The present article, which deals with Wittgenstein’s conception of truth, attempts to show that, contrary to the prevailing interpretation, the later and the former Wittgenstein’s view of truth was identical. Wittgenstein, as it will be mentioned, regarded truth as a redundant concept throughout his philosophical work, and as a result, he refused to provide a theory about truth. At the end, it is going to clarify that refusal to provide a theoretical formulation about truth does not mean logically being involved in anti-realism, but rather he continued to have a realistic approach.
Wittgenstein, L.(1976), Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, edited by C. Diamond, Harvester Press
Wittgenstein, L.(1978), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, edited by G. H. von Right, R. Rhees, G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe, Blackwell Publishers
Wittgenstein, L.(2005), The Big Typescript; TS 213, ed. And trans. by C. Grant Luckhardt, Maximilian A. E. Aue , Blackwell Publishing p.160
Dabbāgh, S., & Mosmer, R. (2006). Wittgenstein’s Conception of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 7(27), 25-60. doi: 10.22091/pfk.2006.294
MLA
Sorūsh Dabbāgh; Reza Mosmer. "Wittgenstein’s Conception of Truth". Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 7, 27, 2006, 25-60. doi: 10.22091/pfk.2006.294
HARVARD
Dabbāgh, S., Mosmer, R. (2006). 'Wittgenstein’s Conception of Truth', Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 7(27), pp. 25-60. doi: 10.22091/pfk.2006.294
VANCOUVER
Dabbāgh, S., Mosmer, R. Wittgenstein’s Conception of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 2006; 7(27): 25-60. doi: 10.22091/pfk.2006.294
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