Perfectionist Luck: Non-Volitional Factors and Obstacles in the Perfection of the Soul 

Abstract
Philosophical perfectionism grounds human flourishing in the development of essential human capacities, while the problem of moral luck highlights how factors beyond one’s control shape moral judgment. This paper introduces the concept of ‘perfectionist luck’ to bridge the theoretical gap between these two frameworks. Rather than treating non‑volitional factors as mere static preconditions, it reconceives them as dynamic, path‑shaping elements within the very process of the perfection of the soul. The central question is how these factors influence the process of moral “becoming,” beyond their role in external evaluation. Using conceptual analysis and a descriptive‑critical method, the study articulates three dimensions of perfectionist luck: ontological, moral‑normative, and deontic. The findings demonstrate that perfectionist lucks not only personalize moral duties but also shift the basis of moral judgment toward context‑sensitive fairness and enable a duty‑ethics rooted in the recognition of luck. The article then addresses potential objections, displaying the logical coherence of the concept. 
Keywords: Perfectionism; Moral Luck; Perfectionist Luck; Perfection of the Soul; Free will; Contextual Ethics; Moral Fairness.

Introduction
Philosophical ethics has long sought to explain the path to the good life and self‑perfection, yet human life abounds with factors such as innate talents, family circumstances, and unpredictable events that lie outside the agent’s direct control. Two distinct intellectual currents exist: ‘philosophical perfectionism,’ which sees human happiness in the flourishing of one’s essential nature, and ‘moral luck,’ which, by critiquing Kantian deontology, shows how non‑volitional factors shape our moral judgments. A fundamental question, however, remains unanswered: do these factors, before affecting our “judgment” of an agent, not influence the very “process” of internalizing virtues and realizing self‑perfection? The main theoretical gap is the absence of a concept that can explain how matters beyond the agent’s control—not as static preconditions but as dynamic, process‑shaping forces—facilitate or obstruct the path of perfection. This study introduces and analyzes “perfectionist luck” to fill that gap, and after explicating the concept’s dimensions, addresses the objections it faces. The necessity of the discussion stems from the fact that perfectionist philosophers, despite emphasizing the virtues needed for happiness, have paid scant attention to the fundamental disparities in the conditions for acquiring those virtues. The methodology is conceptual analysis with a descriptive‑critical approach and deductive reasoning.
Conceptual Foundations and Dimensions of Perfectionist Luck 
Philosophical perfectionism in its narrow sense defines human well‑being in terms of the flourishing of human nature, a tradition stretching from Aristotle to contemporary thinkers. The common core of these views is the development of intrinsic human capacities toward objective goods. Moral luck, brought to prominence by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, shows that our moral evaluations rely heavily on factors beyond the agent’s control. These two rich traditions have so far lacked a connecting link. Perfectionist luck is exactly that missing link: the systematic influence of non‑volitional factors on the process of realizing existential and moral perfections. Its key distinction from moral luck lies in the point of focus; moral luck concerns our external evaluation of an act or agent, whereas perfectionist luck concerns the effect of non‑volitional factors on the process of internalizing virtues and vices within the soul. The former deals with “evaluation,” the latter with “becoming.”
Based on the conceptual framework of the article, perfectionist luck can be identified in three dimensions. In the ontological dimension, non‑volitional factors such as temperament, congenital health, and genetic makeup provide the raw material and the ground for the existential intensification of the soul, determining the fundamental possibility and quality of the perfection path before any moral decision is made. The moral‑normative dimension has two intertwined aspects: first, the causal role of non‑volitional factors in forming character traits and moral personality; second, a basis for fairly evaluating perfection. If we accept that character is to some degree the product of luck, then our criterion for judging someone’s virtuousness or viciousness cannot merely look at their final state; it must consider the path they have traversed and the ratio of their achievements to their initial perfectionist circumstances. This outlook makes judgment context‑sensitive and fair. The deontic dimension shows that perfectionist lucks personalize moral duties. A person born into absolute poverty, for instance, has a different moral duty from one raised in affluence. Perfectionist luck determines the objective framework of moral action and, instead of imposing uniform duties, proposes a “context‑sensitive deontology.” Thus, luck no longer appears as a threat to the control principle but as the very arena in which the will emerges and each person’s unique path of flourishing takes shape.
Addressing Objections and Evaluation
Because perfectionist luck lies at the boundary of “is” and “ought,” it faces several objections, six of which are treated in the article. The first is the naturalistic fallacy: how can one move from descriptive “is” statements to normative “ought” statements? The response is that perfectionist luck does not claim a linear inference; rather, it offers a three‑layer analytical framework: the ontological layer merely describes the fact of non‑volitional factors’ influence; the moral‑normative layer, by adding the principle of fairness, yields the “ought” of moderated judgment; and the deontic layer, by adding the principle of responsibility, derives context‑sensitive duties. 
The second objection is “negative perfection:” if perfection is taken as the mere flourishing of capacities, then a skilled villain has also achieved perfection. The answer lies in distinguishing between generic flourishing and perfection in its philosophical sense, which is oriented toward the actualization of inherently valuable capacities such as rationality and justice. Thus, perfectionist luck can be positive (conducive to virtues) or negative (obstructive to virtues), but the latter never constitutes genuine perfection.
The third objection concerns the derivation of moral judgment: if each person has a unique background, how can a universal rule for judgment be obtained from such plurality? The answer is that the resulting rule is a negative meta‑ethical principle, namely “ethical humility.” Perfectionist luck demands that, given our ignorance of all the dimensions of another’s context, we refrain from absolute and simplistic judgments. 
The fourth objection is relativism about the end of perfection: does perfectionist luck imply the collapse of a single human end? In response, a distinction is drawn between “the end of the species” and “personal paths of flourishing.” The shared end remains rational‑moral flourishing based on the common human essence, while perfectionist luck diversifies the paths, priorities, and obstacles toward that single end. 
The fifth objection concerns moral fairness: can a theory that ties happiness to luck be fair? The answer is affirmative, because genuine fairness does not mean ignoring differences but incorporating them into the measure of judgment. The standard of fair judgment is the ratio of effort and will to the agent’s perfectionist context, not the final state. 
Finally, the sixth objection is divine justice: are non‑volitional disparities compatible with God’s justice? Within the framework of Islamic theology, the concept of perfectionist luck shows that divine justice is not an abstract, uniform reckoning but a measurement of “the ratio of actualized potential to endowed capacities” and the quality of the individual’s moral response to their circumstances, which accords with Qurʾānic principles of responsibility according to capacity.

Discussion
The concept of perfectionist luck reveals that the traditions of perfectionism and moral luck, despite their separate histories, overlap at a deeper level. The article’s assessment indicates that this concept, by providing a realistic account of the process of moral becoming, lends dynamism to perfectionism and an inward, anthropological dimension to moral luck. Moreover, a comparison with approaches such as care ethics and capability ethics shows certain affinities, yet none explicitly link non‑volitional factors to the teleological structure of the perfection of the soul. Perfectionist luck, particularly for the Islamic philosophical tradition—where temperament, upbringing, and divine justice hold a prominent place—opens a fertile ground for historical inquiries.
Conclusion
This research demonstrates that ‘perfectionist luck’ is an independent and necessary theoretical concept that fills the gap between perfectionism and moral luck. Non‑volitional factors are not peripheral but central to the process of self‑perfection, playing a decisive role at the ontological, moral‑normative, and deontic levels. The core conclusion is that fair moral evaluation becomes possible only when grounded in the path of perfection rather than merely in its final outcome. The responses provided to potential objections show that this framework possesses logical coherence and can serve as a more explanatory alternative to competing theories. Furthermore, the article opens new avenues for future research, including the identification of instances of perfectionist luck in the works of Muslim philosophers and the exploration of the theological implications of the concept.

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