What are the ethical implications of panpsychism?

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Associate professor,Department of Philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

People usually think that phenomenal consciousness is unique to humans and animals, but panpsychism extends it to other beings and considers consciousness to be fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world. This extension is the common claim of panpsychists and has ethical implications. Panpsychists differ from each other in the extent of extension of consciousness. Micropsychism extends consciousness to the fundamental particles at the micro-level, and macropsychism extends it to cosmos and all physical objects in the universe. According to micropsychism, fundamental particles have moral status and significant moral standing, but this truth has no practical moral consequences and does not require us to change our behavior towards them. According to macropsychism, the universe has moral status and significant moral standing, and we should act in a way that increases the pleasure and decreases the pain of all beings that we know the cause of their pleasure and pain. Also, macropsychism requires admitting the moral status and significant moral standing of all animate and inanimate beings, and we must behave in such a way that the pleasure of animals and plants increases and their pain decreases, but we do not have any moral obligation regarding inanimate beings.

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References

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
Volume 26, Issue 1
March 2024
Pages 85-106

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