Plantinga and the Great Pumpkin Revisited from the Perspective of Epistemology of Disagreement

Document Type : Research Paper

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International University of Islamic Denominations, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

The epistemic legitimacy of religious belief, as defended within the framework of Reformed Epistemology (RE), has been the subject of sustained scrutiny since Alvin Plantinga introduced the notion of a sensus divinitatis as a properly basic source of theistic belief. While the model purports to secure warrant without evidential support, its normative adequacy becomes contentious when considered in light of recent developments in the epistemology of disagreement. Persistent epistemic parity between dissenting interlocutors, particularly among intellectually and morally serious peers, presents a form of higher-order evidence that cannot be easily deflected by appeals to internal proper function alone. Furthermore, RE’s structural exclusion of dissenting perspectives – by regarding them as the product of cognitive malfunction or noetic effects of sin – risks epistemic insularity and violates principles of epistemic humility and testimonial justice. The analysis draws on debates concerning epistemic responsibility, the asymmetry of religious deference, and the fragility of internalist warrant under conditions of deep disagreement. In pluralistic contexts where dialogical symmetry is morally and epistemically required, the RE model struggles to sustain its claim to epistemic privilege without collapsing into circularity or dogmatism.

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
Volume 27, Issue 3 - Serial Number 105
September 2025
Pages 69-90

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