Should Kane Abandon the Symmetry of Efforts of Will

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Professor, Department of Philosophy, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada.

Abstract

An agent’s efforts of will have long been at the centre of Robert Kane’s influential account of libertarian free will. For several decades it has been a crucial part of his theory that there is a symmetry to these efforts. That is, Kane has long maintained that an agent engaged in an undetermined choice makes a simultaneous and sustained effort to choose and to choose otherwise. In a recent paper Kane abandons this symmetry. I outline and evaluate this change in Kane’s theory. I begin by explaining how Kane’s theory has changed from a symmetric to an asymmetric account of undetermined free choices. I then explore the philosophical benefits of adopting an asymmetric account by considering its implications for the explanatory luck objection, the phenomenological objection, and the objection that engaging in dual efforts of will involves an unacceptable form of irrationality. Finally, I argue that despite these benefits, Kane’s asymmetric model opens the door to a more pervasive worry about luck and it gives up something most libertarians want: the unconditional ability to choose otherwise. Given these points, I conclude the cost of abandoning the symmetric account of efforts of will is excessively high.

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References

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
Volume 26, Issue 3
September 2024
Pages 5-24

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