The position of «Trawwi» (deliberation) in Farabi's thought and its theoretical and practical functions.

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD student, Department of Moral Philosophy, University of Qom

2 Full Professor, Department of Moral Philosophy, Qom University, Qom, Iran

10.22091/jptr.2025.12868.3292

Abstract

This article examines the concept of »deliberation« in Farabi’s philosophy and its role in the process of moral action. Farabi considers practical reason a pivotal faculty for discerning and performing ethical actions, determining the best course of action in specific situations through deliberation. As a rational process and a capacity of practical reason, deliberation involves four stages: envisioning the end goal, evaluating possible options, assessing consequences, and selecting the optimal action. By harmonizing universal and particular knowledge, as well as cognition and desire, this process guides individuals toward goodness and happiness. Deliberation is not limited to generating particular knowledge; through the universal perception of practical reason, it resolves Hume’s “is-ought” problem. By cultivating deliberation and nurturing moral virtues, and achieving balance in the faculties of the soul within the framework of virtue ethics, a human attains happiness. Strengthened through experience, repetition, and habit, deliberation overcomes weakness of will, bridges the gap between theory and practice, and enhances ethical decision-making. Drawing on moral psychology, deliberation is presented as a strategy for ethical education.

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 17 September 2025

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