A Defense of the Realism of Time; Analysis and Critique of McTaggert's Theory of Non-Realism in the Metaphysics of Time

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD Candidate in Comparative Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Humanities, Shahid Motahari University, Tehran. Iran.

2 PhD in Religious Studies, Assistant Professor, Institute of Contemporary Religious. Department of Religious Studies. Qom. Iran

Abstract

McTaggert's argument is the most famous argument in contemporary philosophy for the unreality of time. He proposes two models for explaining time: A-Series and B-Series. A-Series is a model that explains time based on the three concepts of past, present, and future. B-Series is a model that explains time based on a dual model of the concepts of "earlier" and "later". McTaggert contends that the B-Series fails to explain change, which is a condition for the realization of time, and that the A-Series possesses internal contradiction; Consequently, by rejecting the possibility of both models being real, he concludes that time is unreal. This article analyzes and critiques McTaggart's view; and, inspired by the linguistic analysis method of the late Wittgenstein, we show that first of all, some things cannot be explained solely by a theoretical model. Therefore, time is a multi-level reality based on theoretical reflections and linguistic intuitions. Secondly, B-Series can indeed explain change. Also, A-Series is not contradictory; in this view, the objective aspect of time is explained by B-Series and the subjective aspect of that is explained by A-Series. Therefore, time is a multi-level reality that cannot be explained by a single conceptual model.

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 31 December 2024

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