Allameh Tabatabai's Eʿtebāriyāt Theory and Rejection of Value Neutrality Thesis

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Assistant Professor, Institute for Science and Technology Studies, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

Various theories about technical function can be classified as: 1) Theories that reduce the function to the structure of the artifact, or 2) Theories that consider the function to be intention-dependent. The structural interpretation of technical function is in favor of the Value Neutrality Thesis (VNT), while according to the intentional interpretation, the intentionality of the designer/user is necessary for technical function to be determined. The main issue of this article is assessing the approach of Neo-Sadrian philosophers (Allamah Tabatabai and Motahhari) to the function of artifacts. It is shown that the function of technical artifacts is a Constructional Perception (eʿtebār), although its realization depends on the structure and physical properties. Therefore, Allamah Tabatabai's “Eʿtebāriyāt” (constructional perception) Theory is among the intention-dependent interpretations and can be considered as an approach against the value-neutrality thesis.
 
Introduction
The Value Neutrality Thesis (VNT) is based on two assumptions: 1) the neutrality of “objects” and 2) the “reduction” of technical artifacts to objects. In this article, there is no dispute about the first assumption, but it is contended that the Neo-Sadrian approach to artifacts (especially through Allamah Tabatabai’s Eʿtebāriyāt Theory) is against the second assumption. For this purpose, it is vital to first examine the technical function theories and their relations to the VNT and then the Eʿtebāriyāt Theory and its relation to artifacts.
Technical Function and Constructional Perception
According to functional realism, every artifact has a specific function without which it would not be an artifact, and membership in an “artifact kind” is specified based on a shared function. There are various theories about technical function that can be classified as: 1) Theories that reduce the function to the structure of the artifact, or 2) theories that consider the function to be intention-dependent. Proponents of the “structural interpretation” of function consider the physical properties and structural capabilities of the artifact to be “necessary and sufficient” to define and determine the technical function. But in the “intentional interpretation” of function, intentional aspects are also “necessary” (even not “sufficient”) to attribute technical function. Therefore, the structural interpretation is compatible with the VNT because the function of artifacts is supposed to be separated from human goals and is reduced to the physical and structural properties of the artifacts. Thus, technical artifacts are considered “things” with certain structural-causal capabilities. But conversely, accepting the intentional interpretation of technical function, joined with the fact that human goals and actions are valuative and can be good/bad, will lead to the conclusion that function, and consequently the technical artifact, is value-laden.
According to the Eʿtebāriyāt Theory, one of the important characteristics of constructional perceptions (against real perceptions) is that they “have no instantiation outside the mind.” Therefore, to assign something as constructionally perceptive, it must be determined whether we “discover” that thing or it is our “invention.” Definitely, it is not possible to determine whether “something” is a technical artifact or a natural object, solely by referring to its physical and structural properties. Similarly, the “function” of the artifact cannot be discovered from its structure. Function means what a technical artifact is “supposed” to do or is “expected” to do (in a “use plan”) based on the user’s intention. This claim is endorsed when an artifact retains its structure but is not used by any user for centuries, so it is considered an ancient thing, not an artifact. As such, the function of some artifacts obtained from archaeological excavations “cannot be discovered” merely based on their structure without understanding the purposes of their users.
Accordingly, within the framework of the Eʿtebāriyāt Theory, the physical structure of artifacts is not sufficient for their function. In this context, the function of artifacts can be explained through the constructional perception (eʿtebār) of choosing the easiest and the simplest (entekhāb-e akhaff va as-hal). Allamah believes that in the evolution of artifacts, the attributes of “necessity” and “goodness” of an ex-artifact are given to the new one. By denoting the example of the “light” technology from an oil lamp to the electrical light, Allamah argues that the classification of artifacts under the same labels is based on their “utility” and “benefit,” and even if nothing of the original artifact’s structural or physical properties remains in the current sample, the function can preserve the artifact kind. So, the Neo-Sadrian approach by the Eʿtebāriyāt Theory is in favor of the intentional interpretation of function and therefore against the VNT.
It may be criticized that according to the Eʿtebāriyāt Theory, Allamah believes in what is called the “constructional perception of good and evil” (ḥosn va qobḥ), which means that good and evil depend on the humans/society values and this can lead to VNT! In reaction to this claim, it should be noticed that Allamah does not deny “inherent good and evil,” but he thinks that what is “subject to change” is the “specific perception” of good and evil by humans. Moreover, none of man’s actions are performed unless he considers that action to be "good" for himself. That is, we consider the action we perform as compatible with our “good”, and what we do not perform as “bad”.
Discussion
Through the Eʿtebāriyāt Theory, we interpreted the technical function to be intention-dependent. Thus, the Neo-Sadrian approach to the artifacts is against the VNT. Similarly, the “constructional perception of good and evil” (ḥosn va qobḥ) has nothing to do with the VNT. In the context of the Eʿtebāriyāt Theory, every user of a technical artifact uses it because he considers the use of that artifact to be “good” for his own purpose. That is, for example, both a surgeon and a murderer when using a knife would consider their intended use to be “good.” So, for both assumed users (the surgeon and the murderer), the use of the knife is considered “good” and here there is no distinction of the “good/bad user” kind. Thus, the “constructional perception of good and evil” is not in line with VTN, since the proponents of the VNT consider that there are “good users” and “bad users” instead of good technology and bad technology.
Conclusion
The Value Neutrality Thesis (VNT) involves a transition from the neutrality of inanimate objects to the neutrality of technologies. This is while technical artifacts can’t be reduced to their physical properties. Indeed, the intentional aspects of the designer/user of an artifact are “necessary” to determine its functional nature. Based on the Eʿtebāriyāt Theory in the
Neo-Sadrian context, the function of artifacts can be interpreted as constructionally perceptive/mentally posited, since the physical properties are not “sufficient” to determine a function. Also, reflection on the “mentally posited-ness of good and evil” shows that this principle can’t place the Eʿtebāriyāt Theory in line with the VNT. As a result, the Neo-Sadrian approach is against the VNT.
 
 
 

Keywords


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