Incompatibility of Theories of Fiction in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy with Theories of Myth

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Logic, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Logic, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

A large literature on the ontology of fictional entities has developed in recent decades. These ontologies can be categorized into different groups, ranging from realist to anti-realist approaches. The philosophers of this literature, despite their fundamental differences, agree that whatever can be said about the metaphysics and ontology of fictional entities can also be extended to mythical entities. However, if we look at the characteristics of mythical entities based on the mythologies of the last century, we can conclude that these entities have a function in the real world, include some collective and unconscious dimensions, and can be realized in different realizers. These characteristics require implications for an appropriate ontology to extend to mythical entities. Applying these implications to the ontologies of fictional objects, it becomes clear that these ontologies cannot be extended to mythical entities. Accordingly, ontologists of mythical objects have to create their distinctive literature based on mythological research and analytical tools.
Introduction
The literature of fictional entities is one of the literatures in analytic philosophy. Despite great differences in the analysis of fictional objects, they all have in common that the extension of this analysis to mythical objects isn’t problematic. To assess this claim, we first introduce these approaches to fictional objects and then apply the implications of non-analytic mythological theories to these approaches to determine the legitimacy of these extensions.
Fictional Entities in Analytic Tradition
Some analytic theories of fictional objects emphasize that the fictional object exists as an abstract entity created by writers. These approaches may be creationist or abstractionist (Kroon, 2015), or conclude their existence based on easy arguments from common sense or ordinary language (for example, in (Thomasson, 2015) and (Schaffer, 2009)), and/or consider fictional objects as possible objects without any interaction with the real world (Hart, 2012). Antirealist approaches that deny the existence of fictional entities include viewing fictional works as props in a make-believe game (in the pretense account of Walton (Walton, 1990) or the syncretistic account of Voltolini, although he accepts creationism (Voltolini, 2006)), concluding the nonexistence of fictional entities due to the lack of explanatory value in adding them to the world (i.e., fictionalism) (Brock, 2015), considering fictional entities as mere grammatical objects created only from language (Crittenden, 1991), and appealing to speech-act theory to justify metaphysics for fictional statements (Pavel, 1986). Neo-Meinongian approaches, with their distinction between objectivity and existence, make room for nonexistent objects, such as fictional objects. They use the distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties (Parsons, 1980), or the ambiguity of predication in natural language (Zalta, 1988; 2023), or the possible and impossible worlds (Priest, 2005). In these views, fictional objects have only the nuclear properties that the author ascribes to them, or encodes these properties, and/or have them as real objects, only in the worlds of fictional works.
Myth’s Features in Mythological Research
On the other hand, in non-analytic mythologies, especially in the 20th century, various approaches to myths are presented. These approaches include Freudian and Jungian psychological approaches, sociological approaches based on Durkheim’s achievements, from Malinowski to the present day, combined approaches using both psychological and sociological approaches, structuralist approaches of Levi-Strauss and his followers, existentialist approaches of Junas, Bultman and Hatab, and finally postmodern and deconstructivist approaches to mythology.[1] Despite the diversity of their findings, they all agree that 1) myth has a function in culture, society, the mind or psyche of human beings; 2) this function has a collective aspect;
3) The individuation and identification of a mythical object does not depend on its temporary and usually accidental realizers from story and real or apocryphal history; 4) a myth is related to an unconscious or preconscious situation.
Analyzing the Competency of Ontological Theories of Fictional Entities for Mythical Entities
These results inevitably lead to some implications for the theory of mythical objects in analytic philosophy. A) The function of myths in the real world influences ontological decisions about myths. B) Regarding the collectivity of myths, merely individualistic accounts of the existence and persistence of mythical objects seem problematic. C) The unconsciousness of myths precludes any explanation of myths that appeals to merely conscious activities, such as everyday language and common sense. D) Any theory of the identity of mythical objects must explain how a mythical object can reproduce itself in different stories and histories.
Applying these implications to the extension of analytic theories of fiction to myths, it seems that these extensions are disappointing. The reasons are as follows:
1) The ontologies that try to prove the existence of fictional objects on the basis of natural language cannot prove mythical objects in the same way. These ontologies don’t care about the unconscious process of myth.
2) Questioning the process of conscious creation of mythical objects, characters, and entities, they exclude the extension of creationism and abstractionism of fictional entities to mythical ones. They consider the mythical object as the creation of a kind of individual creative process. In the same way, mythical objects aren’t just unreal grammatical objects created by writings.
3) From the function of myths in the real world, the extended version of the theory of pretense, which regards a myth as a mere make-believe game, should be rejected. In this way, a myth can’t also be a grammatical object. Moreover, a myth has an explanatory value in the world against the extension of fictionalism to mythical objects.
4) The functionality of the myth and its causal interaction with the entities of the real world argue against the extensions of fictional ontologies that regard the mythical entity as a non-existent object or merely an (im)possible object in (im)possible worlds.
5) The functionality of myths also implies that the mythical discourse, as discussed in mythologies, is fundamentally different from fictional discourse. Indeed, even if fictional discourse belongs to a different category of speech acts than ordinary assertoric sentences, this can’t be said for mythical ones.
6) The nature of the co-identity of mythical objects does not limit the co-identity of entities to a particular work, time, or place, and intention of the author or audience. Thus, the most realist and antirealist theories of fiction, which don’t satisfy this implication, cannot be extended to mythical entities.
Conclusion
Therefore, there is no theory in the analytic ontology of fictional objects that can be conservatively extended to mythical objects without disastrous deviations. Accordingly, analytic philosophy must develop separate theories of mythical entities, independent of theories of fictional objects.

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
Volume 27, Issue 2
August 2025
Pages 161-183

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