دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979122120200320A Study and Critique of John Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness Argument based on the Finiteness of Divine Active Attributes and Wisdomنقد و بررسی برهان اختفای الهی جان شلنبرگ، بر مبنای تناهی صفات فعلی و حکمت الهی526146210.22091/jptr.2019.4185.2091FAبهروزاسدیدانشجوی دکتری رشته کلام۔ فلسفه دین و مسائل جدید کلامی،گروه فلسفه دانشکده حقوق، الهیات و علوم سیاسی ، واحد علوم و تحقیقات، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تهران، ایران.انشااللهرحمتیاستاد گروه فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، واحد تهران مرکزی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تهران، ایرانبابکعباسیاستادیار، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده حقوق، الهیات و علوم سیاسی، واحد علوم و تحقیقات، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تهران، ایران.Journal Article20190321Introduction <br />Man’s request for God’s revelation, His visibility, a direct connection to Divine angels or at least, being shown with more experiential evidence by God has been one of man’s historical demands from Divine prophets. Human beings’ great inclination to make idols or choosing totems rises from this very demand for the tangibility and visualization of gods. John Schellenberg, an analytic philosopher, taking inspiration from this historical demand, for the first time in 1993 presented the Divine Hiddenness Argument as a reason for the inexistence of God. <br />According to him, one of the requisites of Divine absolute love is that God is not indifferent to His enlightened, sincere seekers and in case they are unable to find convincing evidence, He would deal responsibly regarding their fate by presenting them with more evidence and prevent their tending towards atheism; however, God failed in this regard and proof of that is the existence of logical unbelievers or agnostics. Therefore, through a deductive argument, one can consider Divine hiddenness as a contradiction to Divine absolute love and ultimately, as proof of the inexistence of God. <br />Summary <br />Schellenberg’s supposition in his argument is the absoluteness of the attribute of God’s love. If one is able to challenge this foundation of his argument in terms of the extent of absoluteness and that Divine absolute love is not absolute in the action aspect, his argument, in order to reach his sought conclusion, would fail. The goal of this study is to respond to the following questions: how is Schellenberg’s approach in understanding the meaning and instance of Divine absolute love? Are Divine essential attributes absolute in the action aspect and in relation to creation? Has Schellenberg paid attention to the distinction between God’s essential and action attributes in presenting his argument? <br />By adopting an analogous view in understanding the attribute of Divine love, Schellenberg has considered Divine love to be an absolute form of human love and he believes their difference to only be quantitative. Accordingly, he believes that since in human love, the perfection of the beloved is the manifestation of responsible behavior and is because of a commitment to the sincere expression of the love of his lover and he too must seek to establish a relationship with his lover; therefore, God must also deal responsibly in regards to His lovers and sincere seekers and by presenting more evidence, seek to establish a relationship with them. Since between the two forms of love – agape and eros – the best state is love without expectations, i.e. agape; Schellenberg considers God’s love to be agape. This is while the necessity of establishing a relationship is not one of the requisites of agape love. Therefore, the lack of establishing a relationship on God’s part with His sincere seekers – even in case of the validity of Schellenberg’s claim – is not a proof of a contradiction in Divine love. It seems Schellenberg has confused the two forms of love to adopt an analogous view. <br />One of the classifications of God’s attributes is the division of His attributes into essential and action attributes. Essential attributes are the sources of the action attributes; God’s action attributes derive from a position of action and in respect to being attached to material existents which form one side of the association, they are bound to temporal and locative conditions; even though in respect to being attached to God who is the other side of the association, they are free of such limits and conditions. It seems that Schellenberg has not paid heed to the receptive limits of existents. Another matter that has caused these attributes to be limited is the simultaneous application of these attributes in regards to existents, which has caused these attributes also to limit each other. However, among Divine action attributes, wisdom – the manifestation of the essential attribute of knowledge – is dominant over His other attributes and is the constrainer and guarantor of God’s absolute perfection. Therefore, one can consider Divine hiddenness to be a manifestation of His wise love and present defenses based on man’s free will - in the two areas of cognition and action – from in.صفات محدود و مقیدِ فعلیِ خداوند، تجلّی و بُروز صفات مطلقِ ذاتی او در مقام فعل هستند، اما محدودیت آنها به جهت اِعمال توأمان آنها در کنار یکدیگر و در ارتباط با مخلوقات است. در میان صفات فعلی، صفتِ «حکمت» - تجلّی صفت ذاتی علم - حاکم بر دیگر صفات بوده و تقیّدبخشِ آنهاست. جان شلنبرگ، در «برهان اختفای الهی» از تمایز میان این دو دسته صفات غفلت کرده و همین امر سبب شده تا اولاً با اتخاذ رویکردی تشبیهی، عشق الهی را صورت مطلق شدهٔ عشق انسانی قلمداد کند. ثانیاً، با خلط میان صوَر مختلفِ عشق، یعنی آگاپه و اروس، درک نادرستی از عشق الهی و میزانِ اطلاق آنها داشته باشد و ثالثاً، به رغم صحت تأکید شلنبرگ بر تمایز میان برهان اختفا و برهان شر، استفادهٔ او از اختفا - به عنوان مورد نقضی بر عشقِ نامتناهیِ الهی - به نوعی، بازگشت به برهان شر را به ذهن مخاطب متبادر میکند و برداشت و بهرهگیریای نادرست است. بر مبنای صفت فعلی حکمت، میتوان نشان داد که اختفای الهی - بر خلاف مدعای شلنبرگ - نهتنها نقضی بر عشق الهی نیست، بلکه مظهری از عشق حکیمانهٔ خداوند به انسانهاست که در این نوشتار به برخی از این حکمتها اشاره خواهد شد.دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979122120200320The Elements of Exclusivism in Christian Traditionمؤلّفههای انحصارگرایی در سنّت مسیحی2752156610.22091/jptr.2020.5298.2281FAقدرت اللهقربانیدانشیار فلسفه دانشگاه خوارزمی، تهران، ایران.Journal Article20200303Introduction <br />Religious exclusivism is based on some Christian theological teachings that are derived from the Bible which were introduced through some early Christian theologians’ viewpoints; like Saint Paul. This theological approach emphasizes on exclusive religious truthfulness and salvation, and denies and deprives other religious traditions of participating in divine truthfulness and salvation. In this paper, we try to show some essential roots and elements of Christian exclusivism and some outcomes that it can introduce for the Christian world and Christians’ dialogue with other religions. <br />Summary <br />Christian exclusivism is rooted in some Christian teachings, which are as follows: 1. Some verses of the Bible refer to it, 2. It is based on historical facts regarding the life of Jesus Christ, 3. It indicates direct interference of God to save his children, 4. It relies on some religious beliefs such as Trinity, Atonement, Resurrection of Jesus and Incarnation, 5. It depends on the centrality of Jesus Christ’s role, 6. It shows the high place of the Church and the Pope, 7. It pays more attention to faith and divine grace than legal duties. <br />When we refer to the Bible, we see that there are some verses that confirm religious exclusivism; for example, in the book of John, it is said that there is no way to salvation except through Jesus. The Bible also says Jesus was born, suffered and crucified and died to save Christians and to remove their original sin. In fact, God has decided to send his son, namely Jesus, for removing and clearing the original and inheritable sins of his children; since without sending Jesus and his death, it was not possible to save his children. Therefore, Divine interference was necessary for saving his believers. Based on the aforementioned teachings, Christian theologians argue that there are some teachings that pertain to religious exclusivism. Teachings like the Trinity, Incarnation, Atonement, Grace, Faith and the Resurrection of Jesus can be considered in this case. The teaching of Trinity teaches us that God, the Holy Spirit, and Jesus are the same and have an equal divinity. Based on this teaching, Jesus has acquired a divinity equal to God. The teaching of Incarnation says that God has been embodied and shaped in the body of Jesus and accepted some corporeal virtues in order to save his children. The teaching of Atonement indicates that through crucifixion and the death of Jesus, all the sins of the children of God were forgiven and then they are considered as innocent servants of God. It is important to know that the later Christian theologians and communities have tried to find many religious justifications regarding such teachings. <br />They have discussed and confirmed these teachings in many Christian councils during the last 20 centuries. The next element is Jesus Christ’s central role regarding God’s project for saving his children. It means saving people was possible through Jesus alone; he is the only one who was worthy and suitable for actualizing such a divine program. So, he is the only way for the salvation of God’s children. Then, if we believe in such historical facts regarding Jesus’ birth, suffering, crucifixion, and final resurrection, we can be considered as his believers and all of our sins will be forgiven. Hence, Christians pay more attention to loving Jesus, Divine grace, and faith more than following religious rules. They believe that Jesus Christ has released them from legal laws through his crucifixion and suffering. The last element is the significant role and place of the Church and the Pope regarding the classic interpretation of the Bible and introducing the unique path of salvation. In this case, Catholic Christians believe that salvation is possible only through the Catholic Church and the Pope; whereas, Protestant Christians emphasize believing in Jesus alone as the only way for salvation. The combination and reciprocal cooperation of the aforementioned elements hase established and strengthened Christian Exclusivism from the early periods of Christianity up to recent centuries. <br />The historical growth of Christian exclusivism has gradually led to some irrational and unpleasant outcomes. Some of them are: ignoring the realities and values of other religions, the disinclination of the Christians to listen and learn about other religions’ teachings and values, believing in extreme holiness regarding Christian teachings and avoiding thinking about their rationality, introducing a Christian’s identity to be based on negating other religions’ identity, welcoming ideological missionaries to invite others to Christianity and considering others as disbelievers who should accept the Christian invitation and evangelism. <br />The way to exit Christian Exclusivism is to rethink the Christian teachings that led to exclusivism; especially teachings like the Trinity, Incarnation, Crucifixion, Atonement, the Church and so on. Christians also should try to study about other religions’ realities and facts through their eyes; not Christian eyes. They should emphasize on spreading dialogue between Christianity and other religions in order to recognize each others’ virtues, and to reform their own irrational teachings. <br />Finally, all Christians and adherents of other religions, in particular, Muslims and Jews should note that God has willed to guide all of them and bestowed the grace of truthfulness and salvation to them based on their capacities. So most, or all the people of the world, have benefited from divine grace concerning truthfulness and salvation gradually; not exclusively.انحصارگرایی دینی از صفات ذاتی و مشخصههای تاریخی سنّت مسیحی است. در این دیدگاه بر دو ویژگی حقّانیت و نجاتبخشی انحصاری دین مسیحیت، تأکید اساسی میشود. این نگرش، مؤلفههای مهم تاریخی و الهیاتی دارد که عبارتند از: 1) قابلیت استناد به کتاب مقدّس؛ 2) ابتنا بر واقعیتهای تاریخی زندگی عیسیٰ مسیح؛ 3) لزوم دخالت مستقیم الهی؛ 4) محوریت آموزههای الهیاتی خاص؛ 5) محوریت شخص عیسیٰ مسیح؛ 6) جایگاه مهم کلیسا و پاپ؛ 7) نقش فرعی شریعت و محوریت فیض و ایمان؛ 8) بیتوجهی به آموزههای درست ادیان دیگر. انحصارگرایی مسیحی، به بروز پیامدهای مهمی در طول تاریخ این دین منجر شده است که برخی از آنها عبارتند از: 1) غفلت از ارزشهای ادیان دیگر و استغنا از آموختن از آنها؛ 2) تقدسگرایی افراطی و دوری از عقلانیت؛ 3) اثبات هویت خودی و نفی هویت دیگری؛ 4) رسالت ایدئولوژیک، تهدید صلح و گسترش جنگها. راه برونرفت از این بحران، عدول از انحصارگرایی مسیحی و گشودگی نسبت به حقایقی است که ادیان دیگر حاوی و حامل آن هستند؛ حقایقی که با گفتوگو و احساس نیاز به شنیدن صدای دیگری قابل حصولاند.دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979122120200320Self Knowledge and its Relationship with Rationality; Defending Richard Moran's Transparency Theoryخودآگاهی و ارتباط آن با عقلانیت ؛ دفاعی از نظریهٔ شفافیت ریچارد موران5377156910.22091/jptr.2019.4917.2225FAزهراسرکارپوردانش آموخته دکتری فلسفه تطبیقی دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران.https://orcid.org/00Journal Article20191026Introduction <br />The discussion of “self-knowledge” as a philosophical issue begins with an intuition. This intuition is based on the fact that our knowledge of our mental states or our knowledge in relation to statements like: “I know that I am happy,” is a particular knowledge that is distinct from the rest of our knowledge. It seems that in order to gain knowledge of ourselves, we do not need to go through those processes that we go through in order to gain knowledge about the external world or knowledge of other minds. We feel that we directly know our own mental states. The role of self-knowledge philosophers is to explain this type of particular knowledge. Theories such as the Inner Sense Theory, the Acquaintance Theory, inferentialism, or theories with a rationalist approach are presented in response to this issue. Considering theories such as the Inner Sense Theory and the Acquaintance Theory, we will find that a common aspect of these theories is that self- knowledge has been defined as a product of an internal observation of our mental states. Such an approach is a kind of Empiricism in self-knowledge. The Rationalist approach has been raised against this approach. This approach, by linking self-knowledge with rationality, has opened a new chapter in the discussion of self-knowledge. The foundation of this approach is based on the principle that our situation as a rational agent plays a fundamental role in self-knowledge. Rationalists believed that this ignorance of the fundamental role of rationality in self-knowledge has caused Empiricists to ignore the most important kind of self-knowledge that is associated with rationality. Tyler Burge, Richard Moran, and Matthew Boyle are some of the important philosophers who theorize about this kind of self-knowledge. <br />Goal <br />In this paper, we will first introduce the main components of Rationalist approaches because we want to review the theoretical literature of this approach. Then, we will bring up a summary of the Tyler Burge view, a famous and important philosopher of the rationalist approach. This is an introduction to introduce Moran's Theory of Transparency which is the focal point of our discussion. We will then refer to one of the most important challenges facing the Transparency Theory and bring up a significant solution that is presented by Matthew Boyle. We will also show that despite the advantages of this solution, there are ambiguities and other challenges. Finally, we will try to set up two proposals as a way to advance Boyle’s solution. <br />Conclusion <br />The perspective of rationalist philosophers about the existence of a kind of self-knowledge in rational creatures seems to be a powerful idea that is difficult to oppose. Tyler Burge presented interesting arguments about this issue. But it is not easy replying to the question of how this kind of self-knowledge occurs. The theory of Transparency and Reflectivism were proposed to respond to this question. Although they have been considered as efficient theories; however, the mentioned problem still remains ambiguous and complex. Transparency denied the introspective self-knowledge, but couldn’t explain how transparent self-knowledge occurs and therefore, it does not provide a complete explanation for self-knowledge. Some vagueness and some important challenges still continue to exist in this theory. <br />Finally, we propose two proposals as a complement to Boyle’s theory. Maybe they could advance this theory. We suggest that we can use the concept of non-conceptual belief and dispositional belief. These debates have the potential for solving some of the challenges of Transparency and Reflectivism. These are profound topics and need great reflection. We know that our proposals are very elementary and crude ideas. But perhaps they can be a way toward developing the Transparency and Reflectivism theories.همهٔ ما این شهود را در خود داریم که گویی خودآگاهی، نوع خاصی از معرفت است که با دیگر معرفتهای ما متمایز است. انگیزهٔ فیلسوفان برای پرداختن به این موضوع به عنوان یک مسئلهٔ فلسفی غالباً همین تمایز یاد شده است و آنان همواره تلاش داشتهاند تا ماهیت این معرفت خاص را توضیح دهند. در بین نظریههای خودآگاهی، نظریههای عقلگرا، این معرفت خاص را بر اساس ارتباط آن با عقلانیت توضیح دادهاند. به ادعای هواداران این رویکرد و نظریه، برخوردار بودن ما از قوای عقلانی، ارتباط مهمی با خودآگاهی و خاص بودن آن دارد. در این مقاله - پس از معرفی کلی نظریههای عقلگرایانه در بحث خودآگاهی - به تحلیل نظریهٔ شفافیت ریچارد موران، به عنوان یکی از موفقترین نظریههای عقلگرایانه خواهیم پرداخت و در ادامه، به یکی از چالشهای مهمی که همواره پیش روی این نظریه قرار داشته است، اشاره خواهیم کرد و سپس راه حل جالبی را که متیو بویل برای حل این چالش و در واقع، تکمیل نظریهٔ شفافیت مطرح کرده است، معرفی و تحلیل خواهیم کرد. و در پایان نیز ضمن اشاره به برخی ضعفهای این راه حل، دو پیشنهاد آزمایشی برای پیشرفت این راه حل و در واقع، پیشرفت نظریهٔ شفافیت، ارائه خواهیم داد.دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979122120200320Pure Monotheism: Analysis and Explanation of the Components and a Comparison with Rival Viewsتوحید ناب؛ تحلیل و تبیین مؤلفهها و مقایسهٔ آن با دیدگاههای رقیب7999156710.22091/jptr.2020.5174.2266FAسید رضااسحاق نیااستادیار پژوهشگاه علوم و فرهنگ اسلامی، قم، ایران.0000-0003-0659-6338Journal Article20200127In the matter of the Unity of God which is the base of Divine teachings, different views have been presented by the theologians and philosophers of various inclinations and the Sufis and mystics regarding real existence and there is a specific understanding of it in the minds of the public who believe and profess the Unity of God which conforms to the views of the Peripatetic philosophers and theologians. <br />They believe in the plurality of existence and plurality of existents based on the theory of contrast and separation of existents from each other, and believes one of these plural and contrasting existents is God and He is one of many existents, and the cause of all others. <br />Another view believes in a single real and true instance of existence and existents and considers it to be God; however, this view believes that this single existence and existent manifests in the form of many contingents and since the result of this manifestation is the nominal existence of the contingents, their plurality does not damage the aforementioned real unity of existence and existent. In this view, the ignorant from among the Sufis and their elders are in accordance with each other, with the difference that the former limit the existence of God to this level of manifestation as can also be seen in the apparent words of the mystics and this results in the negation of the essence of God; however, the latter group, apart from this level, believe in a level of no condition-no description for His essence but consider that single existence and existent in both levels – be it the level of essence or that of the manifestations – to be necessary; in contrast to the … who, though they believed in the unity of existence, however, they consider existence to be necessary in only level and contingent in the other. <br />In another view, which has been attributed to the transcendental inclination, existence is considered principal and real only in the Necessary Being and is, therefore one; however, in contingent beings, quiddity has been considered as principal and it is clear that quiddities are plural and various. Therefore, in this view, existence is one and is only God; however, existents include both God as well as quiddities and contingents and ultimately, in the views of the great mystics and transcendental philosophers, existence and existents, despite their real plurality, have been described as one; like a person who stands in front of multiple mirrors, in which case, man and also humanity, is plural; but since all those reflections are that same one person, they are one despite their plurality. <br />According to this view, contingent existents are reflections, shadows, and rays of the existence of God in the world and are real and true; in contrast to the view of the Sufi scholars in which contingent existents are nominal. <br />The aforementioned views, except the last, somehow mix polytheism regarding the real existence because in all of them limitations have been considered for God and this necessitates that God is one according to numeric unity; as is indicated by Imam Ali (peace be on him) in the sermon regarding Unity of God at the beginning of Nahjul Balagha: one who has limited Him has numbered Him (<em>Nahjul Balagha</em>, 1980: 40). In this case, God would not be alone and one and other existents – the contingent beings – stand beside Him; whereas lexically, tawhid means unique and singular and God is one in essence, i.e. in existence as well as attributes and actions and contingent beings are rays of His existence just as their attributes and actions are manifestations of His attributes and actions because attributes and actions follow existence and are secondary to it. <br />Therefore, this pure and free-from-all-types-of-polytheism monotheism regarding the real existence must be sought among the monotheistic views of the great mystics and transcendental philosophers and this is Mulla Sadra’s ultimate view and can be concluded from all the discussions in The Transcendent Philosophy of the Four Journeys of the Intellect – even though in the discussion of cause and effect (vol. 2) he has chosen the view of the Sufi scholars (Mulla Sadra, 1981, 2: 292), in another period – probably under the influence of his teacher Mirdamad – he believed the view attributed to the transcendental inclination. <br />This study includes three main topics: The different views regarding Unity of God, the criterion of attaining purity from polytheism, A critical study of the monotheistic views of the philosophers in contrast to the mystics.مسئلهٔ توحید خداوند در سه مقام مطرح میشود: ۱) وجوب؛ 2) الوهیت؛ 3) وجود حقیقی. در باب توحید در مقام وجود حقیقی، اعتقادات گوناگونی وجود دارد، از قبیل اعتقاد عامهٔ مردم، فیلسوفان مشاء، جهلهٔ صوفیه و نیز اکابر ایشان، حکمای فهلویین، محقّق دوانی و میرداماد، عرفا و حکمای متألهین. صدرالمتألهین شیرازی به اقتضای مقام و در ابواب مختلف کتاب <em>اسفار</em>، اقوال متعددی در این باب داشته است. این مقاله به مقایسهٔ آرا و اقوال مذکور با یکدیگر میپردازد و در نهایت، توحید ناب و خالص را در میان آنها که بری و بدور از اِشکال و ایراد است، معرفی مینماید. توحید ناب، توحیدی است که مشوب به هیچ گونه شرکی در مقام وجود حقیقی نباشد و آن جز قول عرفای شامخین و حکمای متألّهین نیست؛ چنان که نظر نهایی ملاصدرا نیز بر آن است. دیدگاه مذکور مبتنی بر قول به وحدت وجود و موجود در عین کثرت آن دو است و بر پایهٔ آن، وجود و موجودْ منحصر در ذات حق تعالی است و در عین حال، اشراقات و مظاهر گوناگون و حقیقی دارد و از سوی دیگر با این که وجود و موجود دارای اشراقات و مظاهر گوناگون و حقیقی است، در عین حال، واحد بوده و منحصر در ذات باریتعالی است. روش این پژوهش، توصیفی۔ تحلیلی است.دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979122120200320A Study of Paul Thagard’s Conceptual Change Theory and its Results on Scientific Progressبررسی نظریهٔ تغییر مفهومی پل تاگارد و نتایج آن بر مسئلهٔ پیشرفت علمی101126156810.22091/jptr.2020.4978.2237FAاحسانجوادی ابهریدانشجوی دکتری فلسفهٔ علم دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، واحد علوم و تحقیقات تهران، تهران، ایران0000-0003-2263-5771حسینشیخ رضاییعضو هیأت علمی موسسهٔ پژوهشی و حکمت و فلسفهٔ ایران، تهران، ایران.Journal Article20191125Introduction <br />The Publication of Kuhn's influential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is one of the most important points in the history and philosophy of science studies and has raised many debates among philosophers and historians of science. One of the most interesting implications of Kuhn's thesis is the incommensurability of scientific paradigms and its related concepts. Paul Thagard is one of the philosophers who reacted to Kuhn's incommensurability thesis and tried to show how, by appealing to cognitive computational theories, the incommensurability problem could be resolved. In this essay, after introducing Thagard’s Conceptual Change Theory and review of one case study, we will survey the implications of Thagard's theory on scientific growth and the history of science and present two critiques. <br />Summary <br />In this essay, in the first part, we have tried, by the introduction of concept constituents and representation based on Thagard’s Computational Philosophy of Science to show how he explains conceptual changes and revolutions in the history of science. Thagard considered concepts as complex structures like neurons in neural networks which are organized in kind and part hierarchies and relating to each other by relevant weight. Thagard described four types of relations between replacement and substituent theories: incorporation, sublation, supplantation, and disregard. Sublation and supplantation are the important types of theory change processes that have been introduced by Thagard to describe scientific revolution. If T1 partially incorporates T1 while rejecting aspects of T1, then T2 sublatesTl and if T2 involves the near-total rejection of TI, then T2 supplants T1. As Thagard claimed, other than disregard, all of the other three types of scientific theory change accept some degree of cumulating in substituent theory. As we have reviewed in Thagard’s case studies, which he referred to as radical conceptual revolutions; such as Lavasiour and Darwin's revolution, there is at least some amount of evidence and method cumulating in substituent theory. On the other hand, it could be interpreted that Thagard somehow accepted the semantic holism theory. In this paper, an argument has been posed which shows that these two claims are contradicted. The premises and conclusions of the argument are shown as below: <br />1. According to the holism theory of meaning, the meanings of concepts are determined by their relation in a conceptual web or hierarchy. <br />2. It could be interpreted that Thagard confirmed the holism theory of meaning. <br />3. Scientific Revolutions –either occurring as sublation or supplantation way – make dramatic changes in the conceptual hierarchy of existing theory in comparison with substituent theory. <br />4. Thagard declared that in the dramatic scientific revolution, there are at least some method and concepts <br />5. Thagard stated that evidence could be evaluated independently. In other words, he denies the theory dependency of evidence. <br />6. Premises1, 2 and 3 are contradicted by 4 and 5. Because, by accepting the holism theory of meaning, there is no way to evaluate apparent common evidence of rival theories independently without considering their relation to existing and substituent theories. <br />Thagard and some other philosophers like Nancy Nersissian claimed that Thomas Kuhn's mistake is that he has not considered the gradual nature of conceptual changes which has been revealed with the help of cognitive science. They believe that in the theory change stage a gestalt shift is not occurring as Thomas Kuhn thought, for practitioners and advocates of existing and substituent theories or paradigm's, so there is not a sharp and clear boundary between rival theories and advocates of each theory could realize each other's experiments. As a final point, we will show by review of a historical case – the Quantum Mechanic revolution- that the gradual nature of scientific change would not imply that there is not a boundary at all and in principle it could be conceived a final point -albeit not clear- existing theory totally replaced by substituent theory and practitioners of new theory conform their mind by the exemplar, method and tradition of a new theory. <br />Conclusion <br />In this paper, we study Thagard's theory concerning concept structure, representation, and conceptual change. After review of an important case study, we reviewed four types of possible relations between existing and substitute theories. As it has been shown, Thagard believed that at least evidence and methods accumulation take place even in radical revolutionary theory change. By providing an argument, we have tried to show that the holism theory of meaning, which seems to be accepted by Thagard, is contradicted by evidence accumulation. On the other hand, by reviewing a historical case-study we have tried to show that Thagard’s argument against the gestalt shift theory of Kuhn, is confronted by a problem. تغییر مفهومی و بررسی نتایج آن بر تاریخ علم همواه یکی از مسائل چالشبرانگیز در مباحث تاریخ و فلسفهٔ علم بوده است. در این مقاله ابتدا به معرفی آرای پُل تاگارد یکی از فیلسوفان طرفدار فلسفهٔ علم محاسباتی در مورد چیستی و چگونگی تغییر مفاهیم میپردازیم و بر این اساس، به رویکرد او به تاریخ علم از جهت انباشتی بودن یا انقلابی بودن اشاره خواهیم کرد. از نظر تاگارد، شواهد و روشها دستکم چیزهایی هستند که در اکثر انقلابهای علمی بین نظریهٔ موجود و نظریهٔ جایگزین مشترک هستند. در این مقاله، نشان داده خواهد شد که این ادعا با رویکرد کلگرایی معناشناختی تاگارد سازگار به نظر نمیرسد. همچنین با موردکاوی تاریخی در خصوص انقلاب علمی مکانیک کوانتومی در تاریخ علم فیزیک، نشان خواهیم داد که - برخلاف نظریهٔ پل تاگارد - تدریجی بودن و همپوشانی نظریهٔ موجود و جایگزین دلیلی بر پیوستگی آن دو نیست؛ زیرا اگر چه مرز دقیقی نمیتوان میان آن دو یافت، اما این به معنای عدم وجود هیچ مرزی نیست و علیالاصول جایی نظریهٔ موجود کنار رفته و نظریهٔ جایگزین مستقر شده است.دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979122120200320Quasi-Occasionalistic Causation in the Philosophy of René Descartesعلیّتِ شبهاُکازیونالیستی در فلسفهٔ دکارت127146157010.22091/jptr.2020.4906.2219FAحسناحمدی زادهاستادیار گروه ادیان و فلسفه دانشگاه کاشان، کاشان، ایران.0000-0002-1125-1441Journal Article20191022Introduction <br />The discussion of “self-knowledge” as a philosophical issue begins with an intuition. This intuition is based on the fact that our knowledge of our mental states or our knowledge in relation to statements like: “I know that I am happy,” is a particular knowledge that is distinct from the rest of our knowledge. It seems that in order to gain knowledge of ourselves, we do not need to go through those processes that we go through in order to gain knowledge about the external world or knowledge of other minds. We feel that we directly know our own mental states. The role of self-knowledge philosophers is to explain this type of particular knowledge. Theories such as the Inner Sense Theory, the Acquaintance Theory, inferentialism, or theories with a rationalist approach are presented in response to this issue. Considering theories such as the Inner Sense Theory and the Acquaintance Theory, we will find that a common aspect of these theories is that self- knowledge has been defined as a product of an internal observation of our mental states. Such an approach is a kind of Empiricism in self-knowledge. The Rationalist approach has been raised against this approach. This approach, by linking self-knowledge with rationality, has opened a new chapter in the discussion of self-knowledge. The foundation of this approach is based on the principle that our situation as a rational agent plays a fundamental role in self-knowledge. Rationalists believed that this ignorance of the fundamental role of rationality in self-knowledge has caused Empiricists to ignore the most important kind of self-knowledge that is associated with rationality. Tyler Burge, Richard Moran, and Matthew Boyle are some of the important philosophers who theorize about this kind of self-knowledge. <br />Goal <br />In this paper, we will first introduce the main components of Rationalist approaches because we want to review the theoretical literature of this approach. Then, we will bring up a summary of the Tyler Burge view, a famous and important philosopher of the rationalist approach. This is an introduction to introduce Moran's Theory of Transparency which is the focal point of our discussion. We will then refer to one of the most important challenges facing the Transparency Theory and bring up a significant solution that is presented by Matthew Boyle. We will also show that despite the advantages of this solution, there are ambiguities and other challenges. Finally, we will try to set up two proposals as a way to advance Boyle’s solution. <br />Conclusion <br />The perspective of rationalist philosophers about the existence of a kind of self-knowledge in rational creatures seems to be a powerful idea that is difficult to oppose. Tyler Burge presented interesting arguments about this issue. But it is not easy replying to the question of how this kind of self-knowledge occurs. The theory of Transparency and Reflectivism were proposed to respond to this question. Although they have been considered as efficient theories; however, the mentioned problem still remains ambiguous and complex. Transparency denied the introspective self-knowledge, but couldn’t explain how transparent self-knowledge occurs and therefore, it does not provide a complete explanation for self-knowledge. Some vagueness and some important challenges still continue to exist in this theory. <br />Finally, we propose two proposals as a complement to Boyle’s theory. Maybe they could advance this theory. We suggest that we can use the concept of non-conceptual belief and dispositional belief. These debates have the potential for solving some of the challenges of Transparency and Reflectivism. These are profound topics and need great reflection. We know that our proposals are very elementary and crude ideas. But perhaps they can be a way toward developing the Transparency and Reflectivism theories.یکی از مباحث کلیدی در فلسفهٔ دکارت که امروزه نیز در میان پژوهشگران فلسفهٔ مدرن و قرونوسطیٰ، از اهمیت بالایی برخوردار است، رویکرد دکارت در خصوص ارتباط علت و معلولی پدیدهها و رویدادهای مختلف است. دکارت برای ارتباط علّی میان نفس و بدن، رویکردی اُکازیونالیستی یا همان رویکرد مبتنی بر اصالت علل موقعی، اتخاذ کرده است که بر مبنای این رویکرد، علتِ نهایی، خداوند است، اما پرسش اصلی جستار حاضر این است که آیا دکارت، همهٔ ارتباطات علت و معلولی میان پدیدهها - چه مادی و چه فرامادی - را اکازیونالیستی تبیین میکند و آیا اساساً میتوان دکارت را بنیانگذار اصلیِ اکازیونالیسم در فلسفه دانست یا این که ریشههای علیّت اکازیونالیستی را باید در آثار و افکار متفکران قرون وسطیٰ جستوجو کرد؟ از اینرو، در این جستار تلاش خواهیم کرد تا با توجه به آثار مختلف دکارت و نیز با توجه به دیدگاههای برخی متفکران قرون وسطیٰ در خصوص علیّت، نشان دهیم که دکارت را در بهترین حالت، میتوان طرفدار نظریه یا رویکردی شبهِاکازیونالیستی در خصوص علیّت دانست که بر اساس آن، چنین نیست که علل فیزیکی و طبیعی در رویدادهای مختلف، تأثیرگذار نباشند، بلکه - به زعمِ دکارت - در کنار علیّت خداوند، میتوان از تأثیرگذاری علل طبیعی نیز سخن گفت.دانشگاه قمپژوهشهای فلسفی -کلامی1735-979122120200320A Study of John Martin Fischer’s View Regarding Divine Foreknowledge and Man’s Moral Responsibilityبررسی دیدگاه جان فیشر در باب نسبتِ علم پیشینِ الهی و مسئولیت اخلاقی انسان147163157110.22091/jptr.2020.4887.2215FAتوکلکوهی گیگلواستادیار گروه معارف اسلامی . دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی واحد اهر، اهر، ایران.جواددانشاستادیار پژوهشگاه علوم و فرهنگ اسلامی ، قم، ایران.Journal Article20191028Summary <br />The possible incompatibility between God’s foreknowledge and the free will of the agent shows that this issue is wide-ranging: if God has infallible knowledge of all of man’s actions before he has performed them, essentially, is there the possibility of the free will of the agent and his choice between alternative actions? According to John Martin Fischer, God, as a person, is absolutely knowledgeable, such that at all times, like t and in all propositions like P, He is completely aware that P will take place in time t; only and only if the proposition P is true at the time of t. Apart from this, God, as a person, in all possible worlds, possesses absolute and universal knowledge. It is clear that in this explanation, the object of God’s fore and essential knowledge has a universal and comprehensive range and, as a result, includes man’s apparently voluntary actions as well. However, wouldn’t such knowledge be inconsistent and contradictory with man’s free will and freedom to act? <br />Reconstructing Fischer’s approach and arranging a notable solution by paying heed to his collection of views and if possible, proving the incompatibility of Divine fore and infallible knowledge with the free will of the moral agent depends on inserting two other premises to his claims regarding God and His fore and universal knowledge. The first is that Fischer believes in our lack of control over the past and more precisely, in the Fixity of the Past Principle and second, according to him, free will and voluntariness of the moral agent is based on the ability to choose and attempt the possibility of an alternative by the person. <br />Regarding the first condition, it is important to note that like Van Inwagen in the Indirect Consequence Argument, Fischer too believes in our lack of control over the past and more precisely, in the Fixity of the Past Principle. According to this view, the past is fixed in the present and is out of our control and as a result, we cannot make changes in its events through our present choices. Therefore, in the event that the performance of a particular act is preceded by a change in a past reality, due to the fixity and establishment of past phenomena, a person would not be able to perform such an action. By accepting the Fixity of the Past Principle, it seems we cannot escape the incompatibility between Divine foreknowledge and the free will of the moral agent. <br />However, in dealing with the second inserted premise, instead of denying the truth value of possible future propositions or the possibility of Divine knowledge over them, he tries to distinguish between two meanings of freedom and in this way, clarifies that in one meaning, freedom necessitates man’s voluntariness in performing or abandoning an act and as a result is a two-way reality and in another meaning, it is only synonymous with freedom in performing an action and is not preceded by man’s control and choice in abandoning an act. According to Fischer’s Frankfurter approach, in some cases there are conditions which do not force a person to perform an act; however, they make abstaining from acting upon them improbable for him and despite all these voluntary factors and from a moral perspective, he is considered responsible. <br />Fischer’s approach, with all its importance in defending free will and moral responsibility and its compatibility with phenomena such as causal necessity and Divine foreknowledge, is faced with two main problems. The first is that in this approach, the interfering Frankfurter essence at the beginning of his interference in the alternative process has not been revised. Therefore, it is still not clear whether we are simply facing an “unreal interferer” whose interference starts as soon as he receives any type of reliable context and sign which indicates the occurrence of choice or an act against the desire and inclination of the interferer or a “conditional interferer” is at work; one who displays physical and even spiritual actions inconsistent with his own inclinations and desires? Another problem is that in the Frankfurter models, the complete and absolute negation of alternatives to the moral agent would result in the lack of his free will and moral responsibility.این نوشتار متکفّل تبیین و بررسی رهیافت جدیدی از جان مارتین فیشر در حل تعارض احتمالی میان علم خطاناپذیر و سابق خداوند با مسئولیت اخلاقی عامل است. اگر چه فیشر از یکسو اوصافی چون علم را از ویژگیهای ذاتی و خطاناپذیر الهی برشمرده و همچنین خداوند را متصف به ازلیت زمانی غیرتومیستی در همان چارچوب زمانی موجودات مادی میکند و در نهایت، اصل ثبات گذشته و فقدان کنترل انسان بر رخدادهای انقضاء یافتهٔ زمانی را میپذیرد و در بادی امر با تعارض چنین علم پیشینی با ارادهٔ آزاد انسان در کنشها مواجه میشود، اما سنخ دیدگاه او در باب ماهیت اختیار انسان، او را از این چالش میرهاند. در تلقی فرانکفورتی فیشر اختیار عامل مسبوق به توانایی او برای مبادرت به کنش بدیل در روندِ خلاف واقع نیست و از همینرو، اگر هم علم الهی مرادف با یکسویه شدن فعل باشد، چنین پیامدی برابر با انتفای اختیار و آزادی عمل انسان نخواهد بود. در این مقاله پس از تبیین مختصر دیدگاه فیشر - در باب علم پیشین الهی - ، بررسی اصل ثبات گذشته و امکانهای بدیل و رهیافت فرانکفورتی فیشر در برابر آن، به ارزیابی راه حل فیشر میپردازیم و ملاحظه میکنیم که به هر حال، تصور وجود بدیل فعل برای تحقّق اختیار عامل، اجتنابناپذیر خواهد بود.