Moral Luck in Contemporary Twelver Shiite Principles of Jurisprudence

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Ph.D. Student, New Theology, Akhund Khorasani Specialized Center, Mashhad, Iran

2 Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy and Theology, Baqir al-Ulum (a.s.) University, Qom, Iran.

Abstract

The issue of moral luck is one of the interesting and influential issues in contemporary philosophy of ethics. The main question of this discussion can be expressed as follows: Do matters that are beyond the authority and control of the moral agent affect his moral standing or the extent of his worthiness for moral praise or blame? The “Principle of Control” replies negatively to this question while “Moral Luck” gives a positive one. In the first encounter with the jurisprudential tradition after Shaykh Ansari, it seems that there are two stances in this regard. Through the analytic study of this jurisprudential tradition, the authors have strived to identify, review, and explain the views presented in this intellectual tradition. The emphasis of the jurists that an involuntary act is outside the scope of duty, at least apparently, is an emphasis of the Principle of Control; however, we will see that this principle derived from the principles of jurisprudence is different from the Principle of Control raised in contemporary philosophy of ethics. On the other hand, the views of some jurists in the discussion of tajarrī, and their jurisprudence and interpretation regarding some narrations supports the acceptance of moral luck. A comparison of the collection of prevalent views in the principles of jurisprudence of contemporary Twelver Shiites leads us to the conclusion that the stance of most of them is to accept moral luck along with a particular reading that is compatible with the Principle of Control.
 
Introduction
The issue of moral luck that was raised at the end of the twentieth century by Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams can also be pursued in Twelver Shiite principles of jurisprudence. The aims of the authors of this paper are to identify, review, and analyze the prevalent view or views
among contemporary Twelver Shiite jurists in dealing with the issue of moral luck. In the jurisprudential tradition after Shaykh Ansari, there is a stance that approves the Principle of Control. However, a point to note is that the jurists have a particular reading of this principle which is different from the prevalent reading in contemporary philosophy of ethics. Some of the stances of contemporary Twelver Shiite jurists also support the acceptance of moral luck. As a result, moral luck is situational and dispositional. In this paper, we will show that many of the contemporary jurists accept moral luck and the Principle of Control that is compatible with it.
The principle of control in Twelver Shiite principles of jurisprudence
Based on the existing literature in contemporary philosophy of ethics, the Principle of Control can be explained as follows:
The Principle of Control 1: The moral agent can only be morally evaluated to the extent that moral evaluation is based on factors that are under his free will and control.
In contemporary Twelver Shiite principles of jurisprudence, free will is considered a necessary condition for duties or moral judgments. It seems that this view approves of the Principle of Control; however, not precisely the Principle of Control 1. The principle that can be attributed to the jurists is as follows:
The Principle of Control 2: The moral agent is only assessable for the performance of an action that is under his authority and control. Or if it is not under his authority and control, the agent himself has caused this lack of authority through a voluntary act.
Moral luck in Twelver Shiite principles of jusrisprudence
On the other hand, some jurists do not consider a person who is a mutajarrī (one who has performed an act that he thinks is a sin which is not actually a sin) to be deserving of punishment; in contrast to a sinner whereas the difference between the two is in something that is beyond their authority and control. Similarly, it is well-known among jurists that a marja[1] who has arrived at reality will receive twice the reward while one had not arrived would receive one, whereas reaching reality is not completely under his authority and control. Two marajiʿ may strive to the same extent; however, only one of them will arrive at the correct view. The third stance that some contemporary jurists have raised regarding the worthiness of reward or punishment due to an involuntary action is their interpretation of narrations that state: The reward of someone who establishes a good tradition increases to the extent of adherence to that tradition and the punishment of someone who establishes a bad tradition increases to the extent of adherence to that tradition. Obviously, the extent of adherence to a tradition is not completely under the control of the founder of that tradition and two founders may strive to exactly the same extent to promote their traditions; however, one tradition will have more followers.
Discussion
The view of this group of jurists in these discussions requires that something outside the control and authority of the agent influences his worthiness of reward or punishment and this is equivalent to the acceptance of moral luck.
Considering the differences between the Principle of Control 1 and 2, it seems that the Principle of Control 2 can be combined with moral luck and, as a result, with situational and dispositional moral luck. Based on the Principle of Control 2, for an agent to be properly evaluated, it is sufficient that his action is performed voluntarily, or if it is involuntary, the agent himself caused this involuntariness. However, based on the Principle of Control 1, the agent is only assessable to the extent that moral evaluation is based on factors that are under his authority and control. In reality, in the Principle of Control 2, only the voluntariness of an action is important and if the action itself is voluntary, the moral evaluation of the agent is not limited to the extent that the action is voluntary and under one’s control.
Conclusion
Some contemporary Twelver Shiite jurists believe that sometimes a matter beyond the authority and control of an agent is influential in the extent of the worthiness of praise and reward, or blame and punishment of an agent and, therefore, they accept moral luck; except causal luck. Similarly, the jurists also believe in a specific reading of the principle that is compatible with it.

Keywords

Main Subjects

References

Ansari, M. (2007). Faraʾd al-usul. Majma al-Fikr al-Islami. [In Arabic]
Araki, M. A. (1996). Usul al-fiqh. Moassasa-yi Dar Rah-i Haq. [In Arabic]
Araqi, Z. (1950). Badai al-afkar fi al usul. (M. H. Amoli, Ed.). Al-Matbaat al-Ilmiyyah.
[In Arabic]
Araqi, Z. (1990). Menhaj al-usul. (M. E. Karbasi, Ed.). Dar al-Balaghah. [In Arabic]
Athanassoulis, N. (2005). Morality, moral luck and responsibility. Palgrave Macmillan.
Bahaie, M. (2002). Zobdat al-usul. (F. H. Karim, Ed.). Mirsad. [In Arabic]
Bahrani, E. (1985). Qawaʿid al-maram fi ʿilm al-kalam. (S. A. Hoseini, Ed.). Grand Ayatollah Marashi Najafi Library. [In Arabic]
Barqi, A. (1951). Al-Mahasen. (J. Mohaddes, Ed.). Dar al- Kutub al-Islamiyyah. [In Arabic]
Borujerdi, H. (1996). Taqrirat fi usul al-fiqh. (A. P. Eshtehardi, Ed.). Moassasat al-Nashr
al-Islami. [In Arabic]
Coffman, E. J. (2015). Luck: its nature and significance for human knowledge and agency. Princeton University Press.
Divani, A. (2019). The equality of tajarri and ‘isyan in violating the law of will. The Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 79(21), 47-70.     
https://doi.org/10.22091/pfk.2017.1678.1530. [In Persian]
Duncan, P. (2005). Epistemic luck. Oxford University Press.
Fayyaz Lahiji, A. (2004). Gohar-i morad. Sayeh Publications. [In Persian]
Fazel Meqdad, J. (2001). Al-Lawamiʿ al-ilahiyyah fi mabahith al-kalamiyyah. (S. M. A. Qazi Tabatabaie, Ed.). Daftar-i Tablighat-i Islami. [In Arabic]
Haeri Isfahani, M.H. (1983). Al-Fusul al-gharawiyyah fi al-usul al-fiqhiyyah. Dar al-Ihya
al-Ulum al-Islamiyyah. [In Arabic]
Haeri Yazdi, A. (1997). Durar al-fawaʾid. Moassasat al-Nashr al-Islami. [In Arabic]
Hamidi, M.R. (2023). Comparison of the theory of ‘moral luck’ with ‘the Influence of involuntary factors on the deserve of punishment’ among Uṣūlīs. Justarha-ye Fiqhi va Usuli, 29(8), 7-42. https://doi.org/10.22034/jrj.2022.62729.2384. [In Persian]
Hartman, R. J. (2018). Moral luck and the unfairness of morality. Philosophical Studies, 176, 3179–3197. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1169-5.
Hashemi Shahrudi, M. (2009). Adwaʾ wa aaraʾ: taʿliqat ʿala kitabina buhuth fi ʿilm al-usul. Moassasat Dairat al-Maaref al-Fiqh al-Islami. [In Arabic]
Hilli, H. (1986). Kashf al-murad fi sharh tajrid al-iʿteqad. (H. Hasanzadeh Amoli, Ed.). Moassasat al-Nashr al-Islami. [In Arabic]
Hilli, H. (2004). Nihayat al-wusul ila ʿilm al-usul. (E. Bahadori, Ed.). Moassasat al-Imam
al-Sadeq. [In Arabic]
Isfahani, M. H. (2008). Nihayat al-derayah fi sharh al-kefayah. Moassasat Aal al-Bayt Li-Ihya al-Turath. [In Arabic]
Kashef al-Ghita, A. (1961). Al-Nur al-satiʿ fi al-fiqh al-nafiʿ. Matbaat al-Aadab. [In Arabic]
Khazaei, Z. & Tamaddonfard, F. (2018). The relationship between moral luck and responsibility in the view of Thomas Nagel. Journal of Religious Thought, 68(3), 61-84. 
https://doi.org/10.22099/JRT.2018.5044. [In Persian]
Khoei, A. Q. (1990). Al-Raʾiy al-sadid fi al-ijtehad wa al-taqlid wa al-ihtiyat wa al-qadaʾ.
(Q. R. Irfaniyan Yazdi, Ed.). Al-Matbaat al-Ilmiyyah. [In Arabic]
Khoei, A. Q. (1996). Mohaderat fi usul al-fiqh. (M. E. Fayyaz, Ed.). Dar al-Huda. [In Arabic].
Khoei, A. Q. (1998). Dirasat fi ʿilm al-usul. (A. Hashemi Shahrudi, Ed.). Moassasat Dairat
al-Maaref al-Fiqh al-Islami. [In Arabic]
Khoei, A. Q. (2001). Mesbah al-usul. (M. S. Behsudi, Ed.). Moassasat al-Ihya al-Aathar
al-Imam al-Khoei. [In Arabic]
Khorasani, M. K. (Akhund Khurasani). (1986). Fawaʾid al-usul. Ministry of Guidance. [In Arabic]
Khorasani, M. K. (Akhund Khurasani). (1988). Kifayat al-usul. Moassasat Aal al-Bayt. [In Arabic]
Khoury, A. (2018). The objects of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies, 175, 1357–1381. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0914-5
Kuleyni, M. (2008). Al-Kafi. Dar al-Hadith. [In Arabic].
Latus, A. )2001). Moral luck. In J. Feiser (Ed.), The internet encyclopedia of ehilosophy. Retrieved from: http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/m/moralluc.htm.
Madani Tabrizi, Y. (1982). Durar al-fawaʾid fi sharh al-faraʾid. Maktabat Basirati. [In Arabic]
Majlesi, M. B. (n.d.). Haq al-yaqin. Ketab Forushi-yi Islamiyyah. [In Arabic].
Meshkibaf, F., Khazaei, Z., & Legenhausen, M. (2023). Epistemic luck and anti-luck epistemology in the view of Duncan Pritchard. Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 25(2), 5-32. https://doi.org/10.22091/JPTR.2023.9322.2878. [In Persian]
Meshkini, A. (1992). Kifayat al-usul (maʿa hawashi al-Mishkini). Luqman. [In Arabic]
Mirza Shirazi, M. H. (1997). Taqrirat fi usul al-fiqh. (A. Lari Shirazi, Ed.). Al-Lujnat al-Ilmiyyah li-l Motamar. [In Arabic]
Mozaffar, M. R. (2008). Usul al-fiqh. Moassasat al-Nashr al-Islami. [In Arabic]
Musavi Qazvini, A. (2005). Taʿliqat ʿala maʿalim al-usul. Daftar-i Intesharat-i Islami. [In Arabic]
Naeini, M. H. (1973). Ajwad al-taqrirat. (A. Khoei, Ed.). Matbaat Irfan. [In Arabic]
Nagel, T. (1979). Mortal questions. Cambridge University Press; page reference is to the reprint of chapter 3 in Statman 1993b.
Nagel, T. (1993). Moral luck. In D. Statman (Ed.), Moral luck (pp. 57-73). State University of New York Press.
Nelkin, D. K. (2023) Moral luck. In Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (Eds.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition). Retrieved from:   
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/moral-luck/
Niyazi, M., & Ashnad, F. (2022) A comparative study of moral luck in moral philosophy and tajarri in Imami usul al-fiqh. Quarterly Journal of Moral Studies, 14(5), 57-76.        
https://doi.org/10.22034/ethics.2022.50216.1520. [In Persian]
Pritchard, D. (2006). Moral and epistemic luck. Metaphilosophy, 37,1–25.
Qazi Abd al- Jabbar, A. (n.d.). Al-Mughni fi abwab al-ʿadl wa al-towhid (revised and edited). (M. M. Qasem, Ed.). Al-Dar al-Misriyyah. [In Arabic]
Qazwini, M. (2008). Al-Shafi fi sharh al-kafi. (M. H. Derayati, Ed.). Dar al-Hadith. [In Arabic]
Ruhani, M. S. (2003). Zobdat al-usul. Hadith-i Dil. [In Arabic]
Sadr, M. B. (1996). Buhuth fi ʿilm al-usul. (M. Hashemi Shahrudi, Ed.). Moassasat Dairat
al-Maaref al-Fiqh al-Islami. [In Arabic]
Sadr, M. B. (1997). Durus fi ʿilm al-usul. Moassasat al-Nashr al-Islami. [In Arabic]
Saduq, A. (1985). Thawab al-aʿmaal wa ʿiqab al-aʿmaal. Manshurat al-Sharif al-Razi. [In Arabic]
Smith, A. (1976). The theory of moral sentiments. In D. D. Raphael & A. L. Macfie (Eds.). Clarendon Press.
Taleqani, A. (2022). An investigation into the argument of Shaykh Abd‘al- Karīm Ḥāʼirī- Yazdī on the lack of the legal prohibition of tajarrī. Justarha-ye Fiqhi va Usuli, 28(8), 7-36. https://doi.org/10.22034/JRJ.2022.64920.2545. [In Persian]
Taleqani, A. Rafiei, H. (2020). Assessment of Imamī and Mu'tazilī common views on nature of moral goodness and badness and Nasir al-Din al-Tusi's role. Revelatory Ethics, 18(1), 83-110. https://doi.org/20.1001.1.23833025.1399.10.1.4.0. [in Persian]
Tamaddonfard, F. (2022). Shans-i akhlaqi dar gozar-i tarikh. Mirath-i Sharq. [In Persian]
Tonkaboni, M. (1965). Iedah al-faraʾid. Matbaat al-Islamiyyah. [In Arabic]
Tusi, M. (1996). Al-ʿUddat fi usul al-fiqh. (M. R. Ansari Qommi, Ed.). Muhammad Taqi Alaqebandian. [In Arabic]
Williams, B. (1993). Moral luck. In D. Statman (Ed.), Moral luck (pp. 57-73). State University of New York Press.
Zagzebski, L. (1994). Religious luck. Faith and Philosophy, 11, 397–413.       
https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil199411349
 
 
Send comment about this article
CAPTCHA Image
Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
Volume 25, Issue 4
November 2023
Pages 55-78

Files

Share

How to cite

Statistics