The Philosopher Disagreeing with Oneself: On Feldman’s View about Reasonable Religious Disagreement

Document Type : Research Paper

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Professor Assistant in Institute for Science and Technology Studies in Shahid Beheshti Uninversity

10.22091/jptr.2025.12815.3288

Abstract

Richard Feldman, in his paper “Reasonable Religious Disagreements” appeals to the doctrines of social epistemology to suggest a precise argument for rejecting reasonable religious peer disagreement. In his argument, he enumerates all possible cases for a reasonable religious disagreement and dismisses every single one of them. Based on this eliminative argument, he finally defends a limited modest skepticism toward religious beliefs. In this paper, we concentrate on this argument and examine it. After articulating the argument, two of its problems are discussed. The first problem concerns the inconsistency between Feldman’s view in this argument and the implications of his later works for religious disagreement. The second problem concerns Feldman’s claim that his argument results in limited skepticism. We show that by applying his argument to disagreements about common knowledge, we obtain overarching skepticism. Also in this case, Feldman’s later views on peer disagreement avoid this result. Finally, we analyze the root of these inconsistencies in the works of Feldman and the different concepts of rationality he admits in his works.

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 17 August 2025

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