McCabe Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Coe College, USA
10.22091/jptr.2026.17031.3639
Abstract
In this essay I consider the prospects for AI becoming persons deserving of all the same rights and responsibilities as human persons. In doing so, I consider two classic essays by William Lycan and John Searle. I agree with Lycan that a properly programmed AI could have free will, but I argue for a different account of this possibility. I also argue that Searle gives good reason to harbor doubts about the personhood of any future AI. Because of these doubts and the implications of AI personhood, I argue that we should not build AI that for all we know may or may not be persons.
Lemos, J. (2026). AI, Persons, Free Will, and A Policy Recommendation. Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, (), -. doi: 10.22091/jptr.2026.17031.3639
MLA
John Lemos. "AI, Persons, Free Will, and A Policy Recommendation". Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, , , 2026, -. doi: 10.22091/jptr.2026.17031.3639
HARVARD
Lemos, J. (2026). 'AI, Persons, Free Will, and A Policy Recommendation', Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, (), pp. -. doi: 10.22091/jptr.2026.17031.3639
VANCOUVER
Lemos, J. AI, Persons, Free Will, and A Policy Recommendation. Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 2026; (): -. doi: 10.22091/jptr.2026.17031.3639
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