نفس» پژوهشی است دقیق و مسئله‌محور که به یکی از چالش‌برانگیزترین مبانی حکمت متعالیه می‌پردازد. نویسنده با شناسایی دو خوانش متفاوت از این نظریه در میان شارحان صدرایی، و با تکیه بر رویکرد نظام‌مند فلسفه صدرایی، نشان می‌دهد که تفسیر صحیح آن است که نفس در هنگام حدوث، جسمانی و جسم است، نه صرفاً وابسته به جسم. این پژوهش ضمن دقت در عبارات گاه متناقض‌نمای ملاصدرا و تحلیل اصولی چون حرکت جوهری و اتحاد وجودی نفس و بدن، افق تازه‌ای را برای فهم مسئله نفس و بدن و معاد جسمانی می‌گشاید. دو مقاله «جایگاه‌ تروّی در اندیشۀ فارابی و کارکردهای نظری و عملی آن» و «بازخوانی دیدگاه دو حکیم زنوزی در مسئلۀ وجود ذهنی» نیز ناظر به بازخوانی دقیق سنت فلسفی اسلامی اند و نشان میدهند که چگونه این بازخوانی دقیق می‌تواند به کشف ظرفیت‌های نظری نوین بیانجامد. نخستین مقاله با تحلیل مفهوم «تروّی» به عنوان فرآیند عقلانی۔عملی، نقش آن را در پیوند نظر و عمل، تبیین ضعف اراده، و ارائه راهبردی برای تربیت اخلاقی آشکار می‌سازد. دومین مقاله نیز با بررسی تطبیقی دیدگاه دو حکیم زنوزی، از یک سو چگونگی تعامل نظریه وجود ذهنی با تفسیر رادیکال اصالت وجود را نمایان می‌سازد، و نوآوری‌ها و چالش‌های درونی این دیدگاه می‌پردازد. در حوزه فلسفه دین تحلیلی، دو مقاله قابل تأمل در این شماره جای گرفته‌اند. نخست « بررسی و نقد دیدگاه پل دِرِیپِر در مسئلۀ شر » که با روشی تحلیلی۔انتقادی، استدلال قرینه‌گرای شر را واکاوی کرده و نقاط ضعف آن را در تعریف شر گزاف، محاسبه احتمالات پیشین، و پیشفرض‌های محدودکننده درباره اهداف الهی آشکار می‌سازد. مقاله دیگر، «اختلافِ ‌نظر فیلسوف با خود: بررسی دیدگاه فلدمن درباره اختلاف‌نظر دینی معقول»، با کاوشی عمیق در آرای ریچارد فلدمن، ناسازگاری درونی دیدگاه او را درباره اختلاف نظر دینی معقول نمایان می‌سازد و نشان می‌دهد که چگونه پذیرش مفهومی موسع از عقلانیت در آثار متأخر فلدمن، نتایج شک‌گرایانه آثار پیشین او را به چالش می‌کشد. مقاله « بازخوانی خاطرات یا تجربه‌ای نوین؛ بررسی انتقادی نگرۀ بازخوانی خاطرات در تجربۀ نزدیک به مرگ» نیز نمونه‌ای دیگر از پژوهش‌های میان‌رشته‌ای اصیل است. نویسنده با نگاهی فلسفی به پدیده تجربه‌های نزدیک به مرگ، نظریۀ «بازخوانی خاطرات» را به عنوان یکی از تبیین‌های طبیعت‌گرایانه، در بوتۀ نقد می‌گذارد. تکیه بر شواهد تجربی همچون تجربۀ نابینایان مادرزاد و اشتراکات فرافرهنگی، استدلالی قوی علیه این تبیین تقلیل‌گرا فراهم آورده و ضرورت توجه به ابعاد فرافیزیکی نفس انسانی را گوشزد می‌کند. امید که مقالات این شماره، چونان آیینه‌ای شفاف، بتواند بخشی از پویایی و ژرفای پژوهش‌های فلسفی۔کلامی معاصر را بازتاب دهد و زمینه‌ساز ژرفکاوی و گفت‌و‌گوهای سازنده‌ای در میان اندیشوران این دیار باشد. زهرا خزاعی https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_4256_d1e36855091afc95033fd807ac2c1498.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 27 4 2025 11 19 The Philosopher Disagreeing with Oneself: On Feldman’s View about Reasonable Religious Disagreement اختلاف نظر فیلسوف با خود: بررسی دیدگاه فلدمن درباره اختلاف نظر دینی معقول 9 34 3700 10.22091/jptr.2025.12815.3288 FA زهرا زرگر استادیار پژوهشکده مطالعات بنیادین علم و فناوری دانشگاه شهید بهشتی. تهران. ایران. 0000-0002-1721-7535 Journal Article 2025 04 24 Abstract Richard Feldman’s “Reasonable Religious Disagreements” (2011) deploys social epistemology to reject the possibility of reasonable religious peer disagreement. By eliminating all potential cases—differing conclusions from shared evidence (via Uniqueness Thesis), differing foundational beliefs, private evidence, and self-assessed superiority—Feldman concludes that awareness of such disagreement requires suspending religious belief, defending limited modest skepticism. This paper critically examines Feldman’s eliminative argument. It identifies two core problems: first, an inconsistency with Feldman’s later positions (2014, 2022) on second-order evidence, where no general principle mandates belief revision and steadfastness can be rational, allowing reasonable religious disagreement; second, the argument generalizes to common knowledge propositions (e.g., external world realism), entailing overarching skepticism rather than limited skepticism, as Feldman claims. These tensions stem from Feldman’s shifting concepts of rationality—from a strict evidentialist one in 2011 to a permissive view incorporating other epistemic values later. The analysis reveals unnoticed self-disagreement in Feldman’s oeuvre and its implications for religious epistemology. Keywords: Religious Epistemology, Epistemology of Disagreement, Religious Skepticism, Rationality, Evidentialism, Richard Feldman Introduction The epistemology of disagreement, a key area of social epistemology, examines how epistemic agents should respond when they discover that equally qualified peers hold conflicting beliefs about a proposition. Positions on the spectrum range from conciliatory views (e.g., Elga, Christensen) that require significant belief revision under peer conditions, to steadfast views (e.g., van Inwagen, Wedgwood) that permit retention of one’s original doxastic attitude. Religious disagreement occupies a prominent place in these debates, long predating technical disagreement literature. While some philosophers interpret widespread religious disagreement as evidence against justified religious belief, others accommodate or even leverage it in support of religious rationality. Richard Feldman’s 2011 paper “Reasonable Religious Disagreements” offers one of the most precise arguments in this domain, employing evidentialist and uniqueness principles to reject reasonable religious peer disagreement outright and defend modest skepticism. This extended abstract articulates Feldman’s eliminative strategy and subjects it to critical scrutiny, revealing internal tensions with his later work and unintended broader skeptical implications. Modest Skepticism: Feldman’s Eliminative Argument Feldman restricts his analysis to original, peer-level religious disagreements in which parties take each other’s views seriously, have shared all relevant evidence, and are epistemic peers in intelligence, reasoning ability, and background knowledge. He asks whether it is possible for both parties to remain rational in their conflicting beliefs after learning of the disagreement. Systematically enumerating four candidate cases for reasonable disagreement, Feldman dismisses each. First, when parties draw different conclusions from identical evidence, the Uniqueness Thesis entails that a single body of evidence supports at most one doxastic attitude; hence at least one party is irrational. Second, when foundational beliefs or weighting principles differ, Feldman insists these starting points must themselves be rationally grounded; once shared and discussed, the Uniqueness Thesis again forces convergence. Third, private evidence (e.g., incommunicable religious experiences) is neutralized by the principle “evidence of evidence is evidence”: awareness of the other’s private evidence becomes second-order evidence that must be treated symmetrically. Fourth, cases in which parties regard the disagreement as unreasonable (each rationally deeming the other incompetent) collapse once competence judgments, which must also be evidence-based, are shared. Having eliminated all possibilities, Feldman concludes that modest skepticism is the only rational stance: each party knows that one of them is mistaken but has no reason to suppose it is the other; suspension of judgment on the disputed proposition is therefore required. The argument is entirely general and non-religious-specific in its premises. Inconsistencies with Later Work and Overarching Skepticism Feldman’s later writings on disagreement—especially “Evidence of Evidence is Evidence” (2014) and “Is There Something Special about Religious Disagreement?” (2022)—introduce a markedly more permissive account of rationality that directly contradicts the 2011 prescription. He now denies both additivity of evidence and any general rule linking changes in total evidence to rational belief revision. A gap opens between justification (what the total evidence supports) and rational doxastic change (how one ought to update). Non-evidential intellectual values (e.g., the value of inquiry, attractiveness of a view for future research) can render steadfastness rational even when new second-order evidence is acquired. Religious disagreement, moreover, is declared to have “no special difference” from other disagreements. Consequently, no general principle mandates suspension upon peer disagreement, and steadfast retention of belief can be rational—directly opposing the 2011 conclusion that suspension is obligatory. When the same 2011 eliminative argument is applied beyond religion to common-knowledge propositions (e.g., existence of the external world, other minds, ordinary objects such as clouds or hills), the result is overarching rather than modest skepticism. Anti-realist philosophers who deny these entities on metaphysical or epistemological grounds qualify as epistemic peers once evidence is shared; the four-case elimination again forces suspension. Feldman’s 2011 claim of “limited” skepticism is therefore untenable. His later permissive rationality—allowing non-evidential values to justify steadfastness—avoids this global result, but Feldman never addresses the resultant self-inconsistency. The root lies in two incompatible concepts of rationality: the narrow, strictly evidentialist notion operative in 2011 versus the broader, pluralistic notion embraced later. Conclusion Zahra Zargar’s analysis demonstrates that Feldman’s 2011 defense of modest religious skepticism is internally unstable and over-generalizes. The eliminative argument presupposes a rigid evidentialist rationality that Feldman himself later relaxes, permitting reasonable religious disagreement and avoiding global skepticism when applied to common knowledge. These unnoticed shifts reveal a philosopher disagreeing with himself. While the later view is more nuanced and inquiry-friendly, it leaves unresolved how exactly non-evidential values interact with evidentialism and the Uniqueness Thesis. Future work in religious epistemology must either reconcile these conceptions or choose between them explicitly. The case underscores the importance of consistency across an author’s corpus when deploying disagreement arguments to support or undermine religious rationality. ریچارد فلدمن در مقاله «اختلاف نظرهای دینی معقول» با استفاده از آموزه‌های معرفت‌شناسی اختلاف نظر، استدلال دقیقی ارائه می‌دهد تا معقول بودن اختلاف نظر دینی با همتای معرفتی را رد کند. در این استدلال فلدمن تمام حالات ممکن برای اختلاف نظر دینی معقول را برشمرده و با ارائه دلیل کنار می‌گذارد، و در نهایت از نوعی شک‌گرایی متواضعانه در باب باور دینی دفاع می‌کند. موضوع مقاله حاضر بررسی استدلال فلدمن در مقاله مذکور است. پس از شرح استدلال، دو اشکال اساسی در ارتباط با آن مطرح می‌شود. اول این که، دیدگاه فلدمن درباره اختلاف نظر دینی در این استدلال، با دلالت‌های آثار بعدی او درباره اختلاف نظر دینی معقول ناسازگار است. علاوه بر این، در حالی که فلدمن نتیجه استدلال فوق را نوعی شک‌گرایی محدود می‌خواند، می‌توان دید که با کاربست همین استدلال به حوزه معرفت عرفی می‌توان شک‌گرایی گسترده را نیز از آن نتیجه گرفت. در این مورد نیز فلدمن در آثار بعدی خود با اتخاذ موضعی متفاوت نسبت به اختلاف نظر معقول با همتای معرفتی، از پذیرش چنین نتیجه‌ای اجتناب می‌کند. در نهایت، ریشه وجود ناسازگاری در آراء فلدمن تحلیل می‌شود.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_3700_e0201bb436f800a164628a4cc7e338b1.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 27 4 2025 11 25 Rereading Memories or a New Experience: A Critical Review of the Theory of Rereading Memories in Near-Death Experiences بازخوانی خاطرات یا تجربه‌ای نوین؛ بررسی انتقادی نگرۀ بازخوانی خاطرات در تجربۀ نزدیک به مرگ 35 62 3904 10.22091/jptr.2025.13323.3329 FA حمیدرضا شاکرین استاد گروه منطق فهم دین پژوهشگاه فرهنگ و اندیشه اسلامی، قم، ایران. 0000-0003-1493-4237 Journal Article 2025 07 19 This Paper Offers the first comprehensive critique of the naturalistic psychological explanation that interprets near-death experiences (NDEs) as mere rereading or reconstruction of brain-stored memories. Physicalists claim that classic NDE features—out-of-body perception, tunnel experience, life review, luminous beings—are nothing but neural reactivation of archived personal engrams under clinical-death stress. Shakerin distinguishes two variants: reincarnation-linked memories (rooted in metempsychosis) and current-life memory replay. Employing library research and rational-analytical evaluation, he demonstrates that neither variant succeeds. The reincarnational account lacks empirical support and deviates from the established NDE core pattern. The current-life variant collapses under veridical data (accurate perceptions of hidden objects, surgical details during flat EEG), perceptual anomalies (360° vision, undistorted underwater sight, hyper-speed life review without blur), reports by congenitally blind individuals who gain sight, children’s accounts of unknown deceased relatives, shared experiences across cultures and physiology, and profound post-experiential transformations unexplained by ordinary reminiscence. The hypothesis rests on false analogies, contradicts known neurophysiology and optics, and cannot accommodate present-time or future-oriented information later verified. Shakerin concludes that NDEs resist reduction to memory reconstruction, thereby supporting non-material soul dualism and afterlife beliefs while falsifying anthropological physicalism Keywords: Near-Death Experience, Naturalism, Memory Rereading, Memory Reconstruction, Veridical Perception, Soul Dualism Introduction Near-death experiences have been documented since antiquity and entered systematic study with Raymond Moody’s 1975 seminal work. Individuals who reach clinical death—loss of vital signs and medical certification of death—yet revive report vivid, structured encounters in another realm. Core components include feelings of peace, out-of-body travel, passage through a tunnel, life review, meetings with luminous beings, and reluctance to return. Philosophers of religion and theologians increasingly ask whether these reports, assuming reporter sincerity and actual occurrence, constitute genuine perceptions of a non-material reality or mere brain-generated illusions. Naturalistic explanations fall into socio-cultural, physiological, or psychological categories. Among the psychological accounts, the memory-reconstruction hypothesis asserts that NDEs are simply the brain’s rereading of previously archived memories under extreme conditions. This paper provides the first independent, comprehensive critique of that specific hypothesis, demonstrating its scientific, phenomenological, and logical failure and defending the transcendent, veridical character of NDEs. The Memory Reconstruction Hypothesis and Its Two Variants The hypothesis appears in two main forms. The first ties NDE elements—especially life review—to memories of previous incarnations, drawing from reincarnation doctrines originating in Vedic and Upanishadic thought. It suggests that experiencers relive past lives stored in the soul or subtle body. This variant, however, possesses no empirical corroboration, appears in only scattered reports, and is absent from Moody’s extensive database; Moody himself found no direct evidence of reincarnation. Core NDE patterns do not revolve around past bodies, rendering the connection an unsupported speculation. The second and more widespread variant claims that NDEs reconstruct memories from the experiencer’s current life. The tunnel is interpreted as a replay of birth (emerging from the womb), while life review is rapid neural reactivation of stored visual and emotional engrams. Under clinical death, the dying brain supposedly replays archived experiences, creating the illusion of transcendence. Shakerin subjects both variants to rigorous examination, showing that neither withstands scrutiny. NDEs contain numerous elements that exceed ordinary personal memory. Veridical perceptions—accurate observations of distant or concealed events (e.g., a shoe on a high ledge later confirmed, precise surgical instruments during Pam Reynolds’ flat-EEG operation)—concern present-time information unavailable through normal senses or prior knowledge. Such data cannot be reconstructed from archived memories because they were unknown to the experiencer at the time of storage. Perceptual anomalies further refute the hypothesis. Life reviews unfold in “hyper-reality”: decades of events, including minute details and associated emotions, occur in seconds with perfect three-dimensional clarity and stable temporal flow. Known neurophysiology cannot support the required frame rates (e.g., replaying one day’s visual input in one second demands over 200,000 fps without blur or stroboscopic distortion), yet experiencers report pristine, undistorted vision. Visual geometry violates optics: distant objects remain as sharp as near ones; underwater scenes appear undistorted (contrary to refraction, scattering, and depth-distortion documented in vision science); 360° panoramic vision occurs without head movement; and intense light is viewed directly without retinal damage or discomfort—phenomena absent from ordinary visual memory. Congenitally blind individuals, who lack any visual memory or even visual dreams, report clear, accurate sight during NDEs (e.g., Vicki’s case, in which she identified her wedding ring and described room details later verified). This “mindsight” cannot derive from stored visual engrams. Children’s NDEs similarly feature veridical elements (e.g., meeting an unknown deceased sibling later confirmed by parents) despite minimal life experience, contradicting reliance on personal archives. Shared NDEs—identical experiences reported simultaneously by multiple individuals, including deathbed witnesses—cross-cultural consistencies (tunnel, luminous beings), and profound transformative effects (radical value shifts, loss of death fear, heightened empathy) far exceed any known effects of ordinary memory recall. The hypothesis commits multiple false-analogy fallacies, ignores data contradicting established neurophysiological and optical laws, and offers no mechanism for future-oriented or previously unknown information later corroborated. Conclusion Shakerin demonstrates that the memory-reconstruction hypothesis fails to explain near-death experiences. It lacks empirical support, conflicts with verified data and scientific laws, and rests on strained analogies that overlook qualitative differences between NDEs and ordinary memory recall. Veridical perceptions, reports by the congenitally blind, children’s accounts, shared experiences, and transformative impacts all point beyond brain function to independent consciousness and a non-material soul. NDEs thus constitute genuine evidence for dualist anthropology and postmortem survival, decisively undermining physicalist reductionism. This critique highlights the necessity for philosophy of religion and theology to engage NDE evidence on its own terms rather than dismiss it through unsubstantiated naturalistic models. Future research must address these veridical and transcendent dimensions explicitly. تجربه نزدیک به مرگ از تجربه‌های دیرپای بشری است که گزارش‌های متعددی از آن از دوران باستان تاکنون وجود دارد. اکنون از مسائل مهمی که فلسفه دین و الهیات جدید در این زمینه پی می‌جوید معنای این تجربه‌ها و نقش آنها در اثبات برخی از باورهای دینی مانند نفس فرافیزیکی انسان و حیات پس از مرگ است. در این میان رویکرد طبیعت‌گرا تلاش چندجانبه‌ای برای تبیین طبیعی با نگاهی تقلیل‌گرایانه و فیزیکالیستی را جستجو کرده است. از جمله این تلاش‌ها توضیح تجربه نزدیک به مرگ به مثابه بازخوانی و بازسازی تجربه‌های بایگانی‌شده در مغز است. با توجه به اهمیت این مسئله در مواجهه با باورهای دینی، تحقیق پیش رو بر آن است تا دیدگاه یادشده را در معرض بررسی و سنجش قرار دهد. روش تحقیق در مقام گردآوری کتابخانه‌ای و در مقام داوری عقلی-تحلیلی خواهد بود. ماحصل تحقیق این است که دیدگاه یادشده به هیچ روی در تبیین این تجربه‌ها کامیاب نیست، بلکه از سویی فاقد پشتوانه‌های معتبر علمی است و از دیگر سو به جهات متعددی گرفتار قیاس مع‌الفارق است.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_3904_8a32efbd29ec33433ba467711f99aad8.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 27 4 2025 11 30 The Position of “Tarawwi” (Deliberation) in Farabi’s Thought and Its Theoretical and Practical Functions جایگاه‌ «تروّی» در اندیشۀ فارابی و کارکردهای نظری و عملی آن 63 90 3755 10.22091/jptr.2025.12868.3292 FA مسعود حشمتی . دانشجوی دکتری گروه فلسفه اخلاق دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران. محسن جوادی استاد گروه فلسفه اخلاق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران 0000-0001-5867-9691 Journal Article 2025 05 01 This article investigates the concept of tarawwi (deliberation) in Abu Nasr al-Farabi’s philosophy and its central role in moral agency and ethical action. Farabi, the “Second Teacher,” develops practical reason as the pivotal faculty for ethical decision-making, employing tarawwi as a rational process to determine the best course of action in particular circumstances. Tarawwi consists of four stages: envisioning the end goal, evaluating possible options, assessing consequences, and selecting the optimal action that best realizes the intended good. By harmonizing universal principles (apprehended by practical intellect) with particular knowledge, and integrating cognition with desire, tarawwi bridges theory and practice. Unlike views limiting practical reason to particulars (e.g., Avicenna, Mulla Sadra), Farabi attributes to it independent epistemic access to universals, thus resolving Hume’s is-ought problem within practical syllogisms. Tarawwi also explains akrasia (weakness of will): once complete deliberation culminates in resolute choice, action necessarily follows. Strengthened through experience, repetition, and habituation, tarawwi fosters moral virtues within a virtue-ethical framework, leading to eudaimonia (happiness). The paper positions tarawwi as both a theoretical tool for understanding moral psychology and a practical strategy for ethical education and character development. Keywords: tarawwi, deliberation, practical reason, practical reasoning, akrasia, virtue ethics, happiness, Farabi Introduction In the history of Islamic philosophy, Abu Nasr al-Farabi (d. 950 CE), known as the “Second Teacher” after Aristotle, made significant contributions to ethics by integrating Aristotelian practical wisdom with Islamic thought. Central to his moral philosophy is the concept of tarawwi (deliberation), which serves as the mechanism through which practical reason (ʿaql ʿamalī) operates to guide human action toward virtue and ultimate happiness (saʿādah). Unlike Plato, who viewed knowledge as sufficient for virtuous action, or certain later philosophers who restricted practical reason’s cognitive scope, Farabi emphasizes the active, deliberative role of practical intellect in specific moral contexts. This extended abstract elucidates tarawwi’s definition, process, epistemic foundations, and its dual theoretical and practical functions based on Farabi’s key texts. The Concept, Stages, and Process of Tarawwi Farabi conceives tarawwi both as an act of practical reason and as a dispositional capacity or excellence (jūdat al-ruʾya) of the soul. Linguistically derived from “raʾy” (opinion/view), it denotes thoughtful reflection, foresight, and avoidance of haste. Technically, it is the intellectual process preceding voluntary action in particular situations to discern the most appropriate means to a worthy end. The process unfolds in four distinct stages: (1) envisioning the goal or end (ghāyah), often informed by universal principles of the good and happiness; (2) identifying and examining possible courses of action within the given context; (3) evaluating the consequences and outcomes of each option in relation to the end; and (4) selecting and committing to the optimal action that most effectively achieves the virtuous goal. For example, a physician deliberates on treatment by keeping health as the end, weighing options, and choosing the best. Tarawwi synthesizes cognition and inclination, producing not merely judgment but a motivational state leading to action. It involves both universal knowledge (principles of ethics) and particular knowledge (contextual details), facilitated by faculties like imagination and estimation, but ultimately governed by practical reason. Farabi distinguishes it from theoretical reasoning, emphasizing its independence in structuring practical syllogisms. Deliberation is relative to circumstances yet guided by stable criteria of the mean (wasat), analogous to medicine’s pursuit of bodily equilibrium adapted to individual conditions. Epistemic Scope, and Relation to Virtue and Happiness, and Akrasia Farabi’s distinctive contribution lies in attributing to practical reason the ability to apprehend both universals and particulars independently. In practical syllogisms, practical reason formulates both major premises (universal ethical principles) and minor premises (particular circumstances), deriving prescriptive conclusions (“ought” statements) without deriving them solely from theoretical reason. This contrasts with Avicenna and Mulla Sadra, who often see practical reason as primarily operative and limited to particulars, deriving universals from theoretical intellect, and with thinkers like Ghazali who minimize its perceptual role. Consequently, Farabi avoids Hume’s “is-ought” fallacy, as the premises and conclusions remain within the homogeneous domain of practical intellect. Theoretically, tarawwi provides a robust account of akrasia. Farabi distinguishes will (irādah) from choice (ikhtiyār), the latter arising from deliberation. Full tarawwi culminates in a resolute particular judgment and motivational impulse, making subsequent action inevitable as the final cause of the act. Weakness of will occurs when imagination or passion intervenes instead of complete deliberation. Thus, it bridges theory and practice. In Farabi’s virtue ethics, happiness (saʿādah) is the flourishing of the human essence achieved through balanced soul faculties and moral virtues. Tarawwi is indispensable for acquiring virtues and attaining happiness, as it transforms general knowledge into particular, motivated action. Practically, tarawwi enables correct particular moral choices and is crucial for moral education. It is cultivated through experience (accumulating phantasms and estimative meanings), repetition leading to habituation (malakah), and training. In moral psychology terms, tarawwi integrates cognitive, motivational, and volitional dimensions, offering a model for contemporary ethical training. Educators and rulers must cultivate this faculty through guided practice rather than mere theoretical instruction. Conclusion Farabi’s analysis of tarawwi positions practical reason as an autonomous, perceptive, and executive faculty essential for moral life. By detailing its stages and epistemic reach, he offers a comprehensive solution to the challenges of ethical action, moral weakness, and the fact-value distinction. Strengthening tarawwi through habit and experience not only resolves the gap between moral knowledge and performance but also serves as an effective strategy for virtue cultivation and achieving true happiness. This framework remains relevant for contemporary virtue ethics and moral education, demonstrating the enduring depth of Farabi’s practical philosophy in harmonizing reason, desire, and action. در این مقاله به بررسی مفهوم تروّی در اندیشه فارابی و نقش آن در فرآیند فعل اخلاقی پرداخته‌ایم. فارابی عقل عملی را قوه‌ای محوری در تشخیص و انجام اعمال اخلاقی می‌داند که از طریق تروّی بهترین اقدام را در موقعیت‌های خاص تعیین می‌کند. تروّی، به عنوان فرآیند عقلانی و توانایی نفسانی عقل عملی، شامل چهار مرحله تصویرسازی غایت، بررسی گزینه‌های ممکن، سنجش پیامدها و انتخاب بهینه‌ترین عمل است. این فرآیند با ایجاد هماهنگی میان شناخت کلی و جزئی، معرفت و میل، انسان را به سوی خیر و سعادت هدایت می‌کند. تروّی نه‌تنها به تولید معرفت جزئی محدود نمی‌شود، بلکه با ادراک کلی توسط عقل عملی، اشکال هیوم در مسئله «هست» و «باید» را منحل می‌کند. انسان با بهره‌مندی از تروّی و با پرورش فضایل نفسانی و تحقق تعادل در قوای نفس، در چارچوب اخلاق فضیلت‌گرا، به سعادت می‌رسد. تقویت تروّی از طریق تجربه، تکرار و عادت، ضعف اراده را مرتفع می‌کند، شکاف میان نظر و عمل را کاهش می‌دهد و تصمیم‌گیری اخلاقی را بهبود می‌بخشد. همچنین، با تکیه بر روان‌شناسی اخلاق، تروّی به عنوان راهبردی در تربیت اخلاقی معرفی می‌شود.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_3755_d341082f502d961793ec09c37dd1e41f.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 27 4 2025 12 26 An Examination and Critique of Paul Draper’s View on the Problem of Evil بررسی و نقد دیدگاه پل دِرِیپِر در مسئلۀ شر 91 114 4208 10.22091/jptr.2026.14500.3435 FA سید محسن هاشمی کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه دین دانشکدگان فارابی دانشگاه تهران، قم ، ایران 0009-0000-6572-1771 محمد محمدرضایی استاد گروه فلسفه دین. دانشگاه تهران (دانشکدگان فارابی). قم. ایران. 0009-0005-0887-1104 Journal Article 2025 08 18 Abstract Paul Draper is one of the most sophisticated contemporary defenders of the evidential argument from evil. In his seminal 1989 paper “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists,” he argues that the observed distribution and intensity of suffering in the world provide strong evidence against classical theism. Using a Bayesian framework, Draper compares theism (T) with the Hypothesis of Indifference (HI) and contends that the data of pain and pleasure (O) are far more probable under HI than under T. This article offers a detailed analytical-critical examination of Draper’s argument, focusing on its conceptual foundations, probabilistic methodology, and epistemological presuppositions. After reconstructing the key elements—including gratuitous evil, prior probability, and explanatory power—the study presents several interlocking critiques: the epistemic limits of human cognition in identifying truly pointless evil (skeptical theism), the subjectivity of assigning prior probabilities, the underestimation of traditional theodicies (free-will and soul-making), and anthropomorphic assumptions about divine purposes.The analysis concludes that, while Draper’s formulation poses a formidable challenge to theism, it rests on contestable epistemological and methodological assumptions that significantly weaken its force. Thus, despite its influence, the argument does not constitute a decisive refutation of theistic belief. Keywords Paul Draper, evidential argument from evil, gratuitous evil, skeptical theism, theodicy, hypothesis of indifference, philosophy of religion Introduction The problem of evil remains the most persistent challenge to classical theism. While logical versions of the argument have largely been answered by Plantingian free-will defenses, evidential or probabilistic formulations continue to command attention. Among these, Paul Draper’s 1989 argument stands out for its clarity, use of Bayesian reasoning, and shift of focus from isolated instances of horror to the overall pattern of suffering and pleasure. This extended abstract reconstructs Draper’s position and subjects it to sustained critical scrutiny, revealing both its strengths and its significant philosophical vulnerabilities. Draper’s Evidential Argument: Structure and Key Concepts Draper frames the debate as a competition between two hypotheses. Theism (T) asserts that an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God created the world. The Hypothesis of Indifference (HI) states that, if supernatural beings exist, they are indifferent to the pain and pleasure of sentient creatures. The relevant evidence (O) consists of the vast quantities of intense suffering and the biological character of pain and pleasure, which appear geared toward survival rather than moral or spiritual ends. Using Bayes’ theorem, Draper contends that P(O | HI) is significantly higher than P(O | T). Because the observed distribution of suffering is precisely what one would expect under indifference but surprising under theism, the evidence strongly favors HI over T. Central to the argument is the concept of gratuitous (pointless) evil—suffering that serves no greater good and could have been prevented without losing any compensating benefit. Draper maintains that the world contains massive amounts of such evil, which theism should not permit. Epistemological, Conceptual, and Methodological Weaknesses Despite its elegance, Draper’s argument faces formidable objections on several fronts. First, the very identification of gratuitous evil presupposes an epistemic capacity that skeptical theists deny. Human cognitive limitations (“cognitive distance”) mean we are poorly positioned to judge whether any particular instance of suffering is truly pointless. As Wykstra and Alston have argued, the absence of a discernible reason is not evidence of the absence of a reason; God’s purposes may simply lie beyond our ken. Draper’s reliance on the appearance of pointlessness therefore begs the question against skeptical theism. Second, the Bayesian component introduces unavoidable subjectivity. Assigning prior probabilities P(T) and P(HI), as well as the likelihoods P(O | T) and P(O | HI), depends heavily on one’s antecedent worldview. A committed naturalist will naturally rate P(O | HI) highly, while a theist who already accepts other theistic arguments (cosmological, fine-tuning, moral) will assign a much higher prior to T. This renders the argument less a neutral piece of evidence than a reflection of prior commitments, risking circularity. Third, Draper underestimates the resources of traditional theodicies. The free-will defense can account for moral evil, while the soul-making theodicy explains much natural suffering as necessary for character formation. Even apparently gratuitous evils (animal suffering, infant death) may play indirect roles in a larger providential order. Draper’s dismissal of these responses often rests on the assumption that divine goodness must conform to a narrowly utilitarian calculus—an assumption that critics label anthropomorphic. Finally, by concentrating almost exclusively on pain and pleasure, Draper brackets other significant data—cosmic fine-tuning, the existence of consciousness, objective moral values, and religious experience—that many theists regard as positive evidence for theism. A comprehensive Bayesian assessment must weigh all relevant evidence, not merely the negative data of suffering. Conclusion Paul Draper’s evidential argument from evil is a sophisticated and influential challenge to theism, skillfully shifting the debate onto probabilistic terrain. Nevertheless, the argument is undermined by serious epistemological, conceptual, and methodological difficulties. The inability of finite minds to certify gratuitous evil, the unavoidable subjectivity of Bayesian priors, the underestimation of theodicies, and the selective focus on suffering all weaken its force. While Draper rightly highlights a serious evidential cost that theism must bear, he does not succeed in showing that this cost is decisive. The data of evil remain compatible with the existence of a perfectly good, omnipotent, and omniscient God whose purposes may legitimately transcend human comprehension. Future work in philosophy of religion should therefore integrate Draper’s insights with a more comprehensive evidential balance sheet and a deeper appreciation of skeptical theism. این مقاله به بررسی و نقد دیدگاه پل دریپر، فیلسوف برجسته دین، در خصوص مسئله شر می‌پردازد. هدف اصلی پژوهش، تحلیل استدلال قرینه‌گرای شر دریپر است که بر اساس آن، میزان و نوع شر موجود در جهان، شواهدی قوی علیه وجود خدای خیرخواه، قادر مطلق و عالم مطلق ارائه می‌دهد. برای نیل به این هدف، این پژوهش با استفاده از روش تحلیلی۔انتقادی، به بررسی دقیق آثار اصلی دریپر و نقد ساختار منطقی و مبانی معرفت‌شناختی استدلال او می‌پردازد و هم‌زمان، ادبیات پژوهشی مرتبط و نقدهای مطرح‌شده توسط دیگر فلاسفه را نیز مورد توجه قرار می‌دهد. یافته‌های اصلی نشان می‌دهند که استدلال دریپر با چالش‌هایی در تعریف و تشخیص شر گزاف مواجه است و مفاهیمی نظیر احتمال پیشین که او به کار می‌برد، دارای ابهامات روش‌شناختی است. همچنین، این مقاله استدلال می‌کند که فرضیات دریپر درباره اهداف الهی و دانش انسانی نسبت به آنها، قابل تردید هستند. در نتیجه‌گیری، مقاله حاضر نشان می‌دهد که با وجود اهمیت دیدگاه دریپر در مباحث معاصر فلسفه دین، استدلال قرینه‌گرای شر او از نقاط ضعف فلسفی و معرفت‌شناختی قابل توجهی برخوردار است که اعتبار آن را به چالش کشیده و زمینه‌ساز بحث‌های بیشتر در زمینه مسئله شر و راه‌حل‌های آن می‌شود.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_4208_d949e9fdd90060c011e7d4104fa31ff9.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 27 4 2025 11 08 A Re-examination of the Views of the Two Zunūzī Theosophers on the Problem of Mental Existence بازخوانی دیدگاه دو حکیم زنوزی در مسئلۀ وجود ذهنی 115 140 3704 10.22091/jptr.2025.11636.3176 FA محمد حسین زاده دانشیار مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران، تهران. ایران. 0000-0001-7577-4455 Journal Article 2024 12 18 This article offers a critical re-examination of the theory of mental existence (wujūd dhihnī) in the thought of the two Zunūzī theosophers—Mullā ‘Abdullāh Zunūzī and his son Āqā ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī—within the framework of their radical interpretation of the Primacy of Existence (aṣālat al-wujūd). While the classical account of mental existence relies on the presence of the very quiddity (māhiyyah) in both external and mental realms, the Zunūzīs’ ontology denies any external realization to quiddity, viewing it as a purely conceptual representation of the limits of existence. To reconcile this tension, they reconstruct the theory by shifting the ontological locus to the “existence of knowledge” (wujūd al-‘ilm), redefining “representation” (ḥikāyat) as a relation between quidditative concepts and external existence, and “correspondence” (muṭābaqat) as conformity to existential and non-existential limits. A notable innovation is the extension of mental existence to pure intelligibles and even the Necessary Existent. However, this reconstruction generates internal inconsistencies, particularly regarding the instantiation of limited quiddities (bi-sharṭ-i lā) within simple, unconditional existence. Āqā ‘Alī later modifies his position by introducing the “dependent establishment” (thubūt-i tabi‘ī) of quiddities in the divine realm. The study demonstrates both the philosophical dynamism and the unresolved tensions in the Zunūzīs’ synthesis of radical ontology and functional epistemology. دیدگاه ملا عبداللّه زنوزی و آقا علی مدرس در مسئلۀ وجود ذهنی از دو جهت حائز اهمیت است: هم مورد مناسبی برای تبیین نسبت نظریۀ وجود ذهنی با تفسیرهای مختلف اصالت وجود است و هم به خودیِ خود مشتمل بر ابداعاتی -نظیر تعمیم نظریۀ وجود ذهنی به مجردات تام از جمله واجب‌تعالی- است، که لازم است تبیین و ارزیابی شوند. مقالۀ حاضر، با روش تحلیلی-تفسیرگرایانه، دیدگاه دو حکیم زنوزی دربارۀ نظریۀ وجود ذهنی را تبیین و سازگاری آن را با تفسیری که از آموزۀ اصالت وجود ارائه کرده‌اند بررسی کرده است. این کاوش به این نتیجه انجامید که دو حکیم زنوزی به ارتباط نظریۀ وجود ذهنی و آموزۀ اصالت وجود توجه داشته‌اند و علاوه بر ابتنای استدلال‌های وجود ذهنی بر اصالت وجود، دو مؤلفۀ «حکایت» و «مطابقت» در تقریر مشهور وجود ذهنی را متناسب با تفسیر خودشان از آموزۀ اصالت وجود اصلاح کرده‌اند. با وجود این، برخی جنبه‌های دیگاه آنها دربارۀ وجود ذهنی -به‌خصوص بخش‌هایی که وجود ذهنی را به مجردات تام نسبت می‌دهد- با تفسیر آنها از آموزۀ اصالت وجود سازگار نیست.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_3704_da42f99ef3700d2a69d718f2ea71a060.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 27 4 2025 12 22 An Evaluation of an Empathic Reading of Faith in Hume’s Philosophy with a Focus on Contemporary Psychological Interpretations ارزیابی خوانش همدلانه از ایمان در فلسفۀ هیوم با تکیه بر تفسیرهای روان‌شناختی معاصر 141 172 4209 10.22091/jptr.2026.13599.3350 FA فریده لازمی پژوهشگر پسادکتری فلسفه، دانشگاه تبریز، تبریز، ایران 0000-0002-7781-5617 محمد اصغری استاد گروه فلسفه دانشگاه تبریز، تبریز، ایران 0000-0001-8257-7054 Journal Article 2025 08 19 Abstract David Hume’s philosophy of religion is conventionally portrayed as a relentless critique of natural theology, miracles, and rational proofs for God, leading many interpreters to cast him as a precursor to atheism. This article advances an empathic, textually grounded reading that challenges such reductive views. It argues that Hume’s demolition of “demonstrable faith”—the epistemic model dominant in British religious rationalism—does not abolish religion but clears the ground for a modest, indemonstrable, life-oriented faith rooted in human nature. After reconstructing the classical demonstrable model (Cudworth, Clarke, Bentley), the study examines Hume’s empiricist psychology of belief, his critique of causation and analogical reasoning in the Dialogues, and his explanatory naturalism in The Natural History of Religion. Religion emerges as a natural human phenomenon arising from fear, hope, ignorance, and anthropomorphism rather than metaphysical insight. Drawing on contemporary cognitive and evolutionary psychology of religion (Barrett, Boyer, McCauley), the article shows that Hume anticipates modern accounts of faith as a cognitively natural, affectively driven, and existentially meaningful orientation. Hume thus offers neither dogmatic atheism nor traditional orthodoxy, but a naturalistic, human-centered conception of faith compatible with epistemic humility. Keywords: faith, indemonstrable faith, psychology of religion, human nature, naturalism, David Hume, cognitive science of religion Introduction David Hume’s philosophy of religion has long been read primarily through its skeptical and critical dimensions. Influential commentators have emphasized his attacks on natural theology, miracles, and metaphysical proofs, presenting him as a leading Enlightenment figure undermining rational religion. While these readings capture an essential aspect of Hume’s project, they risk overlooking its constructive potential. This extended abstract reconstructs an empathic interpretation according to which Hume’s critique of demonstrable, knowledge-oriented faith does not terminate religious belief but opens space for a non-epistemic, existentially grounded alternative—“indemonstrable faith.” By placing Hume’s texts in dialogue with contemporary psychological interpretations of religion, the analysis reveals a modest, naturalistic vision of faith that remains deeply relevant. The Classical Model of Demonstrable Faith and Hume’s Systematic Critique In seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century British religious rationalism, faith was understood as rationally demonstrable knowledge. Thinkers such as Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, and Richard Bentley defended Christianity by grounding belief in God upon metaphysical arguments—cosmological, teleological, and moral proofs—modeled on mathematical certainty. Faith, in this framework, derived its legitimacy from successful rational demonstration; reason was the final arbiter, and belief was expected to attain epistemic certainty comparable to philosophical or mathematical knowledge. This model presupposed robust notions of causality, substance, necessity, and divine perfection, assuming human reason could transcend experience to establish metaphysical truths. Hume’s empiricism dismantles these foundations at every level. In the Treatise and Enquiry, he shows that concepts such as causation and necessity arise not from rational insight but from habitual association of impressions and ideas. Belief itself is a lively idea linked to a present impression, not the product of demonstrative inference. Consequently, arguments inferring a divine cause from worldly effects lose their epistemological warrant. In the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Hume systematically undermines the design argument by exposing the weaknesses of analogical reasoning from the world to a divine architect. The essay “Of Miracles” further erodes confidence in testimonial evidence for supernatural events. Hume’s critique, however, targets not merely specific proofs but the very expectation that faith must be demonstrable. By revealing the naturalistic and psychological basis of all belief, he undermines the epistemic ambitions of rational theology without thereby eliminating religion from human life. Religion as a Natural Human Phenomenon and the Emergence of Indemonstrable Faith In The Natural History of Religion, Hume shifts from criticism to explanatory naturalism. Religion is no longer evaluated as a system of metaphysical truths but analyzed as a human phenomenon arising from psychological and affective conditions: fear of the unknown, hope for future goods, ignorance of hidden causes, and the universal tendency to anthropomorphize powers. Religion, on this view, springs from the imaginative and emotional structures of the mind rather than philosophical reasoning. It is a natural propensity shaped by vulnerability and uncertainty, fully consistent with Hume’s broader project of explaining human beliefs through psychological mechanisms. This perspective implicitly supports what the article terms “indemonstrable faith”: a form of belief that renounces epistemic certainty while retaining existential and practical significance. Such faith is not grounded in metaphysical proof but in the lived realities of human nature—its fragility, its need for meaning, and its capacity for affective orientation toward the world. Far from constituting theoretical atheism, Hume’s analysis clears conceptual space for a modest, human-centered faith that is psychologically natural and existentially meaningful. Contemporary psychological interpretations of religion strongly resonate with this Humean framework. Justin Barrett’s cognitive science of religion highlights innate agency-detection mechanisms and hyperactive anthropomorphism that make belief in invisible agents cognitively natural. Pascal Boyer’s evolutionary account shows how minimally counter-intuitive concepts spread because they align with ordinary cognitive templates. Robert McCauley emphasizes that religion is “natural” precisely because it exploits evolved affective and social capacities, while science requires effortful, unnatural cognition. These findings confirm Hume’s insight that religious belief emerges from the ordinary operations of the human mind rather than from rational demonstration. By placing Hume in dialogue with these approaches, the article demonstrates that his philosophy anticipates key insights of modern psychology of religion and offers a viable model of faith compatible with naturalism and epistemic humility. Conclusion Hume’s critique of demonstrable theology is not the final word on religion but the necessary prelude to a reconstructed, indemonstrable conception of faith. By exposing the limits of reason and revealing the naturalistic, psychological foundations of belief, Hume reorients faith from an epistemic achievement to an existential orientation rooted in human nature. This modest, life-oriented faith—neither dogmatic atheism nor traditional orthodoxy—remains a natural, meaning-conferring response to the human condition of uncertainty and vulnerability. In light of contemporary cognitive and evolutionary psychology, Hume emerges not as a destroyer of religion but as a profound theorist of a humble, human-centered faith that continues to illuminate philosophical and psychological debates about the nature and value of religious belief. چکیده اندیشۀ دینی دیوید هیوم غالباً به‌مثابه مجموعه‌ای از نقدهای سلبی بر الهیات طبیعی و براهین اثبات وجود خدا تفسیر شده است. این مقاله با اتخاذ خوانشی همدلانه و تحلیلی، نشان می‌دهد که این تصویر رایج، پروژۀ فلسفی هیوم را به‌نحو نابسنده‌ای تقلیل می‌دهد. مدعای اصلی نوشتار آن است که نقدهای هیوم بر الهیات اثبات‌گرا نه پایان دین، بلکه مقدمۀ گذار از ایمانِ معرفت‌محور به ایمانِ زیست‌محور است. در گام نخست، الگوی کلاسیک ایمان اثبات‌گرا در سنت عقل‌گرایی دینی بریتانیا و صورت‌بندی‌های شاخص آن بررسی می‌شود. سپس نشان داده می‌شود که هیوم با تکیه بر تجربه‌گرایی، تحلیل روان‌شناختی ذهن و نقد مفروضات متافیزیکی، امکان دفاع معرفت‌شناختی از ایمان اثبات‌‌گرا را از بنیاد تضعیف می‌کند. در عین حال، تحلیل‌های او در تاریخ طبیعی دین آشکار می‌سازد که دین را باید به‌مثابۀ پدیده‌ای انسانی، برآمده از ساختارهای عاطفی، تخیلی و عادت‌مند ذهن فهم کرد. در این چارچوب، ایمان غیراثباتی به‌عنوان پاسخی طبیعی، معنا‌بخش و وجودی به وضعیت ناپایدار آدمی در جهان پدیدار می‌شود. مقاله نتیجه می‌گیرد که هیوم، نه مبلغ خداناباوری، بلکه نظریه‌پرداز الگویی فروتنانه و انسان‌محور از ایمان است که با خوانش‌های روان‌شناختی معاصر از دین هم‌افق است.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_4209_d20ea55f7816592b05ea23cb1e65e23a.pdf

دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 27 4 2025 11 28 Evaluating two different interpretations of the physical temporality of the soul ارزیابی دو تفسیر متفاوت از حدوث جسمانی نفس 173 196 4198 10.22091/jptr.2026.13361.3331 FA آرمین منصوری استادیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه تبریز، تبریز، ایران 0000-0002-9808-7380 Journal Article 2025 07 17 The theory of physical temporality (creation or coming into being) and spiritual permanence is a fundamental perspective about the soul; for this reason, a misunderstanding of the meaning of the physical temporality of the soul overshadows the answer to all issues related to the soul. By studying the works of Mulla Sadra's commentators and neo-Sadrian philosophers, two different and opposing interpretations of Mulla Sadra's theory about the physical temporality of the soul are evident. These two interpretations are:1. The soul is a body at the time of temporality, and 2. the soul is dependent on the body at the time of temporality. The purpose of this research is to clarify which of these two interpretations is correct based on the system of Mulla Sadra's philosophy and what is Mulla Sadra's intention from the physical temporality of the soul? The method of this research is descriptive-analytical, as well as argumentative, and it has sought to explain Mulla Sadra's main view by analyzing texts and paying attention to the Sadrian philosophical system. The findings of the study indicate that the soul at the time of temporality, is the body, not only dependence on the body at the time of temporality. نظریه جسمانیه الحدوث و روحانیه البقاء، دیدگاهی بنیادین درباره نفس است؛ به همین دلیل فهم نادرست معنای حدوث جسمانی نفس، پاسخ به تمامی مسائل مرتبط با نفس را تحت الشعاع قرار می دهد. با مطالعه آثار شارحان ملاصدرا و فیلسوفان نوصدرایی، دو تفسیر متفاوت و متقابل از نظریه حدوث جسمانی نفسِ ملاصدرا، مشاهده می شود. این دو تفسیر عبارت اند از: 1. نفس در هنگام حدوث جسم است و 2. نفس در هنگام حدوث وابستگی به جسم دارد. هدف پژوهش حاضر روشن ساختن این مطلب است که بر اساس منظومه فلسفه صدرایی کدام یک از این دو تفسیر صحیح بوده و منظور ملاصدرا از حدوث جسمانی نفس، کدام یک از این دو تفسیر است. روش این تحقیق توصیفی-تحلیلی و نیز برهانی بوده و سعی شده است از طریق تحلیل متون و توجه به منظومه فلسفه صدرایی دیدگاه اصلی ملاصدرا تبیین گردد. یافته های پژوهش گویای آن هستند که خوانش صحیح از نظریه حدوث جسمانی نفس، این است که نفس در زمان حدوث جسم است نه اینکه در هنگام حدوث صرفا وابستگی به جسم داشته باشد.

https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_4198_e822d53941d3e71b99be0d2f6624895f.pdf