Wittgensteinian Reflections on Justice with an Emphasis on the Critique of Plato and the Aristotelian-Aquinian Theory of ‘Analogy’

Here, I will first mention the concept of justice as discussed in some of Plato’s works, and then I will try to present some reflections on this concept from the perspective of the philosophy of language. These reflections will be mainly from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language and especially his ideas of family resemblance and language games. In addition to the evaluation of the mentioned concept from the perspective of the idea of family resemblance, I will also evaluate this concept from the perspective of the Aristotelian-Aquinian theory of analogy – which according to some commentators is related to the idea of family resemblance of Wittgenstein – then I will provide a comparison between these two evaluations. I will argue that Wittgenstein’s evaluation of the mentioned concept, unlike the evaluation from the perspective of the Aristotelian-Aquinian theory of analogy, will not lead to the presentation of an alternative metaphysical theory for justice. Rather, the ideas of family resemblance and language games will lead us to a holistic approach to understanding justice.
Introduction
According to our ordinary conception, words serve as labels for meanings. Meanings are fixed, reside somewhere in the mind or a Platonic realm, and are designated by words. Regarding a concept like justice, it is assumed that justice is an identity, idea, or meaning in a Platonic realm or in the realm of human minds, which is labeled with the words “dike” (in Greek) and “justice” (in English).
This conception aligns with two views on the meaning of words: mentalism and Platonism. Wittgenstein disagrees with both. One of the important results of the idea of family resemblance and the identification of meaning and use, two Wittgensteinian ideas, is the rejection of the idea that meanings reside in a Platonic world. Wittgenstein’s argument against private language also critiques the mentalism that dominates the history of modern Western philosophy.
The Theory of Analogy and God’s Justice
Advocates of the theory of analogy in the Middle Ages (including Aquinas) presented this theory in response to issues in three areas: logic, theology, and metaphysics. Thomas Aquinas’s question is how we can apply properties that are used for humans or other creatures to God as well. According to Aquinas’s theory of analogy, we name what we do not have experience of through the words we use to name things we have experience of. This naming depends on some kind of similarity. For example, we do not have any sensory experience of God’s properties and actions, but by recognizing a similarity between them and what is called “just” in human actions, we call God’s action just.
The Idea of “Justice”: The Theory of Analogy Perspective vs. Wittgenstein’s Approach
In Wittgenstein’s thought, just like the Aristotelian-Aquinian theory of analogy, words do not necessarily have a common referent. As a result, one shouldn’t seek a shared referent among instances of the word “justice.” The similarity between Aquinas’s theory of analogy and Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblance also has a negative aspect; that is, a critical view of internalism and mentalism regarding meaning. Accordingly, it must be accepted that justice is not a concept or idea within the minds of humans.
However, the important difference between Wittgenstein’s theory of family resemblance and Aquinas’s theory of analogy is that Wittgenstein’s theory does not depend on the metaphysics that the theory of analogy relies on. The theory of analogy presupposes a metaphysical (or ontological) relationship between entities described by a particular property. In contrast, Wittgenstein’s theory is epistemological, focusing on the recognition of similarities by language users.
“Justice”: Subjective or Objective?
One of the issues regarding the term “justice” is whether our use of this term is objective and factual, like the use of the word “green,” or subjective and mental, like the use of the word “delicious.” Different societies and cultures consider different actions to be just. However, we cannot decisively say that “justice,” like “delicious,” is a subjective and arbitrary concept. This is because if someone claims that a certain situation is just, he/she must be prepared to justify his/her claim. Therefore, justice is neither completely subjective nor completely objective.
According to the Wittgensteinian perspective, the meaning of a term like “justice” depends on a network of relationships between that term and other related terms within the language game. For example, whether a player in a sports game considers the referee’s decision to be unjust depends on the use of the term “justice” in that game, as well as the relationships between this usage and the usage of terms such as “foul,” “penalty,” and so on.
Conclusion
From the perspective of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, especially the idea of family resemblance, justice is a family resemblance concept. Therefore, the Platonic view of concepts (which holds that instances of a concept share a common essence) is critiqued by Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. Aquinas’s theory of analogy regarding meanings relies on a metaphysics and thus does not go far beyond Plato. In contrast, Wittgenstein does not present a metaphysics and hence does not consider meanings to be dependent on any fixed essence or form, whether Platonic or Aristotelian.
Therefore, if we examine the concept of justice from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, there is no relationship between justice and a universal metaphysics (whether Platonic or otherwise) that is independent of cultural and social context. From this viewpoint, justice will be a dynamic and fluid concept, but this dynamism and fluidity does
not imply that the concept of justice is arbitrary, subjective, or individualistic. Based on Wittgenstein’s ideas of family resemblance and language games, the concept of justice depends on the context of social life. Any term that signifies something akin to the concept of justice in any language is tied to a network of terms within that language; therefore, any interpretation of justice must inevitably be holistic. The conclusion is that an essentialist view of the concept and meaning of justice (whether Platonic or alternative) cannot be defended.