Theism and Cumulative Argument

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Associate Professor of Philosophy and Islamic Theology, Faculty of Theology and Ahlulbayt's Studies, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

2 Ph.D. Candidate of Contemporary Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Imam Khomeini International University (IKIU), Qazvin, Iran.

10.22091/jptr.2024.10906.3080

Abstract

In recent scholarly discourse, natural theology’s forefront initiative has been the construction of theistic arguments grounded in empirical observations. A notable focus within this domain is the cumulative argument (CA) approach. The CA posits that individually modest arguments, when synergized, can forge a more compelling collective case. This approach bifurcates into deductive and non-deductive methodologies, both scrutinized through a descriptive-analytical lens across three evaluative tiers: 1. Merits: The CA challenges atheistic and agnostic skepticism, bolstering theistic convictions. 2. Solvable Critiques: The CA process is complex and challenging for the general public, it overlooks competing hypotheses, and a mere 50% likelihood assigned to premises fails to substantiate conclusive acceptance. 3. Critiques: The CA blurs distinctions between belief accuracy probability and rationality degree; it also grapples with assigning definitive values to probability multipliers. This paper culminates with an exploration of the CA’s implementation within Islamic intellectual traditions, illustrating its application in affirming divine existence and underpinning methodologies like suspicious density and prophetic veracity, ultimately aiming to convince counterparts through reasoned dialogue. Although it has some limitations, CA is both rational and defensible when it effectively reinforces core theoretical beliefs and religious practices, including worship and ethics.

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 10 November 2024

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