A Defense of the Realism of Time: Analysis and Critique of McTaggart’s Theory of Non-Realism in the Metaphysics of Time

McTaggart’s argument is the most famous argument in contemporary philosophy for the unreality of time. He proposes two models for explaining time: A-series and B-series. The A-series is a model that explains time based on the three concepts of past, present, and future. The B-Series is a model that explains time based on a dual model of the concepts of “earlier” and “later.” McTaggart contends that the B-series fails to explain change, which is a condition for the realization of time, and that the A-series possesses internal contradiction. Consequently, by rejecting the possibility of both models being real, he concludes that time is unreal. This article analyzes and critiques McTaggart’s view, and inspired by the linguistic analysis method of the late Wittgenstein, we show that, first of all, some things cannot be explained solely by a theoretical model. Therefore, time is a multi-level reality based on theoretical reflections and linguistic intuitions. Secondly, the B-series can indeed explain change. Also, the A-series is not contradictory; in this view, the objective aspect of time is explained by the B-series, and the subjective aspect of that is explained by the A-series. Therefore, time is a multi-level reality that cannot be explained by a single conceptual model.
Introduction
The aim of this article, aside from critical discussions, is to defend a specific approach to realism in the metaphysics of time that considers time as a multi-level reality necessitating a multi-level explanation. This approach is partly inspired by the philosophy of linguistic analysis, especially the philosophy of late Wittgenstein, which, instead of giving primacy to a single theory, considers attention to multiple meanings and applications as a way to solve philosophical problems. Unlike the late Wittgenstein, however, this article also focuses on theoretical models in the philosophy of time and does not limit itself to linguistic analysis and conceptual treatment. The innovation of this article lies in 1) presenting an innovative reading of the A-series;
2) offering a specific reading of the multi-level explanation regarding the reality of time; and
3) combining the method of linguistic analysis with the theory-based method.
Body
McTaggart proposes two conceptual models (A-series and B-series) to explain time. The
B-series is criticized for its inability to demonstrate change, while the realization of time without change is not meaningful. Although the A-series can demonstrate change, it suffers from a self-defeating contradiction. In the A-series, on the one hand, each of the past, present, and future states are non-summable determinations because each event must have one of those states (e.g., the future) to be attributed to that state (e.g., the future), but on the other hand, each of the points attributed to the past, present, or future can simultaneously be attributed to the other three temporal determinations. This contradiction becomes clearer when there is no end point to find the beginning of this chain and the stability of temporal determinations, and it will continue into infinite regression. In our view, McTaggart’s main claims, including the inability of the B-series to explain change, the dependence of the B-series on the A-series, and the self-defeating contradiction in the A-series, are based on a misunderstanding of the A-series and B-series. Attention to linguistic and conceptual analyses leads us to a new understanding of them, as well as the metaphysical gap between the concept of time in these two models and the difference in their characteristics.
Discussion
A careful analysis of the A-series and B-series reveals that, in addition to proving realism, they can be used as two independent and complementary explanatory models. The approach that makes it possible to use two independent models in explaining time is a multi-level explanation of the reality of time. Our first criticism of McTaggart is that both of his proposed models assume the quantitative nature of time, while denying that the two quantitative perceptions of time is not a valid reason to deny the qualitative perception of time (e.g., Heidegger’s view). Secondly, contrary to McTaggart’s claim, the B-series has explanatory power in explaining time independently of the A-series, because each of them belongs to different ontological realms. From this perspective, the B-series represents and explains an epiphenomenal reality. Thirdly, the realization of time in the A-series, which is equivalent to the realization of time in the human mental world, is not conditioned by change. Rather, for the realization of the A-series, merely the flow of mental awareness of the three states (future, present, and past) is sufficient.
Conclusion
In this article, we have gone beyond single-level approaches to the metaphysics of time and have explained the reality of time at two levels: objective and subjective (mental-linguistic). However, the qualitative/existential aspect of time has been omitted due to article limitations. In our opinion, both the A-series and B-series are successful options in explaining the reality of time, although in the B-series, change is a condition for the realization of time; in the A-series, such a condition is not necessary. The A-series explains the subjective aspect of time in the human mental world and their awareness of time, while the B-series elucidates its objective aspect in correspondence with the events of the external world, and hence time has an epiphenomenal reality in relation to objective events.