Culpable Ignorance and Moral Responsibility in the Thought of Ghazālī and Zimmerman

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD Student in Moral Philosophy, Department of Ethics, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.

2 Associate Professor, Department of Ethics, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Qom, Qom, Iran

10.22091/jptr.2026.14548.3434

Abstract

This paper addresses a key problem in moral philosophy: Can ignorance be morally attributable when it is not directly voluntary but results from prior omissions within the agent’s control? To answer this question, the study adopts a comparative and interpretive reading of al-Ghazālī’s moral psychology and Michael Zimmerman’s analytic account of responsibility. It specifically examines al-Ghazālī’s analysis of khawāṭir (involuntary suggestions) and the ethical necessity of murāqaba (vigilance), his account of heedlessness as a failure of moral self-governance, and Zimmerman’s tracing strategy, which attributes responsibility for ignorant wrongdoing to earlier failures of epistemic duty. The paper first clarifies the conceptual problem of ignorant wrongdoing, then compares key elements drawn from al-Ghazālī’s moral psychology of vigilance with corresponding elements in Zimmerman’s framework of responsibility, and finally analyzes tracing as a model of indirect responsibility. It argues that although ignorance as an occurrent mental state is not directly imputable, it becomes culpable when traceable to prior controllable omissions. By demonstrating a structural convergence between al-Ghazālī’s account of vigilance and Zimmerman’s tracing condition, the paper concludes that ignorance is indirectly voluntary in a morally significant sense and is thus central to understanding moral agency and responsibility.

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 27 June 2026

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