A Re-examination of the Views of the Two Zunūzī Theosophers on the Problem of Mental Existence

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Associate Professor at Iranian Institute of Philosophy

10.22091/jptr.2025.11636.3176

Abstract

 
The problem of mental existence (wujūd dhihnī) in the thought of the two Zunūzī theosophers, Mullā ‘Abdullāh and Āqā ‘Alī Mudarris, is of particular importance from two perspectives: first, it provides a precise account of the relationship between this theory and radical interpretations of the Primacy of Existence (aṣālat al-wujūd); second, it contains innovations such as the extension of mental existence to pure intelligibles and the Necessary Existent. Through an analytical-interpretive method, this article reconstructs the specific view of these two thinkers on mental existence and assesses its internal consistency with their ontological foundations, especially their interpretation of the Primacy of Existence. The main finding of this research is that the Zunūzī theosophers, fully aware of the conflict between the well-known account of mental existence and their own principle of the Primacy of Existence, endeavored to reconcile the theory with their foundations by redefining the two key components of “representation” (ḥikāyat) and “correspondence” (muṭābaqat). However, a detailed analysis reveals that some of the consequences and implications of their view, particularly regarding the application of mental existence to purely immaterial beings, are not fully compatible with their specific interpretation of the Primacy of Existence and reveal certain tensions within their philosophical system

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 18 August 2025

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