دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 28 2 2026 07 23 Critical Reassessment of Orientalist Readings of Infallibility ('Iṣmah) in Imāmī Theology with Emphasis on the Problem of Free Will and Determinism بازخوانی انتقادی قرائت‌های مستشرقان شیعه‌پژوه از «عصمت» در اندیشه امامیه با تأکید بر مسئله جبر و اختیار 5 30 4598 10.22091/jptr.2026.15641.3536 FA احمد بهشتی مهر دانشیار گروه شیعه‌شناسی، دانشکده الهیات، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران. 0000-0003-2050-9982 هادی اسدی دانشجوی دکتری گروه شیعه‌شناسی، دانشکده الهیات، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران. Journal Article 2026 04 04 Abstract This article critically examines Western Orientalist scholarship on the doctrine of infallibility ('iṣmah) in Imāmī Shīʿa theology, focusing specifically on how these scholars have addressed the relationship between infallibility and free will/determinism. Employing an analytical-critical and comparative methodology, the study systematically distinguishes between (a) free will and determinism in "infallibility from sin" versus "infallibility from error, forgetfulness, and oversight," and (b) free will and determinism in "attaining the station of infallibility" versus "the infallible's actions under infallibility." The findings reveal that while scholars such as Donaldson, McDermott, Schmidtke, and Madelung have presented relatively accurate depictions of the mainstream Imāmī position, others including Hollister, Momen, and Pinault have offered incomplete explanations that implicitly suggest a deterministic understanding. Paul Walker's analysis contains a fundamental confusion regarding the nature of divine grace (lutf) and its relationship to the perpetuation of infallibility. The study also identifies that Donaldson, despite accurately reporting al-ʿAllāma al-Majlisī's views, failed to present his definitive position on relevant traditions. The article demonstrates that Imāmī theologians consistently affirm the preservation of free will in both the attainment and exercise of infallibility, utilizing arguments based on desert of reward, obligation (taklīf), and divine commendation. Keywords: Free Will and Determinism, Orientalists, Infallibility ('Iṣmah), Shīʿa Studies, Shīʿa Doctrines, Imāmīyya. Introduction The doctrine of infallibility ('iṣmah) constitutes one of the most fundamental theological principles in Shīʿa Islam, particularly within the Imāmī tradition, signifying protection from sin and error. Its relationship with free will and determinism represents a critical analytical dimension that has occupied both classical Islamic sources and modern Western scholarship. The central question this article addresses is: How have Orientalist scholars approached this relationship, and have they succeeded in providing an accurate understanding of the Imāmī position? This investigation is not merely theoretical, as the resolution of this issue bears directly upon questions of obligation (taklīf), desert of reward, the possibility of praising the infallibles, and their status as moral exemplars. Unlike Wahhābī polemicists, Orientalist scholars present their analyses within academic frameworks that systematically transmit ideas to subsequent generations, making it incumbent upon Shīʿa academic institutions to engage critically with their representations of Shīʿa theology. This study examines the works of prominent Shīʿa-oriented Orientalists including Wilferd Madelung, Dwight Donaldson, John Norman Hollister, Sabine Schmidtke, Moojan Momen, David Pinault, Paul Walker, and Martin McDermott, comparing their accounts with the positions of classical and modern Imāmī theologians such as Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, and contemporary figures like ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Shahīd Muṭahharī. Previous studies, including those by Raḍī Bihābādī and Javāndil (2014) and Sāzandagī (2017), have critically examined Paul Walker's entry on infallibility in the Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, identifying his confusion between power to commit sin and actual commission. However, these works have not systematically addressed the broader spectrum of Orientalist scholarship on the free will-determinism question. The present study fills this gap by providing a comprehensive critical assessment of Orientalist readings of infallibility in Imāmī thought. The Two Dimensions of Infallibility: Sin versus Error Deterministic Readings of Infallibility from Sin Several Orientalist scholars have interpreted practical infallibility in terms that entail, either explicitly or implicitly, a deterministic conception. Donaldson (1933, p. 324) reports that al-ʿAllāma al-Majlisī, citing some Islamic scholars, speaks of a special state in the body or soul of the infallible that compels abstention from sin. David Pinault (1992, p. 179) defines infallibility as an innate and intrinsic characteristic, logically entailing a coercive and deterministic reading. Similarly, Paul Walker (2002, pp. 505-506) interprets the intrinsic nature of infallibility as meaning the removal of the power to sin, attributing this view, without citation, to an early Imāmī theologian. Walker further argues that if prophets deserve reward, they must have the capacity to commit sin, concluding that infallibility is not intrinsic but rather a divine grace. The critical analysis reveals that Walker's argument, while correctly affirming the power to commit sin, fails to adequately analyze the concept of the perpetuation of infallibility. Perpetuation of a quality does not necessarily require its intrinsic nature; it may result from external causes that persist over time. Therefore, infallibility as a divine gift, though caused by external factors, does not conflict with the voluntary action of the infallible. Imāmī theologians consistently maintain that while infallibility is a divine grace (lutf), it does not negate free will. Shaykh al-Mufīd (1413c, p. 128), al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (1405, vol. 3, p. 325), and others explicitly affirm the preservation of power and choice in the infallibles' actions. Hollister (1953, p. 36) and Momen (1985, p. 177) exclusively emphasize divine agency in infallibility without mentioning the infallibles' voluntary role. While their accounts are textually accurate in reproducing the language of early theologians like Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, they fail to present the later development of Imāmī theology, where subsequent scholars consistently added qualifications to prevent deterministic misunderstandings. This selective reporting creates the impression that infallibility entails compulsion. Free Will Readings of Infallibility from Sin Some Orientalists have more accurately represented the Imāmī emphasis on free will in infallibility. McDermott (1978, pp. 81, 118) correctly reports Shaykh al-Mufīd's view that divine grace applies only to those who, according to divine knowledge, are capable of accepting it. Schmidtke (1991, pp. 144-145) accurately translates al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī's definition of infallibility as a psychic quality (malaka nafsāniyya) that motivates the infallible toward obedience while preserving the power to act otherwise. Donaldson (1933, pp. 323-324) cites a tradition from Imām al-Sajjād (as) defining the infallible as one who clings to God's rope, yet his translation inaccurately makes infallibility the cause rather than the result of clinging to the Qurʾān. The original tradition clearly indicates that the Imām actively clings to the Qurʾān, thereby attaining the station of infallibility. The analysis further shows that al-ʿAllāma al-Majlisī, contrary to Donaldson's report, explicitly interprets a related tradition to mean that the Imāms are protected from sin because of their own actions—since they cling to God's religion, they receive divine guidance. Arguments for the Infallible's Free Will Imāmī theologians have consistently advanced arguments demonstrating that infallibility cannot be deterministic. Both Donaldson (1933, p. 325) and Schmidtke (1991, pp. 144-145) correctly report the argument based on desert of reward. As al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī argues, if the infallible were compelled to obey, desert of reward would be negated, implying that ordinary individuals would deserve more reward than prophets, which is unanimously rejected. Additional arguments based on obligation (taklīf), commendation, and divine warning all demonstrate that Imāmī theologians consistently affirm free will. Madelung (1997, vol. 4, p. 183), however, presents an incomplete reconstruction of this argument. While he correctly affirms that divine grace does not negate free will, he presupposes free will to establish desert of reward, whereas Imāmī theologians presuppose desert of reward as a premise to establish free will. This methodological inversion represents a significant analytical deficiency in Madelung's account. Conclusion This critical examination demonstrates that Orientalist scholarship on infallibility in Imāmī theology exhibits significant methodological and interpretive variations. While scholars such as Donaldson, McDermott, Schmidtke, and Madelung have largely succeeded in presenting an accurate picture of the mainstream Imāmī position affirming free will, others have provided incomplete or misleading accounts. Hollister, Momen, and Pinault, through their exclusive emphasis on divine agency without mention of voluntary action, create a deterministic impression not found in more developed Imāmī theological formulations. Paul Walker represents a particularly problematic case, confusing the concepts of intrinsic nature, giftedness, and perpetuation, and incorrectly attributing deterministic views to early Imāmī theologians based on misinterpretation of heresiographical sources. Donaldson, despite providing accurate reports of al-ʿAllāma al-Majlisī's views on free will, failed to present his definitive interpretive position on the relevant traditions. Madelung's reconstruction of the Imāmī argument for free will through desert of reward fails to represent the logical structure employed by Imāmī theologians, who treat desert of reward as a premise rather than a conclusion. The article concludes that the Imāmī theological tradition consistently maintains the compatibility of infallibility with free will across all dimensions, employing sophisticated arguments based on desert of reward, obligation, commendation, and divine warning. Future research should address how non-evidential epistemic values interact with traditional theological proofs in defending religious rationality, and should further investigate the relationship between infallibility from error and voluntary action, a dimension largely neglected in Orientalist scholarship. References Alam al-Hudā, ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn (Sharīf al-Murtaḍā). (1984). Rasā’il al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā. Dār al-Qur’ān al-Karīm. [In Arabic] Bar-Asher, M. (1999). Scripture and exegesis in early Imāmī Shiism. Brill. Beheshtīmehr, Aḥmad. (2024). "Sīr-i Taṭavvur-i Āmūzah-yi ‘Iṣmat-i Imām dar Dānish-i Kalām-i Imāmiyyah." Shī‘ah Shināsī, (88), 7-30. https://doi.org/10.22034/shistu.2026.2078618.2571 [In Persian] Donaldson, D. M. (1933). The Shi'ite religion: A history of Islam in Persia and Irak. Luzac & Company. Hollister, J. N. (1953). The Shi'a of India. Luzac and Company, Ltd. Madelung, W. (1997a). Hishām b. al-Ḥakam. In The encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed., Vol. 3). Brill. Madelung, W. (1997b). ʿIṣma. In The encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed., Vol. 4). Brill. McDermott, M. J. (1978). The theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufīd. Dar al-Mashreq. Momen, M. (1985). An introduction to Shi'i Islam. Yale University Press. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad. (1984). Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal. Dār al-Aḍwā’. [In Arabic] Pinault, D. (1992). The Shiites. Palgrave Macmillan. Schmidtke, S. (1991). The theology of al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī. Schwarz. Walker, P. E. (2002). Impeccability. In Encyclopaedia of the Qurān (Vol. 2). Brill.] پژوهش حاضر با رویکردی تحلیلی-انتقادی، با روش تحلیلی، انتقادی و مقایسه‌ای پژوهش‌های مستشرقان را پیرامون جبر و اختیار در عصمت بررسی کرده و با تفکیک نظام‌مند میان جبر و اختیار در «عصمت از گناه» و «عصمت از خطا، سهو و نسیان»، از یک سو، و تفکیک میان جبر و اختیار در «وصول به مقام عصمت» و «عمل معصوم در سایه عصمت»، از سوی دیگر، میزان انطباق پژوهش ایشان با دیدگاه متداول متکلمان امامیه را می‌سنجد. یافته‌های پژوهش نشان می‌دهد دونالدسون، مکدرموت، اشمیتکه و مادلونگ توانسته‌اند تصویری نسبتاً صحیح و روشن از دیدگاه رایج امامیه ارائه دهند. در مقابل، برخی مستشرقان همچون هالیستر، موجان مومن و پینالت با ارائه تبیینی ناقص از مفهوم عصمت، به ‌طور ضمنی زمینه برداشت جبری از رفتار معصومان (ع) را فراهم ساخته‌اند. تحلیل نادرست از اختیار معصومان (ع) ناشی از عدم درک صحیح چگونگی استمرار عصمت است. دونالدسون دیدگاه مجلسی را ذکر اما از ارائه جمع‌بندی نهایی و نظر مختار ایشان در رابطه با روایات مرتبط با بحث غفلت ورزیده است. در حوزه براهین کلامی، اشمیتکه و دونالدسون تقریر صحیحی از استدلال‌های امامیه آورده‌اند، اما مادلونگ، بدون بازسازی دقیق براهین، اختیار را مفروض گرفته و به نقش استحقاق ثواب، به ‌عنوان مقدمه اصلی استدلال متکلمان امامیه، توجه کافی نکرده است.

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دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 28 2 2026 07 23 The Incorporeity of the Soul Based on Imkān Faqrī (Ontological Poverty) and Its Gradational Boundaries in Transcendent Philosophy تجرد نفس از امکان فقری و حدود مرتبه ای آن (در حکمت متعالیه) 31 52 4618 10.22091/jptr.2026.15968.3556 FA سید مرتضی حسینی شاهرودی استاد گروه فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران null حجت اسعدی استادیار گروه فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران. 0000-0001-8442-8765 Journal Article 2026 05 13 Abstract In Mullā Ṣadrā's transcendent philosophy, beings—and especially the human soul—attain, through intensifying motion (ḥarakat ishtidādī), a station where no limit whatsoever, whether essential (quidditative) or gradational (hierarchical), can be ascribed to them. This limitlessness is termed "supra-incorporeity" (fawq al-tajarrud), wherein the soul becomes abstracted from matter and subsequently from quiddity itself. While this thesis constitutes one of Ṣadrā's innovations, this research demonstrates that a station beyond even this can be delineated for the soul in light of Transcendent Philosophy's foundational principles—a station wherein the soul, besides being abstracted from body, matter (whether material, imaginal, or intellectual), and quiddity, also becomes abstracted from imkān faqrī (ontological poverty or essential dependence), from hierarchical limits, and from all such determinations. It thereby attains the ultimate goal of existence through complete annihilation (fanāʾ al-tāmm) and obtains everlasting life and subsistence (baqāʾ) by virtue of the Divine Reality. This novel achievement, obtained through careful analysis of Mullā Ṣadrā's views and a fresh reading of his distinctive principles, advances the discourse on the soul's eschatological journey beyond previous interpretations. Keywords: Soul, Supra-Incorporeity (Fawq al-Tajarrud), Ontological Poverty (Imkān Faqrī), Hierarchical Limits, Mullā Ṣadrā. Introduction In Islamic philosophy, the soul constitutes human identity, and Muslim philosophers concur on its incorporeity after death and separation from the body, though they differ on its modality. In Avicennan philosophy, only blessed souls attain intellectual incorporeity through connection with the Active Intellect. In Illuminationist philosophy, the souls of the perfect attain the imaginal realm without further intensification. In Transcendent Philosophy, Mullā Ṣadrā introduces "supra-incorporeity" (fawq al-tajarrud), wherein the soul becomes abstracted not only from matter but also from quiddity, such that its quiddity is its very ipseity. However, the central question is whether this supra-incorporeity constitutes the soul's final end. Given that the ultimate end is the Divine Reality itself, is abstraction from matter and quiddity sufficient for attaining Him? This research hypothesizes that it is not, for human determinations—above all selfhood (anāniyyah) and relational identity (ʿayn al-rabṭ)—remain, and attainment of the Divine is impossible without complete annihilation (fanāʾ al-tāmm). Mullā Ṣadrā himself considers the view that the soul is a simple reality as insufficient, maintaining that complete annihilation is necessary for supra-intellectual incorporeity. Thus, a station beyond ordinary incorporeity must be delineated for the soul. This research argues that Ṣadrā's final view on the soul's journey toward God transcends mere abstraction from matter and quiddity, encompassing instead abstraction from ontological poverty itself. The method employed is descriptive-analytical, drawing upon Ṣadrā's primary texts and their commentaries. The Three Degrees of the Soul's Abstraction in Transcendent Philosophy In Mullā Ṣadrā's transcendent philosophy, the human soul in its ascending journey toward God is conceived as having three degrees of abstraction. The first degree is abstraction from matter and body, wherein the soul separates from the physical body and its material accidents. The second degree is abstraction from quiddity—called the station of supra-abstraction (fawq al-tajarrud)—wherein the soul's quiddity becomes its very ipseity, and it no longer belongs to any category or genus. While these first two degrees have roots in the Islamic philosophical tradition, the third degree is introduced as the novel contribution of this research: abstraction from all gradational limits and ontological poverty (imkān faqrī), namely the relational and dependent mode of existence that characterizes all created beings. According to this view, not only human beings but all creatures—including animals, plants, and even inanimate objects—are freed from the limitations of their previous world in resurrection and the Hereafter, and by stripping away their determinations, they attain a new kind of manifestation and elaboration. This journey, which begins from intellect, imaginal world, and nature and returns to the imaginal and intellectual realms, is constantly accompanied by an increase in manifestation and detail, ultimately culminating in the encounter with God. However, the third degree, which is the central focus of the discussion, goes beyond these stages, and in it the soul is also stripped of its own contingency, poverty, and relational identity. This degree of abstraction is realized in the Great Resurrection and is accompanied by total annihilation, such that even the contingent and dependent identity of beings vanishes, and it can no longer be called a soul in the conventional sense except analytically and metaphorically. Mullā Ṣadrā invokes verses such as "There is no one in the heavens and earth but that he comes to the Most Merciful as a servant" (Q. 19:93) and "Each of them will come to Him on the Day of Resurrection alone" (Q. 19:95) to demonstrate this universal return, describing it as a return accompanied by servitude and individuation, which is impossible without the negation of everything other than God. The Resurrection as Inner Reality, the Removal of Determinations, and the Encounter with God In Mullā Ṣadrā's view, the Resurrection is an inner and esoteric reality, and when outward veils collapse, the truths of things become manifest. By appealing to the blast of the trumpet, he holds that in the Great Resurrection, no determination or selfhood—whether of matter, quiddity, or even poverty and relation—remains, and at that moment, the questioner and the answerer become one, and pure unity alone appears. Hence, the essence of the Great Resurrection is the removal of all determinations, and this is the very total annihilation that paves the way for everlasting subsistence. This view is founded upon two fundamental principles in Sadrian philosophy: the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd) and the personal unity of existence, meaning that if existence is exclusively confined to God, then creatures are nothing but manifestations and aspects of His essence, and their return to God is the return of manifestation to the Manifestor and the removal of determinations, rather than the return of an independent and separate entity. Moreover, in this philosophical framework, returning to God is a return to the primordial nature and original non-existence, which is achieved through the removal of selfhood and egoity, and this is a universal matter that encompasses all beings. In this process, determinations—including selfhood—are regarded as acquired and accidental, not identical with existence, and thus in the ascending path they are returned one after another to their true owner, so that the soul, like a polished mirror, is cleansed of every form and image, and in it the face of God becomes manifest. This is the realization of "Return to your Lord" (Q. 89:28), in which the soul, by giving back all borrowings, attains a state of without-selfhood in which no accidental egoity remains, and it becomes nothing but a mirror for divine manifestation. The encounter with God (liqāʾ Allāh) in this intellectual system is neither a figurative reward or punishment nor the mere observation of divine effects, but rather the genuine manifestation of monotheism and the return of the outward to the inward, and of form to meaning. When the soul is emptied of all determinations, even its own ontological poverty, it attains annihilation in monotheism, which is itself identical to everlasting subsistence, and this encounter occurs in the domain of knowledge and through the removal of veils. Thus, the end of this journey is identical to its beginning, for both the origin and the finality are God Almighty, and at this stage, pure monotheism is revealed, and "To Us they shall return" (Q. 21:93) is realized in its true sense. Conclusion This research goes beyond incorporeity from matter and quiddity, proposing a novel theory according to which supra-incorporeity in Sadrian philosophy means "incorporeity from essential poverty (imkān faqrī) and hierarchical limits." Analysis of Mullā Ṣadrā's texts demonstrates that the soul's intensifying journey, through the gradual removal of determinations—especially selfhood (anāniyyah) and relational identity (ʿayn al-rabṭ)—leads to complete annihilation (fanāʾ al-tāmm) in the station of the Divine Reality. In this domain, the soul is purified from every determination and essential poverty. The attainment of this station occurs in the Great Resurrection, which is complete annihilation, the encounter with God (liqāʾ Allāh), and permanence through God (baqāʾ bi'llāh). This station is not exclusive to humans but occurs for all beings in their universal return to their origin. The findings underscore the importance of distinguishing between different degrees of abstraction in Sadrian philosophy and recognizing that the soul's ultimate end is not merely intellectual perfection but complete annihilation in the Divine Reality, which alone guarantees everlasting subsistence. References Āshtiyānī, Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn. (2002). Sharḥ bar Zād al-Musāfir. Bustān-e Ketāb. [In Persian] Āshtiyānī, Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn. (1996 AH). Taʿlīqah bar al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah fī al-Manāhij al-Sulūkiyyah. Markaz-e Nashr-e Dānishgāhī. [In Arabic/Persian] Ālūsī, Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdullāh. (1994 AH). Rūḥ al-Maʿānī fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-Karīm. Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah. [In Arabic] Āmulī, Sayyid Ḥaydar. (1985). Risālah Naqd al-Nuqūd fī Maʿrifat al-Wujūd (Ḥamīd Ṭabībīyān, Trans.). Muʾassasah-ye Iṭṭilāʿāt. [In Persian] Āmulī, Sayyid Ḥaydar. (1989). Jāmiʿ al-Asrār wa Manbaʿ al-Anwār. Intishārāt-e ʿIlmī wa Farhangī. [In Arabic/Persian] Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm. (1983). Manṭiq-e Nowīn (ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Mashkūt al-Dīnī, Commentator). Āgāh. [In Persian] Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm. (1984a). Al-Mashāʿir (2nd ed.). Ṭahūrī. [In Arabic] Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm. (1984b). Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb. Muṭāliʿāt-e Farhangī. [In Arabic] Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm. (1999 AH). Majmūʿah Rasāʾil Falsafī (2nd ed.). Ḥikmat. [In Arabic] Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm. (2001 AH). Sharḥ al-Hidāyah al-Athīriyyah. Muʾassasat al-Tārīkh al-ʿArabī. [In Arabic] Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm. (n.d.). Īqāẓ al-Nāʾimīn. Anjuman-e Islāmī-ye Ḥikmat wa Falsafeh-ye Īrān. [In Arabic] در حکمت صدرایی موجودات و مخصوصا نفس آدمی در حرکت اشتدادی به جایی می‌رسند که دیگر اسناد هیچ نوع حدی اعم از ماهیتی و مرتبه‎ای به آنها ممکن نیست. لذا نزد صدرا نفس مقام معلومی ندارد، به این درجۀ بی‌حدی «فوق تجرد» گفته می‌شود. یعنی حقیقت انسانی که نفس اوست در سیر و حرکت اشتدادی پس از این‌که از ماده و عوارض ماده جدا می‎شود، از این مرتبه از تجرد هم بالاتر می‌رود تا به جایی که مجرد از ماهیت می‌شود، با سلب ماهیت مقام فوق تجرد حاصل می‎شود. این مطلب هرچند از نوآوری‌های صدرالمتألهین است، اما از این مرتبه هم بالاتر با توجه به مبانی حکمت متعالیه برای نفس ترسیم می‎شود، مرتبه‎ای که در آن، نفس علاوه بر تجرد از جسم و ماده اعم از مادی، مثالی و عقلی، و علاوه بر تجرد از ماهیت، از امکان فقری و حدود مرتبه‎ای و نظایر آن هم مجرد می‎شود و به غایت هستی با فنای تامّ نائل می‎گردد و حیات و بقای ابدی به وجود حق می‌یابد. این دستاورد نوین با تحلیل آراء صدرالمتألهین و دقت عقلی در بیانات ایشان و نظر به مبانی خاص او در خوانشی نو به‎دست آمد.

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دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 28 2 2026 06 22 A Comparative Analysis of “The Rule of Assisting in Sin” and the “Component of Inclusiveness” in “The Demandingness of Morality” تحلیل تطبیقی «قاعده اعانه بر اثم» و «مؤلفه شمول» در «میزان مطالبه اخلاق» 53 76 4615 10.22091/jptr.2026.15245.3518 FA هادی ایزانلو دانش‌آموخته دکتری فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران 0000-0001-5033-9246 جهانگیر مسعودی استاد دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران 0000-0002-6753-0693 شیرزاد پیک‌حرفه دانشیار دانشگاه بین‌المللی امام خمینی، قزوین، ایران 0000-0001-6822-6901 Journal Article 2026 02 18 Abstract The problem of "Demandingness of Morality" delineates the boundary between personal interests and moral obligations. It is structured around three key components: inclusiveness, intensity, and priority, giving rise to maximalist, minimalist, and moderate approaches. This paper focuses on inclusiveness, within which two crucial distinctions are made: doing versus allowing harm, and intentional versus unintentional acts. The jurisprudential-ethical rule of "assisting in sin" (iʿāna ʿalā al-ithm) offers a powerful framework for analyzing these distinctions and clarifying the scope of inclusiveness. This rule addresses an individual's participation in and responsibility for the wrongful acts of others, asserting that moral responsibility is not limited to one's own direct actions but extends to the actions of others. Applying this rule to the component of inclusiveness shows that it supports a moderate approach: it accepts social responsibility while avoiding the trap of excessive moral demands. Thus, the rule of assisting in sin reinforces the moderate stance in determining the Demandingness of Morality. Keywords: rule of assisting in sin, component of inclusiveness, demandingness of morality, maximalist ethics, moderate ethics, minimalist ethics Introduction The issue of "Demandingness of Morality," introduced with Shelly Kagan's "The Limits of Morality" (1989), deals with the boundary between personal interests and moral obligations. It has three components—inclusiveness, priority, and intensity—and three approaches: maximalist, minimalist, and moderate. The article explains the role of the rule of "assisting in sin" (iʿāna ʿalā al-ithm) in determining inclusiveness; a rule that extends responsibility beyond direct acts to participation in others' wrongful acts, supporting the moderate approach. "Inclusiveness" asks whether there is a domain outside moral evaluation. Key distinctions exist: "doing harm" versus "allowing harm" (refraining despite ability), and "intentional" versus "unintentional" harm. "Priority" concerns impartial obligations versus agent-relative commitments, and "intensity" concerns the cost ceiling and duty versus supererogatory acts. Maximalism denies any moral free zone. Minimalism restricts obligation to refraining from intentional direct harm. Moderatism accepts a free zone but recognizes conditional positive duties: if one can prevent serious harm at reasonable cost, they are obligated. The focus is whether indirect participation or allowing harm falls within responsibility. The Rule of Assisting in Sin "Assisting in sin" means aiding in sin and wrongful acts; the aider is called "muʿīn" and the direct perpetrator "muʿān." Assistance can be material (providing tools) or moral (encouragement, silence). The realization of the rule has two essential pillars: "the occurrence of the wrongful act in the external world" (conceptual condition) and "the knowledge of the aider of its occurrence" (condition of accountability). Wrongful acts have a broad scope, including religious sin and legal crime. From the combination of these two conditions, four scenarios arise: (1) Knowledge and occurrence: full realization of assistance and responsibility. (2) Absence of knowledge and non-occurrence: negation of responsibility. (3) Knowledge without occurrence (tajarrī): although the title of assistance does not apply, the person is deserving of blame due to evil intent. (4) Occurrence without knowledge: based on the principle of "the ugliness of punishment without statement," no responsibility falls on the aider, except in cases of conclusive summary knowledge within a limited sphere (shubha maḥṣūra). The foundations of the rule are: the Quranic verse "And do not cooperate in sin and aggression" (al-Māʾidah: 2) with a prohibitive command; narrations such as the saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him) that even one who sharpens a pen for an oppressor deserves punishment, and the prohibition of Imam al-Sajjād (peace be upon him) from "assisting oppressors"; and rational reasoning that considers providing the means for a reprehensible act to be itself reprehensible. Explaining the Role of the Rule in the Issue of the Extent of Moral Demand The rule of assisting in sin serves as a criterion for distinguishing the boundaries of the approaches. Minimalism does not accept the binding nature of this rule, because it considers responsibility indivisible and confined to direct action: the seller of a weapon later used in murder merely engaged in a free transaction and has no role in the crime. The obligation to refrain from cooperating in the sins of others severely restricts the moral free zone and imposes an extra burden on the individual. For instance, from a minimalist perspective, a web hosting company is not obliged to cut off service to a gambling site, because the company's act is neutral and responsibility rests solely with the customer. Moderatism goes beyond minimalism precisely by accepting the binding nature of the rule. This acceptance signifies the acknowledgment of causal responsibility and the interconnectedness of human beings. The rule forms the core of negative duties beyond the prohibition of direct harm: "You are not obligated to fix the world, but you must not be an instrument of others' evil." In the web hosting example, as soon as one becomes aware of the wrongful use, continuing the service constitutes assisting in sin and is forbidden. This view also paves the way for conditional positive duties (such as rescuing a drowning person). In contrast, maximalism sees this rule as trivial, because the obligation to maximize the good renders refraining from assistance obvious and even insufficient, and asks what the best use of resources for the common good is. Thus, the rule is dissolved within maximalism's greater obligation. Conclusion The rule of assisting in sin plays a key role in explaining the component of inclusiveness. By extending responsibility to indirect participation and conditioning it on knowledge and the occurrence of the wrongful act, this rule produces four logical scenarios, with full responsibility realized only when knowledge and occurrence converge; in other cases, responsibility is either negated or falls under the category of tajarrī (bare intent). These criteria keep the moral theory away from the laxity of minimalism and the rigor of maximalism, and confirm moderatism. Thus, in the Islamic moral system, the individual is responsible not only for their own direct acts but also for the role they play in the actions of others. References al-Hurr al-Amili, M. (1416 AH). Tafsil wasa'il al-Shi'a ila tahsil masa'il al-shari'a. Al al-Bayt (a.s.) Foundation for the Revival of Heritage. (in Arabic) al-Majlisi, M. B. (1368 SH). Bihar al-anwar al-jami'a li-durar akhbar al-a'imma al-athar (a.s.). Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-Arabi. (in Arabic) Anṣārī, Murtaḍā. (1415 AH). Al-Makāsib. Al-Muʾtamar al-ʿĀlamī. [In Arabic] Bujnūrdī, Ḥasan. (1998). Al-Qawāʿid al-Fiqhiyyah. Al-Hādī. [In Arabic/Persian] Kagan, S. (1989). The limits of morality. Oxford University Press. LaFollette, H. (2007). The practice of ethics. Blackwell. Muḥaqqiq Dāmād, Muṣṭafā. (2004). Qawāʿid-e Fiqh (Bakhsh-e Jazāʾī). Markaz-e Nashr-e ʿUlūm-e Islāmī. [In Persian] Payk-e Ḥarfah, Shīrzād. (2011). Marz-hā-ye Akhlāq. Ney. [In Persian] Peykherfeh, S. (1394 SH). Utilitarianism. Negah-e Moaser. (in Persian) Williams, B. (1981). Moral luck: Philosophical papers 1973–1980. Cambridge University Press. چکیده مسئله «میزان مطالبه اخلاق» یکی از چالش‌برانگیزترین و بنیادی‌ترین مباحث در فلسفه اخلاق معاصر به شمار می‌رود که مرز میان منافع شخصی و الزامات اخلاقی را ترسیم می‌کند. این مسئله با سه مؤلفۀ کلیدی «شمول»، «شدت» و «اولویت» صورت‌بندی شده و منجر به شکل‌گیری سه رویکرد کلی «حداکثرگرا»، «حداقل‌گرا» و «اعتدال‌گرا» شده است. تمرکز اصلی این پژوهش بر واکاوی مؤلفۀ «شمول» است. ذیل بحث شمول، دو تمایز و تفکیک میان «انجام/اجازه ایذاء» و «عامدانه/غیرعامدانه» بودن مطرح می‌شود، که هر یک از رویکردهای سه‌گانۀ پیش‌گفته موضع متفاوتی نسبت به آن دارند. در این‌میان، یکی از قواعدی که ظرفیت بالایی برای تبیین دقیق این تفکیک‌ها و روشن‌سازی دامنۀ مؤلفۀ شمول دارد قاعده فقهی-اخلاقی «اعانه بر اثم» است. مسئله اصلی این مقاله تبیین نقش و جایگاه قاعده «اعانه بر اثم» در تعیین گسترۀ مؤلفۀ شمول است. این قاعده، که ناظر به مشارکت، همکاری و مسئولیت فرد در قبال افعال ناروای دیگران است، بیان می‌دارد که مسئولیت اخلاقی انسان محدود به دایرۀ بستۀ افعال مستقیم شخصی نیست، بلکه فرد در برابر اعمال دیگران نیز مسئولیت دارد و باید پاسخگوی آن‌ها باشد. یافته‌های پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که کاربست این قاعده در تحلیل مؤلفۀ شمول منجر به پذیرش مسئولیت اجتماعی بدون افتادن در دام سخت‌گیری‌های غیرقابل‌تحمل می‌شود. بنابراین، رویکرد برآمده از قاعده اعانه بر اثم مؤید و مقوم «رویکرد اعتدال‌گرا» در مطالبه اخلاقی است.

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دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 28 2 2026 06 22 A Knowledge-Oriented Cumulative Response to the Problem of Gratuitous Evil: A Qur'anic-Hadith Analysis in Confronting William Rowe's Argument پاسخ انباشتی معرفت‌محور به مسئلۀ شر گزاف: تحلیلی قرآنی۔روایی در مواجهه با برهان ویلیام رو 77 106 4612 10.22091/jptr.2026.14389.3424 FA سیده منا موسوی استادیار، گروه شیعه‌شناسی، دانشکده الهیات، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران 0000-0003-1167-8899 فرح رامین استاد، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران 0000-0003-3117-1948 عالمه علامی دانش‌آموخته دکتری، رشته کلام، دانشکده الهیات، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران 0009-0009-8124-1976 Journal Article 2025 11 07 Abstract William Rowe's evidential argument from gratuitous evil claims that instances of intense suffering lacking observable justifying purposes constitute strong evidence against the existence of an omnipotent and perfectly good God. This article develops a knowledge-oriented cumulative response grounded in Qur'anic and Imami traditions. It argues that conventional theodicies—including the best possible world, human free will, divine testing, eschatological reward, and skeptical theism—gain explanatory coherence when organized hierarchically around suffering's epistemic function: generating experiential awareness of human existential poverty and ontological dependence upon God. This awareness, the study contends, constitutes the essential foundation for conscious servitude and spiritual perfection. The proposed model distinguishes itself from aggregative approaches by establishing a hierarchical structure wherein the epistemic role of suffering serves as the organizing principle. Through systematic analysis of Qur'anic verses and hadith traditions, the article demonstrates that suffering participates in a broader divine pedagogical order. The study concludes that Rowe's evidential argument loses its force when suffering is interpreted within this comprehensive epistemic-teleological framework, revealing that apparently pointless evil may serve as an indispensable instrument for human existential transformation. Introduction The problem of evil remains among the most persistent challenges to theistic belief. Within contemporary philosophy of religion, William Rowe's evidential argument from gratuitous evil represents one of the most influential formulations. Rowe contends that instances of intense suffering which appear to serve no morally sufficient purpose provide compelling evidence against the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God. His argument rests on the claim that if such a God existed, apparently pointless suffering would not occur; yet examples of intense, seemingly purposeless suffering abound. From this, Rowe concludes that it is reasonable to believe that at least some evils are genuinely gratuitous. While various responses have been advanced within both Western and Islamic traditions, no single approach has proven entirely satisfactory. This article proposes a novel framework that integrates traditional responses within a hierarchical, knowledge-centered model. Drawing upon Qur'anic and Imami sources, it develops a cumulative response in which the epistemic function of suffering—the production of experiential awareness of human existential poverty and dependence upon God—serves as the organizing principle that structures other theodicies. The hierarchical cumulative model transforms the problem from an evidential obstacle into an opportunity for understanding suffering within a broader teleological and epistemic order. Rather than viewing suffering as merely a difficulty to be explained away, this approach recognizes it as an essential element in the divine pedagogical design for human beings, wherein the very experience of limitation and vulnerability becomes the means through which deeper existential truths are apprehended. The Epistemic Function of Suffering and the Cumulative Framework The foundational claim of this article is that suffering possesses an intrinsic epistemic dimension that transforms its apparent meaninglessness into existential significance. The knowledge produced through suffering is experiential rather than merely conceptual. In moments of intense suffering, human beings encounter the limits of their agency and self-sufficiency. The Qur'an repeatedly emphasizes human weakness: "And God created you in weakness" (Q 30:54) and "Man was created weak" (Q 4:28). Suffering functions to make this ontological reality experientially manifest, transforming abstract recognition into lived awareness. Within Islamic theology, suffering serves a pedagogical function. The Qur'anic concept of ibtilāʾ (testing) is not primarily about measuring faith but about refining the soul. As the Qur'an states: "We will surely test you with something of fear and hunger and loss of wealth and lives and fruits" (Q 2:155). The purpose is to cultivate virtues that cannot be developed in the absence of adversity. The Imami tradition further elaborates this dimension, with Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (as) stating that God afflicts believers with tribulations to awaken them from heedlessness and refine their character. This pedagogical understanding is deeply embedded in the Islamic worldview, wherein every human experience—whether pleasant or painful—carries the potential for spiritual growth and deeper self-awareness. The Hierarchical Cumulative Model. Unlike standard cumulative approaches that simply list independent theodicies, this model organizes traditional responses around the epistemic function of suffering as the central organizing principle. The best possible world defense explains the regularity of natural order, but its deeper significance emerges when natural vulnerability is understood as a context for learning human limits. Free will theodicy explains moral evil, yet its full significance becomes apparent when communities experience the consequences of misused freedom and recognize their need for divine guidance. Divine testing reveals the formative role of trials in moving believers from theoretical belief to experiential conviction. Eschatological justice provides a framework for understanding that present suffering is not the whole moral horizon, suggesting that eschatological reward represents the culmination of the knowledge acquired through suffering. Skeptical theism, often criticized as merely defensive, is reinterpreted as contributing to the epistemic function itself: recognizing one's ignorance becomes a form of humility that is itself part of the knowledge produced through suffering. The model integrates these various theodicies by showing that each addresses a different dimension while remaining incomplete in isolation. When understood as nested dimensions of a single process—the formation of existential knowledge—the model achieves explanatory comprehensiveness. In this integrated vision, the traditional theodicies are not competing explanations but complementary perspectives, each illuminating a particular facet of the complex reality of human suffering within the divine economy. Rethinking Gratuitous Evil. The proposed framework demonstrates that what appears as gratuitous evil in Rowe's sense is actually an instrument for human existential transformation. No suffering is truly pointless; each instance contributes to the broader epistemic order within which human beings come to know themselves and their Creator. This transforms the evidential question from "Is each instance of suffering visibly justified here and now?" to "How does suffering contribute to the broader epistemic and eschatological order?" Conclusion This study has examined Rowe's evidential argument and proposed a knowledge-oriented cumulative response grounded in Qur'anic and Imami sources. The analysis has shown that the inference from apparently pointless suffering to the non-existence of God is not philosophically compelling once suffering is understood within a broader epistemic-teleological framework. The study's main contribution is the articulation of suffering's epistemic function in generating experiential awareness of human existential poverty and dependence upon God, and the development of a hierarchical cumulative model that integrates traditional theodicies around this epistemic center. Conventional responses to the problem of evil, while valuable, remain individually insufficient. When interpreted within the knowledge-oriented cumulative model, however, they gain explanatory coherence: natural law explains the mechanism of suffering, free will explains its moral dimension, testing explains its formative role, eschatology explains its ultimate fulfillment, and skeptical theism reminds us of our epistemic limitations. The proposed model thus transforms the question of gratuitous evil from an evidential obstacle into an existential opportunity. From this perspective, no suffering is genuinely gratuitous. The perceived meaninglessness of suffering reflects human epistemic limitation, not a defect in the divine order. Suffering serves as a teacher, awakening human beings from self-sufficiency, exposing existential vulnerability, and directing attention to the ultimate source of meaning. This knowledge forms the basis for genuine servitude and conscious relationship with God. What appears as evidence against divine goodness becomes, upon deeper examination, evidence of a more profound divine pedagogy. Rowe's argument loses its force when suffering is recognized not as pointless but as an indispensable instrument for human flourishing and fulfillment. References al-Kulaynī, M. ibn Y. (1407 AH). Al-Kāfī. Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyyah. al-Majlisī, M. B. (1403 AH). Biḥār al-anwār. Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī. al-Mufīd, M. ibn M. (1413 AH). Taṣḥīḥ iʿtiqādāt al-Imāmiyya. Qom: Kungirah-i Shaykh Mufīd. al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī, M. Ḥ. (1371 AH). Al-Mīzān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān. Qom: Daftar-i Intishārāt-i Islāmī. Hume, D. (2007). Dialogues concerning natural religion. Oxford University Press. Mackie, J. L. (1955). Evil and omnipotence. Mind, 64(254), 200–212. Mobini, M. (2013). Earth's epistemic fruits for harmony with God. In J. P. McBrayer & D. Howard-Snyder (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to the problem of evil (pp. 296–308). Wiley-Blackwell. Plantinga, A. (1997). Falsafeh-ye Dīn: Khodā, Ekhtīyār va Sharr (M. Saʿīdī Mehr, Trans.). Muʾassaseh-ye Farhangī-ye Ṭahā. [In Persian] Rowe, W. L. (1979). The problem of evil and some varieties of atheism. American Philosophical Quarterly, 16(4), 335–341. Trakakis, N. (2007). The God beyond belief. Springer. Ṭūsī, M. ibn Ḥ. (n.d.). Al-Tibyān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān. Qom: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī. Wainwright, W. J. (2011). Falsafeh-ye Dīn (ʿA. Kermānī, Trans.). Muʾassaseh-ye Āmūzishī va Pizhūhishī-ye Imām Khomeynī. [In Persian] چکیده مسئلۀ شر، به‌ویژه گونۀ «شر گزاف» که ویلیام رو آن را به عنوان شاهدی قرینه‌ای علیه خداباوری طرح کرده است، از چالش‌های بنیادین در فلسفۀ دین به شمار می‌آید. این مقاله، با روش نقلی-تحلیلی و با تمرکز بر آیات قرآن و روایات اهل بیت (ع)، پاسخ‌های مرسوم به مسئلۀ شر، از جمله نظام احسن، اختیار، آزمایش، تعالی روح، پاداش اخروی و خداباوری شکاکانه را بررسی و ارزیابی می‌کند. یافته‌های پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که هیچ یک از این پاسخ‌ها به‌تنهایی کفایت نمی‌کند، اما ترکیب نظام‌مند آن‌ها هنگامی موجه و کارآمد می‌شود که نقش معرفت‌زایی شرور در کانون تحلیل قرار گیرد. مواجهه با شرور نقشی اساسی در ایجاد معرفت نسبت به ضعف وجودی انسان و نیازمندی او به خداوند دارد، و همین معرفت بستر عبودیت و تعالی روح را فراهم می‌سازد. بر این اساس، هیچ شرّی گزاف نیست، و هر یک از شرور سهمی در فرایند معرفت‌افزایی انسان ایفا می‌کند.

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دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 28 2 2026 06 22 The common challenges against 3D and 4D theories: Change and Persistence of Material Objects; a Paraconsistent Solution چالش‌های مبناییِ مشترک سه‌بعدگرایی و چهاربعدگرایی: تغییر و بقاء اشیاء مادی؛ یک راه حل فراسازگار 107 132 4624 10.22091/jptr.2026.15933.3553 FA کسری فارسیان دانشجوی دکتری تخصصی فلسفه-منطق، گروه فلسفه و منطق، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران 0009-0001-6799-8106 سید محمد علی حجتی . استاد گروه فلسفه و منطق، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران 0000-0002-9321-7895 Journal Article 2026 05 10 Abstract The idea that ordinary material objects can change while remaining the same might seem obvious at first. However, some philosophers disagree and find it problematic. There is a serious debate in the literature concerning this problem: “persistence through change (or time)”. In this debate, two rival camps are introduced, each arguing that its interpretation is better than the other's. This discussion can be formulated within two different metaphysical frameworks: three and four-dimensionalism. This paper, in two parts, attempts to show that this metaphysical debate has no champion and that another solution must be sought. The first part addresses the problems with the arguments on both sides of the debate by showing that neither three-dimensionalism nor four-dimensionalism provides a convincing response to certain criticisms. In short, 3Dists fail to explain “Persistence of changing things,” whereas 4Dists are involved in describing how things really “change”. The second part also aims to show that there are more fundamental problems behind this debate that make both approaches problematic. We reveal this fundamental problem by posing a version of the Sorites Paradox. Finally, we show that by using a second-order version of LP (Logic of Paradox), a solution is at hand. Keywords:The Problem of Change, Persistence through Change, Three-Dimensionalism, Four-Dimensionalism, Sorites Argument, Logic of Paradox Introduction We all intuitively accept that the material objects around us change, yet remain the same thing as before. For example, if we replace the battery of our watch, we believe that this watch is the very same watch that we received as a gift from a friend 10 years ago. There is also a widely accepted philosophical principle that states, "Two objects are identical if and only if they share all of their properties" (LLI). Here, there appears to be an inconsistency: • If things really change, then before and after the change they must be non-identical. Therefore, if things are non-identical before and after the change, then in fact they have not changed at all. Thus, the issue that initially appeared obvious is not simple at all. In confronting this issue, an extensive literature has emerged in contemporary metaphysics, which, with a slight lack of precision, may be formulated under the dispute between the three-dimensionalist and four-dimensionalist frameworks. This article is a sketch of that dispute, and an attempt to demonstrate the fundamental problems of both approaches. Three-Dimensionalism and Four-Dimensionalism and the Problem of the Persistence of Material Objects Three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism are two general metaphysical frameworks that present a general account of the way material objects exist through time; they also provide an interpretation of the real structure of the material object. Indeed, standard three-dimensionalism is the sum of A-theory and presentism in the ontology of time, while standard four-dimensionalism is the sum of B-theory and eternalism. Corresponding to these two metaphysical frameworks are two theories concerning the problem of the persistence of ordinary material objects through change (or time): endurantism, which holds that the object is a three-dimensional entity that is wholly present at every moment of time, that is, the persistence of the object requires that it endure through different times; and perdurantism, which states that the object is a four-dimensional entity, and its persistence through time is due to its temporal parts; in brief, the object perdures through time. If one asks what change means in the 3Dist and 4Dist frameworks, one may answer, for the former, change means that a three-dimensional object passes wholly from one moment to another, and in this transition some of its properties undergo alteration; whereas for the latter, the material object is like a worm extended throughout space-time, and change in it means that each of its temporal parts possesses different properties. In the literature, there is an important turning point, namely David Lewis' argument from temporary intrinsics. Lewis argues that change is change in the intrinsic properties of an object, and that such a thing entails failure of three-dimensionalism (endurantism) and endorse of four-dimensionalism (perdurantism). How? If an apple was unripe in the spring and became ripe in the summer, and according to endurantism the three-dimensional object is wholly present at every moment, then the apple must be both unripe and ripe, and this is a contradiction. Therefore, Lewis concludes that the material object is a four-dimensional entity possessing temporal parts, one temporal part of which (in the spring) is unripe and another temporal part of which (in the summer) is ripe. In confronting this problem, there are several solutions, all of which have problems: 1. Presentism + Endurantism → Failure in explaining the persistence of objects. 2. Non-presentism + Endurantism → The fixity of properties relative to time. 3. Perdurantism → Changing the subject: there is no such thing as change (in the sense of Alternation). Although there are criticisms and responses to them in the literature between the two sides of the controversy, the problem with these two approaches is more fundamental. The problem actually lies in the inconsistency between the basic metaphysical and logical assumptions of both frameworks. Sorites-Style Paradoxes, the 3D and 4D Dispute, and Paraconsistency It appears that, from a meta-metaphysical perspective, it can be understood that both the standard 3Dist account and the standard 4Dist interpretation of the problem of change contain two incompatible assumptions: the acceptance of bivalent logic and the belief in the truth of LLI. Simultaneously accepting these two foundational assumptions commits us to accepting the undesirable consequences of Sorites-style paradoxes in the discussion of change. If a red object is exposed to sunlight and, over many years, gradually changes color until it ultimately becomes completely white, we must accept that the final object is still red. Why must we accept this? The answer is simple: because in standard logic it is assumed that identity has the properties of transitivity and substitutivity. This challenge has been presented in the literature through different versions of the Puzzle of the Ship of Theseus, and it has been shown that both three-dimensionalists and four-dimensionalists will provide unacceptable answers to this puzzle. To solve this challenge, various approaches may be presented. This paper proposes that we should initially take a step back and say that change is fundamentally a gradual and inconsistent process. Then, in light of contemporary works in paraconsistent logic, we are able to introduce a second-order version of LP in such a way that, although LLI holds, identity exhibits non-standard (non-transitive) behavior, and for this reason the undesirable consequences of Sorites paradoxes in the discussion of change can be avoided. Conclusion The conclusion reached in this paper was formulated in two parts. First, in the dispute between three-dimensionalists and four-dimensionalists, there are serious criticisms and challenges against both sides of the dispute, such that neither side can be regarded as the winner of this controversy. Second, in addition to those criticisms, there is a more fundamental problem before them, and this problem becomes apparent through a meta-metaphysical study of the issue: the inconsistency between their two assumptions (the acceptance of standard logic and the acceptance of LLI), which leads us to accept the undesirable consequences of Sorites paradoxes. Finally, one solution was suggested, namely the acceptance of LP as the underlying logic of metaphysics. References Baker, L. (1999). Unity without identity: A new look at material constitution. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23(10), 144–165. Cattermole, T. (2016). Paraconsistent logics and identity: A pragmatic approach [Master's thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam]. Gallois, A. (2016). Identity over time. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford University. Goswick, D. L. (2013). Change and identity over time. In H. Dyke & A. Bardon (Eds.), A companion to the philosophy of time (pp. 365–386). Wiley. Hawley, K. (2024). Temporal parts. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford University. Hodjati, S. M. A., & Farsian, K. (2025). Paraconsistency and Aristotlean-Avecinnian account of the identity across change. Logical Studies, (forthcoming), Article e10113. https://doi.org/10.30465/lsj.2025.51005.1493 (in Persian) Le Poidevin, R. (1991). Change, cause and contradiction: A defence of the tenseless theory of time. St. Martin's Press. Leibniz, G. W. (2020). Discourse on metaphysics (G. Rodriguez-Pereyra, Ed. & Trans.). Oxford University Press. Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Blackwell. Loux, M. J. (2006). Metaphysics: A contemporary introduction (3rd ed.). Routledge. Magidor, O. (2015). Endurantism vs. perdurantism?: A debate reconsidered. Noûs, 50(3), 509–532. McTaggart, J. E. (1908). The Unreality of Time. Mind, 17, 457–474. Merricks, T. (1994). Endurance and indiscernibility. The Journal of Philosophy, 91, 165–184. Sattig, T. (2006). The language and reality of time. Oxford University Press. این‌که چیزهای مادی متعارف اطراف ما تغییر می‌کنند اما همان شئ باقی می‌مانند در ابتدا بدیهی به‌نظر می‌رسد، اما برخی فیلسوفان چنین نظری ندارند. مناقشه‌ی مهمی بر سر همین مسئله، «بقاء شئ طی تغییر» ، وجود دارد و دو گروه رقیب در آن استدلال‌های متعددی علیه یکدیگر مطرح می‌کنند تا نشان دهند تفسیر خودشان از بقاء اشیاء، تفسیر درست است. این نزاع را می‌توان ذیل دو چارچوب متافیزیکی مختلف، یعنی سه‌بعدگرایی و چهاربعدگرایی صورت‌بندی کرد. این مقاله در دو بخش سعی دارد نشان دهد هردوی این رویکردها با اشکالات اساسی‌ای مواجه‌اند و باید به دنبال راه حل دیگری بود. بخش نخست به مشکلات استدلال‌های هر دو طرف مناقشه پرداخته، سعی دارد نشان دهد هم سه‌بعدگرایی، هم چهاربعدگرایی در مواجهه با برخی انتقادات رایج در ادبیات پاسخی برای گفتن ندارند. خلاصه‌ این که سه‌بعدگرایان در توضیح مسئله‌ی «بقاء» به مشکل می‌خورند و چهاربعدگرایان گرفتارِ توضیحِ مسئله‌ی «تغییر» خواهند بود. بخش دوم قصد دارد نشان دهد ایراد بنیادین‌تری در پشتِ این نزاع است که هردو رویکرد را با مشکل روبرو می‌سازد. این ایراد بنیادین را با مطرح کردن نسخه‌ای از پارادوکس خرمن نشان می‌دهیم. در انتها پیشنهاد می‌دهیم که راه حل برون‌رفت از این مشکلات، از دریچه‌ی منطق فراسازگارِ LP می‌تواند بگذرد.

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دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 28 2 2026 06 22 The Transformation of the Concept of Divine Infinity in the Greek Tradition: With Emphasis on the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa تحول مفهوم بی‌نهایتِ الهی در سنت یونانی با تأکید برالهیات گریگوری نیسایی 133 154 4363 10.22091/jptr.2026.13673.3358 FA حسن احمدی زاده دانشیار، گروه ادیان و فلسفه دانشگاه کاشان، کاشان، ایران 0000-0002-1125-1441 Journal Article 2025 08 18 Abstract The concept of infinity has deep roots in ancient Greek thought, yet its historical development does not exhibit a continuous evolution. This article traces the ontological-theological trajectory of infinity in Greek philosophy and its transformation into a divine attribute, with emphasis on Gregory of Nyssa's theology. Greek thinkers employed apeiron to denote both quantitative and qualitative infinity, though the latter predominates in theological contexts. Plato and Aristotle rejected divine infinity as incompatible with perfection, equating it with formlessness and deficiency. By contrast, Philo of Alexandria and Plotinus initiated a crucial shift by attributing infinity to God, linking it to divine incomprehensibility and transcendence. Gregory of Nyssa represents the culmination of this development, being the first thinker to offer a detailed account of divine infinity. His theology, however, remains ambiguous: while some passages suggest God is infinite in essence, others emphasize divine incomprehensibility within a negative theological framework. Gregory's approach oscillates between ontological and epistemological interpretations, ultimately employing infinity to articulate divine transcendence and the human spiritual journey toward God. The study concludes that Gregory's notion of divine infinity, though conceptually imprecise, significantly transformed Christian theology by establishing infinity as a primary divine attribute. Keywords: Divine Infinity, Greek Philosophy, Apeiron, Gregory of Nyssa, Negative Theology, Divine Incomprehensibility Introduction The concept of infinity constitutes one of the most profound and challenging notions in the history of Western thought. Its trajectory from pre-Socratic philosophy to Christian theology reveals a complex transformation in which a mathematical and cosmological concept gradually acquired theological significance. Unlike other fundamental philosophical concepts, the history of infinity in ancient Greek thought does not follow a continuous development but exhibits diverse and sometimes contradictory interpretations. Pre-Socratic philosophers, particularly Anaximander, conceived of the apeiron as the originating principle of all things, possessing both ontological and ethical significance. The Pythagoreans, by contrast, adopted a negative attitude toward infinity, emphasizing its association with indeterminacy and imperfection. The decisive turn regarding divine infinity came with Plato and Aristotle, who rejected its attribution to God on the grounds that infinity entails formlessness and imperfection. For them, determination and form were essential to perfection, and God, as the most perfect being, could not be characterized by the absence of form. This view, however, was challenged by the Neoplatonic tradition, particularly Plotinus, who identified the One as infinite precisely because it transcended all determination. Philo of Alexandria, drawing on Jewish theological resources, also contributed to this transformation by linking divine infinity with incomprehensibility. This article examines the transformation of divine infinity from Greek philosophy to Gregory of Nyssa's theology. The central question is: How did infinity, initially viewed as a mark of imperfection, become a primary attribute of God? By tracing these developments, the article demonstrates that Gregory played a pivotal role in establishing divine infinity as a cornerstone of Christian theology. The Development of Divine Infinity in Greek Philosophy Pre-Socratic and Platonic-Aristotelian Perspectives. The earliest Greek thinkers engaged with infinity primarily as a cosmological principle. Anaximander identified the apeiron as the origin of all things—a principle unlimited in time and space, governing the cosmos in a quasi-divine manner. However, it remained unclear whether this apeiron was material, abstract, or divine. For Anaximander, infinity denoted the absence of limitation rather than a positive attribute. Plato and Aristotle fundamentally rejected this conception. For Plato, indeterminacy signified deficiency requiring the formative activity of the Demiurge. Form and determination were essential to being. Aristotle defined infinity in quantitative terms and denied the existence of actual infinity, viewing it as merely potential. Consequently, God, as the most perfect being, could not be infinite. This view dominated Western thought for centuries. The Neoplatonic Reversal. The crucial shift toward affirming divine infinity occurred within Neoplatonism. Philo of Alexandria was among the first to explicitly attribute infinity to God, arguing that God is incomprehensible precisely because he is infinite, transcending all spatial and temporal limitations. Philo's innovation lay in linking divine infinity with incomprehensibility, providing an epistemological rationale for negative theology. Plotinus completed this reversal by identifying the One as infinite. For Plotinus, determination was precisely what limited and diminished perfection. The One, as the ultimate principle, transcended all determination; its infinity was a mark of absolute transcendence. However, Plotinus also applied infinity to matter and evil, indicating the concept was not univocally attributed to the divine. Despite this ambiguity, Plotinus paved the way for Christian theologians to conceive of God as infinite without sacrificing divine perfection. Gregory of Nyssa and the Theology of Divine Infinity The Ambiguity of Divine Infinity in Gregory's Thought. Gregory of Nyssa stands as the first Christian theologian to offer a detailed account of divine infinity. He repeatedly affirms that God is infinite and considers this attribute essential to the divine nature. In his Contra Eunomium, he emphasizes the ontological chasm between uncreated and created natures: one is finite, the other infinite. This contrast underscores divine transcendence and the inadequacy of human concepts. However, scholars disagree on Gregory's precise meaning. One interpretation holds that God's essence itself is infinite, ontologically unlimited. Another interpretation suggests that Gregory's language functions within negative theology, emphasizing that God is incomprehensible and beyond all names. The article argues that both interpretations find textual support, reflecting the inherent difficulty of the concept rather than a deficiency in Gregory's thought. He employs apeiron in multiple senses without clearly distinguishing them. This imprecision does not diminish his contribution: he established divine infinity as a central theological category. The Epistemological and Ontological Dimensions. Gregory's treatment encompasses both epistemological and ontological dimensions. Epistemologically, divine infinity entails incomprehensibility: because God is infinite, the human mind cannot fully grasp his essence. Gregory employs Moses' ascent of Mount Sinai to illustrate this: Moses continually ascends toward God, yet the journey never ends because God is infinite. This vision of endless progress (epektasis) becomes central to Gregory's spiritual theology, shaping human perfection as endless participation in the infinite divine life. Ontologically, divine infinity serves to protect divine transcendence and absolute perfection. If God were finite, he would be limited by something beyond himself, compromising his perfection. Gregory argues that conceiving God as finite implies something greater encompasses him. The only way to preserve divine perfection is to affirm that God is infinite, transcending all limitations. This ontological reading points toward God as the absolute ground of all being. Conclusion This study has traced the transformation of divine infinity from Greek philosophy to Gregory of Nyssa's theology. The concept underwent a significant reversal: from being viewed as a mark of imperfection in Platonic and Aristotelian thought, it became a primary attribute of divine perfection in Neoplatonism and Christian theology. Gregory played a pivotal role, being the first thinker to offer a detailed treatment of divine infinity and incorporate it into a comprehensive theological vision. Gregory's contribution remains conceptually ambiguous. He employs apeiron in multiple senses—ontological infinity, qualitative transcendence, and epistemological incomprehensibility. This ambiguity reflects the inherent difficulty of the concept rather than a deficiency in Gregory's thought. What is clear is that Gregory established divine infinity as a cornerstone of Christian theology, linking it to both divine transcendence and human spiritual transformation. The implications extend beyond intellectual history. Gregory's vision of endless progress toward the infinite God offers a profound account of human perfection as dynamic participation in an infinite good rather than attainment of a finite end. This vision shaped subsequent Christian theology, influencing thinkers from Maximus the Confessor to modern theologians. The concept of divine infinity, transformed from a Greek philosophical notion into a central Christian teaching, continues to challenge and inspire theological reflection on the nature of God and the human relationship to the divine. References Aristotle. (1999). Samāʿ-e Ṭabīʿī (Fīzīk) (M. Ḥ. Loṭfī, Trans.). Ṭarḥ-e Now. [In Persian] Geljon, A.-K. (2005). Divine infinity in Gregory of Nyssa and Philo of Alexandria. Vigiliae Christianae, 59(2), 152–177. Gregory of Nyssa. (1978). The life of Moses (A. J. Malherbe & E. Ferguson, Trans.). Gregory of Nyssa. (1999). Saint Gregory of Nyssa: Ascetical works (V. W. Callahan, Trans.). The Catholic University of America Press. Gregory of Nyssa. (2007). Contra Eunomium II (S. G. Hall, Trans.). Brill. Gregory of Nyssa. (2023). On the human image of God. Oxford University Press. Huffman, C. (2005). Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, philosopher and mathematician king. Cambridge University Press. Jaeger, W. (1936). The theology of the early Greek philosophers. Oxford University Press. Motia, M. (2022a). Imitations of infinity: Gregory of Nyssa and the transformation of mimesis. University of Pennsylvania Press. Motia, M. (2022b). Dionysius and Gregory of Nyssa. In M. Edwards (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of Dionysius the Areopagite. Oxford University Press. Sweeney, L. (1992). Divine infinity in Greek and medieval thought. Peter Lang. Żiāʾī, A. A. (2021). Moʿżal-e Bī-Nihāyat dar Riyāżīyāt va Falsafeh. Intishārāt-e Beyn al-Melalī-ye Amīn. [In Persian] چکیده یونانیان و نیز الهی‌دانان مسیحی‌ای که متأثر از آن‌ها بوده‌اند، مانند گریگوری نیسایی، با رویکردهای مختلفی از مفهوم بی‌نهایت سخن گفته‌اند. در اِسناد این مفهوم به خداوند، دقیقاً مشخص نیست که ایشان چه معنایی از آن در نظر دارند. یونانیان هم از بی‌نهایتِ کمّی سخن گفته‌اند هم از بی‌نهایتِ کیفی. اما اکثر ایشان و نیز الهی‌دانان مسیحی، در درجۀ اول، به بی‌نهایت نه از نظر کمیت، بلکه به عنوان کیفیتی منحصربه‌فرد از خداوند می‌اندیشند، کیفیتی که ارتباط مستقیمی با عدد و اندازه‌گیری ندارد. از نظر گریگوری، طبیعت الهی تغییرناپذیر و فاقد هر گونه ضدی است که بتواند او را محدود سازد، و از آنجا که خداوند هیچ ضدی ندارد، در نیکویی و دیگر کمالات بی‌حدوحصر است. در جستار حاضر تلاش خواهیم کرد تا سرگذشتِ هستی‌شناختی-الهیاتیِ مفهوم بی‌نهایت در اندیشۀ یونانیان باستان و تأثیر آن در دیدگاه گریگوری نیسایی را بررسی کنیم. این مفهوم به بخشی از الهیات سلبی در آثار گریگوری نیسایی تبدیل می‌شود. از نظر او، به دلیل شدت تعالیِ خداوند، ذات او را نمی‌توان با هیچ نامی بیان کرد. گریگوری اولین متفکری است که به‌تفصیل در مورد بی‌نهایت الهی بحث می‌کند، اگرچه این مفهوم در دیگر پدران کاپادوکیه‌ای نیز ظاهر می‌شود.

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دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 28 2 2026 06 22 Epistemological Dualism in Functionalism and the Explanation of Causal Roles دوگانه‌گرایی معرفت‌شناختی در نظریۀ کارکردگرایی و تبیین نقش‌های علّی 155 180 4561 10.22091/jptr.2026.13435.3335 FA میلاد روشنی پایان گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران ایران 0000-0001-5770-8999 اصغر واعظی گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران, ایران 0000-0003-1400-1904 Journal Article 2025 07 23 Abstract Functionalism is one of the most widely accepted contemporary theories in the philosophy of mind for explaining consciousness. It is based on the principle of multiple realizability. According to this principle, the function of a system does not have an intrinsic correlation with its physical substrate. Therefore, systems with different physical properties can perform similar functions. This principle rests on the assumption that a system's function depends solely on its causal roles within a causal network. In contemporary philosophy of mind, the nature of causal roles has been a topic of intense debate. This debate has not only arisen between proponents and opponents of functionalism, but also among different branches within the functionalist school itself. One of the most heated discussions in this area has been between reductionists, who argue that causal roles can be reduced to physicalist functions, and non-reductionists, who believe in the metaphysical independence of causal roles.This paper, after outlining the foundations of functionalism and the areas of disagreement, aims to offer an epistemological approach to address the existing challenges in explaining causal roles. Keywords: consciousness, causal network, philosophy of mind, causal exclusion principle, physicalism Introduction Functionalism emerged as a response to the shortcomings of behaviorism and the identity theory in explaining mental states. While behaviorism focused exclusively on observable behavior and the identity theory reduced mental states to specific neurobiological processes, functionalism defines mental states by the causal roles they play within a system. It argues that mental phenomena, such as pain, are characterized by their functional relations to sensory inputs, internal states, and behavioral outputs rather than by their physical realization. By embracing the principle of multiple realizability, functionalism provides a more flexible framework for understanding the mind, allowing identical mental functions to be instantiated through diverse biological or artificial structures. This principle, however, rests on a foundational assumption that has become the locus of intense contemporary debate: the nature of the causal roles themselves. The question of whether these roles are metaphysically independent of their physical substrates or are ultimately reducible to them has not only divided functionalists from their critics but has also created a significant schism within the functionalist school itself. This internal debate fundamentally questions the explanatory power of non-reductive functionalism, particularly when confronted with the causal closure of the physical domain. This paper aims to navigate this complex terrain by proposing an epistemological framework that reconciles the competing demands of physicalist ontology and the functionalist emphasis on causal organization. We argue that by adopting an epistemological dualism, it becomes possible to maintain the scientific legitimacy of higher-level functional explanations without falling prey to the causal exclusion argument. This approach suggests that while mental states are ontologically realized through physical processes, their explanatory significance can be understood through their unique roles within cognitive models, offering a coherent path forward for functionalist theory. Causal Roles and the Irrelevance of Physical Structure This section develops the functionalist claim that mental states are defined by their causal roles rather than by their physical constitution. Mental phenomena such as pain contribute to an organism’s survival by mediating between sensory inputs, other mental states, and behavioral responses. Because these causal functions can be realized through different physical substrates, functionalism endorses the principle of multiple realization and rejects the identification of mental states with specific neural structures. The section then examines Hilary Putnam’s computational interpretation of the mind through the model of the Turing machine. Putnam argues that a system’s logical organization, rather than its physical implementation, determines its mental states, thereby reinforcing the functionalist distinction between causal organization and material realization. This computational framework established one of the central philosophical foundations of modern functionalism. Putnam argued that mental states are functional rather than physical, using the Turing machine to distinguish causal organization from material realization. His probabilistic automaton extended functionalism to explain the complexity and variability of human cognition. The Problem of Causal Exclusion and the Return to Reductionist Physicalism This section examines Jaegwon Kim’s critique of classical functionalism through the problem of causal exclusion. Kim argues that if the physical domain is causally closed, mental causation must ultimately be explained in physical terms, making non-reductive functionalism difficult to sustain. He proposes that multiple realizability is compatible with local reductions of mental states to distinct physical realizations rather than a single universal reduction. The debate highlights the tension between preserving the causal efficacy of mental states and maintaining a coherent physicalist ontology. Epistemological Dualism: A Bridge Between Reductionism and Non-Reductionism This section explores attempts to reconcile reductionist physicalism with non-reductive functionalism. Shoemaker explains mental causation through inherited causal powers grounded in physical states, while Ludwig distinguishes metaphysical causation from epistemic causal dependence to preserve functional explanations without abandoning physicalism. Drawing on Woodward’s interventionist account of causation, the discussion argues that mental states can retain explanatory significance despite their physical realization, suggesting an epistemological framework that bridges reductionist and non-reductionist interpretations of functionalism. This section proposes epistemological dualism as a way to reconcile reductionist physicalism with non-reductive functionalism. While mental states are ontologically grounded in physical processes, they can be understood epistemologically through their functional roles within cognitive systems. Functional explanations therefore retain scientific value without competing with physical causation. By distinguishing ontological realization from epistemological description, this framework preserves multiple realizability and supports higher-level functional models applicable to both biological and artificial systems, offering a coherent response to the problem of causal exclusion. Conclusion Functionalism advanced the philosophy of mind by explaining mental states through their causal roles and accommodating multiple realizability, thereby overcoming key limitations of behaviorism and identity theory. Nevertheless, Kim’s causal exclusion argument challenged non-reductive functionalism by insisting that causal explanations remain grounded in the physical domain. This article argues that an epistemological dualist framework offers a viable reconciliation. While mental states are ontologically realized through physical processes, they can be understood epistemologically as higher-level functional References Camlin, J. (2025). Post-biological functional epistemology in recursive AI: Disproving Searle and Chalmers through the Camlin–Cognita dual theorem - Δ⨀Ψ∇. Meta-Ai: Journal of Post-Biological Epistemics, 1(1). Davidson, D. (1960). Mental events. In Essays on actions and events (pp. 170–187). Oxford University Press. Davidson, D. (1973). Material mind. In Essays on actions and events (pp. 200–211). Oxford University Press. Gulick, R. V. (1983). Functionalism as a theory of mind. Philosophy Research Archives, 8, 185–204. https://doi.org/10.5840/pra1982820 Kim, J. (1989). The myth of nonreductive materialism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 63(3), 31–47. Kim, J. (2010). Philosophy of mind (3rd ed.). Westview Press. Kind, A. (2018). The mind-body problem in 20th-century philosophy. In Philosophy of mind in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (pp. 52–77). Routledge. Kobes, B. W. (2014). Functionalist theories of consciousness. In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans, & P. Wilken (Eds.), The Oxford companion to consciousness (pp. 310–315). Oxford University Press. Ludwig, K. (1998). Functionalism, causation, and causal relevance. Psyche: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Consciousness, 4(3), 1–26. Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47(1), 44–50. Putnam, H. (1960). Minds and machines. In Philosophical papers: Mind, language and reality (pp. 362–385). Cambridge University Press. Putnam, H. (1967a). The nature of mental states. In Philosophical papers, volume 2: Mind, language and reality (pp. 429–441). Cambridge University Press. Putnam, H. (1967b). The mental life of some machines. In Philosophical papers: Mind, language and reality (pp. 408–428). Cambridge University Press. Shoemaker, S. (2007). Physical realization. Oxford University Press. Skinner, B. F. (1965). Science and human behavior (Internet ed.). B. F. Skinner Foundation. Turing, A. M. (1936). On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 2(42), 230–265. Woodward, J. (2005). Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation. Oxford University Press. چکیده کارکردگرایی یکی از پذیرفته‌شده‌ترین نظریه‌های امروز فلسفۀ ذهن در تبیین آگاهی است، که مبتنی بر اصل تحقق‌پذیری چندگانه است. بر پایۀ اصل تحقق‌پذیری چندگانه، کارکرد یک سامانه همبستگی ذاتی با بستر فیزیکی آن ندارد. از این رو، سامانه‌هایی با خصوصیات فیزیکی متفاوت می‌توانند کارکردهای مشابهی داشته باشند. این اصل بر این فرض استوار است که کارکرد یک سامانه صرفاً متکی بر نقش‌های علّی در شبکۀ علیّت است. در فلسفۀ ذهن امروز، چیستیِ نقش‌های علّی محل بحث بسیار بوده و منجر به بحثی گسترده نه تنها در میان موافقان و مخالفان کارکردگرایی، بلکه در میان نحله‌های متفاوت در مکتب کارکردگرایی نیز شده است. در این میان، بحث میان طرفداران فروکاست‌گرایی، که معتقد به فروکاست نقش‌های علّی به کارکردهای فیزیکالیستی هستند، با طرفداران نافروکاست‌گرایی، که معتقد به استقلال متافیزیکی نقش‌های علّی هستند، یکی از داغ‌ترین مباحث این حوزه بوده است. در این مقاله، پس از طرح مبادی کارکردگرایی و محل‌های اختلاف، تلاش شده تا از موضعی معرفت‌شناختی راهکاری برای دشواری‌های موجود در تبیین نقش‌های علّی ارائه شود.

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دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 28 2 2026 06 22 Perfectionist Luck: Non-Volitional Factors and Obstacles in the Perfection of the Soul شانس‌های استکمالی: عوامل و موانع غیراختیاری در استکمال نفس 181 212 4390 10.22091/jptr.2026.12532.3263 FA محمد مهدی منتصری استادیار گروه ادیان و عرفان، بنیاد پژوهش‌های اسلامی آستان قدس رضوی، مشهد، ایران 0000-0001-8991-5300 زینب برخورداری دانشیار گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران 0000-0246-8536-2900 Journal Article 2025 03 11 Abstract Philosophical perfectionism grounds human flourishing in the development of essential human capacities, while the problem of moral luck highlights how factors beyond one’s control shape moral judgment. This paper introduces the concept of ‘perfectionist luck’ to bridge the theoretical gap between these two frameworks. Rather than treating non‑volitional factors as mere static preconditions, it reconceives them as dynamic, path‑shaping elements within the very process of the perfection of the soul. The central question is how these factors influence the process of moral “becoming,” beyond their role in external evaluation. Using conceptual analysis and a descriptive‑critical method, the study articulates three dimensions of perfectionist luck: ontological, moral‑normative, and deontic. The findings demonstrate that perfectionist lucks not only personalize moral duties but also shift the basis of moral judgment toward context‑sensitive fairness and enable a duty‑ethics rooted in the recognition of luck. The article then addresses potential objections, displaying the logical coherence of the concept. Keywords: Perfectionism; Moral Luck; Perfectionist Luck; Perfection of the Soul; Free will; Contextual Ethics; Moral Fairness. Introduction Philosophical ethics has long sought to explain the path to the good life and self‑perfection, yet human life abounds with factors such as innate talents, family circumstances, and unpredictable events that lie outside the agent’s direct control. Two distinct intellectual currents exist: ‘philosophical perfectionism,’ which sees human happiness in the flourishing of one’s essential nature, and ‘moral luck,’ which, by critiquing Kantian deontology, shows how non‑volitional factors shape our moral judgments. A fundamental question, however, remains unanswered: do these factors, before affecting our “judgment” of an agent, not influence the very “process” of internalizing virtues and realizing self‑perfection? The main theoretical gap is the absence of a concept that can explain how matters beyond the agent’s control—not as static preconditions but as dynamic, process‑shaping forces—facilitate or obstruct the path of perfection. This study introduces and analyzes “perfectionist luck” to fill that gap, and after explicating the concept’s dimensions, addresses the objections it faces. The necessity of the discussion stems from the fact that perfectionist philosophers, despite emphasizing the virtues needed for happiness, have paid scant attention to the fundamental disparities in the conditions for acquiring those virtues. The methodology is conceptual analysis with a descriptive‑critical approach and deductive reasoning. Conceptual Foundations and Dimensions of Perfectionist Luck Philosophical perfectionism in its narrow sense defines human well‑being in terms of the flourishing of human nature, a tradition stretching from Aristotle to contemporary thinkers. The common core of these views is the development of intrinsic human capacities toward objective goods. Moral luck, brought to prominence by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, shows that our moral evaluations rely heavily on factors beyond the agent’s control. These two rich traditions have so far lacked a connecting link. Perfectionist luck is exactly that missing link: the systematic influence of non‑volitional factors on the process of realizing existential and moral perfections. Its key distinction from moral luck lies in the point of focus; moral luck concerns our external evaluation of an act or agent, whereas perfectionist luck concerns the effect of non‑volitional factors on the process of internalizing virtues and vices within the soul. The former deals with “evaluation,” the latter with “becoming.” Based on the conceptual framework of the article, perfectionist luck can be identified in three dimensions. In the ontological dimension, non‑volitional factors such as temperament, congenital health, and genetic makeup provide the raw material and the ground for the existential intensification of the soul, determining the fundamental possibility and quality of the perfection path before any moral decision is made. The moral‑normative dimension has two intertwined aspects: first, the causal role of non‑volitional factors in forming character traits and moral personality; second, a basis for fairly evaluating perfection. If we accept that character is to some degree the product of luck, then our criterion for judging someone’s virtuousness or viciousness cannot merely look at their final state; it must consider the path they have traversed and the ratio of their achievements to their initial perfectionist circumstances. This outlook makes judgment context‑sensitive and fair. The deontic dimension shows that perfectionist lucks personalize moral duties. A person born into absolute poverty, for instance, has a different moral duty from one raised in affluence. Perfectionist luck determines the objective framework of moral action and, instead of imposing uniform duties, proposes a “context‑sensitive deontology.” Thus, luck no longer appears as a threat to the control principle but as the very arena in which the will emerges and each person’s unique path of flourishing takes shape. Addressing Objections and Evaluation Because perfectionist luck lies at the boundary of “is” and “ought,” it faces several objections, six of which are treated in the article. The first is the naturalistic fallacy: how can one move from descriptive “is” statements to normative “ought” statements? The response is that perfectionist luck does not claim a linear inference; rather, it offers a three‑layer analytical framework: the ontological layer merely describes the fact of non‑volitional factors’ influence; the moral‑normative layer, by adding the principle of fairness, yields the “ought” of moderated judgment; and the deontic layer, by adding the principle of responsibility, derives context‑sensitive duties. The second objection is “negative perfection:” if perfection is taken as the mere flourishing of capacities, then a skilled villain has also achieved perfection. The answer lies in distinguishing between generic flourishing and perfection in its philosophical sense, which is oriented toward the actualization of inherently valuable capacities such as rationality and justice. Thus, perfectionist luck can be positive (conducive to virtues) or negative (obstructive to virtues), but the latter never constitutes genuine perfection. The third objection concerns the derivation of moral judgment: if each person has a unique background, how can a universal rule for judgment be obtained from such plurality? The answer is that the resulting rule is a negative meta‑ethical principle, namely “ethical humility.” Perfectionist luck demands that, given our ignorance of all the dimensions of another’s context, we refrain from absolute and simplistic judgments. The fourth objection is relativism about the end of perfection: does perfectionist luck imply the collapse of a single human end? In response, a distinction is drawn between “the end of the species” and “personal paths of flourishing.” The shared end remains rational‑moral flourishing based on the common human essence, while perfectionist luck diversifies the paths, priorities, and obstacles toward that single end. The fifth objection concerns moral fairness: can a theory that ties happiness to luck be fair? The answer is affirmative, because genuine fairness does not mean ignoring differences but incorporating them into the measure of judgment. The standard of fair judgment is the ratio of effort and will to the agent’s perfectionist context, not the final state. Finally, the sixth objection is divine justice: are non‑volitional disparities compatible with God’s justice? Within the framework of Islamic theology, the concept of perfectionist luck shows that divine justice is not an abstract, uniform reckoning but a measurement of “the ratio of actualized potential to endowed capacities” and the quality of the individual’s moral response to their circumstances, which accords with Qurʾānic principles of responsibility according to capacity. Discussion The concept of perfectionist luck reveals that the traditions of perfectionism and moral luck, despite their separate histories, overlap at a deeper level. The article’s assessment indicates that this concept, by providing a realistic account of the process of moral becoming, lends dynamism to perfectionism and an inward, anthropological dimension to moral luck. Moreover, a comparison with approaches such as care ethics and capability ethics shows certain affinities, yet none explicitly link non‑volitional factors to the teleological structure of the perfection of the soul. Perfectionist luck, particularly for the Islamic philosophical tradition—where temperament, upbringing, and divine justice hold a prominent place—opens a fertile ground for historical inquiries. Conclusion This research demonstrates that ‘perfectionist luck’ is an independent and necessary theoretical concept that fills the gap between perfectionism and moral luck. Non‑volitional factors are not peripheral but central to the process of self‑perfection, playing a decisive role at the ontological, moral‑normative, and deontic levels. The core conclusion is that fair moral evaluation becomes possible only when grounded in the path of perfection rather than merely in its final outcome. The responses provided to potential objections show that this framework possesses logical coherence and can serve as a more explanatory alternative to competing theories. Furthermore, the article opens new avenues for future research, including the identification of instances of perfectionist luck in the works of Muslim philosophers and the exploration of the theological implications of the concept. References Ibn Sīnā. (1984). Al‑Shifāʾ: al‑Manṭiq (The Healing: Logic). Maktabat Āyat Allāh al‑Marʿashī al‑Najafī. Tamaddun‑fard, F. (2020). Negāh‑e mutafāvet‑e Bernārd Vīliyāmz beh masʾūliyyat‑e akhlāqī (Bernard Williams’s Different View of Moral Responsibility). Philosophical-theological Research, 22(2), 119‑143. Aristotle. (1991). Complete works (J. Barnes, Ed.). Princeton University Press. Campbell, G. G. (2024). Situated agency and constitutive moral luck. In A. Capone et al. (Eds.), Philosophy, cognition and pragmatics. Springer. Foot, Ph. (2003). Natural goodness. Oxford University Press. Hartman, R. J. (2017). In defense of moral luck. Routledge. Nelkin, D. K. (2019). Moral luck. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2019 ed.). Wall, S. (2019). Perfectionism in moral and political philosophy. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2019 ed.). Williams, B. (1993). Postscript. In D. Statman (Ed.), Moral luck. SUNY Press. چکیده «کمال‌گرایی فلسفی» رویکردی اخلاقی است که سعادت انسان را در گرو توسعه ویژگی‌های خاص او مانند عقل می‌داند. از سوی دیگر، «شانس اخلاقی» بر نقش امور غیراختیاری در قضاوت‌های اخلاقی تأکید دارد. پژوهش حاضر، با هدف پر کردن خلأ نظری میان «کمال‌گرایی فلسفی» و «شانس اخلاقی»، مفهوم «شانس‌های استکمالی» را به عنوان عوامل یا موانع غیراختیاری پویا در فرآیند استکمال نفس معرفی می‌کند. مسئله اصلی تبیین چگونگی تأثیر این عوامل بر استکمال انسان، فراتر از نقش آن‌ها در صرف قضاوت اخلاقی است. با استفاده از روش تحلیل انتقادی و تحلیل توصیفی، این پژوهش به طرح و بسط مفهومی پرداخته که در سه بُعد وجودی، اخلاقی-هنجاری و وظیفه‌شناختی صورت‌بندی شده است. یافته‌های تحقیق نشان می‌دهد که شانس استکمالی نه تنها تکالیف اخلاقی شخصی‌شده و مسیرهای منحصربه‌فردی برای شکوفایی هر فرد را در قالب قابلیت‌های نوع انسانی مشخص می‌سازد، بلکه بنیان‌های قضاوت اخلاقی را به سمت انصاف زمینه‌مند سوق می‌دهد و زمینۀ یک درک وظیفه‌شناختی برخاسته از شانس را نیز فراهم می‌کند. پس از ارائه زمینه مفهومی در این نوشتار، «شانس استکمالی» به عنوان یک مفهوم مورد تحلیل و تبیین قرار گرفته است. سپس، با پاسخگویی به اشکالات محتمل، تلاش شده تا استحکام منطقی این مفهوم به نمایش گذاشته شود.

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دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 28 2 2026 06 22 Phenomenological Analysis of Prophet Moses’ Religious Experience at Mount Sinai: Through the Lens of Rudolf Otto’s Theory پدیدارشناسی تجربه دینی حضرت موسی (ع) در کوه طور با بهره‌گیری از چارچوب نظریه رودلف اُتو 213 246 4634 10.22091/jptr.2026.15056.3482 FA خدیجه امیری دانشجوی دکتری تفسیر تطبیقی، گروه علوم قرآن و حدیث، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران. 0000-0003-4552-5735 سید رضا مودب استاد گروه علوم قرآن و حدیث، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران. Journal Article 2026 01 02 Abstract Investigating religious experiences within revelatory texts necessitates a critical re-examination of the alignment between Western theoretical frameworks and the structural nuances of Quranic narratives. Rudolf Otto’s theory of the “Numinous,” with its emphasis on the affective-emotional dimensions of encountering divinity, remains a seminal model in this field; nonetheless, its capacity to provide a comprehensive explanation of revelatory accounts warrants critical scrutiny. Adopting an “interpretive phenomenological” approach, this study evaluates the efficacy of Otto’s theory in analyzing the experience of Moses (PBUH) at Mount Sinai, while elucidating the structural divergences between the Quranic revelation and Otto’s model.The findings suggest that while Otto’s theory is effective in accounting for the emotional components of this encounter, it encounters significant challenges when confronted with two fundamental characteristics of the Quranic narrative. First, the dialogical nature of revelation: whereas Otto’s model emphasizes a unilateral, awe-inspiring encounter, the Quranic revelation unfolds within a direct, dialogical context with the Divine, which establishes a foundation for moral responsibility. Second, the active agency of the subject: in contrast to the passive recipient archetype found in classical models, Moses (PBUH) plays a dynamic role in shaping the revelatory event through inquiry and petition. Ultimately, this research argues that the Quran elevates the religious experience from a state of mere “emotional passivity” to a “dynamic and mission-oriented event,” transcending the classical frameworks of the phenomenology of the Numinous. Keywords: Religious Experience, The Numinous, Rudolf Otto, Interpretive Phenomenology, Quranic Revelation, Moses (PBUH).. Introduction Religious experience, unlike conventional phenomenological experiences, is predicated upon an encounter with a supernatural subject, ultimate reality, or the manifestation of the Sacred (Peterson et al., 2024). In this context, the religious experience of Moses at Mount Sinai represents an exceptional encounter that transcends mere engagement with phenomena; it is a confrontation with a transcendent reality that, while manifesting within the subject’s consciousness, exceeds the boundaries of ordinary sensory perception. This event constitutes a unique encounter wherein the Sacred, by opening new horizons of meaning, confronts the subject with a reality that is realized only under specific conditions within the framework of an “existential manifestation.” The central problem of this research lies in the inadequacy of existing phenomenological models to fully explicate the dimensions of revelatory experience in Qur’anic narratives. Although Rudolf Otto’s theory of the “Numinous” provides a powerful framework for analyzing such encounters through the lens of immediate and a priori experiences of the Sacred, it contains theoretical lacunae regarding the structural aspects of revelation. Specifically, Otto overlooks the components of “duty/mission” and the “structure of revelatory dialogue.” Therefore, the objective of this study is to provide a more rigorous analysis of the Qur’anic account of Moses’s revelatory experience by addressing these gaps. Utilizing a phenomenological methodology centered on Otto’s Numinous theory, this research analyzes the experience at two levels: “theoretical structure” and “process of execution.” The primary originality of this paper lies in the proposal of a “six-fold analytical model.” By integrating the dimensions of “duty/mission” and “dialogical structure” into Otto’s fourfold framework (the mysterium tremendum, the fascinans, the sense of creatureliness, and the awe-inspiring presence), this study offers an expanded model for analyzing revelation. The findings suggest that this integrative approach, by focusing on the “mode of experience” (first-person perspective) rather than “theological validation,” enables a more comprehensive representation of the Qur’anic narrative of Moses at Mount Sinai and provides a robust framework for identifying the Numinous dimensions in sacred texts Phenomenology of the Numinous Experience The phenomenology of religion, as an approach aimed at establishing a connection with diverse religious data through “understanding” rather than “explanation,” emphasizes the irreducibility of religious phenomena and avoids reducing them to non-religious paradigms (Kristensen, 1960). In this regard, this study, by adhering to the principles of “epoché” and the researcher’s “self-bracketing” (bracketing of preconceptions), seeks to engage with religious phenomena from the perspective of the believer to recover their authentic essence. The tradition of the phenomenology of religion is characterized by two primary approaches: the classical and the hermeneutic. In classical phenomenology, Jean-Marc de Laury (Note: Please verify if you meant Jean-Marc De Laury or Otto/Eliade as per your source) defines the study of religion as the investigation of the “essence” and “manifestations” of religion, positing that the “Numinous” is inherently unknowable and transcendent. This tradition, by emphasizing the understanding of manifestations, paves the way for the nexus between the phenomenon and the ultimate truth. On the other hand, hermeneutic phenomenology, evolving from Husserl toward Heidegger, shifts the focus of phenomenology from a mere description of consciousness toward an “ontological unfolding.” In this framework, any encounter with a phenomenon is conceived as a form of interpretation and a disclosure of meaning within the context of Being (Dasein). To facilitate a precise analysis of revelatory experiences, this research synthesizes these two traditions. While classical phenomenology faces challenges such as essentialism, its principles of “empathy” and “neutral description” remain indispensable for grasping religious meaning. This study utilizes the foundations of interpretive phenomenology—specifically the concept of Kashf al-Mahjub (the unveiling of the veiled)—to move beyond the superficial layers of the Quranic verses and seek the underlying reality of the phenomenon. Ultimately, this methodological framework is integrated with Rudolf Otto’s theory of the “Numinous.” While phenomenology serves as the analytical tool for the “disclosure and interpretation” of the semantic layers of the verses, Otto’s theory provides the conceptual categories necessary to evaluate the “nature” of the manifested reality. Consequently, by synthesizing a phenomenological-interpretive method with Otto’s categories (such as Mysterium Tremendum and Mysterium Fascinans), this research investigates how the components of the Numinous are manifested within the Quranic discourses pertaining to the experience of Moses (PBUH). Conclusion "The findings of this study demonstrate that the Quranic revelatory experience transcends the passive-affective components of Rudolf Otto’s theory by transitioning from mere passivity to active agency, thereby transforming ‘fascination’ into a foundation for trust and dialogue. Our critical analysis reveals that Otto’s theory of the ‘Numinous,’ due to its reliance on traditional dichotomies, inherent essentialism, and the marginalization of the subject’s active participation, faces significant challenges in addressing the multifaceted nature of divine revelation. In contrast to Otto’s reductionist model, the Quranic narrative presents a dialogical and responsibility-oriented structure, offering a more dynamic and operational framework for interpreting revelatory experiences. This study concludes that the Quranic model effectively surpasses classical Western phenomenological patterns, providing a robust paradigm for understanding the religious experience as a transformative and mission-driven engagement rather than an ephemeral emotional encounter. Reference Cox, J. L. (2023). Rāhnamāyī be Pīdārshināsī-ye Dīn (M. Aʿẓamī Marām, Trans.). Ḥikmat. [In Persian] Fakhr al-Rāzī, M. b. ʿU. (1999 AH). Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr (Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb). Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī. [In Arabic] Heidegger, M. (2004). The phenomenology of religious life (M. Fritsch & J. A. Gosetti-Ferencei, Trans.). Indiana University Press. Heidegger, M. (2007). Hastī va Zamān (S. Jamādī, Trans.). Qoqnūs. [In Persian] Ḥosaynī Shāh-rūdī, S. M., & Farżalī, F. (2011). "Rūykard-e Pīdārshināsāneh-ye Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī va Rūdolf Ottō be 'Amr-e Qodsī'." Andīsheh-ye Dīnī, 41, 49–80. [In Persian] Husserl, E. (1964). The idea of phenomenology (W. P. Alston & G. Nakhnikian, Trans.). Martinus Nijhoff. (Original work published 1907) Husserl, E. (1999). Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology (D. Cairns, Trans.). Kluwer Academic Publishers. Kristensen, W. B. (1960). The meaning of religion: Lectures in the phenomenology of religion (J. B. Carman, Trans.). Martinus Nijhoff. Makārem Shīrāzī, N. (1995). Tafsīr-e Nemūneh. Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyyah. [In Persian] Mariano da Rosa, L. C. (2022). Da espiritualidade enquanto experiência epistêmico-existencial envolvendo a verdade como paradoxo em Sören Kierkegaard, o sagrado em Rudolf Otto e a Presença Espiritual em Paul Tillich. Revista Pistis e Práxis: Teologia e Pastoral/Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná, 14(3), 860-897. Otto, R. (1917). The idea of the holy: An inquiry into the non-rational factor in the idea of the divine and its relation to the rational. [Publisher unknown]. Otto, R. (1958). The idea of the holy: An inquiry into the non-rational factor in the idea of the divine and its relation to the rational (J. W. Harvey, Trans.). Oxford University Press. Rivera, J. (2022). Phenomenology and the horizon of experience: Spiritual themes in Henry, Marion, and Lacoste. Routledge. Ṣādeqī Tehrānī, M. (1986 AH). Al-Furqān fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾān bil-Qurʾān wa al-Sunnah. Muʾassasat al-Aʿlamī lil-Maṭbūʿāt. [In Arabic] Salamī, M. b. Ḥ. (2000 AH). Ḥaqāʾiq al-Tafsīr. Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah. [In Arabic] Ṭabarsī, F. b. Ḥ. (n.d.). Tarjomeh-ye Tafsīr-e Majmaʿ al-Bayān. Farāhānī. [In Persian] چکیده بررسی پدیدارشناختی تجربه‌های دینی در متون وحیانی مستلزم بازاندیشی در میزان انطباق چارچوب‌های نظری غرب با ساختارهای روایت‌های قرآنی است. نظریه «امر قدسی» رودلف اُتو، با تمرکز بر ابعاد عاطفی-هیجانیِ مواجهه با الوهیت، الگویی اثرگذار در این حوزه محسوب می‌شود. با این حال، توانایی این مدل در تبیین دقیق و تمام‌عیارِ روایت‌های وحیانی همچنان محل تأمل است. پژوهش حاضر، با اتخاذ رویکرد «پدیدارشناسی تفسیری»، به ارزیابی کارآمدی نظریه اُتو در تحلیل تجربه موسی (ع) در کوه طور و تبیین وجوه تمایز ساختار وحیانی با مدل او می‌پردازد. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد که اگرچه نظریه اُتو در تبیین مؤلفه‌های هیجانی این تجربه تا حدی کارآمد است، اما در مواجهه با دو ویژگی بنیادین روایت قرآنی با چالش روبروست. نخست، ماهیت گفتگومند وحی است. بر خلاف مدل اُتو که بر مواجهه‌ای تک‌سویه و هیبت‌آلود تأکید دارد، وحی در قرآن در بستر گفتگویی مستقیم با امر الهی شکل می‌گیرد که زمینه‌ساز مسئولیت‌پذیری می‌شود. دوم، کنشگریِ فعال مخاطب در وحی است. بر خلاف الگوی دریافت‌کننده منفعل در مدل‌های کلاسیک، موسی (ع) در این روایت با پرسشگری و درخواست در شکل‌دهی به رویداد وحیانی نقش ایفا می‌کند. در نهایت، این پژوهش استدلال می‌کند که قرآن تجربه دینی را از یک «انفعالِ هیجانی» به یک «رویداد پویا و رسالتی» ارتقا می‌دهد که فراتر از چارچوب‌های کلاسیک پدیدارشناسی امر قدسی است.

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دانشگاه قم پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی 1735-9791 28 2 2026 06 22 A Critique of David Chalmers’s Property Dualism Through the standpoint of Ontological Monism نقد دوگانه‌انگاری ویژگی دیوید چالمرز از رهگذر یگانه‌انگاری انتولوژیک 247 270 4636 10.22091/jptr.2026.15642.3539 FA محمدمهدی ستوده دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه معاصر، دانشگاه تهران، دانشکدگان فارابی، دانشکده الهیات، قم، ایران 0000-0002-8364-0155 مهدی ذاکری دانشیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه تهران، دانشکدگان فارابی، دانشکده الهیات، قم، ایران 0000-0003-1243-7130 احمد رجبی استادیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه تهران، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2026 04 11 Abstract This article develops a critique of David Chalmers’s property dualism from the standpoint of ontological monism. Chalmers, by proposing panprotopsychism, attempts to preserve the principle of the causal closure of physics while treating consciousness as a fundamental property that exists at the level of microparticles in the form of protophenomenal properties. According to this view, once these properties are arranged within an appropriate compositional structure at the macro level, they give rise to first person consciousness. In this account, the relation between macro level consciousness and micro states is explained through the grounding relation, without reducing consciousness to the physical body. However, this approach appears inadequate in resolving the relation between consciousness and the body. The critique developed here is grounded in a renewed understanding of the body. Ontological monism, centered on the notion of the pre noetic body, argues that consciousness is not the outcome of the composition of fundamental particles but rather a mode of the body’s being-in-the-world. The pre noetic body, in an ontological relation of availableness with the biological body and its environment, constitutes the first person structure of consciousness through proprioception, kinesthetic perception, and ecological experience. From this perspective, Chalmers’s explanation faces three major difficulties: an abstract and reductionist approach to the body, ambiguity in explaining the relation of grounding, and an inability to account for the first person phenomenal perspective. Keywords: The ontological monism, the pre-noetic body, the biological body, Panprotopsychism, David Chalmers, the relation of grounding.. Introduction This article aims to critically examine David Chalmers’ account of the mind-body problem, with particular emphasis on his theories of panprotopsychism and property dualism, and to develop a novel account of the relationship between consciousness and the body within a critical framework termed Ontological Monism. The study seeks to re-establish the foundational significance of the body, a dimension that has been largely overlooked in dominant theories within the philosophy of mind and in reductionist approaches to cognitive science. It argues that perception and consciousness are inseparable from the embodied structure of human existence and cannot be adequately understood independently of lived bodily experience. Research Question The central research question of this study is whether, in the analysis of human perceptual states, the primary point of reference should be the mind or the body. More specifically, the study asks whether Chalmers’ theory of panprotopsychism, which attempts to explain consciousness at the level of fundamental entities and to resolve the combination problem while preserving a broadly physicalist framework, can provide a coherent and genuinely non-reductionist account of first-person phenomenal consciousness. Alternatively, does this theory, despite its innovative aspects, ultimately remain committed to a reductionist explanatory model that fails to recognize the constitutive role of the body in the emergence of consciousness? Methodology This study adopts a descriptive-analytical and critical approach grounded in the phenomenological tradition and informed by the achievements of the embodied cognition movement, drawing on the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Gallagher. To this end, the article first reconstructs Chalmers’ account of the relationship between consciousness and fundamental physical entities. It then evaluates this account through a distinct critical framework developed in the present study, namely Ontological Monism. This framework is based on the notion of the pre-noetic body as the arche or foundational ground of consciousness, together with the ontological concept of availableness (adapted from Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world). Key Findings The analysis indicates that Chalmers’ theory faces three major challenges. 1. The Abstract Conception of the Body Chalmers’ account does not adequately address the constitutive role of the biological body, including bodily posture, skeletal organization, anatomical structure, and sensory orientation, in the formation of consciousness. The body is treated primarily as a vehicle for neural processes, while explanatory priority is assigned to brain activity and fundamental particles. Against this view, the present study argues that the brain is not the exclusive locus of consciousness; rather, conscious experience is shaped by the active and situated presence of the living body in the world. 2. The Explanatory Gap in the Grounding Relation Chalmers’ appeal to a non-causal grounding relation between micro-phenomenal entities and macro-level consciousness lacks sufficient explanatory power to account for the developmental emergence and unity of conscious experience. As a result, the theory risks collapsing into a functional or reductive mode of explanation, despite its explicit attempt to avoid reductionism. 3. The Failure to Account for First-Person Phenomenal Consciousness The mere aggregation or combination of fundamental entities that do not themselves possess first-person or phenomenal characteristics cannot, on logical and ontological grounds, adequately account for the subjective character of human consciousness. In contrast, the pre-noetic body, understood as a lived bodily structure endowed with proprioceptive, motor, and ecological capacities, and characterized by the experiential dimensions of the sense of ownership and the sense of agency, provides a more plausible ontological basis for first-person phenomenal consciousness. Conclusion Compared with panprotopsychism, Ontological Monism offers a more comprehensive account of the relationship between consciousness and the body. Consciousness is neither the mechanical outcome of combining fundamental particles nor a secondary appendage of neural processes. Rather, it is the mode of being and intentional orientation of the pre-noetic body in the world. From this perspective, the mind-body problem must be reformulated. Instead of asking how consciousness emerges from physical matter, we should ask how the living body discloses the world and brings it into meaningful presence. Consciousness and cognition become intelligible only when the foundational role of the body in lived experience and its active participation in the world are taken seriously. Without the body, the world would appear merely as a third-person description devoid of phenomenal presence and subjective awareness. References Campos, J. J., Bertenthal, B. I., & Kermoian, R. (1992). Early experience and emotional development: The emergence of wariness of heights. 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Routledge. چکیده این مقاله به نقد دیدگاه دوگانه‌انگاری ویژگی دیوید چالمرز از منظر یگانه‌انگاری انتولوژیک می‌پردازد. چالمرز با طرح «پنسایکیسم مقوم » می‌کوشد ضمن حفظ اصل بستار علّی فیزیک، آگاهی را به مثابۀ یک ویژگی بنیادی تلقی کند که در سطح ذرات خرد در قالب ویژگی‌های «مقوم‌پدیداری » حضور دارد و بعد از قرار گرفتن در ساختار مناسبی از ترکیب در سطح کلان به آگاهی اول‌شخص بدل می‌شود. در این تلقی، رابطۀ آگاهی کلان و حالات خرد در قالب رابطۀ ابتناء تبیین می‌شود، بی آن که به بدن فیزیکی تقلیل یابد. این دیدگاه در حل رابطۀ آگاهی و بدن ناکارآمد به نظر می‌رسد. این موضع انتقادی از منظری نو به مسئلۀ بدن میسر است. یگانه‌انگاری انتولوژیک با محوریت «بدن پیشاحضور» استدلال می‌کند که آگاهی نه برآیند ترکیب ذرات بنیادین، بلکه نحوۀ بودن بدن در جهان است. بدن پیشاحضور، در نسبتی انتولوژیک، در قالب «دردسترس‌بودگی » با بدن بیولوژیک و محیط، از طریق حس عمقی، ادراک حرکتی و تجربۀ اکولوژیک، ساختار اول‌شخص آگاهی را تقویم می‌کند. از این منظر، تبیین چالمرز با سه مشکل مواجه است: رویکرد انتزاعی و تقلیل‌گرایانه به بدن، ابهام در تبیین رابطۀ ابتناء و ناتوانی در توضیح پیدایش منظرگاه پدیداری اول‌شخص.

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