The Coceivability of a Disembodied Personal Life Beyond Death Based on David Lund’s Views

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Ph.D. Student in Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

2 Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

3 Associate Professor, Department of philosophy of religion, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

As science focuses exclusively on the physical, it seems to assume that the brain has a key role in the origin if not also the constitution of our consciousness; and thus the destruction of the brain, the nervous system, and the body makes it pointless or even absurd to think of any personal consciousness after death. But one need not be convinced by this. However, any effort to investigate a possible post-mortem life depends on forming a coherent conception of what such a life could be. Can we speak, without incoherence or contradiction, of a person continuing to exist after death in a disembodied state? Our concern in this study lies here. Based on Lund's view, we will present and defend an argument that one can conceive of a self who is fully embedded in the natural world and deeply embodied in a physical organism, and yet could have a rich variety of experiences in an afterworld encountered after death. In this theory, the close association of the mental and the physical is due to a causal connection - a connection that fails to establish that the physical brings the mental into existence and is compatible with theories that the source of consciousness is not in the brain (e.g., the transceiver or filter theory).

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References

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
Volume 22, Issue 3 - Serial Number 85
September 2020
Pages 69-88

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