The Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Will

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Coe College, USA.

Abstract

This article articulates and defends an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will (LFW). It begins by defining the conception of free will at issue and then goes on to present versions of the luck objection which is often made against theories of LFW. It is argued that the sort of indeterministic weightings model of LFW which has been defended in the recent literature by Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe (2005, 2008) and John Lemos (2018, Ch.5) has the resources to answer such luck objections while possessing virtues which some other libertarian views lack. According to the indeterministic weightings model of LFW, in making undetermined free-willed choices between two courses of action, A or B, the reasons for choosing each option don’t come with pre-established evaluative weights. During the process of deliberation, the agent assigns weight in an undetermined way to the reasons for each option and this typically leads to the choice of the option that has been assigned a greater value. In the paper, it is not only argued that this theory can resolve worries about luck but also that the view has virtues which certain other libertarian views lack, as such the view is contrasted with the modest libertarian models of LFW from Daniel Dennett (1978) and Alfred Mele (1995) as well as Robert Kane’s view (1996, 2002, 2007, 2011, 2019).

Keywords

References

 
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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
Volume 23, Issue 3 - Serial Number 89
Special Issue on Free Will
September 2021
Pages 137-156

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