An Evaluation of William Hasker's Argument for the Unity of the Subject of Consciousness in Light of Mullā Ṣadrā's Philosophy

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 PhD student in Islamic theology, ,department of Islamic philosophy and theology, university of Qom,Qom, Iran,

2 Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.

Abstract

The problem of the unity of the subject of consciousness is a central issue in contemporary philosophy of mind. It concerns the relationship between the unity of conscious experience and the existence of a single conscious subject, as well as whether this unity can be reduced to the material processes of the brain. Drawing on the phenomenal unity of consciousness, the principle of logical reducibility, and the principle of subjecthood, William Hasker argues that reductionist theories, nonreductive physicalism and panpsychism fail to explain the unity of the conscious subject. He therefore defends emergent dualism. Using a descriptive-analytical method, this study evaluates Hasker's argument in light of the metaphysical principles of Mulla Ṣadrā's Transcendent Philosophy (al-Ḥikmah al-Mutaʿāliyah). It examines whether his account can be more coherently reconstructed within Ṣadrian metaphysics. The findings show that, although Hasker successfully exposes the explanatory limitations of materialist theories, his account leaves unresolved questions concerning the ontological origin of the soul, the soul-body relation, and the unity of diverse mental states within a single enduring subject. By contrast, Mulla Ṣadrā's conception of the soul as a single, dynamic, graded reality provides a coherent ontological framework that strengthens Hasker's account of the unity of the conscious subject.

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 05 August 2026

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