A Critical Examination of Mullā Sadrā’s Theory of the Correspondence of Existential Realms within the Framework of the Epistemological Correspondence Theory of Truth

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Professor/ University of Tehran

2 University of Tehran

3 Professor of University of Tehran

Abstract

Mullā Sadrā interprets “correspondence” in the “correspondence theory of truth” as the quiddity identity (ʿayniyyat-e māhuwī) between mental existence (wujūd-e dhihnī) and the external existence (wujūd-e khārijī) of the known object. This view faces a challenge: according to Sadra’s principle of the primacy of existence, mental and external existences occupy two distinct existential ranks. Thus, these two existences cannot possess identical quiddities. Consequently, Sadra's theory of the quiddity identity between mental and external existence conflicts with his principle of the primacy of existence. Sadrā attempts to resolve this inconsistency through his theory of the correspondence of existential realms (tatābuq-e 'awālim-e wujūdī). This article demonstrates that while Sadrā provides a precise explanation of what correspondence (in quiddity identity) entails, his theory of existential correspondence falls short in resolving the aforementioned inconsistency, because according to the theory of existential correspondence, knowledge of an external object entails knowing it through knowledge of its qualities in an indeterminate (lā bishart) manner. Yet mere indeterminate knowledge of an object's qualities does not imply knowledge of the object itself. True knowledge of an external object requires distinguishing it from other objects, which necessitates knowing it in a determinate (bishart-e lā) rather than an indeterminate way.

Keywords

Main Subjects

Send comment about this article
CAPTCHA Image
Journal of Philosophical Theological Research

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 17 January 2025

Files

Share

How to cite

Statistics