دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979128120260321The Challenge of Agency in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: An Ontological PerspectiveThe Challenge of Agency in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: An Ontological Perspective714449810.22091/jptr.2026.16299.3583FAزهراخزاعیاستاد گروه فلسفه و کلام، دانشگاه قم ،قم، ایران0000-0001-8302-9674Journal Article20260608The rapid development of generative artificial intelligence systems, particularly large language models, has significantly reshaped contemporary philosophical discussions of agency. What was once primarily situated within philosophy of mind has now become a central concern in philosophy of technology, metaphysics, and AI ethics. These systems exhibit increasingly sophisticated capacities for natural language generation, inferential simulation, and goal-directed behavior, thereby blurring the conceptual distinction between intelligent behavior and genuine agency. Within analytic philosophy, agency is typically analyzed in terms of intentionality, reason-responsiveness, and rational control. This editorial proposes a graded framework of agency and introduces the concept of the quasi-agent as a philosophical hypothesis. A quasi-agent is an entity that exhibits stable and often complex patterns of agent-like behavior without possessing ontological subjecthood or intrinsic intentionality. To deepen this distinction, the discussion draws on Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Theosophy, particularly the doctrines of the primacy of existence, the gradation of being (tashkīk al-wujūd), and knowledge by presence (ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī). From this perspective, agency is not merely a behavioral property but a mode of being. The editorial concludes that artificial intelligence should neither be classified as a full agent nor reduced to a mere instrument, but rather understood as a quasi-agentive entity that challenges prevailing philosophical frameworks of action, responsibility, and subjectivity.The rapid development of generative artificial intelligence systems, particularly large language models, has significantly reshaped contemporary philosophical discussions of agency. What was once primarily situated within philosophy of mind has now become a central concern in philosophy of technology, metaphysics, and AI ethics. These systems exhibit increasingly sophisticated capacities for natural language generation, inferential simulation, and goal-directed behavior, thereby blurring the conceptual distinction between intelligent behavior and genuine agency. Within analytic philosophy, agency is typically analyzed in terms of intentionality, reason-responsiveness, and rational control. This editorial proposes a graded framework of agency and introduces the concept of the quasi-agent as a philosophical hypothesis. A quasi-agent is an entity that exhibits stable and often complex patterns of agent-like behavior without possessing ontological subjecthood or intrinsic intentionality. To deepen this distinction, the discussion draws on Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Theosophy, particularly the doctrines of the primacy of existence, the gradation of being (tashkīk al-wujūd), and knowledge by presence (ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī). From this perspective, agency is not merely a behavioral property but a mode of being. The editorial concludes that artificial intelligence should neither be classified as a full agent nor reduced to a mere instrument, but rather understood as a quasi-agentive entity that challenges prevailing philosophical frameworks of action, responsibility, and subjectivity.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_4498_9a19ca6f7f63eb933e4da3b1f29e907a.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979128120260321Programmable Islamic Epistemology for the Modern Sciences: A Critical-Realist Bridges to Cosmology, Quantum Foundations, and ConsciousnessProgrammable Islamic Epistemology for the Modern Sciences: A Critical-Realist Bridges to Cosmology, Quantum Foundations, and Consciousness1538446110.22091/jptr.2026.13868.3380FAAlimanAlimanMuhammadiyah University, Makassar0009-0002-6762-8807Journal Article20250913This study develops a “programmable” Islamic epistemological framework that brings together kalām, Sufi ethics, and empirical method within one structured workflow. Here, “programmable” means translating metaphysical and ethical commitments into clear inputs, decision rules, checkpoints, and outputs that can be consistently applied and reviewed. The framework aims to improve explanation and testability in fields where metaphysical assumptions shape how evidence is interpreted. Al-Sanūsī’s three judgements are converted into design rules—ethical gates, empirical warrants, and rational-coherence checks—while eight Islamic epistemic sources are arranged into a typed warrant model within a critical-realist perspective. Rather than presenting completed empirical studies, the article offers a methodological framework and illustrative applications using Bayesian model comparison, decision checkpoints, and dual-track protocols linking first-person reports with neural measures.<br />The framework makes three illustrative contributions. In cosmology, it clarifies the role of priors and posterior sensitivity in fine-tuning debates. In quantum foundations, it proposes reporting standards grounded in Bell-type tests and the measurement problem. In consciousness studies, it presents intentionality-sensitive designs that connect phenomenology and neural dynamics under strict ethical safeguards. The program makes priors explicit, strengthens adjudication, and distinguishes normative, empirical, and rational warrants when setting priors and checking external validity.This study develops a “programmable” Islamic epistemological framework that brings together kalām, Sufi ethics, and empirical method within one structured workflow. Here, “programmable” means translating metaphysical and ethical commitments into clear inputs, decision rules, checkpoints, and outputs that can be consistently applied and reviewed. The framework aims to improve explanation and testability in fields where metaphysical assumptions shape how evidence is interpreted. Al-Sanūsī’s three judgements are converted into design rules—ethical gates, empirical warrants, and rational-coherence checks—while eight Islamic epistemic sources are arranged into a typed warrant model within a critical-realist perspective. Rather than presenting completed empirical studies, the article offers a methodological framework and illustrative applications using Bayesian model comparison, decision checkpoints, and dual-track protocols linking first-person reports with neural measures.<br />The framework makes three illustrative contributions. In cosmology, it clarifies the role of priors and posterior sensitivity in fine-tuning debates. In quantum foundations, it proposes reporting standards grounded in Bell-type tests and the measurement problem. In consciousness studies, it presents intentionality-sensitive designs that connect phenomenology and neural dynamics under strict ethical safeguards. The program makes priors explicit, strengthens adjudication, and distinguishes normative, empirical, and rational warrants when setting priors and checking external validity.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_4461_69e94d7ef251755665ff38085b214b0a.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979128120260321Peripatetic philosophy, Transcendent Philosophy, essential possibility, ontological poverty, God, Necessary Being, contingent being, infinite regress.Reexamining Ibn Sīnā's Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn: A Defense of the Avicennian Formulation Against the Critiques of Transcendent Philosophy3958440010.22091/jptr.2026.15280.3508FAمحمدشفیعیدانشجوی دکتری، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران0009-0006-2226-9678محمدذبیحیاستاد گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران.0000-0002-5749-0261Journal Article20260204The Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn, the most rigorous argument for God's existence in Islamic philosophy, has been formulated in various ways. After Mullā Ṣadrā, his formulation gained prominence, while Ibn Sīnā's original version faced three main criticisms from Transcendent Philosophy: that it is purely conceptual, that it relies on the refutation of infinite regress, and that it lacks distinction from the argument from essential possibility. This article reexamines Ibn Sīnā's formulation and defends its originality and sufficiency against these critiques. Through an analytical study of his primary texts, the article demonstrates that the charge of conceptuality arises from preconceptions about Ibn Sīnā's philosophy rather than a neutral reading of his work; that the proof does not depend on refuting infinite regress; and that it is an argument from existential poverty fundamentally distinct from essential possibility. The study further shows that Ibn Sīnā's proof satisfies all four criteria of the Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn: proceeding within the reality of existence, using self-evident premises, establishing the divine attributes, and requiring no appeal to divine acts. The article concludes that Ibn Sīnā's formulation does not fundamentally differ from Mullā Ṣadrā's and should be regarded as an authentic precursor to the proof in the fifth century AH.The Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn, the most rigorous argument for God's existence in Islamic philosophy, has been formulated in various ways. After Mullā Ṣadrā, his formulation gained prominence, while Ibn Sīnā's original version faced three main criticisms from Transcendent Philosophy: that it is purely conceptual, that it relies on the refutation of infinite regress, and that it lacks distinction from the argument from essential possibility. This article reexamines Ibn Sīnā's formulation and defends its originality and sufficiency against these critiques. Through an analytical study of his primary texts, the article demonstrates that the charge of conceptuality arises from preconceptions about Ibn Sīnā's philosophy rather than a neutral reading of his work; that the proof does not depend on refuting infinite regress; and that it is an argument from existential poverty fundamentally distinct from essential possibility. The study further shows that Ibn Sīnā's proof satisfies all four criteria of the Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn: proceeding within the reality of existence, using self-evident premises, establishing the divine attributes, and requiring no appeal to divine acts. The article concludes that Ibn Sīnā's formulation does not fundamentally differ from Mullā Ṣadrā's and should be regarded as an authentic precursor to the proof in the fifth century AH.https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_4400_07d70b97e70aaa1f85411a26214a29d3.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979128120260321A Critical Assessment of Positivity Theory of FaithA Critical Assessment of Positivity Theory of Faith5980436410.22091/jptr.2026.14709.3445FAمحبوبهپاکدلدانشجوی دوره دکتری فلسفه دین، دانشگاه تهران، ایران.0000-0002-2174-0695عباسیزدانیاستاد گروه فلسفۀ دین دانشگاه تهران، ایران.0000-0001-9499-7259Journal Article20251129This paper offers a differentiated assessment of two major challenges to positivity theories of faith: the internal critique advanced by Malcolm and Scott against desire-based (DES) accounts, and the external axiological critique concerning the value of God’s existence. I argue that these challenges operate at distinct levels and therefore do not carry equal force. Malcolm and Scott demonstrate that faith can persist in the absence of positive desire, inclination, or favorable evaluation toward its object. Their analyses of crisis, ambivalence, and sustained commitment devoid of a pro-attitude successfully undermine the posited conceptual necessity of desire for faith, exposing the limitations of linguistic and intuitive defenses of DES-positivity. By contrast, axiological anti-theistic arguments which often appeal to personal goods such as privacy or autonomy remain limited in scope. We contend that they are insufficient to outweigh the broad impersonal goods traditionally associated with theism, including cosmic justice, moral grounding, the absence of gratuitous evil, and objective meaning. We argue that such objections do not destabilize the structural core of positivity theory, but they at most render its evaluative dimension context-sensitive. The overall conclusion is therefore differentiated: while DES-positivity fails to be a necessary condition for faith, the axiological critique does not decisively refute the evaluative dimension of positivity theory. As an alternative, we advance the True Grit Theory as a structurally superior alternative. By grounding faith in practical steadfastness, resilience, and coordinated commitment under pressure, True Grit captures the action-guiding nature of faith without treating positive desire as conceptually essential. This paper offers a differentiated assessment of two major challenges to positivity theories of faith: the internal critique advanced by Malcolm and Scott against desire-based (DES) accounts, and the external axiological critique concerning the value of God’s existence. I argue that these challenges operate at distinct levels and therefore do not carry equal force. Malcolm and Scott demonstrate that faith can persist in the absence of positive desire, inclination, or favorable evaluation toward its object. Their analyses of crisis, ambivalence, and sustained commitment devoid of a pro-attitude successfully undermine the posited conceptual necessity of desire for faith, exposing the limitations of linguistic and intuitive defenses of DES-positivity. By contrast, axiological anti-theistic arguments which often appeal to personal goods such as privacy or autonomy remain limited in scope. We contend that they are insufficient to outweigh the broad impersonal goods traditionally associated with theism, including cosmic justice, moral grounding, the absence of gratuitous evil, and objective meaning. We argue that such objections do not destabilize the structural core of positivity theory, but they at most render its evaluative dimension context-sensitive. The overall conclusion is therefore differentiated: while DES-positivity fails to be a necessary condition for faith, the axiological critique does not decisively refute the evaluative dimension of positivity theory. As an alternative, we advance the True Grit Theory as a structurally superior alternative. By grounding faith in practical steadfastness, resilience, and coordinated commitment under pressure, True Grit captures the action-guiding nature of faith without treating positive desire as conceptually essential. https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_4364_65e85a0116cd4d7f0b688c94b4c7a2d8.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979128120260321Artefacts and the Mediation of TranscendenceMaterial Religion, Technology, Phenomenology, Ihde; Islamic Calligraphy.8194438610.22091/jptr.2026.14963.3506FAEhsanArzroomchilarSouth Bohemia University, Czech Republic0000-0001-6642-4365Journal Article20260203Material religion, as a broad field of inquiry, examines how material forms and embodied practices participate in the making of religious worlds. This article seeks to extend that conversation by drawing on insights from the phenomenology of technology. From this perspective, artefacts–whether explicitly religious or not–are not passive symbols but active mediators that shape and extend perception. They configure how the sacred is sensed, enacted, and made present. By attending to the mediating function of tools and technologies, the analysis highlights how material engagements can open experiential horizons that would otherwise remain beyond immediate reach. In this sense, both scientific instruments and religious artefacts function as extensions of human embodiment, enabling access to domains–such as transcendence–that would remain inaccessible without them. The article concludes that, within religious contexts, artefacts serve either to draw the transcendent into the immanent or to elevate the immanent toward the transcendent, and are therefore far from passive.<br /><br />Material religion, as a broad field of inquiry, examines how material forms and embodied practices participate in the making of religious worlds. This article seeks to extend that conversation by drawing on insights from the phenomenology of technology. From this perspective, artefacts–whether explicitly religious or not–are not passive symbols but active mediators that shape and extend perception. They configure how the sacred is sensed, enacted, and made present. By attending to the mediating function of tools and technologies, the analysis highlights how material engagements can open experiential horizons that would otherwise remain beyond immediate reach. In this sense, both scientific instruments and religious artefacts function as extensions of human embodiment, enabling access to domains–such as transcendence–that would remain inaccessible without them. The article concludes that, within religious contexts, artefacts serve either to draw the transcendent into the immanent or to elevate the immanent toward the transcendent, and are therefore far from passive.<br /><br />https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_4386_b6f23645b5af35855e4f62baa25ade3d.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979128120260321Divine Simplicity: A New AssessmentDivine Simplicity: A New Assessment95112436210.22091/jptr.2026.13037.3307FAسید جابرموسوی راددانشیار گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران0000-0003-0168-9797Journal Article20250526One of the attributes traditionally ascribed to God by medieval philosophers is divine simplicity. This article explores the various interpretations of divine simplicity presented by medieval thinkers, evaluating their philosophical plausibility. It addresses the concept of divine simplicity primarily with respect to the absence of plurality in the divine essence. While God is free from material multiplicity, the discussion highlights that analytical plurality–comprising existence and quiddity–can still exist. Regarding the conception of divine simplicity as pure actuality, the article argues that this concept is acceptable only concerning the attributes of the divine essence. A third interpretation posits that God's attributes are identical to His essence. If this interpretation means that God's attributes do not contribute to multiplicity within the divine essence, then it could also apply to humans and is not exclusive to God. However, if it implies a complete semantic and ontological identity between God and His attributes, this interpretation would be problematic. In conclusion, the article asserts that the concept of divine simplicity is valid in certain senses but not in others. <br />Keywords <br />Divine simplicity, medieval philosophers, divine attributes; sovereignty of God. One of the attributes traditionally ascribed to God by medieval philosophers is divine simplicity. This article explores the various interpretations of divine simplicity presented by medieval thinkers, evaluating their philosophical plausibility. It addresses the concept of divine simplicity primarily with respect to the absence of plurality in the divine essence. While God is free from material multiplicity, the discussion highlights that analytical plurality–comprising existence and quiddity–can still exist. Regarding the conception of divine simplicity as pure actuality, the article argues that this concept is acceptable only concerning the attributes of the divine essence. A third interpretation posits that God's attributes are identical to His essence. If this interpretation means that God's attributes do not contribute to multiplicity within the divine essence, then it could also apply to humans and is not exclusive to God. However, if it implies a complete semantic and ontological identity between God and His attributes, this interpretation would be problematic. In conclusion, the article asserts that the concept of divine simplicity is valid in certain senses but not in others. <br /><br /><br />https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_4362_7f5f1cb1eec6a91334a55f5231a47805.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979128120260321Classification of Challenges and Solutions in Practical Theology: A Three-Level Approach (Meta-theoretical, Theoretical, and Practical)Classification of Challenges and Solutions in Practical Theology: A Three-Level Approach (Meta-theoretical, Theoretical, and Practical)113148439410.22091/jptr.2026.14073.3401FAحسینباقریدانشجوی دکتری فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه زنجان، زنجان، ایرانسحرکاوندیاستاد فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه زنجان، زنجان، ایران0000-0003-3936-770Xمرتضیحسین زادهاستادیار فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه زنجان، زنجان، ایران0000-0002-9351-6561Journal Article20251004This study systematically classifies the challenges and solutions in practical theology within a three-level framework: meta-theoretical, theoretical, and practical. Despite developments since Schleiermacher, practical theology lacks an integrated framework addressing interconnected challenges across these levels. Using a descriptive-analytical and comparative-critical method, the research examines key definitions and four approaches: pastoral, social studies-based, theory-centered, and reformist. Findings reveal profound transformations: expansion from ecclesial to social contexts, a shift from applicative to critical-reflective methods based on religious praxis, and increased attention to socio-cultural dimensions. The classification shows that meta-theoretical challenges (modernity, hermeneutical crisis) shape foundational presuppositions; theoretical challenges (interaction with human sciences) create methodological tensions needing interdisciplinary solutions; and practical challenges (clergy education, institutional reforms) demand context-sensitive interventions. The study’s main contribution is demonstrating the dialectical interconnection among these levels: revising epistemological presuppositions enables interdisciplinary methodologies, which facilitate practical reforms in clergy education. Solutions include linking religious narratives to contemporary issues, using social sciences to understand social structures, developing effective communication skills, and creatively employing new technologies in religious education. This study systematically classifies the challenges and solutions in practical theology within a three-level framework: meta-theoretical, theoretical, and practical. Despite developments since Schleiermacher, practical theology lacks an integrated framework addressing interconnected challenges across these levels. Using a descriptive-analytical and comparative-critical method, the research examines key definitions and four approaches: pastoral, social studies-based, theory-centered, and reformist. Findings reveal profound transformations: expansion from ecclesial to social contexts, a shift from applicative to critical-reflective methods based on religious praxis, and increased attention to socio-cultural dimensions. The classification shows that meta-theoretical challenges (modernity, hermeneutical crisis) shape foundational presuppositions; theoretical challenges (interaction with human sciences) create methodological tensions needing interdisciplinary solutions; and practical challenges (clergy education, institutional reforms) demand context-sensitive interventions. The study’s main contribution is demonstrating the dialectical interconnection among these levels: revising epistemological presuppositions enables interdisciplinary methodologies, which facilitate practical reforms in clergy education. Solutions include linking religious narratives to contemporary issues, using social sciences to understand social structures, developing effective communication skills, and creatively employing new technologies in religious education.<br />Keywords: <br /><br />https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_4394_c7ca2c6e62d6ddae2b67b637e3c2394d.pdfدانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979128120260321Intellectual Humility and the Ethical Challenge of Teaching Negative Theology in Kalām: A Comparison of Jahm b. Ṣafwān and Ḍirār b. ʿAmr's ModelsIntellectual Humility and the Ethical Challenge of Teaching Negative Theology in Kalām: A Comparison of Jahm b. Ṣafwān and Ḍirār b. ʿAmr's Models149170385510.22091/jptr.2025.13282.3325FAمصطفیاسلامیدانشجوی دکتری کلام امامیه، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات، دانشکدگان فارابی، دانشگاه تهران، ایران.0009-0005-4344-4634محمدتقیاسلامیاستادیار و مدیر گروه اخلاق پژوهشگاه علوم و فرهنگ اسلامی، قم، ایران0000-0003-2889-351Xمحمدحسینمنتظریاستادیار کلام امامیه، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات، دانشکدگان فارابی، دانشگاه تهران، ایران.0009-0002-5454-572XJournal Article20250703Negative theology in Kalām aims to preserve the unity and simplicity of the divine essence by refraining from affirming the attributes of God. However, teaching such theology raises a moral and epistemic question: How can one cultivate intellectual humility without dissolving meaningful theological discourse? This article investigates this dilemma by comparing the negative theological models of Jahm b. Ṣafwān and Ḍirār b. ʿAmr. Employing a conceptual and comparative methodology grounded in primary sources and virtue epistemology, this study demonstrates that Jahm’s extreme rejection of predication leads to epistemic skepticism and the collapse of theological reasoning. In contrast, Ḍirār’s approach grounds denial in a semantic strategy that preserves meaning and interpretive responsibility, offering a form of dynamic intellectual humility. The article concludes by proposing an educational model of “dialogical authority,” wherein theological expertise and humility mutually reinforce one another. This model fosters a classroom environment in which students are encouraged to ask difficult questions, acknowledge epistemic limits, and participate responsibly in theological inquiry. <br /><br />Negative theology in Kalām aims to preserve the unity and simplicity of the divine essence by refraining from affirming the attributes of God. However, teaching such theology raises a moral and epistemic question: How can one cultivate intellectual humility without dissolving meaningful theological discourse? This article investigates this dilemma by comparing the negative theological models of Jahm b. Ṣafwān and Ḍirār b. ʿAmr. Employing a conceptual and comparative methodology grounded in primary sources and virtue epistemology, this study demonstrates that Jahm’s extreme rejection of predication leads to epistemic skepticism and the collapse of theological reasoning. In contrast, Ḍirār’s approach grounds denial in a semantic strategy that preserves meaning and interpretive responsibility, offering a form of dynamic intellectual humility. The article concludes by proposing an educational model of “dialogical authority,” wherein theological expertise and humility mutually reinforce one another. This model fosters a classroom environment in which students are encouraged to ask difficult questions, acknowledge epistemic limits, and participate responsibly in theological inquiry. <br /><br /><br />https://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_3855_a9c5006c50d42f1f4a7e7d53fe30c5b1.pdf