Epistemological Dualism in Functionalism and the Explanation of Causal Roles

Document Type : Research Paper

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Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Human Sciences, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

10.22091/jptr.2026.13435.3335

Abstract

Functionalism is one of the most widely accepted contemporary theories in the philosophy of mind for explaining consciousness. It is based on the principle of multiple realizability. According to this principle, the function of a system does not have an intrinsic correlation with its physical substrate. Therefore, systems with different physical properties can perform similar functions. This principle rests on the assumption that a system's function depends solely on its causal roles within a causal network. In contemporary philosophy of mind, the nature of causal roles has been a topic of intense debate. This debate has not only arisen between proponents and opponents of functionalism, but also among different branches within the functionalist school itself. One of the most heated discussions in this area has been between reductionists, who argue that causal roles can be reduced to physicalist functions, and non-reductionists, who believe in the metaphysical independence of causal roles.
This paper, after outlining the foundations of functionalism and the areas of disagreement, aims to offer an epistemological approach to address the existing challenges in explaining causal roles.

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 28 June 2026

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