Is Knowledge a Justified Belief?

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Allamah Tabatabai University, Tehran, Iran

10.22091/jptr.2024.10813.3070

Abstract

Epistemologists have widely accepted that truth, justification, and belief are necessary conditions for knowledge. This article challenges the necessity of the two components, "belief" and "justification," in the definition of knowledge. It argues that belief is distinct from knowledge; belief is an act of will, whereas knowledge is acquired automatically. One may possess knowledge without actively willing to believe it, and conversely, one may will to believe something without actually knowing it. Additionally, justification should be seen as a method of validating knowledge, not a fundamental part of its definition. Therefore, knowledge without justification remains knowledge, even though its truth cannot be proven. Building on this perspective, the proposed definition of knowledge shifts to "awareness or recognition of facts." According to this definition, the Gettier problem and the lottery paradox find alternative solutions. 

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References

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
Volume 26, Issue 3
September 2024
Pages 175-192

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