A Look at "From a Hypothesis" Syllogism from Aristotle to Farabi

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Abstract

Although Aristotle had promised a detailed explanation of "from a hypothesis" syllogisms in Prior Analytics, he did not deliver this promise in any of his surviving works. After Aristotle, his students and followers introduced various types of this argument with respect to his book, Dialectics. In Alexander's explanation of Aristotle's Priori Analytics, he purposefully tries to include stoic indemonstrability in Aristotle's "from a hypothesis" syllogism and thus provide a framework for Aristotelian propositional logic. Alexander's efforts were implicitly accepted by various Peripatetic philosophers in later periods. Although Farabi, who takes inspiration from the Peripatetic school, understood Aristotle's "from a hypothesis" syllogism in the Peripatetic outline, he stayed true to some of Aristotle's teachings regarding this syllogism, particularly the condition of agreement in arguments and applied the term "hypothetical syllogism" to three different meanings without any particular indication. However, Farabi's understanding of conditional syllogisms as being one of the types of "from a hypothesis" syllogisms seems to be more similar to Galen's view than to Alexander's.
 

Keywords


-  Alexander of Aphrodisias. (2013a). On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1. 23-31, Trans. Ian Mueller. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
-  Alexander of Aphrodisias. (2013b). On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1. 32-46, Trans. Ian Mueller. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
-  Aristotle. (1960). Topica, Trans. E. S. Forster. Loeb Classical Library.
-  Aristotle. (1989). Prior Analytics, Trans. Robin Smit. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
-  Aristotle. (2009). Prior Analytics book 1, Trans. Gisela Striker. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
-  Barnes, J. (1985). Theophrastus and Hypothetical Syllogistic, Wiesner Jürgen (ed. ), Aristoteles Und Seine Schule, De Gruyter.
-  Bobzien, S. (2014). “Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Theory of Stoic Indemonstrables”, M. Lee (ed.), Strategies of Argument: Essay in Ancient Ethics, Epistemology and Logic. New York: Oxford University Press.
-  Galen. (1964). Galen’s Institutio logica, Trans. J. S. Kieffer. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.
-  Kneale W. & Kneale, M. (1971). The Development of Logic. Oxford: Clarendonc Press.
-  Lameer, J. (1994). Al-Farabi and Aristotelian Syllogistics. Leiden: Brill.
-  Lear, J. (1980). Aristotle and Logical Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press.
-  Slomkowski, P. (1997). Aristotle’s Topics. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
-  Speca, A. (2001). Hypothetical Syllogistic. Leiden: Brill.
Resources written in Arabic / Persian
-  ‘Azīmī, Mahdī. (1394 SH). The Theory of Deduction in Avicenna's Logic: An Aristotelian-Stoic Combination with Ptolemaic Errors. The Biannual Journal of Avicennian Philosophy (MESHKAAT Al - Noor), no. 53, pp. 21-48.
-  Badwī, ‘Abdul Raḥmān. (1980). Mantiq-i Arasṭū, vol. 1. Beirut: Dār al-Qalam.
-  Fārābī, Muḥammad bin Muḥammad. (1408 AH).  Al-Manṭiqiyyāt li al-Fārābī, vol. 1. Qom: Ᾱyatullāh al-Uzmā al-Mar‘ashī al-Najafī Library.
CAPTCHA Image