A Comparative Analysis of “The Rule of Assisting in Sin” and the “Component of Inclusiveness” in “The Demandingness  of Morality” 

Abstract
The problem of "Demandingness of Morality" delineates the boundary between personal interests and moral obligations. It is structured around three key components: inclusiveness, intensity, and priority, giving rise to maximalist, minimalist, and moderate approaches. This paper focuses on inclusiveness, within which two crucial distinctions are made: doing versus allowing harm, and intentional versus unintentional acts. The jurisprudential-ethical rule of "assisting in sin" (iʿāna ʿalā al-ithm) offers a powerful framework for analyzing these distinctions and clarifying the scope of inclusiveness. This rule addresses an individual's participation in and responsibility for the wrongful acts of others, asserting that moral responsibility is not limited to one's own direct actions but extends to the actions of others. Applying this rule to the component of inclusiveness shows that it supports a moderate approach: it accepts social responsibility while avoiding the trap of excessive moral demands. Thus, the rule of assisting in sin reinforces the moderate stance in determining the Demandingness of Morality.

Keywords: rule of assisting in sin, component of inclusiveness, demandingness of morality, maximalist ethics, moderate ethics, minimalist ethics

Introduction
The issue of "Demandingness of Morality," introduced with Shelly Kagan's "The Limits of Morality" (1989), deals with the boundary between personal interests and moral obligations. It has three components—inclusiveness, priority, and intensity—and three approaches: maximalist, minimalist, and moderate. The article explains the role of the rule of "assisting in sin" (iʿāna ʿalā al-ithm) in determining inclusiveness; a rule that extends responsibility beyond direct acts to participation in others' wrongful acts, supporting the moderate approach. "Inclusiveness" asks whether there is a domain outside moral evaluation. Key distinctions exist: "doing harm" versus "allowing harm" (refraining despite ability), and "intentional" versus "unintentional" harm. "Priority" concerns impartial obligations versus agent-relative commitments, and "intensity" concerns the cost ceiling and duty versus supererogatory acts. Maximalism denies any moral free zone. Minimalism restricts obligation to refraining from intentional direct harm. Moderatism accepts a free zone but recognizes conditional positive duties: if one can prevent serious harm at reasonable cost, they are obligated. The focus is whether indirect participation or allowing harm falls within responsibility.

The Rule of Assisting in Sin
"Assisting in sin" means aiding in sin and wrongful acts; the aider is called "muʿīn" and the direct perpetrator "muʿān." Assistance can be material (providing tools) or moral (encouragement, silence). The realization of the rule has two essential pillars: "the occurrence of the wrongful act in the external world" (conceptual condition) and "the knowledge of the aider of its occurrence" (condition of accountability). Wrongful acts have a broad scope, including religious sin and legal crime. From the combination of these two conditions, four scenarios arise: (1) Knowledge and occurrence: full realization of assistance and responsibility. (2) Absence of knowledge and non-occurrence: negation of responsibility. (3) Knowledge without occurrence (tajarrī): although the title of assistance does not apply, the person is deserving of blame due to evil intent. (4) Occurrence without knowledge: based on the principle of "the ugliness of punishment without statement," no responsibility falls on the aider, except in cases of conclusive summary knowledge within a limited sphere (shubha maḥṣūra).
The foundations of the rule are: the Quranic verse "And do not cooperate in sin and aggression" (al-Māʾidah: 2) with a prohibitive command; narrations such as the saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him) that even one who sharpens a pen for an oppressor deserves punishment, and the prohibition of Imam al-Sajjād (peace be upon him) from "assisting oppressors"; and rational reasoning that considers providing the means for a reprehensible act to be itself reprehensible.
Explaining the Role of the Rule in the Issue of the Extent of Moral Demand
The rule of assisting in sin serves as a criterion for distinguishing the boundaries of the approaches. Minimalism does not accept the binding nature of this rule, because it considers responsibility indivisible and confined to direct action: the seller of a weapon later used in murder merely engaged in a free transaction and has no role in the crime. The obligation to refrain from cooperating in the sins of others severely restricts the moral free zone and imposes an extra burden on the individual. For instance, from a minimalist perspective, a web hosting company is not obliged to cut off service to a gambling site, because the company's act is neutral and responsibility rests solely with the customer.
Moderatism goes beyond minimalism precisely by accepting the binding nature of the rule. This acceptance signifies the acknowledgment of causal responsibility and the interconnectedness of human beings. The rule forms the core of negative duties beyond the prohibition of direct harm: "You are not obligated to fix the world, but you must not be an instrument of others' evil." In the web hosting example, as soon as one becomes aware of the wrongful use, continuing the service constitutes assisting in sin and is forbidden. This view also paves the way for conditional positive duties (such as rescuing a drowning person). In contrast, maximalism sees this rule as trivial, because the obligation to maximize the good renders refraining from assistance obvious and even insufficient, and asks what the best use of resources for the common good is. Thus, the rule is dissolved within maximalism's greater obligation.

Conclusion
The rule of assisting in sin plays a key role in explaining the component of inclusiveness. By extending responsibility to indirect participation and conditioning it on knowledge and the occurrence of the wrongful act, this rule produces four logical scenarios, with full responsibility realized only when knowledge and occurrence converge; in other cases, responsibility is either negated or falls under the category of tajarrī (bare intent). These criteria keep the moral theory away from the laxity of minimalism and the rigor of maximalism, and confirm moderatism. Thus, in the Islamic moral system, the individual is responsible not only for their own direct acts but also for the role they play in the actions of others.

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