Critical Reassessment of Orientalist Readings of Infallibility ('Iṣmah) in Imāmī Theology with Emphasis on the Problem of Free Will and Determinism 

Abstract
This article critically examines Western Orientalist scholarship on the doctrine of infallibility ('iṣmah) in Imāmī Shīʿa theology, focusing specifically on how these scholars have addressed the relationship between infallibility and free will/determinism. Employing an analytical-critical and comparative methodology, the study systematically distinguishes between (a) free will and determinism in "infallibility from sin" versus "infallibility from error, forgetfulness, and oversight," and (b) free will and determinism in "attaining the station of infallibility" versus "the infallible's actions under infallibility." The findings reveal that while scholars such as Donaldson, McDermott, Schmidtke, and Madelung have presented relatively accurate depictions of the mainstream Imāmī position, others including Hollister, Momen, and Pinault have offered incomplete explanations that implicitly suggest a deterministic understanding. Paul Walker's analysis contains a fundamental confusion regarding the nature of divine grace (lutf) and its relationship to the perpetuation of infallibility. The study also identifies that Donaldson, despite accurately reporting al-ʿAllāma al-Majlisī's views, failed to present his definitive position on relevant traditions. The article demonstrates that Imāmī theologians consistently affirm the preservation of free will in both the attainment and exercise of infallibility, utilizing arguments based on desert of reward, obligation (taklīf), and divine commendation.
Keywords: Free Will and Determinism, Orientalists, Infallibility ('Iṣmah), Shīʿa Studies, Shīʿa Doctrines, Imāmīyya.
 

Introduction
The doctrine of infallibility ('iṣmah) constitutes one of the most fundamental theological principles in Shīʿa Islam, particularly within the Imāmī tradition, signifying protection from sin and error. Its relationship with free will and determinism represents a critical analytical dimension that has occupied both classical Islamic sources and modern Western scholarship. The central question this article addresses is: How have Orientalist scholars approached this relationship, and have they succeeded in providing an accurate understanding of the Imāmī position? This investigation is not merely theoretical, as the resolution of this issue bears directly upon questions of obligation (taklīf), desert of reward, the possibility of praising the infallibles, and their status as moral exemplars.
Unlike Wahhābī polemicists, Orientalist scholars present their analyses within academic frameworks that systematically transmit ideas to subsequent generations, making it incumbent upon Shīʿa academic institutions to engage critically with their representations of Shīʿa theology. This study examines the works of prominent Shīʿa-oriented Orientalists including Wilferd Madelung, Dwight Donaldson, John Norman Hollister, Sabine Schmidtke, Moojan Momen, David Pinault, Paul Walker, and Martin McDermott, comparing their accounts with the positions of classical and modern Imāmī theologians such as Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, and contemporary figures like ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Shahīd Muṭahharī. Previous studies, including those by Raḍī Bihābādī and Javāndil (2014) and Sāzandagī (2017), have critically examined Paul Walker's entry on infallibility in the Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, identifying his confusion between power to commit sin and actual commission. However, these works have not systematically addressed the broader spectrum of Orientalist scholarship on the free will-determinism question. The present study fills this gap by providing a comprehensive critical assessment of Orientalist readings of infallibility in Imāmī thought.
The Two Dimensions of Infallibility: Sin versus Error
Deterministic Readings of Infallibility from Sin
Several Orientalist scholars have interpreted practical infallibility in terms that entail, either explicitly or implicitly, a deterministic conception. Donaldson (1933, p. 324) reports that al-ʿAllāma al-Majlisī, citing some Islamic scholars, speaks of a special state in the body or soul of the infallible that compels abstention from sin. David Pinault (1992, p. 179) defines infallibility as an innate and intrinsic characteristic, logically entailing a coercive and deterministic reading. Similarly, Paul Walker (2002, pp. 505-506) interprets the intrinsic nature of infallibility as meaning the removal of the power to sin, attributing this view, without citation, to an early Imāmī theologian. Walker further argues that if prophets deserve reward, they must have the capacity to commit sin, concluding that infallibility is not intrinsic but rather a divine grace.
The critical analysis reveals that Walker's argument, while correctly affirming the power to commit sin, fails to adequately analyze the concept of the perpetuation of infallibility. Perpetuation of a quality does not necessarily require its intrinsic nature; it may result from external causes that persist over time. Therefore, infallibility as a divine gift, though caused by external factors, does not conflict with the voluntary action of the infallible. Imāmī theologians consistently maintain that while infallibility is a divine grace (lutf), it does not negate free will. Shaykh al-Mufīd (1413c, p. 128), al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (1405, vol. 3, p. 325), and others explicitly affirm the preservation of power and choice in the infallibles' actions. Hollister (1953, p. 36) and Momen (1985, p. 177) exclusively emphasize divine agency in infallibility without mentioning the infallibles' voluntary role. While their accounts are textually accurate in reproducing the language of early theologians like Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, they fail to present the later development of Imāmī theology, where subsequent scholars consistently added qualifications to prevent deterministic misunderstandings. This selective reporting creates the impression that infallibility entails compulsion.

Free Will Readings of Infallibility from Sin
Some Orientalists have more accurately represented the Imāmī emphasis on free will in infallibility. McDermott (1978, pp. 81, 118) correctly reports Shaykh al-Mufīd's view that divine grace applies only to those who, according to divine knowledge, are capable of accepting it. Schmidtke (1991, pp. 144-145) accurately translates al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī's definition of infallibility as a psychic quality (malaka nafsāniyya) that motivates the infallible toward obedience while preserving the power to act otherwise.
Donaldson (1933, pp. 323-324) cites a tradition from Imām al-Sajjād (as) defining the infallible as one who clings to God's rope, yet his translation inaccurately makes infallibility the cause rather than the result of clinging to the Qurʾān. The original tradition clearly indicates that the Imām actively clings to the Qurʾān, thereby attaining the station of infallibility. The analysis further shows that al-ʿAllāma al-Majlisī, contrary to Donaldson's report, explicitly interprets a related tradition to mean that the Imāms are protected from sin because of their own actions—since they cling to God's religion, they receive divine guidance.

Arguments for the Infallible's Free Will
Imāmī theologians have consistently advanced arguments demonstrating that infallibility cannot be deterministic. Both Donaldson (1933, p. 325) and Schmidtke (1991, pp. 144-145) correctly report the argument based on desert of reward. As al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī argues, if the infallible were compelled to obey, desert of reward would be negated, implying that ordinary individuals would deserve more reward than prophets, which is unanimously rejected. Additional arguments based on obligation (taklīf), commendation, and divine warning all demonstrate that Imāmī theologians consistently affirm free will.
Madelung (1997, vol. 4, p. 183), however, presents an incomplete reconstruction of this argument. While he correctly affirms that divine grace does not negate free will, he presupposes free will to establish desert of reward, whereas Imāmī theologians presuppose desert of reward as a premise to establish free will. This methodological inversion represents a significant analytical deficiency in Madelung's account.

Conclusion
This critical examination demonstrates that Orientalist scholarship on infallibility in Imāmī theology exhibits significant methodological and interpretive variations. While scholars such as Donaldson, McDermott, Schmidtke, and Madelung have largely succeeded in presenting an accurate picture of the mainstream Imāmī position affirming free will, others have provided incomplete or misleading accounts. Hollister, Momen, and Pinault, through their exclusive emphasis on divine agency without mention of voluntary action, create a deterministic impression not found in more developed Imāmī theological formulations. Paul Walker represents a particularly problematic case, confusing the concepts of intrinsic nature, giftedness, and perpetuation, and incorrectly attributing deterministic views to early Imāmī theologians based on misinterpretation of heresiographical sources. Donaldson, despite providing accurate reports of al-ʿAllāma al-Majlisī's views on free will, failed to present his definitive interpretive position on the relevant traditions. Madelung's reconstruction of the Imāmī argument for free will through desert of reward fails to represent the logical structure employed by Imāmī theologians, who treat desert of reward as a premise rather than a conclusion.

The article concludes that the Imāmī theological tradition consistently maintains the compatibility of infallibility with free will across all dimensions, employing sophisticated arguments based on desert of reward, obligation, commendation, and divine warning. Future research should address how non-evidential epistemic values interact with traditional theological proofs in defending religious rationality, and should further investigate the relationship between infallibility from error and voluntary action, a dimension largely neglected in Orientalist scholarship.
 

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