Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
Print: 1735-9791
Online: 2538-2500

Ethical Authorship in the Age of Generative AI: A Digital Humanist Framework for Scholarly Accountability

Reza Rezvani [1] **A. Mehdi Riazi** [2]

1. Department of Foreign Languages and Linguistics, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran, **(Corresponding author)** rezvanireza@gmail.com

2. Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, mehdi.riazi@mq.edu.au

Abstract

Original Research

The integration of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) into scholarly publishing has precipitated a philosophical crisis in authorship, agency, and moral responsibility. While a pragmatic consensus holds that AI cannot be an author (Nature Portfolio, 2023), this prohibition remains philosophically under-justified, and no constructive normative framework for human–AI authorship has been offered. This paper examines how traditional humanism, posthumanist distributed agency, and reactive policy pragmatism fail to address the ethical and epistemic challenges of human–AI collaboration. Through philosophical analysis, it investigates whether scholarly authorship can be reconceived to preserve human moral agency and epistemic trust. Engaging with philosophy of technology debates on mediation and moral agency, we argue that digital humanism offers a necessary normative recalibration. This framework reconceptualizes authorship not as the sole origin of text, but as a non-delegable ethical practice of custodial responsibility, where human scholars retain ultimate accountability for AI-augmented work. The paper's principal result is twofold: a philosophical grounding for the authorship prohibition, and custodial authorship as an operational ethical model. We propose that scholarly publishing adopt proactive, value-driven policies enforcing transparency and human oversight.

Keywords:

generative AI, digital humanism, authorship, moral agency, philosophy of technology.

Received: 2025/10/16; **Received in revised form:** 2026/03/14; **Accepted:** 2026/04/12; **Published online:** 2026/04/18

Rezvani, R. & Riazi, A. M. (2026). Ethical Authorship in the Age of Generative AI: A Digital Humanist Framework for Scholarly Accountability. *Journal of Philosophical Theological Research*, (Special Issue on AI, Consciousness, and Human Agency), 28(3), 125-154. https://doi.org/10.22091/jptr.2026.16977.3635

Copyright © The Authors

Introduction

Research integrity has long served as the fundamental pillar ensuring the credibility, trustworthiness, and ethical standards of research and scholarly publishing across disciplines. It underpins the scholarly endeavor by safeguarding the authenticity of the research process and research outputs, and by maintaining public confidence in academic work. However, the rapid evolution of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies – especially GenAI tools like ChatGPT – poses profound challenges to conventional notions of research integrity, including authorship, responsibility, and ethical attribution (Acosta-Enriquez et al., 2024; Hosseini et al., 2024). As AI tools increasingly contribute to creating, editing, and disseminating research and scholarly outputs, the very concept of authorship and what constitutes genuine scholarly contribution is being fundamentally reshaped. This transformation aligns with the fourth digital revolution (Floridi, 2014), which simultaneously reconfigures our knowledge frameworks (epistemology) and modes of existence (ontology) by altering how we perceive and construct reality (Pezzano, 2024). This is not merely a practical challenge, but a deeply philosophical and ethical one, forcing us to rethink what it means to be an author and to be morally responsible for knowledge in an age of machine collaboration.

We are facing an ethical dilemma about how we should deal with AI tools in research and scholarly dissemination. Following ChatGPT's public release in November 2022, researchers rapidly adopted GenAI tools for different purposes. Surveys as early as 2023 indicate approximately 15% of researchers now use such tools to craft grant proposals, while nearly one-third employ them for manuscript drafting assistance (Van Noorden & Perkel, 2023). This trend has intensified, as indicated by Khalifa and Albadawy (2024). They identify main areas where AI supports academic writing and research by facilitating idea generation and research design, enhancing content and structure, streamlining literature review and synthesis, improving data management and analysis, assisting with editing and publishing tasks, and aiding communication and ethical compliance efforts. The scope of adoption became even clearer in a 2025 survey by Naddaf (2025), which examined researchers' reliance on tools like ChatGPT and DeepSeek. Findings underscored a growing consensus that most researchers now view AI as indispensable to scientific research and publishing, with over 50% reporting its superiority to humans in tasks like literature summarization, plagiarism detection, and citation management. Notably, half of the respondents predicted widespread AI adoption within two years, signaling a near-universal shift in scholarly practices.

This swift use of AI tools has ignited debate over GenAI's legitimacy, particularly when researchers list tools like ChatGPT as co-authors (Pavlik,

2023; Prillaman, 2024; Stokel-Walker, 2023). On the other hand, the time-saving potential is substantial, especially in peer review where an estimated 15 million hours are spent annually evaluating rejected papers (American Journal Experts, 2018). Publishers and journals have automated some publishing tasks – including author-reviewer correspondence, plagiarism detection, statistical checks, methodological validation, reviewer identification, and initial quality control – to enhance efficiency (Checco et al., 2021; Kousha & Thelwall, 2023; Lin et al., 2021; Price & Flach, 2017). These developments accelerate predictions that AI could identify "inconsistencies difficult for reviewers to spot" by 2030 (Burley & Moylan, 2017, p. 3).

While studies acknowledge GenAI's benefits for academic tasks (see, e.g., Kasneci et al., 2023; Kohnke et al., 2023; Shen et al., 2023), others document its value for research and writing activities (see, e.g., Dergaa et al., 2023; Hutson, 2022; Lendvai, 2025; Moorhouse & Nejadghanbar, 2025; Morocco-Clarke et al., 2024; Nguyen-Trung et al., 2024; Thorp, 2023; van Dis et al., 2023). Yet these tools also raise pressing ethical questions about permissible uses. As AI applications grow more sophisticated, fundamental questions about authorship and responsibility intensify and demand careful attention. These questions are, at their core, philosophical, touching on moral agency, ethical accountability, and the nature of scholarly contribution. Although the problem is widely acknowledged, its philosophical dimensions remain underexamined. Current scholarship documents that AI fails authorship criteria, but rarely explains why those criteria carry moral weight, nor does it offer a constructive normative framework for human–AI authorship. This paper addresses that gap.

Increasing reliance on AI may jeopardize core principles of genuine authorship, critical thinking, original insight, and moral accountability, since AI-generated texts might lack these inherently human qualities. This ambiguity complicates intellectual attribution and raises legal and ethical concerns about AI-produced content. Consequently, as Casal and Kessler (2023) observed, the scholarly community – including publishers, independent journals, editors, reviewers, and researchers alike – must confront pivotal issues regarding AI's legitimate role in authorship, transparency requirements, and ethical boundaries. In light of this, Berdejo-Espinola and Amano (2023), Hosseini et al. (2024), and Lund and Naheem (2024) have highlighted intense debate over whether AI systems like ChatGPT should be recognized as authors, underscoring the need for clearer standards for ethical responsibility, transparency, and governance. These discussions frame the urgency of adopting governance structures grounded in ethical principles as AI becomes more embedded in scholarly workflows.

Positioned within the philosophy of technology, the primary aim of this

paper is to explore the ethical implications of AI's increasing role in scholarly publishing, particularly how it challenges conventional notions of authorship, responsibility, and integrity. We ask: How can scholarly authorship be philosophically reconceived to preserve human moral agency and epistemic trust in an era of AI collaboration? To address this, we engage in philosophical analysis, examining how different theoretical frameworks – namely humanism, posthumanism, and digital humanism – address the crisis of moral agency and accountability in technologically mediated knowledge production. We seek to clarify the principles of these perspectives, emphasizing digital humanism as a framework that balances innovation with ethical accountability in an era of technological augmentation. Our goal is to provoke dialogue on the adequacy of current standards and detection tools for protecting authentic scholarly effort, and to propose balanced policies that acknowledge AI's role while upholding core ethical values and moral responsibility. Ultimately, we offer a normative philosophical framework for re-establishing authorship on firmer ethical ground. The paper begins by examining debates around authorship in the AI age, then explores policies governing the use of AI tools in scholarly publications, followed by a philosophical examination of the theoretical perspectives underpinning these concepts. The paper concludes with reflections on scholarly publishing policies regarding authorship, primarily informed by digital humanism, to promote ethically responsible practices in this evolving field.

Authorship in the Age of GenAI: Current Debates and Challenges

The transformative impact of AI technologies, particularly large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT, has ushered in a new era in scholarly writing for publication. Since ChatGPT's public release, there has been swift and widespread adoption across academic and research communities, prompting efforts to regulate and mitigate AI's influence on scholarly work. According to Gulumbe (2024), many publishers and institutions are actively exploring measures to address the ethical and practical challenges posed by AI-generated content. Some researchers (e.g., Islam & Greenwood, 2024) advocate for the outright prohibition of AI use to preserve research integrity. In line with this, and according to Thorp (2023), journals like *Science* have explicitly stated that AI models will not be credited as authors in their publications, emphasizing that any AI-generated content must be properly documented. Failing to cite such contributions may constitute plagiarism (Rezvani, 2024) according to some journals. Similarly, Nature (Nature Portfolio, 2023) has stated that:

> Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, do not currently satisfy our authorship criteria. Notably, an attribution of authorship carries with it accountability for the work, which cannot be effectively applied to LLMs. The use of an LLM should be properly documented in the Methods section (or, if a Methods section is not available, in a suitable alternative part) of the manuscript.

Another perspective (see, e.g., Gulumbe et al., 2024) promotes the constructive integration of GenAI, arguing that restricting these tools is impractical given their pervasive role in modern academia. A more radical perspective, exemplified by Masters (2025), argues that academic authorship (more specifically, the act of writing and composing) itself is a mechanical blending of cultural artifacts – a task ideally suited to LLMs. Drawing on Barthes' (2010) essay, "The Death of the Author," Masters contends that researchers can relinquish authorship to AI entirely, focusing solely on research while AI handles the mechanical act of writing. This view positions authorship as a dispensable proxy for research contribution. Its plausibility, however, depends on an extension of Barthes' argument that Barthes himself did not make. Barthes' claim concerns the interpretive authority of the reader: that a text's meaning is not exhausted by authorial intention. Whether that claim can be extended to the moral responsibility of the writer is a separate question, and one that Masters leaves largely unaddressed. The distinction matters because textual generation and authorial responsibility are not the same thing. Producing sentences can be considered a mechanical act, whereas standing behind a knowledge claim is an ethical one. If authorship is reduced to textual production, it becomes difficult to say who is answerable for the truth, originality, or consequences of what is published; it is precisely this accountability that scholarly integrity presupposes.

As Hammad (2023) observed, while current LLMs excel at mimicking human-like text and organizing content, their capacity for originality and creative thought remains disputed. Whether AI can generate genuinely novel ideas, or merely recombine existing patterns in novel-seeming ways, is an open philosophical question. What is less contentious is that AI cannot assume responsibility for the novelty it produces: even if an AI-generated insight proves original, no machine can be held accountable for its truth, significance, or consequences. In line with Hammad's observation, Salvagno et al. (2023) argue that using GenAI tools like ChatGPT to draft scientific papers still requires expert oversight, as generated texts often lack the nuanced depth and understanding characteristic of human-authored work. Moreover, AI's ability to subtly rephrase or alter content presents unprecedented challenges for plagiarism detection. Discerning these manipulations and maintaining textual

authenticity often requires human judgment, which is increasingly difficult given the sophistication of AI outputs. Studies show that humans are limited in this effort. Gao et al. (2023) found that reviewers could identify only 70% of ChatGPT-generated abstracts, while Weber-Wulff et al. (2023) document significant inaccuracies across detection methods. Adding to this complex situation, Carobene et al. (2024) contend that increasing workloads and shrinking time resources make detection more time-consuming and less reliable. This situation underscores the urgent need for clear ethical guidelines on AI use (Liebrenz et al., 2023).

As Yeo (2025) argues, the rise of GenAI coincides with a crisis in defining scholarly impact, one where traditional metrics like productivity increasingly overshadow human accountability and ethical responsibility (Mazzoleni & Ambrosino, 2024; Moorhouse & Nejadghanbar, 2025). This tension mirrors the core ethical challenge to research integrity posed by GenAI, namely, the reconfiguration of authorship. Specifically, whether non-human entities can hold authorial rights or bear the moral and scholarly obligations inherent in scholarly content creation remains contentious (Mazzi, 2024; Perkins & Roe, 2024). This debate was foreshadowed by historical precedents like the 1981 publication crediting the computer program Racter as an author and the 2019 algorithm-generated book *Lithium-Ion Batteries* by "Beta Writer" (Lee, 2023).

Academic authorship criteria fundamentally focus on accountability and ethical responsibility for intellectual content and integrity. Consequently, the prevailing consensus is clear: AI tools like chatbots do not meet authorship standards because they cannot assume moral or legal responsibility for their output. As Lee (2023, p. 2) notes, a remaining question is: "What about more advanced chatbots in the future?" Considering this question, major publishers explicitly exclude LLMs from authorship eligibility, mandating transparency about AI use in methods or acknowledgments sections. Despite broad acceptance, ethical complexities and questions of moral agency persist, driving calls for standardized ethical guidelines on responsible AI use (Perkins & Roe, 2024; Tate et al., 2023). This prevailing consensus, however, remains a pragmatic policy position rather than a settled philosophical answer. The persistent ethical complexities and fundamental questions of moral agency underscore the need for the conceptual clarity that a philosophical framework like digital humanism aims to provide.

Policies on the Use of AI Tools

Existing research on GenAI policies reveals disciplinary inconsistencies.

Analyses show only 24% of publishers and 87% of top journals have public GenAI policies (Ganjavi et al., 2024), and more recent empirical audits confirm this fragmentation. As a case in point, Bhavsar et al. (2025) found that only 34.6% of STM publishers had publicly available AI policies as of late 2023, while Goyanes et al. (2025) documented that 52.3% of top social science journals do not mention AI use at all in their author guidelines.

These policies commonly prohibit AI authorship and mandate disclosure, but lack consistency in implementation (e.g., where and how to disclose). Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) fields, such as cardiology, show greater coherence, with uniform prohibitions against AI authorship, AI-generated images, and AI in peer review (Inam et al., 2024). Perkins and Roe's (2024) cross-disciplinary analysis confirms consensus on permitting documented GenAI use while taking account of its limitations and biases, alongside an emphasis on human ethical accountability. Yet Goyanes et al. (2025) show significant disciplinary variation: communication and sociology demonstrate greater openness to AI use, while economics remains more conservative – a disparity that underscores the absence of cross-disciplinary consensus.

Broadly, three stances underpin these policies: (1) the strict prohibition of AI authorship due to its lack of consciousness, intentionality, and moral agency (see, e.g., COPE Council, 2019; Hosseini et al., 2024); (2) the principle that human authors are ultimately ethically responsible for content, as GenAI operates via pattern recognition, not original intellectual decision-making (Tang et al., 2024); and (3) mandatory disclosure regarding AI use, though the specifics of disclosure remain contested (Perkins & Roe, 2024). These stances affirm that authorship requires capacities like liability for ethical and legal misconduct, which, according to Hosseini et al. (2024), AI cannot fulfill.

The policy fragmentation indicates that pragmatic rules overrun conceptual coherence, leaving fundamental ethical questions about authorship unexamined. Current approaches correctly pinpoint tensions but treat authorship and moral accountability as self-evident, amplifying practical challenges like inconsistent enforcement and detection difficulties (Gulumbe et al., 2024). Consequently, prevailing prohibitions against AI authorship often remain reactive and rooted in practicality, rather than in ethical principle. This gap between high-level ethical principles and implementable practices reflects a broader challenge in AI governance, where translating ethical guidelines into actionable ethical frameworks remains difficult (Papagiannidis et al., 2025).

These persistent tensions between AI's utility and its (in)ability to satisfy authorship criteria demand more than policy adjustments; they require rigorous interrogation of the philosophical and ethical foundations of scholarly

authorship and accountability. In what follows, we briefly explore three pivotal perspectives – namely, humanism, posthumanism, and digital humanism – to establish the groundwork for reimagining ethical authorship in the age of AI.

Conceiving Authorship from Humanism, Posthumanism, and the Digital Humanist Alternative

1. Humanism: Conceptual Diversity and Foundational Principles

The concept of humanism is inherently fluid, adapting across different historical contexts and cultural settings (Prem, 2024). Scholars like Davies (2008) also emphasize the fundamental diversity of humanism, noting the absence of a single, unique definition. According to Prem (2024), this diversity stems from its broad spectrum of historical origins, variously attributed to antiquity, the Italian Renaissance, or German pedagogical traditions. Consequently, contemporary discussions often indiscriminately apply the humanistic label to any philosophy centered on human values, generating substantial conceptual ambiguity (Fuchs, 2022; Kristeller, 1979). Amid this diversity in perspective, the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU, n.d.; see also Copson, 2015, p. 6) provides a unifying modern definition:

> Humanism is a democratic and ethical life stance, which affirms that human beings have the right and responsibility to give meaning and shape to their own lives.

Despite the diversity of interpretations of humanism, certain foundational principles have consistently underpinned its evolution. Its core values focus on acknowledging the dignity of human beings and their ethical responsibility for meaning-making and life-shaping, emphasizing rational inquiry and the pursuit of human flourishing (Copson, 2015). Humanism has also been characterized by a particular interest in understanding human nature through essentialist frameworks that seek to identify qualities unique to humans – distinguishing them from animals and mechanistic views – while also advocating for self-determination and personal autonomy (Prem, 2024).

Ultimately, humanism constitutes "a set of presuppositions that assigns to human beings a special position in the scheme of things," which is "not just a school of thought or a collection of specific beliefs," but "rather a general perspective from which the world is viewed" (Audi, 2015, p. 475). In light of humanist thought, informed by these foundational principles, we can understand human agency as a central principle. Within this paradigm, the

production of scholarly knowledge is understood as fundamentally a human endeavor, emphasizing the intrinsic agency of individuals and their accompanying moral responsibilities, rather than attributing this agency to non-human entities such as machines or emerging generative AI technologies. This perspective aligns with the context in which humanism was initially developed, framing the generation of meaning and knowledge as a uniquely human enterprise endowed with both rights and ethical duties. Consequently, research and scholarly publication are seen as inherently human activities. Thus, individuals possess the right and responsibility to create meaning, including scholarly productions, and to utilize the results of these scholarly endeavors to shape their own lives and experiences (Copson, 2015). The implications for authorship follow directly from this account: if human dignity consists in the capacity for reasoned judgment and moral choice (Copson, 2015), then authorship is not merely a convention of academic publishing, but an expression of that very capacity. To author is to exercise reason, judgment, and accountability – the constitutive features of human dignity as humanism conceives it. Authorship therefore carries moral weight that cannot be transferred to a machine, because machines cannot exercise the capacities that make authorship a moral practice.

2. Posthumanism: Reimagining the Human in a Technological Age

In direct contrast to the humanist position outlined above, posthumanism emerges from a profound critique of humanism, which, according to Ranisch and Sorgner (2014), has "lost its credibility" (p. 16); as Badmington (2000, p. 9) stated, a "crisis in humanism is happening everywhere." This critique has generated diverse posthumanist approaches that, while varying in focus, collectively envision a future where humanism persists only as a residual trace (Chatelier, 2017; Ranisch & Sorgner, 2014). This philosophical movement rejects the anthropocentric premise that "man is the measure of all things" (Ranisch & Sorgner, 2014, p. 16) and challenges the dualist frameworks deeply rooted in Western tradition – such as human/machine, nature/culture, and organic/inorganic – contending that definitions of human beings are historically contingent and ideologically constructed rather than reflections of a fixed essence (Deretić & Sorgner, 2016; Ranisch & Sorgner, 2014).

Expanding on this perspective, posthumanism often revolves around emerging technologies, prompting a reconsideration of the concept of the "human being" through active engagement and interaction with technological innovation (Ranisch & Sorgner, 2014). For example, as a preliminary way to understand this shift, transhumanism advocates for the radical transformation

of human biological and social capacities through technology – an idea that involves human enhancement or augmentation so profound that it could produce life forms with markedly different characteristics, potentially perceived as fundamentally other than human. This technologically driven evolution is commonly called the posthuman (Ranisch & Sorgner, 2014).

Conceptually, posthumanism reframes technology not as an external tool, but as an intrinsic dimension of human evolution. As Valera (2014, p. 486) argues, it embraces a "symbiotic relationship between people and technology," wherein "as much as people create and determine technology, technology creates and determines people." This symbiosis facilitates "hybridization," which is deemed a "progressive elimination and fluidization of differences" that transcends biological constraints and repositions humans as "embodied in an extended technological world" rather than distinct from it (Valera, 2014, pp. 483–484).

Posthumanism does not herald humanity's literal end, but signals "the end of a particular image of us" (Hassan, 1977, p. 845). Hayles (1999) similarly clarifies that "posthumanity is already here," signifying not human extinction, but "the end of a particular conception of the human" (p. 286). However, some strands envisage humanity's replacement by cyborgs and data-centric systems as an inevitable outcome of scientific progress (Harari, 2017). Distinct from transhumanism, a techno-optimist discourse rejects instrumentalist techno-determinism (Popenici, 2023; Ranisch & Sorgner, 2014). It prioritizes reconceptualization over transcendence, emphasizing ethical reorientation toward non-human agents (animals, machines, ecosystems) and emancipatory politics that challenge anthropocentrism (Soper, 2012; Valera, 2014). The techno-optimist perspective seeks to enhance posthumanity through biological or cybernetic augmentation.

According to Tang et al. (2024), posthumanist thought, informed by new materialist frameworks (see, e.g., Barad, 2007), fundamentally reconfigures agency as an emergent property of human–technological networks (Tang & Cooper, 2024). Within this paradigm, scientific knowledge creation – substantially aided by unprecedented methodological innovation and insight generation – is conceived as a collaborative partnership between humans and GenAI, emphasizing shared agency rather than attributing primacy to either entity (Tang et al., 2024). This collaborative dynamic catalyzes novel forms of partnership, integrating human cognitive capabilities with GenAI's computational power to generate, process, analyze, and synthesize complex information (Tang et al., 2024). Consequently, research outputs will increasingly reflect co-creation between human scholars and AI systems, each contributing specialized functions within the knowledge production process (Tang et al., 2024). However, this distributed model of agency raises critical

questions about where ethical accountability ultimately resides – questions that Kotsis (2025) argues are inadequately addressed by current frameworks, as AI cannot bear epistemic or legal responsibility for content errors, fabricated citations, or methodological flaws. This fundamental deficit in accounting for ultimate responsibility is precisely what the digital humanist framework, upholding human sovereignty, is designed to address.

Despite its emancipatory aims, posthumanism faces ethical critiques. Popenici (2023) warns that uncritical narratives of technological integration can fuel dehumanizing constructs disguised as posthuman or antihuman creeds. Similarly, Soper (2012) cautions against soulless techno-determinism. These concerns resonate with the emergent vision of digital humanism, which explicitly seeks to counterbalance technological determinism (Fuchs, 2022), echoing the idea that "life and its fate must be in our hands, in the hands of humans" (Werthner et al., 2024, p. v) to shape technology, not be shaped by it (Fuchs, 2022). This ethical imperative underscores the need for human moral oversight even within technologically mediated partnerships. While posthumanism usefully deconstructs human exceptionalism, its model of hybrid agency faces a critical philosophical limitation: it cannot adequately resolve the problem of *asymmetric moral accountability* within human–AI networks.

3. Digital Humanism: Centering Human Values in the Digital Transformation

As a proposed resolution to the tensions between humanist tradition and posthumanist innovation, the concept of digital humanism – not to be confused with digital humanities – is gaining increased academic attention. Digital humanism has evolved into an influential academic movement with aims that span political and societal spheres (Prem, 2024). It emerges as a proactive philosophical and ethical framework that seeks to "describe, analyze, and, most importantly, influence the complex interplay of technology and humankind, for a better society and life, fully respecting universal human rights" (Werthner, 2024, p. 123). It aims to respond to serious concerns about the societal impact of digitization, ensuring that technology serves humanity while fully respecting universal human rights (Fuchs, 2022; Prem, 2024; Serrano et al., 2024).. This movement explicitly counters techno-economic determinism by advocating for human-centered technological development and democratic participation in tech governance (Coeckelbergh, 2024; Werthner, 2024). At its core, digital humanism represents "an attempt to place human values and interests at the center of the digital transformation" by addressing ethical, social, and political challenges posed by rapid technological advancement (Serrano et al., 2024, p. 1).

The movement is deeply rooted in Enlightenment and humanist traditions, which emphasize reason, freedom, and equality (Nida-Rümelin & Winter, 2024). These ideals, shaped by the Enlightenment, are foundational to the recognition of universal human rights and the belief in the inherent dignity of all individuals, regardless of background (Nida-Rümelin & Winter, 2024). Digital humanism seeks to revive these principles in the context of modern technology, advocating for digital tools that can enhance human autonomy and ethical responsibility rather than diminish them (Nida-Rümelin & Winter, 2024).

The movement crystallized in 2019 following an international conference at the Vienna University of Technology, which produced the Vienna Manifesto on Digital Humanism as a "call to deliberate and act on technological development" (Prem, 2024, p. 2). This manifesto formalized growing unease about the trajectory of digitization and its dehumanizing effects, particularly through AI-driven automation that threatens human agency (Coeckelbergh, 2024). Drawing inspiration from humanist ideals, as Pezzano (2024) articulated, digital humanism bridges "humanistic ideals rooted in Renaissance Humanism with critical reflections on technological progress" (p. 1). Pezzano continues to argue that by blending these ideals with critical engagement with technology, digital humanism seeks to foster a society where humans remain central to technological progress. The manifesto explicitly links the quest for digital humanism to the intellectual traditions of humanism and the Enlightenment (Werthner et al., 2019). According to Nida-Rümelin and Winter (2024), this approach aims to promote values such as rationality, autonomy, and moral responsibility, serving as a counterbalance to the unchecked proliferation of AI and digitalization.

Central to digital humanism is the principle of human ethical sovereignty over technology, insisting that humans must "keep control over digital technology" (Coeckelbergh, 2024, p. 2) and advocating specifically for "computer-supported decisions rather than entirely machine-made decisions" when people are affected (Prem, 2024, p. 3). This demand for human moral oversight directly challenges autonomous AI systems operating without the meaningful and transparent intervention of humans (for further elaboration on this, see Koeszegi, 2024; Weippl & Schrittwieser, 2024; Werthner et al., 2024). Furthermore, digital humanism calls for embedding humanistic and ethical values directly into technology design to respect inherent human dignity and worth, emphasizing that humans are deserving of agency and autonomy (Winter, 2024). This includes a core principle articulated in the Vienna Manifesto, which explicitly proclaims that "Digital technologies should be designed to promote democracy and inclusion. This will require special efforts to overcome current inequalities and to use the emancipatory potential of digital

technologies to make our societies more inclusive" (Werthner et al., 2019, p. 2).

Prem (2024) observes that while the Vienna Manifesto positions digital humanism within Enlightenment and humanistic traditions, these foundational ideals remain insufficiently elaborated and detailed. As discussed in this article, there should be dialogue and discussion on how to mediate between philosophical traditions – in this case, digital humanism – and contemporary technological realities in practice, particularly in their ethical application to contemporary challenges such as AI governance and scholarly publication.

Despite broad acceptance of its motivations, digital humanism faces notable conceptual tensions. As Prem (2024) states, some dismiss it as an oxymoron that paradoxically combines "human" with "non-human" technological systems, while others criticize its reliance on traditional humanist ideals given their historical associations with colonialism, anthropocentrism, and exclusionary worldviews. However, as an evolving field, it continues to navigate these tensions between enduring humanist traditions and the realities of rapidly advancing technology. Nonetheless, its core aim remains clear and vital: to ensure that the primary purpose of technology – especially emerging digital technologies – is and must be to serve humanity, anchoring innovation in human dignity and ethical responsibility rather than merely technical possibility (Pezzano, 2024).

As suggested in the preceding discussion, digital humanism is positioned as a response to the problem of ultimate responsibility. This claim, however, requires specification. Digital humanism does not deny that AI systems participate in knowledge production; it denies that participation entails responsibility. Agency in the descriptive sense – the capacity to produce effects – is distinct from agency in the normative sense – the capacity to be held answerable. AI may possess the former, but cannot possess the latter, because accountability requires the ability to recognize and respond to reasons (Nida-Rümelin & Staudacher, 2024), to have intended an outcome, and to be subject to normative appraisal (Nida-Rümelin & Staudacher, 2024).

Therefore, for the specific crisis of scholarly authorship, digital humanism provides the necessary normative foundation. It re-grounds the authority and accountability of the author not in solitary genius, but in the human scholar's sovereign role as the ethical custodian of AI-augmented knowledge production. By custodial responsibility, we mean the non-delegable duty of a human agent to verify the accuracy and integrity of AI-assisted content, to authorize its submission as a scholarly claim, and to bear moral and professional liability for its consequences. Crucially, this responsibility is assumed at a determinate moment: the act of submission. Prior to submission, AI use is a private writing practice; at submission, it becomes a public act of accountability.

Having thus established this framework, the next section offers our insights and reflections on its implications for scholarly publishing. While focused on research articles, these reflections are also applicable broadly to scholarly dissemination given widespread AI use. They aim to support ethically responsible practices and are born from our critical engagement with the ideas discussed. These reflections are not exhaustive or prescriptive, but are intended to foster dialogue and provoke thoughtful consideration among all stakeholders regarding the ethical challenges and opportunities GenAI introduces.

Reflections and Recommendations

Throughout history, societies have reacted to disruptive innovations with fear, suspicion, and calls for regulation. Ferraris (2024) traces this tendency to Plato's era, when the introduction of writing sparked concerns about the decline of "live" education – fears ultimately addressed through appeals to ethics. Yet, as Ferraris reminds us, "what incites fear and prompts the call for ethics as a remedy against the unknown is not so much the technical apparatus itself but its novelty" (Ferraris, 2024, p. 4). Applied to AI, this suggests that the task is not to reject the technology, but to shape its development through ethical foresight. As Lanier (2011) observes, approaching emerging technologies with anticipation of their negative consequences allows us to shape a positive future – a point reinforced by Grosswiler (2012, p. 93), who notes that "if you anticipate that a new medium will have negative consequences, the consequences are more likely to be positive."

This perspective aligns with digital humanism, which Nida-Rümelin and Staudacher (2024) describe as an ethics for the digital age that interprets and shapes digital transformation in accordance with humanist philosophy. Its central aim is to guide technological development in a way that remains true to humanist values, and its core concept is human authorship – a notion that has shaped moral and legal systems for centuries by highlighting the "triad of reason, freedom, and responsibility" (Nida-Rümelin & Staudacher, 2024, p. 18). Moral agency, on this account, is grounded in the ability to respond thoughtfully to reasons, which forms the normative basis for ethical behavior.

According to Nida-Rümelin and Staudacher (2024), from a conceptual standpoint, digital humanism involves rejecting both the mechanistic view that humans are essentially like machines, and the animistic view that machines can be considered as (or like) humans. Practically, it asserts that ethical responsibility should never be attributed to AI systems, nor should they be permitted to make autonomous ethical decisions. Instead, responsibility

remains a human moral prerogative; that is, those involved in developing and deploying AI must ensure that moral judgment and accountability stay firmly within the realm of human agency. In light of these principles, it becomes clear that while AI is an incredibly powerful and supportive tool, it should not be entrusted with moral responsibility or ethical decision-making. Rather, AI should be viewed as a tool that supports and enhances human tasks without supplanting human reasoning, ethical judgment, and moral agency. This approach ensures that technological progress aligns with the fundamental virtues of reason, freedom, and responsibility – values that lie at the heart of digital humanism and are essential for the ethical development and use of AI.

Having established this digital humanist orientation, the following sections apply its core principles to the specific ethical challenges of authorship and scholarly publishing. We first consider its implications for equity, then examine how it reframes the concepts of authorship and moral accountability, and finally derive recommendations for proactive ethical policy.

1. Beyond Dystopia: A Digital Humanist Ethics for the AI Age

The relationship between technology and access is not new. Rana (2024) observes that historical innovations like the typewriter shifted academic writing toward specialized audiences, privileging those with access to new tools while marginalizing others. This precedent underscores the critical need to align emerging technologies with democratic and ethical values – a need that digital humanism explicitly addresses by asserting that "digital technologies should be designed to promote democracy and inclusion" (Werthner et al., 2019, p. 2).

In scholarly communication, generative AI holds significant promise for advancing these principles by reducing linguistic barriers and democratizing access (Tang et al., 2024). It can level the playing field for researchers with limited English proficiency through enhanced language editing and clarity (Tang et al., 2024). In a sense, AI may serve as a "golden tongue" – a motif long sought across cultures to overcome communicative barriers (Archaeology News Online Magazine, 2026) – granting scholars who have been marginalized by the dominance of English in academic publishing a voice in a discourse where language proficiency has historically dictated participation. This structural disadvantage is well-documented: non-native speakers spend significantly more time writing papers and receive more than double the rejections of their native-speaking counterparts (Amano et al., 2023), and writing in English is perceived as more difficult and anxiety-inducing (Hanauer & Englander, 2011). This linguistic burden, rooted in colonial and neocolonial power dynamics

(Biesta et al., 2025), extends beyond practical barriers to shape whose knowledge is valued and whose voice is heard in global scholarship (Nature Human Behaviour, 2023). Evidence supports this potential, as a survey by Prillaman (2024) found that 55% of researchers prioritize AI-assisted editing, and 75% of European Research Council grant recipients expect GenAI to "reduce language barriers for non-native speakers" by 2030 (European Research Council, 2023, p. 11). When ethically deployed, such tools can ensure that English writing prowess no longer dictates scholarly reach (Bon et al., 2024; Dwivedi et al., 2023), operationalizing digital humanism's goal of equitable and ethical knowledge dissemination.

However, this democratizing potential is not automatic. As Draude (2024) argues, AI can also automate and amplify existing inequities. Scholars warn that privileged researchers and high-income countries are poised to exploit large language models, potentially widening the research gap (Dergaa et al., 2023; van Dis et al., 2023). Empirical evidence bears this out. Liang et al. (2023) found that GPT detectors consistently misclassify non-native English writing as AI-generated, with a false positive rate of 61.22% compared to near-zero for native writers. Giray et al. (2026) explain the mechanism behind this bias, indicating that detection tools operationalize human writing through metrics such as perplexity and burstiness, which encode monolingual, native-speaker norms. Writers whose English reflects careful, formal composition – precisely what L2 academic writing instruction rewards – are structurally disadvantaged, penalized for linguistic discipline rather than flagged for machine generation. What this bias reveals is how technological tools can inadvertently penalize scholars whose first language is not English – ironically, the very scholars who might benefit most from AI-assisted writing. Grieve et al. (2026, p. 2) frame this as a form of epistemic injustice, where "English-language sources are treated as definitive and scholarship that has been traditionally viewed as non-Western is framed as supplementary or contextual." They argue that the dominance of English in academic publishing perpetuates colonial power structures, silencing voices and knowledges that do not conform to Western-centric norms.

Addressing these inequities requires deliberate, value-driven action. From a digital humanist standpoint, this necessitates involving diverse stakeholders – including end-users, developers, ethicists, and representatives from marginalized communities – in AI development and governance (Serrano et al., 2024). This must be coupled with technical and policy efforts to build systems that actively promote ethical fairness and avoid discrimination (Knees et al., 2024; Schmid, 2024), as well as conscious efforts to diversify citation practices, engage with non-English literature, and include voices from the Global South (Grieve et al., 2026). The path

to equity, therefore, lies not in restricting AI, but in deliberately shaping its development and deployment through inclusive, ethicallyinformed, and value-driven design – a core tenet of digital humanism in practice.

2. Digital Humanism in Practice: Equity, Custodial Authorship, and the Imperative of Transparency

The dual potential of GenAI to foster inclusion while threatening integrity brings us to the core ethical crisis: the erosion of authorship. The capabilities that make AI a powerful tool for accessibility also obscure the source of intellectual contributions, challenging foundational concepts of originality and moral accountability. This ambiguity directly jeopardizes the trust and ethical integrity upon which scholarly publishing depends.

Addressing this crisis requires more than technical fixes; it demands a conceptual, ethical, and normative framework. Digital humanism, with its emphasis on human responsibility and reason, provides this foundation, asserting that authorship must remain an inherently human practice grounded in moral agency and non-delegable ethical responsibility (Coeckelbergh, 2024; Nida-Rümelin & Staudacher, 2024). This directly counters posthumanist visions of hybrid agency (Tang & Cooper, 2024) or the radical "death of the academic author" (Masters, 2025), which conflate the mechanical generation of text with the ethical act of authorship. From a digital humanist perspective, the author is not the originator of every sentence, but the ethical custodian who assumes ultimate responsibility for the work's integrity, validity, and ethical soundness. This conception also echoes recent philosophical reflections on human dignity in the age of AI. As Pope Leo XIV (2026, p. 4) warns, the drive to "translate everything, including the mystery of the person, into data and performance" risks reducing human agency to mere computation. Recognizing that every man and woman possesses an "inalienable dignity" (Pope Leo XIV, 2026, p. 13), the encyclical affirms that the human person is not a passive data point, but an active moral subject whose agency cannot be delegated to machines. Kotsis (2025) similarly argues for a hierarchical authorship taxonomy distinguishing human, AI-assisted, and AI-generated contributions – a classification that complements the custodial authorship model by making levels of human oversight explicit. Custodial authorship operationalizes this principle by locating responsibility not in the act of writing per se, but in the exercise of critical judgment and moral oversight over AI-generated contributions.

This redefined authorship also demands ethical transparency. In an era where text provenance is easily obscured, transparency is not a minor concession, but an ethical and epistemic necessity. It is the mechanism that

makes human ethical responsibility visible and assessable. Current frameworks are inadequate: AI can reproduce work without attribution (Else, 2023), and detection tools are unreliable (Perkins et al., 2024). Tsigaris and Teixeira da Silva (2026) demonstrate that under empirically plausible conditions, AI detectors produce more false accusations than correct identifications, with false discovery rates exceeding 70% when the prevalence of detectable AI use is low. They conclude that "transparent disclosure of AI use, clearer institutional guidelines… represent better strategies than an arms-race dynamic" between detectors and AI systems (Tsigaris & Teixeira da Silva, 2026, p. 8). Therefore, we must move beyond vague acknowledgments. Disclosure must be granular and functional, specifying how AI was used (e.g., for literature synthesis, drafting, or language polishing) and what level of human ethical oversight was applied (e.g., editing, verification, integration). This creates an ethical audit trail for human judgment, fulfilling the scholarly community's need to evaluate the work and attribute moral responsibility correctly.

Operationalizing this requires clear, shared ethical standards. The current landscape is fragmented, with varying publisher expectations causing confusion and inconsistent enforcement (Bergstrom & Ruediger, 2024). Building a common ethical vocabulary – defining terms like "AI-assisted drafting," "AI-generated content," and "human intellectual lead" – is a prerequisite for consistent ethical policy and meaningful interdisciplinary dialogue (Bergstrom & Ruediger, 2024; Sueur et al., 2024). This collaborative, multidisciplinary effort itself is consistent with digital humanism's ethical and synthetic approach (Nida-Rümelin & Staudacher, 2024; Werthner et al., 2024).

We therefore propose that publishers explicitly endorse the use of GenAI for legitimate tasks such as language editing and refinement, conditional upon rigorous ethical transparency. This endorsement should be accompanied by clear caveats: overreliance on AI risks introducing distortions, inaccuracies, or "hallucinations" (Alkaissi & McFarlane, 2023; Hicks et al., 2024; Ji et al., 2022), while the "halo effect" of polished prose may mask substantive flaws (Kreuz, 2025). All stakeholders – including authors, reviewers, and editors – should therefore be equipped with critical ethical awareness and training to scrutinize AI-assisted work. The goal is a culture of sovereign and ethically informed use, in which AI enhances human capability without displacing human critical and ethical judgment.

From Principle to Policy: A Proactive Framework for Governance

Custodial authorship and transparency require proactive, structural support beyond individual commitment. Guided by digital humanism, policymaking must

shift from a reactive stance to an anticipatory and ethically driven endeavor. This aligns with concepts of anticipatory ethics (Brey, 2012) and proactive ethics (Floridi & Sanders, 2005), which emphasize embedding ethical foresight and moral reasoning into the development and governance of technology. The urgency of proactive governance is driven by the regulatory gaps documented in recent empirical studies. For example, Bhavsar et al. (2025) found that 65.4% of STM publishers still lack any AI policy, while Goyanes et al. (2025) revealed that only 47.7% of top social science journals mention AI use at all in their author guidelines – a situation that Kotsis (2025) warns leaves editors, institutions, and authors without clear ethical direction, thereby exposing the scientific record to risks of error, bias, and weakened accountability.

A proactive ethical approach calls for a coalition of stakeholders – including publishers, academic institutions, funding bodies, and ethics committees – working together to co-create evolving ethical standards (Papagiannidis et al., 2025). The goal, as Schiaffonati (2024) asserts, shifts from merely avoiding harm to actively fostering societal good, ensuring AI tools uphold integrity, transparency, and human rights.

Publishers must develop clear, adaptable ethical policies that mandate detailed disclosure and establish verification protocols, requiring authors to certify their understanding of responsible and ethical AI use. These policies must be iterative and inclusive, forged through multidisciplinary and ethically informed partnerships with researchers, ethicists, and technologists. Furthermore, publishers must transparently disclose their own use of AI in editorial and production processes, practicing the reciprocal ethical integrity they demand of authors. This approach is reflected in recent regulatory developments, such as the EU's Digital Omnibus on AI (Regulation 2026/1744), which establishes AI literacy as a legal obligation for providers and deployers (Article 4) and mandates guidelines to minimize compliance burdens while maintaining human accountability (Recital 37). Such frameworks operationalize the digital humanist commitment to human-centric governance.

A critical complication is the inherent opacity of many AI systems (Dwivedi et al., 2023; Tamburrini, 2024; Weippl & Schrittwieser, 2024). A digital humanist stance holds that this technical "black box" does not absolve scholars of ethical responsibility. On the contrary, it heightens the author's duty of vigilant ethical custodianship. Authors are ethically obliged to exercise due diligence, rigorously verify outputs, and bear full moral and professional responsibility for any inaccuracies or misuse, regardless of the tool's internal unknowability (Werthner et al., 2024).

Proactive policymaking is thus the institutional enactment of the digital humanist commitment to human ethical sovereignty. It is the means by which

the scholarly community collectively ensures that technological progress remains anchored in the human values of dignity, equity, and moral accountability, thereby safeguarding the integrity and ethical trust essential to its mission. This represents a conscious philosophical choice: to govern technology through human values, thereby asserting that the trajectory of scholarly communication is a matter of ethical and political will, not an inevitable technical outcome.

Conclusion

The rapid integration of generative AI into scholarly publishing represents more than a practical challenge; it is a profound conceptual and ethical crisis that threatens the very foundations of authorship, moral accountability, and trust upon which academia depends. As this paper has shown, current policy responses are fragmented and reactive (Ganjavi et al., 2024; Perkins & Roe, 2024), prioritizing pragmatic rules over philosophical and ethical coherence. This inadequacy, combined with unreliable detection tools (Perkins et al., 2024; Weber-Wulff et al., 2023) and the inherent opacity of AI systems (Dwivedi et al., 2023; Werthner, 2024), leaves scholarly integrity and ethical trust vulnerable.

In confronting this crisis, we have argued that neither a retreat to traditional humanist essentialism nor an embrace of posthumanist distributed agency provides an adequate ethical framework. Instead, digital humanism offers the essential conceptual and normative ethical foundation. It resolves the tension by asserting three non-negotiable principles for the digital age: the non-delegability of human moral responsibility, the sovereignty of human ethical judgment over technology, and epistemic and ethical transparency as a condition for trust.

Scholarly authorship can preserve human moral agency in an era of AI collaboration only if it is relocated from textual production to moral accountability. From these principles, we have derived a coherent framework for reconstructing authorship. This framework redefines the author not as the sole generator of text, but as the responsible ethical custodian of scholarly work – the agent who exercises critical and moral oversight, verifies content, and assumes ultimate ethical accountability. It mandates granular ethical transparency to make this custodianship visible, and demands proactive, value-driven, and ethically informed governance to institutionalize these norms across the scholarly ecosystem. This approach directly addresses the dual edges of GenAI, harnessing its potential for equity and inclusion while erecting necessary ethical guardrails to protect intellectual integrity.

The contribution of this framework is threefold: it grounds the authorship prohibition in moral philosophy rather than policy pragmatism; it converts that grounding into an actionable model; and it bridges the gap between ethical principle and scholarly practice by translating core digital humanist values – reason, dignity, and responsibility – into policies for transparency and governance. In doing so, it resists both the erosion of ethical responsibility and the myth of hybrid agency, offering instead a normative account of authorship that centers human moral agency in human–AI collaboration.

The framework developed here carries implications for the principal actors in scholarly publishing. For publishers, it implies the development of clear and evolving standards for disclosure and verification. For authors, it implies a conception of authorship as vigilant custodianship – exercising oversight and accepting responsibility for AI-augmented work. For academic institutions and funders, it implies support for this shift through training, policy, and incentives.

The choice is not between adopting or rejecting AI, but between allowing technology to erode scholarly norms and shaping technology to serve enduring human values. If the digital humanist commitment to reason, freedom, and responsibility is taken seriously, generative AI can be integrated into scholarly practice in a way that expands access and preserves the integrity, accountability, and trust on which the scholarly enterprise depends.

▣ Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback on an earlier version of this manuscript.

▣ AI Use Declaration

The authors used ChatGPT (Version 3.5) for language editing and polishing. The authors reviewed and revised all content and take full responsibility for the final manuscript.

▣ Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no competing interests.

References

Acosta-Enriquez, B. G., Arbulú Ballesteros, M. A., Huamaní Jordan, O., López, R. S., Paredes, P. S., & Cruz, J. L. (2024). Analysis of college students' attitudes toward the use of ChatGPT in their academic activities: Effect of intent to use, verification of information, and responsible use. *BMC Psychology, 12* (1), Article 255. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40359-024-01764-z

Alkaissi, H., & McFarlane, S. I. (2023). Artificial hallucinations in ChatGPT: Implications in scientific writing. *Cureus, 15*(2), Article e35179. https://doi.org/10.7759/cureus.35179

Amano, T., Ramírez-Castañeda, V., Berdejo-Espinola, V., Borokini, I., Chowdhury, S.,... & Zahawi, R. A. (2023). The manifold costs of being a non-native English speaker in science. *PLOS Biology*, *21*(7), Article e3002184. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3002184

American Journal Experts. (2018). *Peer review: How we found 15 million hours of lost time*. http://www.aje.com/en/arc/peer-review-process-15-million-hours-lost-time/

Archaeology News Online Magazine. (2026, July 6). Ancient tombs with golden tongues found at Egypt's Marina El Alamein reveal 2,000-year-old burial secrets. *Archaeology News Online Magazine*. https://archaeologymag.com/2026/07/tombs-with-golden-tongues-at-marina-el-alamein/

Audi, R. (Ed.). (2015). *The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy*. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139057509

Badmington, N. (Ed.). (2000). *Posthumanism*. Palgrave.

Barad, K. (2007). *Meeting the universe halfway: Quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning*. Duke University Press.

Barthes, R. (2010). The death of the author. In V. B. Leitch (Ed.), *The Norton anthology of theory and criticism* (pp. 1322–1326). W. W. Norton & Company.

Bearman, M., & Ajjawi, R. (2023). Learning to work with the black box: Pedagogy for a world with artificial intelligence. *British Journal of Educational Technology, 54*(5), 1160–1173. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjet.13337

Berdejo-Espinola, V., & Amano, T. (2023). AI tools can improve equity in science. *Science, 379*(6636), 991. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adg9714

Bergstrom, T., & Ruediger, D. (2024). *A third transformation? Generative AI and scholarly publishing* (Research Report). Ithaka S+R. https://doi.org/10.18665/sr.321519

Bhavsar, D., Duffy, L., Jo, H., & Sokolova, A. (2025). Policies on artificial intelligence chatbots among academic publishers: A cross-sectional audit. *Research Integrity and Peer Review*, *10*, Article 1. https://doi.org/10.1186/s41073-025-00158-y

Biesta, G., Takayama, K., Kettle, M., & Heimans, S. (2025). How to say in English what you cannot say in English? Dilemmas of 'global' scholarship and small steps forward. *Asia-Pacific Journal of Teacher Education*, *53*(2), 135–137. https://doi.org/10.1080/1359866X.2025.2469970

Bon, A., Saa-Dittoh, F., & Akkermans, H. (2024). Bridging the digital divide. In H. Werthner, C. Ghezzi, J. Kramer, J. Nida-Rümelin, B. Nuseibeh, E. Prem, & A. Stanger (Eds.), *Introduction to digital humanism: A textbook* (pp. 283–298). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45304-5_19

Brey, P. A. (2012). Anticipatory ethics for emerging technologies. *NanoEthics, 6*(1), 1–13.

Burley, R., & Moylan, E. (2017). *What might peer review look like in 2030? A report from BioMed Central and Digital Science* (SpotOn Report). BioMed Central & Digital Science. https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.4884878

Carobene, A., Padoan, A., Cabitza, F., Banfi, G., & Plebani, M. (2024). Rising adoption of artificial intelligence in scientific publishing: Evaluating the role, risks, and ethical implications in paper drafting and review process. *Clinical Chemistry and Laboratory Medicine, 62*(5), 835–843. https://doi.org/10.1515/cclm-2023-1136

Casal, J. E., & Kessler, M. (2023). Can linguists distinguish between ChatGPT/AI and human writing? A study of research ethics and academic publishing. *Research Methods in Applied Linguistics, 2*(3), Article 100068. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rmal.2023.100068

Chan, C. K. Y. (2023). A comprehensive AI policy education framework for university teaching and learning. *International Journal of Educational Technology in Higher Education, 20*(38), 1–25.

Chatelier, S. (2017). Beyond the humanism/posthumanism debate: The educational implications of Said's critical, humane praxis. *Educational Theory, 67*(6), 657–672. https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12278

Checco, A., Bracciale, L., Loreti, P., Pinfield, S., & Bianchi, G. (2021). AI-assisted peer review. *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 8*(1), 1–11.

Coeckelbergh, M. (2024). What is digital humanism? A conceptual analysis and an argument for a more critical and political digital (post)humanism. *Journal of Responsible Technology, 17*, Article 100073. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrt.2023.100073

COPE Council. (2019). *COPE discussion document: Authorship*. Committee on Publication Ethics. https://doi.org/10.24318/cope.2019.3.3

Copson, A. (2015). What is humanism? In A. Copson & A. C. Grayling (Eds.), *The Wiley Blackwell handbook of humanism* (pp. 1–33). Wiley-Blackwell.

Davies, T. (2008). *Humanism*. Routledge.

Deretić, I., & Sorgner, S. L. (2016). Introduction. In I. Deretić & S. L. Sorgner (Eds.), *From humanism to meta-, post- and transhumanism?* (pp. 13–20). Peter Lang.

Dergaa, I., Chamari, K., Zmijewski, P., & Ben Saad, H. (2023). From human writing to artificial intelligence generated text: Examining the prospects and potential threats of ChatGPT in academic writing. *Biology of Sport, 40*, 615–622. https://doi.org/10.5114/biolsport.2023.125623

Draude, C. (2024). Digital transformation through the lens of intersectional gender research: Challenges and needs for action. In H. Werthner, C. Ghezzi, J. Kramer, J. Nida-Rümelin, B. Nuseibeh, E. Prem, & A. Stanger (Eds.), *Introduction to digital*

humanism: A textbook (pp. 83–97). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45304-5_6

Dwivedi, Y. K., Kshetri, N., Hughes, L., Slade, E. L., Jeyaraj, A., Kar, A. K., Baabdullah, A. M., Koohang, A., Raghavan, V., Ahuja, M., Albanna, H., Albashrawi, M. A., AlBusaidi, A. S., Balakrishnan, J., Barlette, Y., Basu, S., Bose, I., Brooks, L., Buhalis, D., … Wright, R. (2023). "So what if ChatGPT wrote it?" Multidisciplinary perspectives on opportunities, challenges, and implications of generative conversational AI for research, practice, and policy. *International Journal of Information Management*, *71*, Article 102642. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2023.102642

Else, H. (2023). Abstracts written by ChatGPT fool scientists. *Nature, 613*(7944), 423. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-023-00056-7

European Research Council (2023). Foresight: Use and impact of artificial intelligence in the scientific process. Luxembourg: European Research Council. UNT Libraries Government Documents Department. Retrieved January 10, 2025, from https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc2289481/m1/4/

Ferraris, M. (2024). Intelligence as a human life form. *Journal of Responsible Technology, 18*, Article 100081. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrt.2024.100081

Floridi, L. (2014). *The fourth revolution: How the infosphere is reshaping human reality*. Oxford University Press.

Floridi, L., & Sanders, J. W. (2005). Internet ethics: The constructionist values of *homo poieticus*. In R. J. Cavalier (Ed.), *The impact of the internet on our moral lives* (pp. 195–214). State University of New York Press.

Fuchs, C. (2022). *Digital humanism: A philosophy for 21st century digital society*. Emerald Publishing.

Ganjavi, C., Eppler, M. B., Pekcan, A., Biedermann, B., Abreu, A., Collins, G. S., Gill, I. S., & Cacciamani, G. E. (2024). Publishers' and journals' instructions to authors on use of generative artificial intelligence in academic and scientific publishing: Bibliometric analysis. *BMJ*, *384*, Article e077192. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj-2023-077192

Gao, C. A., Howard, F. M., Markov, N. S., Dyer, E. C., Ramesh, S., Luo, Y., & Pearson, A. T. (2023). Comparing scientific abstracts generated by ChatGPT to real abstracts with detectors and blinded human reviewers. *NPJ Digital Medicine*, *6*, Article 75. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41746-023-00819-6

Giray, L., Sevnarayan, K., & Maphoto, K. B. (2026). GPTZero and the challenges of AI detection in assessing writing. *Assessing Writing*, *69*, Article 101078. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asw.2026.101078

Goyanes, M., Lopezosa, C., & Piñeiro-Naval, V. (2025). The use of artificial intelligence (AI) in research: A review of author guidelines in leading journals across eight social science disciplines. *Scientometrics*, *130*, 3725–3741. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-025-05377-0

Grieve, A., de Sales, A., Adarkwah, M. & Rumyantseva, N. (2026). Epistemic (in)justice in higher education publishing. *Journal of University Teaching and Learning Practice,*

23(2). https://doi.org/10.53761/eap

Grosswiler, P. (2012). Editorial. *Explorations in Media Ecology, 11*(2), 91–93.

Gulumbe, B. H. (2024). Obvious artificial intelligence-generated anomalies in published journal articles: A call for enhanced editorial diligence. *Learned Publishing*, *37*(4), 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1002/leap.1626

Gulumbe, B. H., Audu, S. M., & Hashim, A. M. (2024). Balancing AI and academic integrity: What are the positions of academic publishers and universities? *AI & Society, 40*, 1775–1784. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-024-01946-8

Hammad, M. (2023). The impact of artificial intelligence (AI) programs on writing scientific research. *Annals of Biomedical Engineering, 51*(3), 459–460.

Hanauer, D. I., & Englander, K. (2011). Quantifying the burden of writing research articles in a second language: Data from Mexican scientists. *Written Communication*, *28*(4), 403–416. https://doi.org/10.1177/0741088311420056

Harari, Y. N. (2017). *Homo Deus: A brief history of tomorrow.* Vintage.

Hassan, I. (1977). Prometheus as performer: Toward a posthumanist culture? *The Georgia Review, 31*(4), 830–850.

Hayles, N. K. (1999). *How we became posthuman: Virtual bodies in cybernetics, literature, and informatics*. University of Chicago Press.

Hicks, M. T., Humphries, J., & Slater, J. (2024). ChatGPT is bullshit. *Ethics and Information Technology, 26*(1), 38. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-024-09775-5

Hosseini, M., Rasmussen, L. M., & Resnik, D. B. (2024). Using AI to write scholarly publications. *Accountability in Research, 31*(7), 715–723. https://doi.org/10.1080/08989621.2023.2168535

Hutson, M. (2022). Could AI help you to write your next paper? *Nature*, *611*, 192–193. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-022-03479-w

Inam, M., Sheikh, S., Minhas, A. M. K., Vaughan, E. M., Krittanawong, C., Samad, Z., Lavie, C. J., Khoja, A., D'Cruze, M., Slipczuk, L., & Alarakhiya, F. (2024). A review of top cardiology and cardiovascular medicine journal guidelines regarding the use of generative artificial intelligence tools in scientific writing. *Current Problems in Cardiology*, *49*(3), Article 102387.

International Humanist and Ethical Union. (n.d.). *What is humanism?* Retrieved June 2025, from https://humanists.international/what-is-humanism/

Islam, G., & Greenwood, M. (2024). Generative artificial intelligence as hypercommons: Ethics of authorship and ownership. *Journal of Business Ethics, 192*(2), 659–663. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-024-05741-9

Ji, Z., Lee, N., Frieske, R., Yu, T., Su, D., Xu, Y., Ishii, E., Bang, Y. J., Madotto, A., & Fung, P. (2022). Survey of hallucination in natural language generation. *ACM Computing Surveys, 55*(12), 1–38. https://doi.org/10.1145/3571730

Kasneci, E., Sesler, K., Küchemann, S., Bannert, M., Dementieva, D., Fischer, F.,... & Weller, J. (2023). ChatGPT for good? On opportunities and challenges of large

language models for education. *Learning and Individual Differences, 103*, Article 102274. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lindif.2023.102274

Knees, P., Neidhardt, J., & Nalis, I. (2024). Recommender systems: Techniques, effects, and measures toward pluralism and fairness. In H. Werthner, C. Ghezzi, J. Kramer, J. Nida-Rümelin, B. Nuseibeh, E. Prem, & A. Stanger (Eds.), *Introduction to digital humanism: A textbook* (pp. 417–434). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45304-5_27

Knight, S., Dickson-Deane, C., Heggart, K., Kitto, K., Kozanoglu, D. C., Maher, D., Narayan, B., & Zarrabi, F. (2023). Generative AI in the Australian education system: An open data set of stakeholder recommendations and emerging analysis from a public inquiry. *Australasian Journal of Educational Technology*, 39(5), 101–124. https://doi.org/10.14742/ajet.8922

Koeszegi, S. T. (2024). AI @ work: Human empowerment or disempowerment? In H. Werthner, C. Ghezzi, J. Kramer, J. Nida-Rümelin, B. Nuseibeh, E. Prem, & A. Stanger (Eds.), *Introduction to digital humanism: A textbook* (pp. 175–196). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45304-5_12

Kohnke, L., Moorhouse, B. L., & Zou, D. (2023). ChatGPT for language teaching and learning. *RELC Journal, 54*(2), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1177/00336882231162868

Kotsis, K. T. (2025). Redefining Scientific Authorship in the Age of AI: Challenges for Editors and Institutions. *European Journal of Innovative Studies and Sustainability, 1*(5), 23-33. https://doi.org/10.59324/ejiss.2025.1(5).03

Kreuz, R. (2025). Too many em dashes? Weird words like "delves"? Spotting text written by ChatGPT is still more art than science. The Conversation. Retrieved February 9, 2025, from https://theconversation.com/too-many-em-dashes-weird-words-like-delves-spotting-text-written-by-chatgpt-is-still-more-art-than-science-259629

Kristeller, P. O. (1979). *Renaissance thought and its sources*. Columbia University Press.

Lanier, J. (2011). *You are not a gadget: A manifesto*. Vintage.

Lee, J. Y. (2023). Can an artificial intelligence chatbot be the author of a scholarly article? *Journal of Educational Evaluation for Health Professions, 20*, 6. https://doi.org/10.3352/jeehp.2023.20.6

Lendvai, G. F. (2025). ChatGPT in academic writing: A scientometric analysis of literature published between 2022 and 2023. *Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics*, *20*(3), 131–148. https://doi.org/10.1177/15562646251350203

Liang, W., Yuksekgonul, M., Mao, Y., Wu, E., & Zou, J. (2023). GPT detectors are biased against non-native English writers. *Patterns*, *4*(7), Article 100779. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2023.100779

Liebrenz, M., Schleifer, R., Buadze, A., Bhugra, D., & Smith, A. (2023). Generating scholarly content with ChatGPT: Ethical challenges for medical publishing. *The Lancet Digital Health*, *5*(3), e105–e106. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2589-7500(23)00019-5

Lin, J., Song, J., Zhou, Z., & Shi, X. (2021). Automated scholarly paper review: Possibility and challenges. *arXiv preprint*. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2111.07533

Lund, B. D., & Naheem, K. T. (2024). Can ChatGPT be an author? A study of artificial intelligence authorship policies in top academic journals. *Learned Publishing, 37*(1), 13–21. https://doi.org/10.1002/leap.1582

Masters, K. (2025). Artificial intelligence and the death of the academic author. *Medical Teacher, 47*(10), 1563–1565. https://doi.org/10.1080/0142159X.2025.2523463

Mazzi, F. (2024). Authorship in artificial intelligence-generated works: Exploring originality in text prompts and artificial intelligence outputs through philosophical foundations of copyright and collage protection. *Journal of World Intellectual Property*, *27*(3), 410–427. https://doi.org/10.1111/jwip.12310

Moorhouse, B. L., & Nejadghanbar, H. (2025). A response to Szudarski's (2025) book review of 'Vocabulary, corpus and language teaching. A machine-generated literature overview'. *ELT Journal*, *79*(3), 490–495. https://doi.org/10.1093/elt/ccaf018

Mazzoleni, S., & Ambrosino, N. (2024). How artificial intelligence is changing scientific publishing? Unrequested advices for young researchers II. *Pulmonology, 30*(5), 413–415. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pulmoe.2024.04.011

Morocco-Clarke, A., Sodangi, F. A., & Momodu, F. (2024). The implications and effects of ChatGPT on academic scholarship and authorship: A death knell for original academic publications? *Information and Communications Technology Law, 33*(1), 21–41. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600834.2023.2239623

Naddaf, M. (2025, February 4). How are researchers using AI? Survey reveals pros and cons for science. *Nature*. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-025-00343-5

Nature Human Behaviour. (2023). Scientific publishing has a language problem [Editorial]. *Nature Human Behaviour*, *7*, 1019–1020. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-023-01679-6

Nature Portfolio. (2023). Artificial intelligence (AI). Retrieved December 20, 2024, from https://www.nature.com/nature-portfolio/editorial-policies/ai

Nguyen-Trung, K., Saeri, A. K., & Kaufman, S. (2024). Applying ChatGPT and AI-powered tools to accelerate evidence reviews. *Human Behavior and Emerging Technologies, 2024*(1), Article 8815424. https://doi.org/10.1155/2024/8815424

Nida-Rümelin, J., & Staudacher, K. (2024). Philosophical foundations of digital humanism. In H. Werthner, C. Ghezzi, J. Kramer, J. Nida-Rümelin, B. Nuseibeh, E. Prem, & A. Stanger (Eds.), *Introduction to digital humanism: A textbook* (pp. 1–20). Springer.

Nida-Rümelin, J., & Winter, D. (2024). Humanism and enlightenment. In H. Werthner, C. Ghezzi, J. Kramer, J. Nida-Rümelin, B. Nuseibeh, E. Prem, & A. Stanger (Eds.), *Introduction to digital humanism: A textbook* (pp. 3–16). Springer.

Papagiannidis, E., Mikalef, P., & Conboy, K. (2025). Responsible artificial intelligence governance: A review and research framework. *Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 34*(2), Article 101885. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsis.2024.101885

Pavlik, J. V. (2023). Collaborating with Chatgpt: Considering the Implications of Generative Artificial Intelligence for Journalism and Media Education. *Journalism & Mass Communication Educator, 78,* 84-93. https://doi.org/10.1177/10776958221149577

Perkins, M., & Roe, J. (2024). Academic publisher guidelines on AI usage: A ChatGPT supported thematic analysis. *F1000Research, 12*, Article 1398. https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.142411.2

Perkins, M., Roe, J., Postma, D., McGaughran, J., & Hickerson, D. (2024). Detection of GPT-4 generated text in higher education: Combining academic judgement and software to identify generative AI tool misuse. *Journal of Academic Ethics*, *22* (1), 89–113. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10805-023-09492-6

Pezzano, G. (2024). Are we done with (Wordy) manifestos? Towards an introverted digital humanism. *Journal of Responsible Technology*, *17*, Article 100078. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrt.2024.100078

Pope Leo XIV. (2026). *Magnifica humanitas: On safeguarding the human person in the time of artificial intelligence* [Encyclical letter]. Vatican City.

Popenici, S. (2023). *Artificial intelligence and learning futures: Critical narratives of technology and imagination in higher education*. Routledge.

Prem, E. (2024). Principles of digital humanism: A critical post-humanist view. *Journal of Responsible Technology*, *17*, Article 100075. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrt.2024.100075

Price, S., & Flach, P. A. (2017). Computational support for academic peer review: A perspective from artificial intelligence. *Communications of the ACM*, *60*(3), 70–79. https://doi.org/10.1145/2979672

Prillaman, M. (2024, March 7). Is ChatGPT making scientists hyper-productive? The highs and lows of using AI. *Nature*, *627*(8002), 16–17. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-024-00592-w

Rana, N. K. (2024). Generative AI and academic research: A review of the policies from selected HEIs. *Higher Education for the Future, 12*(1), 97–113. https://doi.org/10.1177/23476311241303800

Ranisch, R., & Sorgner, S. L. (2014). Introducing post- and transhumanism. In R. Ranisch & S. L. Sorgner (Eds.), *Post- and transhumanism: An introduction* (pp. 7–28). Peter Lang Edition.

Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 July 2026 amending Regulations (EU) 2024/1689, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2023/1230 as regards the simplification of the implementation of harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Digital Omnibus on AI). (2026). *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 2026/1744. http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/1744/oj

Rezvani, R. (2024). A qualitative study of TEFL graduate students' source text use: Learning, problems, and strategies. *Teaching English Language, 18*(2), 93-126. https://doi.org/ 10.22132/tel.2024.452802.1592

Salvagno, M., Taccone, F. S., & Gerli, A. G. (2023). Can artificial intelligence help for scientific writing? *Critical Care, 27*(1), 75. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13054-023-04380-2

Schiaffonati, V. (2024). Promises and perils in moralizing technologies. In H. Werthner, C. Ghezzi, J. Kramer, J. Nida-Rümelin, B. Nuseibeh, E. Prem, & A. Stanger (Eds.),

Introduction to digital humanism: A textbook (pp. 255–265). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45304-5_17

Schmid, U. (2024). Trustworthy artificial intelligence: Comprehensible, transparent and correctable. In H. Werthner, C. Ghezzi, J. Kramer, J. Nida-Rümelin, B. Nuseibeh, E. Prem, & A. Stanger (Eds.), *Introduction to digital humanism: A textbook* (pp. 151–164). Springer.

Serrano, G., Striano, F., & Umbrello, S. (2024). Digital humanism as a bottom-up ethics. *Journal of Responsible Technology, 18*, Article 100082.

Shen, Y., Heacock, L., Elias, J., Hentel, K., Reig, B., Shih, G., & Moy, L. (2023). ChatGPT and other large language models are double-edged swords. *Radiology, 307*(2), Article e230163. https://doi.org/10.1148/radiol.230163

Soper, K. (2012). The humanism in posthumanism. *Comparative Critical Studies, 9*(3), 365–378. https://doi.org/10.3366/ccs.2012.0069

Stokel-Walker, C. (2023, January 18). ChatGPT listed as author on research papers: Many scientists disapprove. *Nature, 613(7945), 620–621.* https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-023-00107-z

Sueur, C., Lombard, J., Capra, O., Beltzung, B., & Pelé, M. (2024). Exploration of the creative processes in animals, robots, and AI: Who holds the authorship? *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 11,* Article 611. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03125-y

Tamburrini, G. (2024). Artificial intelligence and large-scale threats to humanity. In H. Werthner, C. Ghezzi, J. Kramer, J. Nida-Rümelin, B. Nuseibeh, E. Prem, & A. Stanger (Eds.), *Introduction to digital humanism: A textbook* (pp. 241–254). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45304-5_16

Tang, K. S., Cooper, G., & Nielsen, W. (2024). Philosophical, legal, ethical, and practical considerations in the emerging use of generative AI in academic journals: Guidelines for research in science education (RISE). *Research in Science Education, 54(*5), 797-807. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11165-024-10192-3

Tang, K.-S., & Cooper, G. (2024). The role of materiality in an era of generative artificial intelligence. *Science & Education, 34*, 731–746. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-024-00508-0

Tate, T., Doroudi, S., Ritchie, D., Xu, Y., & Warschauer, M. (2023). Educational research and AI-generated writing: Confronting the coming tsunami. *EdArXiv*. https://doi.org/10.35542/osf.io/4mec3

Thorp, H. H. (2023). ChatGPT is fun, but not an author. *Science, 379*(6630), 313. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adg7879

Tsigaris, P., & Teixeira da Silva, J. A. (2026). AI detecting AI in academic writing: Why most AI detector findings are false. *Research Ethics*, *7*, Article 101396. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nexres.2026.101396

Valera, L. (2014). Posthumanism: beyond humanism?. *Cuadernos de bioetica : revista oficial de la Asociacion Espanola de Bioetica y Etica Medica*, *25*(85), 481–491.

van Dis, E. A. M., Bollen, J., Zuidema, W., van Rooij, R., & Bockting, C. L. (2023). ChatGPT: Five priorities for research. Nature, 614, 224–226. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-023-00288-7.

Van Noorden, R., & Perkel, J. M. (2023). AI and science: what 1,600 researchers think. *Nature, 621*(7980), 672–675. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-023-02980-0

Weber-Wulff, D., Anohina-Naumeca, A., Bjelobaba, S., Foltýnek, T., & Wawer, A. (2023). Testing of detection tools for AI-generated text. *International Journal for Educational Integrity*, *19*, Article 26. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40979-023-00146-z

Weippl, E. R., & Schrittwieser, S. (2023). Introduction to security and privacy. In H. Werthner, C. Ghezzi, J. Kramer, J. Nida-Rümelin, B. Nuseibeh, E. Prem, & A. Stanger (Eds.), *Introduction to digital humanism: A textbook* (pp. 397–414). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45304-5_26

Werthner, H. (2024). Digital transformation, digital humanism: What needs to be done. In H. Werthner, C. Ghezzi, J. Kramer, J. Nida-Rümelin, B. Nuseibeh, E. Prem, & A. Stanger (Eds.), *Introduction to digital humanism: A textbook* (pp. 115-134). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45304-5_18

Werthner, H., Ghezzi, C., Kramer, J., Nida-Rümelin, J., Nuseibeh, B., Prem, E., & Stanger, A. (2024). Preface. In H. Werthner, C. Ghezzi, J. Kramer, J. Nida-Rümelin, B. Nuseibeh, E. Prem, & A. Stanger (Eds.), *Introduction to digital humanism: A textbook (pp. v–x). Springer.*

Werthner, H., Prem, E., Lee, E. A., Ghezzi, C., Kramer, J., Nida-Rümelin, J., Nuseibeh, B., & Stanger, A. (2019). *The Vienna manifesto on digital humanism*. https://dighum.org/dighummanifesto/

Winter, S. (2024). The road less taken: Pathways to ethical and responsible technologies. In H. Werthner, C. Ghezzi, J. Kramer, J. Nida-Rümelin, B. Nuseibeh, E. Prem, & A. Stanger (Eds.), *Introduction to digital humanism: A textbook* (pp. 267-282). Springer.

Yeo, M. A. (2025). Academic publishing in the age of GenAI: Expanding the concept of journal impact. *RELC Journal*, *56*(2), 221-226. https://doi.org/10.1177/00336882251361159